CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

Action 41. We will strengthen the response of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Action 39. Sub-Action (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto.

Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification convened

# of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification

Increase in # of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification

Since 2008, the IGN has convened over 40 sessions that referenced the need to curb misuse of the P5’s veto authority, especially in cases involving the threat or realization of mass atrocities.

On Nov. 25 and Dec. 4, 2024, dedicated discussions on limitation of the veto were held for the first time in IGN history. The Co-Chairs convened two rounds of informal informal discussions “Taxel Talks” (informals).

Minimal Progress

Proposals adopted by UNGA to curb the veto’s misuse

# of relevant proposals adopted by UNGA to curb veto misuse

Increase in relevant # of proposals adopted

GA Resolution A/77/L.52 (Apr. 2022), the “Liechtenstein Veto Initiative” (followed shortly by GA Resolution 76/262) established a mechanism through which the PGA convenes the GA within 10 days of a P5 veto to discuss the topic. The mechanism was triggered 10 times since adoption.

No new further veto proposals were adopted in the Oct. 24 – Sept. 25 period.

Minimal Progress

Action 40. Sub-Action (a) Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

Agreed consolidated model

Proposed consolidated UNSC reform model introduced for formal “text-based” IGN negotiations

Progress in adoption of a consolidated model on UNSC reform

As of Sept. 2024, delegations remain split on process between text-based negotiations via a single consolidated document/ model (the L.69, Benelux, G4, and Nordic Group) and insisting on agreed reform principles and model first (Uniting for Consensus, African, and Arab Groups)

As noted in the convergence document by the co-chairs in June 2025, the consolidated model is now a clear IGN objective, intended to provide a concrete basis for text-based negotiations, with co-chairs working to reconcile differences across the 5 interlinked clusters: size, categories, veto, regional representation, and working methods.

Minimal Progress

Action 41. Sub-Action (c) Actively reinforce the ongoing efforts of the Security Council to review and enhance its working methods, including, inter alia, penholding and co-penholding arrangements, and strengthen the cooperation and communication between the Security Council and the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, including the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the Economic and Social Council and regional and subregional arrangements, including by continuing to fully implement and make use of Assembly resolutions 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950 on uniting for peace and 76/262 of 26 April 2022 on the veto initiative.

General Assembly sessions convened under veto initiative resolution 76/262

# of GA Sessions invoked under resolution 76/262 on the veto initiative

Increase in # of times GA resolution 76/262 on the veto initiative was invoked

Since adoption in Apr. 2022, the resolution has been invoked 17 times in the previous 3 years, with 10 cases triggering special emergency GA sessions.

As of Apr. 28, 2026, the resolution was invoked 18 times, with 10 cases triggering special emergency GA sessions under the “veto initiative.”

Substantive
Progress

Action 42. We will increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Sub-Action (b) Enhance ways in which the General Assembly can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by taking action in accordance with the UN Charter

Emergency Special Sessions convened under Uniting for Peace resolution

# of Emergency Special Sessions held under resolution 377A(V) “Uniting for Peace”

Increase in # of Emergency Special Sessions convened

Between Oct. 2023 – Sept. 2024, 4 Emergency Special Sessions were convened.

Between Oct. 2024 – Sept. 2025, 5 Emergency Special Sessions were convened.

Minimal Progress

GA debates triggered by Security Council vetoes under resolution 76/262

# of GA debates triggered by Security Council vetoes under GA resolution 76/262 (“veto initiative”)

Consistent # of relevant GA debates in relation to UNSC vetoes not addressed by an Emergency Special Session

Between the adoption of resolution 76/262 (Apr. 2022) and Sept. 2024, the General Assembly convened 9 plenary debates under the veto initiative, one for each of the 9 vetoes cast in the Security Council during that period not addressed by an Emergency Special Session

Between Oct. 2023 – Sept. 2024, 3 GA debates were convened under the veto initiative, corresponding to 5 Security Council vetoes. Subsequently, Russia’s two Ukraine amendment vetoes (24 Feb. 2025) were addressed in a single debate, as were the two Nov. 2024 vetoes on Sudan and Gaza.

Substantive Progress

GA requests for ICJ advisory opinions
submitted

# of GA requests for an International Court of Justice advisory opinion

Increase in # of relevant GA requests

The UNGA has requested an ICJ advisory opinion in 7 previous instances with the last one being in March 2023. No other opinions were requested in the Oct. 2023 – Sept. 2024 period.

One advisory opinion requested (A/RES/79/232) in the Oct. 2024 – Sept. 2025 period.

Substantive Progress

Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Sub-Action (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission.

Peace building compliance

# of countries improving or deteriorating in the Global Peace Index (GPI) “Safety and Security” domain

Increase in # of countries improving in the GPI “Safety and Security” domain, with improvements exceeding deteriorations

In the 2024 Global Peace Index, the Safety and Security domain was the only GPI domain to improve; 81 countries improved and 77 deteriorated.

In the 2025 Global Peace Index, although the overall Safety and Security domain improved (slightly); only 74 countries improved compared to 87 that deteriorated.

Regression

Peacebuilding
Fund
contributions

Total annual financial contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund

Consistent # of relevant GA debates in relation to UNSC vetoes not addressed by an Emergency Special Session

In 2023, the Peacebuilding Fund approved a $202.5 million budget but received only $131.8 million in contributions (still, this is roughly $10 million more than reaching 60% of the annual target).

Voluntary contributions declined to $132.3 million in 2025, an 8% decrease from 2024 (and only 52% of the $250 million target / approved budget).

Regression

Sub-Action (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States’ progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the advisory, bridging and convening role of the Commission, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the mandate of the Commission.

Increase of resources channelled for nationallyowned and nationally-led peacebuilding actors and efforts

# of countries engaged by the Commission

Increase # of countries supported

In 2023, the Commission supported 10 country- and region-specific settings, including 5 first-time engagements, bringing its total to 31 countries and regions since 2005.

In 2025, the Commission engaged 7 countries, including the first meeting on Haiti, jointly with ECOSOC. It also hosted an ambassadorial-level engagement on the peaceful settlement of Central Asian border disputes.

Minimal Progress

International Financial Architecture Reforms (Pact Actions 47–52)

Action 48. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries.

Action 50. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.

Action 52. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can meet the urgent challenge of climate change.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Action 48. Sub-Action (a) Encourage the Board of the International Monetary Fund to take further steps to continue to support a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced institution

Compromises, negotiations on quota size

Quota size in Special Drawing Rights

Conduct General Review of Quotas every five years

In Dec. 2023, the IMF Board of
Governors concluded the 16th
General Review of Quotas and
approved an increase of IMF
member quotas by 50%—SDR
238.6 billion, or $320 billion.

As of Nov. 7, 2025, the IMF did not
increase its quotas; its Executive
Board approved another six-month
extension of the period to consent
to the quota increase under the 16th
General Review of Quotas (GRQ),
through May 15, 2026.

No Progress

Action 50. Sub-Action (a) Enable countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens to escape debt overhang and prioritize government expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Debt servicing paused, innovative debt relief mechanisms in place

Developing countries’ dollar expenditure to cover debt-service

Decrease

In 2023, developing countries’ interest payments to service their total external debt reached about $406 billion.

In 2024, developing countries’ interest payments reached $415.4 billion.

No Progress

Debt servicing paused; innovative debt relief mechanisms in place

SDG 17.4.1 Debt service as a proportion of exports of goods, services and primary income

SDG 17.4 Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, relief and restructuring.

In 2024 total external debt in developing countries rose to $11.7 trillion.

In 2025, total external debt in developing countries reached a record $12.1 trillion.

No Progress

Action 52. Sub-Action (a) Call on multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions to increase the availability, accessibility and impact of climate finance to developing countries, while safeguarding the additionality of climate finance to support developing countries to implement their national plans and strategies to address climate change.

National governments’ expenditures for climate finance to developing countries

Annual amount of climate finance disbursed to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation

Increase

In 2023, the World Bank Group provided $38.6 billion in climate financing.

In 2025, the World Bank Group provided $39.2 billion in climate financing.

Minimal Progress

Agreements between national governments and the World Bank

# of countries that are drawing on Climate Resilient Debt Clauses with the World Bank

Increase

As of Nov. 2024, 14 of 45 countries eligible for Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (set of options that helps countries invest in crisis preparedness and response) have included this clause in loan agreements.

As of Apr. 2025, 17 of 45 countries eligible for Climate Resilient Debt Clauses included this clause.

Substantive Progress

Action 53. We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Sub-Action (a1) Request the Secretary-General to establish an independent high-level expert group to develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product.

Assessment of potential candidates, contacts with candidates, definition of mandate

SG steps to
establish HighLevel Expert Group
on Beyond GDP

Appoint HighLevel Expert Group on Beyond GDP

In May 2023, SG proposed establishment of a high-level expert group of independent experts with a mandate to produce key indicators that go beyond GDP.

On May 7, 2025, the SG appointed an independent High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP.

Substantive Progress

Sub-Action (a2) An independent high-level expert group to develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product, in close consultation with Member States and relevant stakeholders, and to present the outcome of its work during the eightieth session of the General Assembly.

Online consultations with civil society, NGOs, academia, private sector, government representatives via a survey held November 5-30, 2025

Hold consultations by November 2025

Hold consultations by November 2025

As of Sept. 2024, High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP not established.

In Nov. 2025, the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP opened multistakeholders consultations from Nov. 5-30, 2025 and published its interim report (Final Report released on May 7, 2026).

Substantive Progress

Action 54. We will strengthen the international response to complex global shocks.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Sub-Action (a1) Consider approaches to strengthen the United Nations system response to complex global shocks, within existing authorities and in consultation with Member States.

Contributing countries’ allocations to Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Amount of financial resources to support enhanced capacity for climate complex global shocks

Increase

In 2024, CERF allocated $10.5 million for a dedicated climate action funding envelope.

In 2025, CERF allocated $9.5 million for a dedicated climate action funding envelope.

Regression

Allocated funds

Amount of financial resources to support enhanced capacity for complex global shocks

Increase

As of Oct. 17, 2024, the Pandemic Fund’s Governing Board approved $547 million grants through 2 funding rounds.

As of Nov. 2025, the Pandemic Fund awarded $885 million in grants.

Substantive
Progress

Sub-Action (a2) Consider approaches to strengthen the United Nations system response to complex global shocks, within existing authorities and in consultation with Member States, and with full respect for the mandated coordination role of the United Nations in response to humanitarian emergencies.

Allocated funds

Amount of financial resources to support the exisiting UN system response to humanitarian emergencies

Decrease

In 2024, UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking Service reported $37.13 billion total funding to respond to humanitarian crises.

In 2025, UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking Service reported $27.60 billion total funding to respond to humanitarian crises (a 26% decrese from 2024).

Regression

Member States’ contributions to Central Emergency Response Fund

Amount of financial resources to support the exisiting UN system response to humanitarian emergencies

Increase

In 2024, CERF committed over $120 million in funding for anticipatory action.

As of Nov. 2025, CERF committed $124.7 million in funding for anticipatory action.

Minimal
Progress

Action 56. We will strengthen international cooperation for the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.

OUTPUT

Indicator

Target

Baseline: Sept 2024 Data Summary

Most Recently Reported Data

Progress

Sub-Action (a1) Reaffirm the importance of the widest possible adherence to and full compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

Member’s accessions and ratifications

# of States Party to the Outer Space Treaty

Increase in
Member State
signatories

As of Jan. 2024, the Outer Space Treaty had 114 States Parties.

As of Dec. 2025, the Outer Space Treaty counted 118 States Parties.

Minimal
Progress

Meetings held

# of UN regulations fostering full compliance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty

UN Security Council Resolution to prevent an arms race

In votes in Apr. and May 2024, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution on outer space to introduce the obligation of all State Parties to fully comply with Outer Space Treaty and to prevent an outer space arms race.

On Dec. 1, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution on preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

Minimal
Progress

Sub-Action (a2) Discuss the establishment of new frameworks for space traffic, space debris and space resources through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Members signing the Zero Debris Charter

# of signatories to the Zero Debris Charter

Become debrisneutral by 2030

In May 2024, the European Space Agency and 12 European countries signed the Zero Debris Charter, based on ESA’s Zero Debris approach for space debris mitigation to achieve debris-neutrality by 2030.

As of Jan. 2026, the Zero Debris Charter has over 210 signatories across 34 countries, including 21 national governments.

Substantive
Progress

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