Chapter 5: Transforming Global Governance
UN Security Council Reforms (Pact Actions 39-41)
Action 39 - We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.
Action 40 - We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform as a matter of priority and without delay.
Action 41 - We will strengthen the response of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly.
Sub-Action Initiative
Indicator and Target
Baseline Data
Action 39. Sub-Action (b) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current United Nations membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world and, taking into account our commitments of Sustainable Development Goal 16.8, increase representation of developing countries and small and medium-sized States;
(b1) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current United Nations membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world
Increase in the # of permanent UNSC seats
Increase in the # of elected (non-permanent) UNSC seats
Consideration of earlier UNSC enlargement proposals
Consideration of recent UNSC enlargement proposals
Current # of permanent seats: 5 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). In 2024–2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models, involving additional permanent seats, with the goal of working toward a “consolidated model” (based on a convergence of five clusters of states, and other models presented by individual Member States) as a basis for future negotiations.
Current # of elected (non-permanent) seats: 10 (alternating between regional groups every 2 years). In 2024-2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models, involving additional non-permanent seats, with the goal of working toward a “consolidated model” (based on a convergence of five clusters of states, and other models presented by individual Member States) as a basis for future negotiations.
One of the earliest reforms, introduced in 1963 (taking effect in 1965) centered on increasing non-permanent seats from six to ten, in order to expand representation of newly decolonized nations. In contrast, the 1997 Razali Proposal addressed both permanent and non-permanent categories. Though never adopted, it reflects a shift in the conversation toward more consequential, structural reform.
Though official agreement on UNSC enlargement (whether permanent or non-permanent seats) remains elusive, some four different enlargement models have been introduced, post-2005, by clusters of states. These major proposals include:
1. G4 Proposal (2005-present)
2. African Union Proposal–Ezulwini Consensus (2005-present)
3. Uniting for Consensus Proposal (2005-present)
4. L.69 Group of Developing Countries Proposal (2007-present)
Action 39. Sub-Action (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use;
(d1) Intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto
Increase in the # of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification
Increase in the # of proposals adopted by the UNGA to curb the veto’s misuse
Increase in the # of UN Member States proposals on Security Council veto reform
Since 2008, the IGN has convened over 40 sessions to curb the misuse of the P-5’s veto authority, especially in cases involving the threat or realization of mass atrocities.
On April 26, 2022, the landmark General Assembly Resolution (A/77/L.52) was adopted without a vote, deciding that the GA’s President shall convene the Assembly within ten days of a P-5 member casting a veto and hold a debate about the situation giving rise to a veto by one or more permanent members. The “Liechtenstein Veto Initiative” has triggered several such convenings in the Assembly since its inception.
From 2000-2022, six proposals on veto reform were introduced by Member States, including a focus on better addressing mass atrocities and genocide. In contrast, in only 2023-2024 alone, nine more proposals were introduced.
Action 44 - We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.
Sub-Action Initiative
Indicator and Target
Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission;
(a1) Building and sustaining peace worldwide, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts
Increase in societal safety and security, reflected in % change in the Global Peace Index average societal safety and security score
Decrease in ongoing domestic and international conflicts, reflected in % change in Global Peace Index average ongoing conflict score
Decrease in militarization, reflected in % change in Global Peace Index average militarization score
While the average country peacefulness level deteriorated by 0.56% in 2024, the safety and security score improved, with 81 countries recording improvements, while 77 deteriorated.
The Global Peace Index’s ongoing conflict score declined in 2024, with 85 countries recording a decline. “Deaths from internal conflict” and “internal conflicts fought” indicators recorded the largest deterioration.
The militarization score deteriorated by 1.7%, with 108 countries recording deteriorations. The main driver was rising military spending, with 86 countries increasing military expenditure.
Sub-Action (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States’ progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the advisory, bridging and convening role of the Commission, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the mandate of the Commission;
(b2) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States’ progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts
Increase in direct Commission support to Member States in advancing nationally owned and led peacebuilding, sustaining peace, and prevention efforts, as reflected in the number of settings engaged per year by the Commission
In 2024, the Commission directly supported nine separate country- and region-specific settings, a decrease from the ten engaged in 2023. The Commission broadened its geographic scope, holding its first meetings in Guatemala, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and Principe.
International Financial Architecture Reforms (Pact Actions 47–52)
Action 47 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to address the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Action 48 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries.
Action 49 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to mobilize additional financing for the Sustainable Development Goals, respond to the needs of developing countries and direct financing to those most in need.
Action 50 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.
Action 51 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen its capacity to support developing countries more effectively and equitably during systemic shocks and make the financial system more stable.
Action 52 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can meet the urgent challenge of climate change.
Sub-Action Initiative
Indicator and Target
Baseline Data
Action 47. Sub-Action (a) Continue to pursue deeper reforms of the international financial architecture to turbocharge implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achieve a more inclusive, just, peaceful, resilient and sustainable world for people and planet, for present and future generations.
(a1) Reforms of the international financial architecture to turbocharge implementation of the 2030 Agenda
Decrease in annual SDG financing gap
Decrease in global public debt-to-GDP ratio
Financing gaps for sustainable development are significant and increasing, with 2024 estimates suggesting that U.S. $4 trillion is needed annually, representing a 50% rise from pre-pandemic levels.
Global public debt reached 91% of GDP in 2022, a 4% decline from 2021, yet still 7.5% higher than prepandemic levels. While some developed economies have improved in their debt-to-GDP ratios, many developing countries continue to grapple with significant debt vulnerabilities.
Action 48. Sub-Action (a) Encourage the Board of the International Monetary Fund to take further steps to continue to support a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced institution and improve the voice and representation of developing countries, in particular through the ongoing work of the Executive Board of the Fund to develop by June 2025 possible approaches as a guide for further quota realignment, including through a new quota formula, under the seventeenth general review of quotas, while protecting the quota shares of the poorest members;
(a1) Support a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF
Increase in total IMF quotas
As of December 2023, the IMF Board of Governors approved a 50% increase in quotas under the 16th General Review, raising total quotas to SDR 715.7 billion (approximately U.S. $960 billion). This increase aims to strengthen the IMF’s quota-based nature and reduce reliance on borrowed resources. Implementation of this increase is pending member countries’ consent.
Action 49. Sub-Action (a) Deliver a robust and impactful twenty-first replenishment of the International Development Association that includes contributions and strong policy commitments from both new and existing donors that significantly increase the resources of the Association, and work towards establishing a pathway to significantly and sustainably increase the Association by the 2030 replenishment;
(a1) Deliver a robust and impactful twenty-first replenishment of the International Development Association [IDA] that includes contributions and strong policy commitments from both new and existing donors
Increase in total IDA21 replenishment amount compared to IDA20
The IDA21 replenishment secured U.S. $100 billion— up from U.S. $93 billion in IDA20—with U.S. $24 billion from donors and the rest from markets and internal resources.
Action 50. Sub-Action (a) Strengthen the multilateral response to support countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens, with the meaningful participation of the countries concerned and all relevant actors, ensuring an approach that is more effective, orderly, predictable, coordinated, transparent and timely to enable those countries to escape debt overhang and prioritize government expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals;
(a1) Strengthen the multilateral response to support countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens
Decrease in U.S. $ paid in interest on foreign debt
n 2023, developing countries paid a record U.S. $1.4 trillion to service foreign debt, with interest payments soaring nearly 30% to U.S. $406 billion, a 20-year high, putting severe pressure on public expenditure. The poorest countries, eligible for World Bank IDA support, paid U.S. $96.2 billion, including a record U.S. $34.6 billion in interest (four times more than a decade ago).
Action 51. Sub-Action (a) Call on countries that are in a position to do so to voluntarily rechannel special drawing rights from the 2021 allocation, and for those countries to also consider rechannelling at least half of their special drawing rights, including through multilateral development banks, while respecting relevant legal frameworks and preserving the reserve asset character of special drawing rights;
(a1) Encourage countries, that are in a position to do so, to voluntarily rechannel at least half of their special drawing rights from the 2021 allocation
Increase in total SDR amount (in U.S. $ equivalent) rechanneled to developing countries annually
No rechanneling of SDRs to developing countries was reported in 2024. As of March 2025, 23 Resilience and Sustainability Trust partners have channeled or committed to channeling U.S. $47 billion to the RST, which provides affordable long-term financing for countries to address structural challenges.
Action 52. Sub-Action (a) Increase the availability, accessibility, and impact of climate finance to developing countries;
(a1) Increase availability and accessibility of climate finance to developing countries
Increase in annual amount of climate finance dispersed to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation
In 2023, the World Bank Group provided U.S. $38.6 billion in climate financing to developing countries. This rose 10% in 2024, reaching a record U.S. $42.6 billion.