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REPORT

Human Security
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 Global Governance
Innovation Network

Global Governance Innovation Report 2025

Advancing the Pact for the Future
and Environmental Governance

June 2025

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June 2025

Global Governance Innovation Report 2025

Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance

This report encourages creative and ambitious thinking on global governance renewal and innovation, introducing a unique approach to assessing and promoting implementation of the Pact for the Future, alongside novel ideas for consideration at COP30 in Belém and other environmental policy fora.

With multilateral institutions facing an extreme liquidity crisis and the international rules-based order under pressure, states and civil society partners committed to collective security, sustainable development, human rights, and multilateral diplomacy must step up to defend and champion a stronger, reformed, and more capable global governance system. A growing financing gap and weakening political support for the Paris Agreement further threaten progress on tackling the world’s most urgent challenge: climate change. Against a backdrop of political division and mistrust among major powers, world leaders convened the Summit of the Future in September 2024 to renew international commitments and reimagine how aging institutions can better cope with contemporary risks and opportunities. The *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* (GGIR’25) offers tools for assessing and promoting implementation of the summit’s outcomes—the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations—and explores how to overcome barriers to change ahead of the Pact’s official high-level review in September 2028. It further analyzes and offers novel policy and institutional reform proposals to grapple with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution—an underemphasized issue at the summit. GGIR’25 finds slow yet visible headway to date in realizing key goals of the Pact. Its success hinges on effective multilateral diplomacy, sustained United Nations leadership, civil society engagement, and rigorous follow-through.

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Dedicated to all UN personnel who have lost their lives in service of the hope for a better world. Their work, often unseen and under fire, upheld the principles at the heart of global governance. As the frontliners of multilateralism for eighty years, may their sacrifice remind us of both the cost and value of committed collective action.

Foreword

Though long forewarned by climate scientists, humanity has now crossed the 1.5°C Climate Rubicon, contributing, in 2024 alone, to 604 extreme weather events. Global wildlife populations have declined by 73 percent since 1970, while air pollution is the second leading risk factor for death globally. Meanwhile, despite last September’s successful adoption by world leaders of a Pact for the Future to rebuild trust and address gaps in global governance, the United Nations now faces extreme budgetary and political pressures. This will severely hamper the world body’s ability to help nations and their citizens effectively cope with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, as well as multiple other threats and challenges in the closely related realms of development, security, technology, and human rights.

In *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025: Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance*, the authors present the first authoritative progress review of the Pact, while offering novel pathways for implementing its ambitious 56 Actions, as well as the Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations. It further introduces out-of-the-box thinking for consideration this November at COP30 in Belém and other environmental policy fora. Together, the Pact for the Future and COP30 offer an urgent and rare chance to revitalize global governance at a time of converging crises and geopolitical fragmentation. Their success will hinge on a sustained commitment, innovative coordination, and inclusive follow-through grounded in lessons from past reform efforts—for which this report contributes abundant empirical evidence.

I wish to express my appreciation to the authors of this report, which is the third edition of the *Global Governance Innovation Report*, a series dedicated to reimagining how humanity can better manage the resources and environment of the only home we have, with a special focus on following through to last September’s Summit of the Future in New York. Given the gravity of today’s most daunting challenges, we must together pursue the opportunities offered by the Pact for the Future and multilateral environmental agreements. Both present and future generations need today’s leaders—across governments, the business community, civil society, and the multilateral system—to seize the moment with unrivaled courage, foresight, and a renewed commitment to act.

María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés
*73rd President of the General Assembly,
Executive Director of GWL Voices, and former
Foreign and Defense Minister of Ecuador*

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List of Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence	NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa	ODA	Official Development Assistance
COP	(UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) Conference of the Parties	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	P-5	Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States)
DFG	Declaration on Future Generations	PBA	UN Peacebuilding Architecture
EU	European Union	PBAR	UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review
FFD4	Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development	PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
FF-NPT	Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty	RST	Resilience and Sustainability Trust
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation	SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
GDC	Global Digital Compact	SDR(s)	Special Drawing Right(s)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	SIDS	Small Island Developing States
GGIR ('23, '24, '25)	<i>Global Governance Innovation Report (2023, 2024, 2025)</i>	SOTF	Summit of the Future
GNI	Gross National Income	R&D	Research and Development
G20	Group of 20 (19 nations + the EU and AU)	UN	United Nations
G24	Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development	UNEA	United Nations Environment Assembly
G7	Group of 7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States)	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
INC-5.2	Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee	UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
IGN	Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform	UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
LDC(s)	Least Developed Countries	UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
MHEWS	Multi-Hazard Early Warning System	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
		U.S.	United States
		WHO	World Health Organization
		WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive Summary

“The Pact for the Future is our blueprint for the actions we need to take in order to deliver a better future for humanity. Its implementation will be at the core of my Presidency, building upon the agenda set forth by my predecessors.”

—Annalena Baerbock, 80th President of the United Nations General Assembly.¹

Recent developments, such as the World Health Assembly’s adoption of the first agreement to prevent and respond to future pandemics and the International Maritime Organization’s legally binding commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions, signal renewed hope in multilateral solutions to global challenges. At the same time, however, the United Nations’ long-standing financial crisis has suddenly morphed into an **extreme liquidity crisis**. Annual budget shortfalls, as high as 30-40 percent in humanitarian and other UN bodies, could severely hamper the world body’s work with partners to confront the polycrisis of devastating wars, runaway climate change, unconstrained artificial intelligence, and other factors fueling longstanding inequality and injustice.

Paradoxically, as it nearly coincided with these unprecedented attacks, last September’s United Nations Summit of the Future in New York presented a generational moment to rebuild trust and reinvigorate the multilateral system to prepare for over-the-horizon challenges and opportunities. The summit’s adopted **Pact for the Future**, **Global Digital Compact**, and **Declaration on Future Generations** can serve as a bulwark against forces seeking to dismantle the idea of cooperative global governance launched in 1945.

PACT

Defending & Reforming Multilateralism through the Pact for the Future

Against a backdrop of divisive politics and mistrust among major powers, *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* (GGIR’25) on “Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance” demonstrates how efforts to **deliver on the Pact and the promise of COP30** in Belém equally address the broader, urgent need to **defend and reform multilateral institutions and the international rules-based order**. They provide both a positive narrative and a practical focus on achieving near-term global governance breakthroughs in response to catastrophic risks, including the triple planetary environmental crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.

In particular, the Pact’s Chapter Five on “Transforming Global Governance” offers a **roadmap for long overdue, system-wide structural changes**, including in the areas of international financial architecture reform, enlarging the Security Council, strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission, redefining how national progress is assessed, and enhancing how the international community responds to global shocks. The full realization of the Pact means a United Nations system capable of keeping pace—and empowering people and nations to better grapple—with the pivotal challenges and opportunities of the present era.

In response to the UN’s extreme liquidity crisis, Secretary-General António Guterres unveiled, in March 2025, his **UN80 Initiative** to modernize the UN’s structure, priorities, and operations for our time. It wields the potential to reinforce the Pact for the Future by focusing on the UN’s core strengths, fostering system-wide efficiencies, relocating staff to where needs are greatest, and encouraging a **new Grand Bargain to underpin the multilateral system**—reflecting renewed concerns about another Cold War or even a Third World War, as well as environmental destruction, population growth, and migration.

Monitoring the Pact for the Future (Year 1) Through a Logical Framework Approach

Given that data monitoring gaps were anticipated, GGIR'25 assessed process deliberations, existing official SDG indicators, and proxy indicators that speak to the essential meaning of select Pact Actions. Based on evaluation best practice, all indicators adhered to **SMART** (or Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound) **criteria** for Pact implementation measurement, alongside associated, credible, and relatively recent baseline data examples.

On the whole, our review of around one-half of the Pact's Actions suggests that **slow yet visible progress is observed** across key elements of the Pact. For instance, steps toward strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission (speaking to Action 44) are underway, and the recent World Bank-IMF Spring Meetings and upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) are helping to sustain momentum on certain international financial architecture reforms (speaking to Pact Actions 47-52). We also note progress toward standing-up an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance (Pact Chapter Three and Global Digital Compact Objective 5).

At the same time, proposed **steep funding cuts are anticipated to hurt Pact implementation across the board**, as many countries begin to pull back from foreign aid and international organization financing. Leveraging the Secretary-General's UN80 initiative may prove crucial in helping to advance, rather than detract from, the ambitions of the Pact for the Future, by creating a more agile, cost-effective, and impactful UN system.

Innovative Environmental Governance for a Post-1.5°C World

In preparation for this November's COP30 in Belém, the report analyzes and offers outside-the-box policy and institutional reform proposals for tackling the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, including:

Enhance the Climate COPs: To overcome chronic deadlocks in climate negotiations, COP decision-making should adopt **weighted or supermajority voting** to mitigate obstruction by emitting minority countries. Brazil's proposed high-level, influential country **Climate Change Council**, under the aegis of the UN and sourcing non-state expertise, can further improve coordination by aggregating climate action efforts that are currently fragmented.

Finalize an Effective Global Plastics Treaty: The next round of Global Plastics Treaty negotiations this August in Geneva should focus on the prohibition of a wide range of **chemicals of concern**, the **expansion of circularity** both through enhanced recycling and ecological design, ambitious and legally-binding global and national **production reduction targets**, and effective **financing mechanisms** to ensure technology transfer and capacity-building. To increase buy-in for a strong treaty, an economically supportive transition away from plastics is vital.

Embed Responsibility Chains in Global Environmental Governance: Complementing traditional accountability approaches, Responsibility Chains identify and connect governance actors across sectors and levels who share responsibility for environmental harms—and their solutions. Operating through a new Global Environment Organization (GEO), a Responsibility Chains Task Force would **assess governance gaps, map chains**

of **responsibility** across public and private sectors, and **identify institutional barriers** to coordinated environmental action across the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.

INNOVATION

Taking the Pact for the Future Forward: A Multistakeholder Governance Approach

In examining pathways and pitfalls to advancing the Pact for the Future, GGIR'25 outlines ways to navigate around three chief sets of obstacles: first, **facilitating coordination and responsibility**: address capacity constraints head on, while avoiding coordination gaps, institutional misalignment, and stakeholder ambiguities; second, **maintaining Pact integrity**: pursue Pact reforms in a balanced and comprehensive way across all five chapters, rather than as a simple menu of options to choose from; third and finally, **overcoming financing and other implementation barriers**: circumventing short-term national economic and strategic interests requires concerted efforts to unlock new financial resources, streamline debt restructuring, and coordinate international financial architecture reforms, including through a new Biennial Summit on the Global Economy (Pact Action 48).

Initial evidence from the report's mapping and monitoring exercises further suggests that specific Pact Actions can garner momentum when they are championed by even a small number of diverse and committed governments. Besides the **seventeen intergovernmental fora** overseen directly by the President of the General Assembly, other international fora can offer opportunities for creative and resourceful leadership, including the **G20, Climate COPs, WTO, and regional organizations**.

Additionally, some lessons for Pact follow-up, gleaned from earlier Human Rights Council and Peacebuilding Architecture reform efforts, are: i) to ensure that **innovative new global governance tools are carefully developed by experts and widely consulted** among governments and other important stakeholders, learning from prior efforts to establish the Council's Universal Periodic Review and the Architecture's Peacebuilding Fund; and ii) to sustain political support for an innovation long after its initial adoption by **forming and nurturing a smart coalition** of champion governments, international civil servants, and like-minded partners across civil society, whose ideas, networks, and capabilities are all valued and employed in unison at key intervals.

Drawing on these and other lessons, while building on this year's President of the General Assembly (PGA) Interactive Dialogue series, GGIR'25 recommends convening every May in New York an **Annual PGA Dialogue on Pact for the Future Follow-up**, as well as a proposed **Ministerial Dialogue on the Pact Review Framework**, in September 2026, at the mid-point on the road to the official high-level review in September 2028. Such high-level fora would encourage skillful multilateral diplomacy, sustained leadership across the UN system, active civil society engagement, and a robust, closely monitored follow-through effort to support the goals and commitments adopted at the September 2024 Summit of the Future.

The Pact for the Future is more than a set of Actions: It is an affirmation by 193 countries to prioritize cooperation over isolation and solidarity over narrow self-interest. Serving as a **proxy for the defense and reform of multilateral institutions**, the Pact's full implementation would signal that global governance can evolve—not by inflating bureaucracy, but by embracing innovation, inclusivity, and accountability.

I. Defending & Reforming Multilateralism through the Pact for the Future

“We have come to recognize that the wisest and most effective way to protect our national interests is through international cooperation—that is to say, through united effort for the attainment of common goals. This has been the great lesson taught by the war and is, I think, the great lesson of contemporary life—that the peoples of the earth are inseparably linked to one another by a deep, underlying community of purpose. This community of purpose is no less real and vital in peace than in war, and cooperation is no less essential to its fulfillment.”

—Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Bretton Woods, 1944.²

For decades, most countries have taken multilateralism for granted to navigate complex and interconnected transnational environments. For much of the United Nations’ eighty years, its Member States have largely assumed that the world body and its diverse departments, programs, funds, agencies, and regional commissions would naturally move toward greater effectiveness, inclusion, and efficiency. In the past decade, however, the multilateral system has suffered from divisive fault-lines and mistrust, both between the Great Powers and between the countries of the Global North and the Global South. Now more than ever, states and their partners across civil society that believe in the power of collective security, sustainable development, human rights, and multilateral diplomacy must step up to champion a stronger, reformed, and more capable system of global governance.

“Now more than ever, states and their partners across civil society that believe in the power of collective security, sustainable development, human rights, and multilateral diplomacy must step up to champion a stronger, reformed, and more capable system of global governance.”

After several years of consultation and negotiation, the Summit of the Future (22–23 September 2024 in New York) presented a generational opportunity to rebuild trust and address gaps in global governance; reaffirm the United Nations (UN) Charter, the 2030 Agenda, and other existing commitments; and renew the multilateral system to prepare for over-the-horizon challenges and opportunities. In lending support for the development of some 56 Actions and 361 associated commitments (or “Sub-Actions”) adopted in the summit’s chief outcome documents—the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations—and their follow-through, more than a dozen ImPact Coalitions between champion governments, civil society (including scholars and policy researchers), UN agencies, and other partners were established at the May 2024 United Nations Civil Society

Conference in Nairobi (see [table 4.5](#)). The action agenda embodied in the Pact, if fully implemented and effectively communicated, can be a bulwark against forces seeking to erode, and, in some cases dismantle, the 1945 idea of cooperative global governance.

The Pact as Proxy: UN80 and the Defense of Multilateralism

Given its sheer reach—delving deep within the world body’s three pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights—efforts to deliver on the Pact for the Future equally address the broader, urgent need to defend multilateral institutions and the international legal order. In particular, the Pact’s Chapter Five on “Transforming Global Governance,” offers a roadmap for long overdue, system-wide structural changes, including in the areas of international financial architecture reform, enlarging the Security Council, strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission, redefining how national progress is assessed, and enhancing how the international community responds to global shocks. The full realization of the Pact means a United Nations system capable of keeping pace—and empowering people and nations to better grapple—with the pivotal challenges and opportunities of the present era, including devastating wars, runaway climate change, unconstrained artificial intelligence, the safeguarding of human rights, and promoting human development in today’s hyperconnected global economy. It provides both a positive narrative and a practical focus on achieving near-term global governance breakthroughs in response to major systemic shocks and over-the-horizon catastrophic risks. Moreover, the Pact adds the voices of many who were missing around the table in 1945.³

At the same time, failure to deliver on the promise of the Pact could further intensify the current polycrisis, leading to even greater human suffering, material damage, the possibility of reaching irreversible tipping points long-feared by leading scientists and policy specialists, and transgressing most, if not all, of the world’s nine planetary boundaries.⁴ As explored in [section three](#) of this report, last year’s crossing of the 1.5° Celsius threshold for temperature change since the start of industrialization could further accelerate other known climate-related “push-factors,” forcing people to migrate to more environmentally stable and economically and politically viable countries and regions. Left unchecked and ungoverned, the coming climate catastrophe will drive refugee flows and broader displacement of persons, while contributing to increased political and criminal violence, greater inequality, and other systemic injustices.

Meanwhile, with the ink hardly dry on the Pact for the Future, the United Nations’ long-standing financial crisis has suddenly morphed into an extreme liquidity crisis. Exacerbated by multiple factors—rising populist political forces in traditional international organizations and foreign aid financing donor countries, pressure to significantly expand military budget outlays in response to heightened geopolitical tensions, the emergence of non-military security threats involving the environment and new technologies, and renewed frustrations about perceived bloated and dysfunctional international bureaucracies—there are likely no quick fixes. Ongoing deliberations in New York and Geneva suggest that major humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Program, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and International Organization for Migration, could see severe annual budget shortfalls as high as 30-40 percent, and the UN Secretariat may need to let go at least 20 percent of its staff, in addition to other immediate cost-saving measures.⁵ Internal UN modelling suggests that the year-end cash deficit will, absent budget cuts, leave the Secretariat without money to pay salaries and suppliers by September of this year, and a letter to Member States by the Secretary-General, in February 2025, warned that the UN’s peacekeeping budget to pay for troops may run dry by mid-year.⁶

Fortunately, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and his UN system colleagues have chosen to shape a constructive course in response to likely draconian budget cuts soon imposed, in *de facto* ways, by major Member States which have largely financed and provided global political leadership through the world body for decades. The “UN80 Initiative,” first announced by the Secretary-General on March 12, 2025, aims to:

- Rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements in the way the United Nations works.
- Thoroughly review the implementation of all mandates given to the UN by Member States, which have significantly increased in recent years.
- Conduct a strategic review of deeper, more structural changes and program realignment in the UN System.⁷

It is critical that Member States work closely with the Secretariat to fully leverage this multi-pronged effort to help advance, rather than detract from, the Pact for the Future, by creating a more agile, cost-effective, and impactful UN system.

As illustrated in [figure 1.1](#), the UN80 Initiative wields the potential to complement and reinforce the Pact for the Future in at least four essential and concrete ways. *First*, it encourages a healthy examination of the world body’s core strengths—and many clues can be found within the Pact’s negotiated 56 Actions, as well as the UN’s long-cited three pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights. *Second*, the initiative creates chances to promote long-overdue system-wide efficiency gains, from rebalancing a top-heavy bureaucracy to employing technology in creative new ways for back-office and other critical functions.⁸ Though it is regrettable (given the massive, urgent, and global planetary and human needs associated with present polycrisis), in the short-run, the UN and other global institutions will be forced to do less-with-less financial, human, and other resources. However, as multilateral institutions progress in their restructuring—including through the tech-modernization, foresight, and behavioral/cultural shift program known as “UN 2.0” (an integral part of the Pact)—opportunities to achieve more-with-less could, at least in theory, begin to take shape.⁹


Third, UN80 considers the need to relocate staff and associated capabilities closer to where operational needs are greatest, across Africa, the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia, as well as to consolidate departments/agencies—thereby striking a healthier balance between the UN system’s core functions and actual form. *Fourth and finally*, it welcomes thoughtful deliberation among powerful governments and other key stakeholders about a new Grand Bargain to underpin the multilateral system for the coming decades.

“Just as the 1945 United Nations struck a balance between inclusive idealism... and Great Power realism... the new Grand Bargain will need to ponder similar kinds of global governance innovations.”

Eight decades ago, the agreement reached among the UN’s founding members, in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, can be found in the opening words of the Charter’s Preamble: “... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”¹⁰ Though it will need to arrive organically through purposeful and broad-based consultations, the new Grand

Bargain should weigh fundamental global shifts since World War II and a new “logic for the future.”¹¹ This will reflect renewed fears of another Cold War or even a Third World War facilitated by artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and other cutting-edge technologies. But it is also likely to reflect intense though contentious concerns about environmental destruction, population growth, and migration—all terms not mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter. Just as the 1945 United Nations struck a balance between inclusive idealism (one-state, one-vote within the General Assembly; a system introduced in the 1919 League of Nations) and Great Power realism (a small Security Council led by five veto-wielding major countries), the new (2025, UN80?) Grand Bargain will need to ponder similar kinds of global governance innovations—combining the exigencies of changing Great Power politics and technology with pragmatic and far-sighted multistakeholder approaches—to tackle new and emerging 21st century challenges.

Figure 1.1: How the UN80 Initiative can reinforce the Pact



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

If well-executed by a motivated and mission-driven international civil service and backed by a cross-regional group of champion governments and partners in civil society, the combined UN80 Initiative and Pact for the Future follow-through agendas hold out the promise that the United Nations can navigate the turbulent waters ahead and come out a more nimble, tech-savvy, and outcome-oriented rather than process-driven international organization on the other side. In short, they could collectively give renewed and tangible meaning to making the UN, as often-proclaimed during the more than decade-long crisis of global governance, “fit-for-purpose.”¹²

The Pact and the Future of Environmental Governance

Since 2023, both the analytical findings and institutional and policy reform proposals presented in the *Global Governance Innovation Report* (GGIR) series have sought to encourage more ambition in the

negotiations shaping the September 2024 Summit of the Future and its follow-through. **GGIR'23** showcased the theme “Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action,” and **GGIR'24** explored the topic of “Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture.” The world needs better ways for managing its many, growing problems—engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures—through improved global governance in the service of human security—and just security too. The GGIR series defines global governance to mean the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and to tackle global challenges effectively.¹³

GGIR'25, with a focus on “Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance,” examines how both sets of issues and policy agendas are inextricably linked. Though climate and broader environmental governance concerns are featured chiefly in Pact Actions 9, 10, and 52, they are reflected elsewhere across the Pact, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations. With climate change now exceeding the 1.5°C and eroding political support, not since the adoption of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015 has the world convened as consequential a high-level environmental gathering as this November’s COP30 in Belém within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This coincides with this November’s World Social Summit in Doha and G20 Summit in Johannesburg, each poised to mobilize heightened political support and creative thinking for enhancing global governance, both to mitigate risks and seize opportunities for collective problem-solving.

The remainder of this section highlights global “macrotrends” in social and economic issues; peace, security, and humanitarian action; climate and broader environmental action; and human rights/inclusive governance, and how these four themes interrelate. [Section two](#) of the report introduces a new logical framework methodology for monitoring initial Year 1 progress in implementing the Pact for the Future. [Section three](#) analyzes and offers outside-the-box policy and institutional reform proposals for grappling with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution—an urgent, yet downplayed concern within the Pact for the Future. Finally, [section four](#) draws upon these analyses to chart new pathways for delivering on the Pact between now and September 2028, when its official, high-level review is mandated.

Global Macrotrends to Watch in 2025 & Beyond

Polycrisis refers to how overlapping, urgent, complex, and sometimes even extreme problem-sets—across socioeconomic, security, humanitarian, environmental, legal, and governance dimensions—intersect and further exacerbate global threats and challenges. We consider each of these dimensions, briefly, below.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

The global social development landscape faces mounting pressure due to declining aid, persistent economic challenges, and rising geopolitical tensions. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is projected to drop 20 to 40 percent this year, with sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia facing the steepest cuts—ranging from 30 to 40 percent.¹⁴ These cuts come at a time when developing countries are grappling with record debt levels, reaching U.S. \$11.4 trillion, or 49 percent of their joint Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 99 percent of annual export earnings. Tightened budgets have resulted in reduced public expenditure on infrastructure, education, and health, jeopardizing hard-earned

social development achievements and threatening the robustness of national safety nets.¹⁵ Emblematic of these trends, the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises resulted in the slowest rise in the Human Development Index (for 2020, 2021, and anticipated for 2024) since its inception in 1990.¹⁶ Adding to these challenges, escalating trade tensions have led the U.S. to impose a 10 percent universal import tariff, with even steeper rates on some countries such as China.¹⁷

The global reaction to overlapping economic and social pressures has been inconsistent. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) warns of a growing gap between development finance needs and donor willingness to give, noting that despite record commitments in 2023, aid is stagnating due to inflation, earmarking, and shifting focus toward geopolitical concerns like Ukraine, which now receives 14 percent of global aid.¹⁸ Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have turned to blended finance and debt restructuring initiatives, but access remains uneven, with conditionalities often excluding the poorest and conflict-affected countries.¹⁹ At the same time, on May 20, 2025, the World Health Assembly adopted (121 in favor with 11 abstentions) the world's first agreement to cooperate, prevent, and respond to future pandemics, including a developing nations' right to access pathogen data, guaranteed vaccine distribution, and responsibilities to transfer critical technologies.²⁰


INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY, AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

International peace and security faced tumultuous pressures in 2024, with the most concurrent armed conflicts since 1946 and over 233,000 conflict-related fatalities recorded (figure 1.2).²¹ Geopolitical rivalries among Great Powers, widening divides between the Global North and South, fast evolving artificial intelligence (AI), and weapons of mass destruction are fueling instability. Global military spending rose to U.S. \$2.7 trillion in 2024, marking a 9.4 percent increase from the previous year.²² The rapid integration of AI into military systems without regulation reduces human oversight and raises miscalculation risks, while competition for critical minerals needed for AI and satellite infrastructure intensifies resource competition and environmental harm.

A tragic example of the absence of peace and security is Sudan, where a year-long civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has resulted in over 14,000 deaths and displaced nearly 8.6 million people.²³ International diplomatic efforts have failed to achieve a ceasefire.²⁴ Similarly, Myanmar is trapped in a cycle of violent political instability, exacerbated, on March 28, 2025, by a catastrophic 7.7 magnitude earthquake that killed over 3,500 people.²⁵ Meanwhile, the now underway 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (Action 44 of the Pact for the Future) serves as a reminder of the urgent need for coordinated, sustained action to strengthen multilateral peace and security frameworks.²⁶ [Section two](#) of this report assesses initial progress by the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform in delivering on Pact Actions 39–41.²⁷

“Alarmingly, six out of nine planetary boundaries are now breached, namely: climate change, pollution, biosphere integrity, land use, freshwater change, and biogeochemical flows.”

Figure 1.2: Rising civilian conflict-related deaths since the Pandemic



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center. Data Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, “ACLED Explorer,” accessed May 29, 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE ACTION

New scientific reports underscore alarming trends pushing up against critical planetary boundaries—and beyond the “safe operating space for humanity”—threatening to expose billions of people to unprecedented and irreversible climate and other environmental disasters.²⁸ Alarming, six out of nine planetary boundaries are now breached, namely: climate change, pollution, biosphere integrity, land use, freshwater change, and biogeochemical flows.²⁹ Air pollution is the second leading risk factor for death globally, resulting in 8.1 million deaths in 2021,³⁰ while the burning of fossil fuels and biomass is responsible for 85 percent of all global air pollution.³¹ Additionally, global wildlife populations have declined by an average of 73 percent since 1970.³² Deforestation rates in the Amazon rainforest (estimated at 14 to 17 percent) could trigger catastrophic and permanent consequences for biodiversity and climate systems.³³

The focus of section three of this report, global and regional institutions are responding in new and novel ways to the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. For instance, on April 11, 2025, by a vote of 63 countries to 16, the International Maritime Organization adopted a legally binding global climate agreement that approves new regulations to cut greenhouse gas emissions across the maritime sector—backed by financial penalties and a structured compliance framework for one of most polluting industries on the planet.³⁴ At the COP29 United Nations Climate Change Conference, in November 2024 in Baku, governments committed to a U.S. \$300 billion per annum target (by 2035) in support of developing countries’ climate action, though climate experts estimate that U.S. \$1.3 trillion is actually needed.³⁵

HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE, AND CIVIC SPACE

Global freedom faces intensifying threats from the resurgence of authoritarian governance, the weakening of democratic institutions, and the growing influence of non-state armed actors. 2024, according to Freedom House, marked the nineteenth consecutive year of decline in global freedom, with political rights and civil liberties deteriorating in 60 countries and improving in only 34.³⁶ From 2023 through 2024, the rule of law further weakened in 57 percent of countries, reflecting a broader erosion of legal norms and institutional safeguards.³⁷ Election-related violence was also reported in 27 of the 66 countries and territories that held national elections in 2024, with targeted attacks on candidates documented in 20 cases.³⁸ Meanwhile, over 5.4 billion people now live in countries where fundamental human rights have deteriorated by more than 60 percent, including freedoms of expression, assembly, and privacy.³⁹

Undermining efforts to push back against these negative trends, the United Nations currently faces a severe liquidity crisis due to the non-payment of dues, with only 104 of the 193 Member States having paid their regular budget assessments in full as of May 14, 2025 (also see [box 1.1](#)).⁴⁰ Consequently, the UN system is preparing for large-scale staff reductions across key agencies, with recruitment freezes, layoffs, and program suspensions already underway, further undermining the organization's ability to deliver essential services in crisis-affected areas.⁴¹ Hindered by geopolitical pressures, the work of UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) investigative bodies in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan, and Myanmar are regularly disrupted.⁴² At the same time, the UNHRC's March 25, 2025 resolution on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights underscores the centrality of rights-based fiscal policy, calling on Member States to adopt progressive taxation, combat illicit financial flows, and align domestic resource mobilization with their human rights obligations.⁴³

Box 1.1: The United States' severe cuts in UN and broader international development financing

The United States, as the United Nations' largest contributor, is assessed at 22 percent of its regular budget and, separately, 27 percent of the peacekeeping budget.⁴⁴ It currently owes U.S. \$2.8 billion in overdue payments.⁴⁵ In February 2025, the U.S. took initial steps toward radically downsizing its development and humanitarian aid abroad by terminating 90 percent of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) foreign aid contracts and, subsequently, terminating USAID altogether.⁴⁶ It also withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the Paris Climate Agreement (and its corresponding new Loss and Damage Fund), and the World Health Organization (WHO), and it signalled renewed scrutiny of other UN bodies, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).⁴⁷ It has also cut U.S. \$377 million in funding to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), resulting in the termination of 48 grants previously administered through USAID and the State Department.⁴⁸

In response to recent White House proposals to reduce dramatically U.S. contributions to the UN system, UN agencies such as WHO, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have frozen recruitment, laid off thousands of staff, and suspended critical health and humanitarian programs, particularly affecting frontline workers and displaced populations in countries like Haiti, Sudan, and Gaza.⁴⁹ Influenced by the White House's recommendations, the U.S. House of Representatives voted, on May 22, 2025, to eliminate all funding for the United Nations' regular operating budget, which was U.S. \$761 million in U.S. Fiscal Year 2024.⁵⁰ In the same budget bill, the House voted to cut UN peacekeeping contributions by 22 percent from the previous year (from U.S. \$1.367 billion to U.S. \$1.069 billion).⁵¹

At the same time, United States' and other countries' reductions in foreign aid are severely impacting civil society organizations and humanitarian programs worldwide. These financial shortfalls come at a time of heightened global conflict, leaving many essential services underfunded and communities in crisis.⁵²

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data sources: Council on Foreign Relations, "Funding the United Nations: How Much Does the U.S. Pay?" accessed April 9, 2025; Deen, "A Cash Crisis Forces UN to Re-Figure its Budget and Freeze Staff Hiring"; Knickmeyer, et al, "Trump administration says it's cutting 90% of USAID foreign aid contracts"; Banjo, "UN Shrugs Off US Budget-Cuts Memo Publicly"; UN Peacekeeping, "How are we funded," accessed April 15, 2025; Jarvis, "A Make-or-Break Moment for Global Development Finance—& the Role Philanthropy Must Play"; IEP, "Official Development Assistance: Geopolitical Tensions, Economic Constraints & Shifting Priorities," 4; OECD, *Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2024*, 2; UNSD, *The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2024*, 4; UN Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Letter to Chair Collins, Committee on Appropriations"; and Blanchfield, "United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping."

* * *

Giving definition to the present polycrisis (in terms of its marked impact on both people and planet), these four sets of global macro trends feed off of each other, at times worsening and at other times improving the conditions for durable solutions—or, at the very least, better ways to managing these complex and interdependent protracted crises. Each macro trend features prominently in the Pact for the Future, which, as argued earlier, represents a proxy for the defense and reform of multilateralism today. Rather than fostering a bloated and outdated international bureaucracy, many Pact Actions tracked in this report (including those associated with UN 2.0 technological and foresight applications) align well with the Secretary-General's new UN80 Initiative. Assessing progress on delivering on the Pact—through a combination of official and proxy indicators that speak to the essential meaning of Pact Actions, as well as analysis of follow-on deliberations since last September's Summit of the Future—is the subject to which we now turn.

II. Monitoring the Pact for the Future (Year 1) through a Logical Framework

“What we measure, therefore, must be grounded in a shared commitment to transparency, impact, and progress. Because in reality, we can only manage what we can measure.”

—Philémon Yang, President of the 79th United Nations General Assembly.⁵³

“Monitoring and evaluation is especially important, because it is how we remain accountable in turning a shared vision into real, measurable results.”

—Guy Ryder, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Policy.⁵⁴

As the main outcome of the September 2024 Summit of the Future (SOTF) in New York, the Pact for the Future sets out a package of Actions and reinforcing commitments to reinvigorate and plan for the future of multilateralism. The Pact encompasses a chapeau, followed by 56 Actions featured in five thematic chapters: i) Sustainable development and financing for development; ii) International peace and security; iii) Science, technology and innovation, and digital cooperation; iv) Youth and future generations; and v) Transforming global governance.⁵⁵ Across the Pact for the Future and the annexed Global Digital Compact (GDC) and Declaration on Future Generations (DFG) are 361 commitments (“Sub-Actions”) that form the “to-do list” for multilateralism, with 291 directly requiring Member States’ leadership (or 80 percent of all Sub-Actions).⁵⁶

Without a clear strategy and comprehensive mechanism(s) to carefully assess progress over a concrete time-frame, United Nations Member States, the Secretariat, and other partners from the civil society and private sector will soon face challenges evaluating the implementation of the Pact for the Future’s 56 Actions and 361 Sub-Actions. As an unofficial initiative undertaken by independent scholars and policy researchers, this section of the *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* (GGIR’25) presents a logical framework (or “logframe”) for monitoring the first year of Pact implementation. The approach aims to complement and buttress formal, official efforts to gauge comprehensive progress between now and the SOTF’s official review, at the start of the UN General Assembly’s eighty-third session in September 2028.⁵⁷ It is a major component of a larger “Pact Monitoring Toolkit,” which aspires to include a comprehensive mapping exercise, an interactive online portal, and other multistakeholder ImPact Coalitions’ monitoring tools.

Pact Monitoring, including a Logical Framework, to Enhance Accountability and Performance

Though an official intergovernmental review of the Pact for the Future is not mandated until September 2028,⁵⁸ multiple benefits for Member States, the UN system, and civil society partners are envisaged from the development and refinement of a Pact for the Future logical framework and related monitoring tools that, together, comprise a proposed Pact Monitoring Toolkit, including the ability to:

Pool existing monitoring capabilities for measuring progress toward Pact for the Future implementation, while seeking to fill any identified gaps: Rather than launching an entirely new monitoring mechanism or framework, a Pact for the Future Monitoring Toolkit aspires to pull together and fully utilize existing indicators and multilateral monitoring methodologies (such as those for the Sustainable Development Goals), as well as others in research, private sector, and civil society institutions worldwide. If critical gaps in modeling or data are identified, the Pact Monitoring Toolkit would offer a ready and recognized venue or access point for new, vetted tools or measures to fill them. This report's logframe and related monitoring tools will support UN system efforts with cutting-edge progress indicators (against Pact Actions and Sub-Actions) to assess change over time and relevant stakeholder contributions.

Collect data and analyze multiple, parallel President of the General Assembly supervised intergovernmental efforts for driving implementation on the Pact for the Future's 56 Actions and associated commitments (Sub-Actions): Major intergovernmental vehicles for advancing near-term progress on Pact implementation include follow-on resolutions by the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the General Assembly; intergovernmental Security Council Reform negotiations; and ECOSOC and related High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) reviews. Sector-specific implementation is also taken up in venues such as the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR); the 2025 Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4); the 2025 World Social Summit; the World Summit on the Information Society +20 review in 2025; the High-level Review of the Global Digital Compact during the General Assembly's 2027-2028 session; review of the Declaration on Future Generations at a high-level plenary meeting during the General Assembly's 2028-2029 session; and other ongoing forums such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), Climate Conference of the Parties (COPs), and Group of Twenty (G20) meetings.

Identify implementation gaps early, while highlighting policies and programs that are most successful in advancing progress: Besides identifying potential indicators and related data gaps, the Pact Monitoring Toolkit's comprehensive and up-to-date assessments of Pact for the Future implementation could aid efforts led by UN Member States and the multilateral system to identify and address accountability and implementation performance gaps. Outputs from the toolkit (data, analytical findings, and case studies) could feed into a complementary Pact Innovation Plan—see [section four](#) of this report—that embodies and facilitates, where necessary, corrective actions to improve Pact implementation.

Help channel, coordinate, and facilitate the multistakeholder ImPact Coalitions initiated at the 2024 UN Civil Society Conference in data collection and wider monitoring efforts, so as to facilitate the constructive and distinct contributions of diverse civil society and private sector groups to Pact for the Future implementation: Some twenty-three civil society-led multistakeholder coalitions were established at the May 2024 UN Civil Society Conference in Support of the Summit of the Future. Besides working


now to drive implementation across the five Pact for the Future chapters, the Global Digital Compact, and the Declaration on Future Generations, each ImPact Coalition (see [table 4.5](#)) could be equipped through the Pact Monitoring Toolkit with the skills and knowledge base to generate data to support both sector-specific and wider post-SOTF monitoring efforts.

Demonstrate, through independent, authoritative, and user-friendly monitoring tools, tangible progress in Pact for the Future implementation, coordination, and information-sharing between Member States, the UN system, and partners across civil society and the private sector, resulting in a more effective, networked, and inclusive multilateral system: At regular intervals and through innovative technology use, the Pact Monitoring Toolkit would both help assure its users that there is tangible progress toward implementation, and highlight areas where implementation is in need of support.

Besides the **logical framework tool** introduced in this report, three other core elements of the proposed Pact Monitoring Toolkit are (see [figure 2.1](#)):

- A **comprehensive mapping exercise** consisting of three parts:
 - i. Full literature review and data audit, to identify existing and new data and indicators, with a preliminary determination of their strength and potential value for inclusion in the Pact Monitoring Toolkit. That effort would identify: i) “low-hanging fruit,” that is, Actions/Sub-Actions where useful indicators/data sources exist (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), climate, etc.); ii) indicators/data sources that will need to be generated but are doable (in part because the specific Action/Sub-Action is measurable/traceable and credible data sources exist); iii) Actions/Sub-Actions that are ambiguous and difficult to track; and iv) high-aspiration (but perhaps “un-monitorable” because they are not attainable) Actions/Sub-Actions (e.g., a world free of hunger). A “Call for Data” could source relevant data from different stakeholders.
 - ii. A stakeholder consultation, including presentation of preliminary findings, a compilation of feedback from all parties, and execution of select streams of additional research as needed.
 - iii. Progress Tracking Methodology, including incorporation of remaining indicators, weighting schemes if required, and future feedback and adjustment mechanisms.
- Development and testing of an **interactive online portal** tool, where UN Mission staff and international organization officials can quickly and easily search for real-time progress updates on specific Pact for the Future Actions and associated Sub-Actions. Given the focus on progress rather than static measures, the portal will aim to include a stoplight feature, noting via green, amber, and red colors which themes, Actions, Sub-Actions, or countries are progressing and those that are potentially lagging.
- Encourage diverse, multipartner **ImPact Coalitions monitoring** tools to contribute to the development of (and benefit from) an interactive online portal, logframe, and other Pact for the Future monitoring tools. Here, champion governments, UN system entities, and civil society groups and networks—including the civil society-led umbrella Coalition for the UN We Need—could work to channel, coordinate, and facilitate the ImPact Coalitions in data collection and wider monitoring efforts (accessing additional Pact-related progress assessments or communities otherwise difficult to reach).

Figure 2.1: Toward a Pact Monitoring Toolkit



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

These proposed four steps should be viewed as mutually reinforcing, interdependent, and integral to the Pact Monitoring Toolkit. The comprehensive mapping exercise could recommend carefully tailored indicators—while, simultaneously, pulling together existing indicators—and requisite datasets for tracking change over time through the logframe tool. Meanwhile, the interactive online portal tool could further refine indicators employed through the logframe, while encouraging subsequent logframe editions to employ more robust (yet still tailor-made) indicators and data sources. At the same time, each ImPact Coalition (whose role in support of Pact implementation is detailed in section four of GGIR’24 and elaborated further in [section four](#) of GGIR’25) could be equipped through the Toolkit with the skills and knowledge base to generate data to support both sector-specific and wider post-SOTF monitoring efforts.

Year 1: Pact for the Future Monitoring

Given the sheer breadth and ambitious scope of the Pact for the Future’s 56 Actions and 361 Sub-Actions, the *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* establishes a framework for monitoring progress toward implementation of 24 select Actions. The research and monitoring team examined three Actions from each of the Pact’s first four chapters, sufficient to demonstrate the reach and respect for Pact integrity, while acknowledging both the complexity of the issues and limited availability of data for monitoring all Pact Actions and Sub-Actions at this time. For Pact Chapter 5 (“Transforming global governance”—which, arguably, embodies the most novel ideas in the Pact) another twelve Actions were carefully assessed. It is hoped that in subsequent additions of the GGIR series, new Actions will be tracked beyond these initial 24, especially as far more data becomes available for a more comprehensive and thorough progress evaluation.

As further elaborated in [GGIR'25 Technical Annex I](#), from the compilation of Pact Sub-Actions found in the project's [GGIR'25 Full Logical Framework](#), the discussion that follows in this section focuses on the selected 24 Actions, each containing (except in certain cases) two Sub-Actions, supported by a “mini-logframe.” The discussions engage the global condition(s) that the Action is intended to address, while the mini-logframe presents, when available, official monitoring indicators and baseline data associated with the Sub-Actions, which are broken into component measurable elements (“Sub-Action Initiatives”). Whereas Sub-Action text derives directly from the Pact for the Future, the “Sub-Action Initiatives” represent the report’s careful interpretation to enable specific Sub-Actions to be monitorable. Where a newly adopted Sub-Action has not benefited from official indicators or lacks reliable baseline data, the logframe—and, indeed, wider Pact Monitoring Toolkit—recommends SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound) criteria for proxy indicators and associated, credible, and relatively recent baseline data examples to fill critical Pact implementation monitoring gaps. SMART proxies speak to the essential meaning of a specific Sub-Action and can, therefore, substitute for the lack of metrics so essential to gauging overall progress on a specific Pact Action.

PACT CHAPTER 1: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT

The three illustrative Actions monitored in Chapter One of the Pact for the Future focus on *development financing*, *gender equality*, and *climate change*.

Action 4 – We will close the Sustainable Development Goal financing gap in developing countries.

With only 17 percent of SDGs on track for implementation as of 2024, calls for a significant SDG Stimulus have grown to help fill the SDG financing gap, estimated in 2023 at between U.S. \$2.5 trillion (pre-COVID-19) and U.S. \$4.2 trillion annually.⁵⁹ In response to the medium-term socioeconomic knock-on effects from COVID-19, the wars in Sudan, Gaza, Ukraine, and elsewhere, and rising food and energy prices, closing the SDG financing gap remains urgent. Championed by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and other world leaders since the 2023 SDG Summit, a proposed U.S. \$500 billion SDG Stimulus focuses on three priorities: tackling high debt costs and rising risks of debt distress, scaling up affordable and long-term financing for development, and expanding contingency financing for countries in need.⁶⁰ The Leaders Group of the SDG Stimulus includes the Heads of State and Government from Canada (Co-Chair), Jamaica (Co-Chair), Barbados, Brazil, France, India, Italy, Kenya, South Africa, and Spain. Three key platforms in 2025 for closing the SDG financing gap in developing countries are the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) in June/July, the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in July, and the World Social Summit in November.

In the GGIR'25 logframe, Action 4 identifies 25 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.1: Action 4 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (b) Continue to advance with urgency towards a SDG stimulus through the Secretary-General’s proposal at the United Nations and in other relevant forums;		
(b1) Advance with urgency towards a SDG stimulus	Increase in MDB lending	MDB lending rose from U.S. \$30 billion in 2000 to U.S. \$96 billion in 2022, while the concessional share of total MDB lending fell from 35% in 2004 to 13% in 2022.
	Decrease in # of countries in debt distress	As of March 2025, 9 countries are in debt distress, according to the IMF.
Sub-Action (c) Scale up and fulfill our respective Official Development Assistance commitments, including the commitment by most developed countries to reach the goal of 0.7% of gross national income for Official Development Assistance and 0.15 to 0.20 percent of gross national income for Official Development Assistance to least developed countries;		
(c1) Scale up and fulfill our respective Official Development Assistance commitments	Increase in ODA commitments	In 2023, total ODA rose by 1.8% in real terms compared to 2022, having reached a record high of U.S. \$223.7 billion (having more than doubled ODA in real terms as compared with 2000).
	SDG 17.2.1 [Increase] Net ODA as a proportion of OECD Development Assistance Committee donors’ Gross National Income	In 2023, Development Assistance Committee donors’ ODA amounted to approximately 0.37% of their combined Gross National Income, just over half of the longstanding 0.7% target.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: ECOSOC, *Trends and Progress in International Development Cooperation*; IMF, *List of LIC DSAs for PRGT-Eligible Countries*; IMF, “*QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (SDRs)*”; UNSD, *The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2024*, 4; European Parliament, “*White Paper on the Future of European Defence*”; IEP, *Official Development Assistance*, 2; OECD, “*Official Development Assistance (ODA)*,” accessed April 12, 2025; and UNGA56, “*Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.*”

While total Official Development Assistance (ODA) rose by 1.8 percent in 2023, major donors like the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), and European Union (EU) countries, which accounted for 63 percent of all ODA in 2023, recently announced significant cuts in foreign aid.⁶¹ By March 10, 2025, 83 percent of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs had been terminated, creating a U.S. \$60 billion funding gap that neither the EU countries and U.K. nor other donors are likely to bridge amid declining global assistance trends.⁶² Table 2.2 portrays future ODA scenarios. Striking a better balance between public and private financing has become essential, in 2025, to closing the SDG financing gap faced by developing countries.⁶³

Table 2.2: Future Official Development Assistance Scenarios

The projected ODA scenarios find that total ODA contributions are poised to drop globally by between 10 and 40 percent.

Scenario	Funding Flow	US	EU27	United Kingdom	Rest of the World	Total Gross Impact
Optimistic	Voluntary Contributions	20-40 percent reduction across ODA sectors	10 percent reduction	50 percent reduction	Maintains 2023 levels	U.S. \$29 billion (10 percent of 2023 total)
	Mandatory Assessed Contributions	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged	Maintains 2023 levels	
Moderate	Voluntary Contributions	50-60 percent reduction across ODA sectors	30 percent reduction	60 percent reduction	Maintains 2023 levels	U.S. \$57 billion (20 percent of 2023 total)
	Mandatory Assessed Contributions	10 percent of mandatory contributions withheld	Unchanged	Unchanged	Maintains 2023 levels	
Pessimistic	Voluntary Contributions	70-90 percent reduction across ODA sectors	70 percent reduction	80 percent reduction	10 percent reduction across ODA sectors	U.S. \$115 billion (40 percent of 2023 total)
	Mandatory Assessed Contributions	30 percent of mandatory contributions withheld	20 percent of mandatory contributions withheld	20 percent of mandatory contributions withheld	10 percent of mandatory contributions withheld	

Source: IEP, *Geopolitical Tensions, Economic Constraints & Shifting Priorities Official Development Assistance*, 12.

Action 8 – We will achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls as a crucial contribution to progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals and targets.

Action 8 speaks directly to SDG 5 on achieving gender equality, empowerment, human rights, equal opportunities for leadership roles, freedom from violence and harassment, equal rights to economic resources, access to sexual and reproductive health, and reproductive rights. Some recent intergovernmental forums for advancing Action 8 are the Health Working Group Meeting (G20), World Trade Congress on Gender, and the 69th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69).

In the GGIR'25 [logframe](#), Action 8 identifies 10 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.3: Action 8 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Take bold, ambitious, accelerated, just and transformative actions to ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all women and girls;		
(a1) Ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all women and girls	SDG 5.1.1 Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce and monitor equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex	Since 2019, 90% of States reported introducing, implementing, strengthening or enforcing violence against women and girls' laws, while 79% have set up, updated, or expanded national action plans to end violence.
	Decrease in gender inequality according to the Gender Inequality Index	The Gender Inequality Index shows equality worldwide improving, with the global value decreasing from 0.579 in 1990 to 0.455 in 2023.
Sub-Action (e) Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance, natural resources and appropriate new technology, in accordance with national laws;		
(e1) Give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, in accordance with national laws	SDG 5.a.1 [Increase] Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by sex; and share of women among owners or rights-bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure	Between 2009 and 2023, men owned land at least twice as often as women in almost half of the assessed 49 countries, and male landowners constituted over 70% of total landowners in one-third of the countries.
	SDG 5.a.2 [Increase] Proportion of countries where the legal framework guarantees women's equal rights to land ownership and/or control	As of 2022, among 68 reporting countries, 47% offered limited legal protection, 22% provided moderate protection, and only 31% had strong or very strong legal frameworks ensuring women's land rights.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UN Women, *“SDG Indicator Dashboard,”* accessed April 26, 2025; UNDP, *“Gender Inequality Index (GII)”* accessed May 20, 2025; UNGA56, *“Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”*; and UNDESA, *“The Sustainable Development Goals Extended Report 2024.”*

The adoption of a political declaration and multi-year program of work (by consensus) at CSW69, in March 2025, marked a milestone in advancing the global gender equality agenda.⁶⁴ At the same time, language around diversity, equity, inclusion, gender-bias, and gender-responsive measures was weakened, due to opposition from major countries.⁶⁵ Despite the political declaration’s shortcomings, civil society groups acknowledged progress in the Declaration’s first explicit mention of gender-based violence, as well as references to women’s rights to work and rights at work, equal pay for work of equal value, and collective bargaining.

Action 9 – We will strengthen our actions to address climate change.

Comprising 11 Sub-Actions, Action 9 reflects a strong commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement and directly aligns with SDG 13 on urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. The agreement emphasizes holding the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts to limit that increase to 1.5°C.⁶⁶ At the 29th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries agreed to mobilize at least U.S. \$300 billion annually by 2035 to help developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions, nowhere near what experts estimate the cost of mitigation and adaptation to be in the Global South.⁶⁷ Among this year’s major intergovernmental forums that address Action 9 include the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in July and COP30 Brazil in November.

In the GGIR'25 logframe, Action 9 was measured through three of its 11 Sub-Actions with 12 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.4: Action 9 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Reaffirm the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change, and underscore that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with 2 degrees Celsius and resolve to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius;		
(a1) Reaffirm the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels	Decrease in global surface temperature	Earth was 1.5° Celsius warmer in 2024 than in the late 19th-century (1850-1900) pre-industrial average.
	SDG 13.2.1 [Increase] # of countries with nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, national adaptation plans and adaptation communications	As of February 2025, only 17 of 195 Paris Agreement signatories communicated their 2025 NDC climate plans to the UNFCCC Secretariat.
Sub-Action (c) Further recognize the need for deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5 degrees Celsius pathways and call on parties to contribute to the following global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches: tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power; accelerating efforts globally towards net zero emission energy systems, utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century; transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science; accelerating zero- and low-emission technologies, including, inter alia, renewables, nuclear, abatement and removal technologies such as carbon capture and utilization and storage, particularly in hard- to-abate sectors, and low-carbon hydrogen production; accelerating and substantially reducing non-carbon dioxide emissions globally, including in particular methane emissions by 2030; accelerating the reduction of emissions from road transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero-and low-emission vehicles; and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible;		
(c9) Accelerating the reduction of emissions from road transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero-and low-emission vehicles; and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or just transitions, as soon as possible	Decrease in greenhouse gas concentrations attributed to road transportation	In 2023, road transportation accounted for approximately 12.2% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
	Development of infrastructure for zero-and low-emission vehicles	While data on infrastructure development for zero- and low-emission vehicles is country-specific, UNEP's Global Electric Mobility Programme, as of 2023, supports over 60 Global South countries with U.S. \$130 million in grants to help transition away from fossil fuels in the transport sector. The global stock of electric cars displaced over 1 million barrels per day of oil consumption in 2024. The stock of electric vehicles is uneven across the world; in China, around one-in-ten cars on the road is now electric, whereas in Europe the ratio is closer to one-in-twenty.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: NASA, "[Global Temperature](#)," accessed May 20, 2025; NOAA Global Monitoring Laboratory, "[Annual Greenhouse Gas Index \(AGGI\)](#)," accessed April 23, 2025; IISD SDG Knowledge Hub, "[15 of 195 Parties to Paris Agreement Meet Deadline to Communicate New NDCs](#)"; WRI, "[4 Charts Explain Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Country and Sector](#)"; UNEP, "[Caribbean Leading the Charge to Electric Mobility](#)"; IEA, "[Trends in Electric Car Markets](#)," accessed May 21, 2025; and UNGA56, "[Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#)."

In January 2025, the United States formally withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement for the second time.⁶⁸ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warned that 2024 warming could temporarily exceed 1.5°C—a threshold it later surpassed—as most nations failed to meet their Paris Agreement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).⁶⁹ Section three of this report elaborates on the alarming pace of climate change, contending that despite bold global climate pledges by many countries and corporations, carbon emissions are predicted to hit a new record of 41.6 billion metric tons in 2024, suggesting that even if the Paris Agreement emission targets were met in the coming few decades, temperature rise would only be limited to 2.6-2.8°C.⁷⁰

PACT CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The three illustrative Actions monitored in Chapter Two of the Pact address the *root causes of conflict*, *unmet needs of humanitarian emergencies*, and *benefits and risks associated with new and emerging technologies*.

Action 13 - We will redouble our efforts to build and sustain peaceful, inclusive and just societies and address the root causes of conflicts.

Action 13 of the Pact builds directly on SDG 16 by addressing the causes of instability, providing and protecting access to civic space, justice, and human rights, and considering how excessive military expenditure threatens SDG investments. In a world where 7.6 percent of humanity lives in extreme poverty and peacebuilding expenditures are less than 0.6 percent of military spending, connecting challenges of basic survival to political instability and violence merits urgent attention.⁷¹ Among the intergovernmental processes and Secretary-General-led efforts for advancing Action 13 are the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, the ongoing Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform, and the Secretary-General’s forthcoming review on the future of United Nations peace operations and report on the impact of increasing military expenditure on SDG achievement.⁷²

In the GGIR’25 logframe, Action 13 identifies 11 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.5: Action 13 Logframe


Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Strengthen resilience and comprehensively address the drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence and instability and their consequences, including by accelerating investment in and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals;		
(a1) Address the drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence, and instability	Increase in global Positive Peace Index Score	The global Positive Peace average score improved by 1% over the 2013-2022 period.
	SDG 16.1.2 [Decrease] Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause	The number of civilian deaths in armed conflict skyrocketed in 2023. Between 2022 and 2023, civilian casualties increased by 72%, making it the highest increase since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in 2015.
Sub-Action (c) Ensure that military spending does not compromise investment in sustainable development and building sustainable peace and request the Secretary-General to provide analysis on the impact of the global increase in military expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals by the end of the seventy-ninth session.		

(c1) Ensure that military spending does not compromise investment in sustainable development	Decrease in SDG financing and investment gaps	The estimated amount of annual finance needed to achieve the SDGs surged by 36% from 2015 to 2022, yet resources only grew by 22% over that period. The resulting annual financing gap has increased by 60%, up to U.S. \$4 trillion.
	Decrease in global military expenditure	Global military expenditure rose to U.S. \$2.718 trillion in 2024, a 37% rise between 2015 and 2024. The 9.4% increase in 2024 was the steepest year-on-year rise since at least 1988.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: IEP, *Positive Peace Report 2024: Analysing the factors that build, predict and sustain peace*, 12; OECD, *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025*; SIPRI, *SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in World Military Expenditure*, 1; IEP, *Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, 5; OHCHR, “SDG Indicator 16.1.2”; and UNGA56, “Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

To build more peaceful societies, the inherent tradeoffs between military and SDG-related expenditure (“guns versus butter”) must be addressed. The SDG financing gap is around U.S. \$4 trillion annually, while military expenditure exceeds U.S. \$2.718 trillion annually. Meanwhile, the economic cost of violence hit U.S. \$19.1 trillion.⁷³ Military and internal security expenditure account for 74 percent of the global economic impact of violence, as seen in figure 2.2. As global security threats rise, some argue that military spending cuts are unrealistic and instead advocate for linking military budgets to climate and development projects.⁷⁴ Comparing global aggregates is challenging, as increasing military spending by high SDG-investing countries may threaten SDG funding by diverting resources from public investment, even as many countries are already shifting their focus away from development funding. The Secretary-General’s report on the impact of increasing military expenditures on SDG achievement, due at the end of the 79th session, should be comprehensive in clarifying the impact.⁷⁵

Figure 2.2: Composition of the global economic impact of violence (2023)



Source: IEP, “Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World,” 39.

Action 15 - We will ensure that people affected by humanitarian emergencies receive the support they need.

Action 15 of the Pact aims to address humanitarian emergencies by strengthening anticipatory mechanisms, addressing causes of displacement, implementing durable solutions, improving burden-sharing, and ensuring predictable emergency financing. Refugee numbers worldwide have grown exponentially, reaching 37.8 million in 2024, and 97 countries saw worsening peacefulness.⁷⁶ With ongoing climate and conflict-related crises, it is crucial to emphasize shared responsibility, warning systems, and international cooperation to address these global humanitarian challenges. Among the intergovernmental processes for advancing Action 15 progress are the 4th International Financing for Development Conference and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Global Humanitarian Policy Forum.

In the GGIR’25 [logframe](#), 12 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.6: Action 15 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Strengthen our efforts to prevent, anticipate and mitigate the impact of humanitarian emergencies on people in need, while paying special attention to the needs of persons in the most vulnerable situations;		
(a1) Strengthen efforts to anticipate and mitigate the impact of humanitarian emergencies	Increase in countries with Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems	As of October 2024, 113 countries reported having MHEWS, compared to only 54 countries in 2015. 69 countries reported having self-assessed their MHEWS with “limited to moderate” achievement, while 39 countries self-scored “substantial to comprehensive” achievement.
	SDG 13.1.1 [Decrease] # of deaths, missing persons and directly affected persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population	Average disaster-related mortality per 100,000 population declined from 1.62 in 2005-2014 to 0.82 during the period 2014-2023 (a decline of 49%).
Sub-Action (b) Address the root causes of forced and protracted displacement, including the mass displacement of populations, and implement and facilitate access to durable solutions for internally displaced persons, refugees and stateless persons, including through equitable international burden- and responsibility sharing, and support to host communities, and with full respect for the principle of nonrefoulement of refugees;		
(b3) Implement equitable and international burden- and responsibility sharing	% of refugee population compared to country’s income	As of 2023, 80% of the world’s refugee population was hosted by countries that together represented only 19% of the world’s income.
	Increase in # of refugees hosted by upper and middle income countries	As of mid-2024, the share of refugees hosted in upper-middle-income countries increased from 7% in 2009 to 37%.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNDRR, [Snapshot of Sendai Framework Monitoring](#); UNDRR, [“Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,”](#) accessed March 26, 2025; UNHCR, [Global Compact on Refugees Indicator Report](#), 27; UNHCR, [“Refugee Data Finder,”](#) accessed March 26, 2025; and UNGA56, [“Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”](#)

When addressing equitable and international burden- and responsibility-sharing, affiliated SDG indicators (such as SDG 10.7.2) do not capture the essence of responsibility-sharing on a global scale.⁷⁷ To address this gap, more precise proxy indicators are introduced to highlight how support for refugee-hosting countries—particularly those with varying economic capacities—can better reflect responsibility sharing. The number of countries receiving United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettlement submissions fell from 35 in 2016 to 25 in 2022, indicating less responsibility-sharing. While most displaced people go to neighboring countries, this disparity underscores the need for increased funding and expanded refugee pathways to ensure more equitable burden-sharing.

Action 27 - We will seize the opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address the potential risks posed by their misuse.

Given their growing importance in daily lives—including for education and employment—emerging technologies and their associated risks will remain a major focus of multilateral bodies. Action 27 focuses, in particular, on assessing impact, reporting by Member States, and enhancing cooperation in the diffusion of new technologies worldwide. In addition to the Global Digital Compact (including steps underway toward an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and Global Dialogue on AI Governance), efforts to advance Action 27 are furthered by the Second World Summit for Social Development, Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Good Global Summit, AI Action Summit, G20/T20 task force on digital transformation, and the World Summit on the Information Society.

In the GGIR'25 [logframe](#), 9 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.7: Action 27 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (c) Enhance international cooperation and capacity-building efforts in order to bridge the digital divides and ensure that all States can safely and securely seize the benefits of digital technologies;		
(c2) Enhance capacity-building to ensure that all States can safely and securely seize the benefits of digital technologies	SDG 17.8.1 [Increase] Proportion of individuals using the Internet	It is estimated that 5.5 billion people, or 68% of the global population, used the internet in 2024, up from 53% in 2019. Despite this growth, 2.6 billion people remain offline.
	Improved gender parity in internet use	As of 2024, 65% of female and 70% of male populations were using the internet.
	Improved rural-urban parity in internet use	As of 2024, 83% of urban and 48% of rural populations were using the internet.
Sub-Action (d) Continue to assess the existing and potential risks associated with the military applications of artificial intelligence and the possible opportunities throughout their life cycle, in consultation with relevant stakeholders;		

(d1) Assess the existing and potential risks associated with the military applications of artificial intelligence	Risk assessment report produced on the military applications of AI	The High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons organized “the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems” in 2024. There has not been a risk assessment report to follow.
	Continued discussions on AI military applications through the UN Security Council on AI, Responsible AI in the Military Domain Summit, and AI Safety Summit meetings	First UN Security Council meeting on AI in July 2023 led to two new intergovernmental fora: the Responsible AI in Military Domain Summit and AI Safety Summit.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: ITU-D, “[Statistics](#),” accessed March 28, 2025; ITU-D, “[Facts and Figures 2024](#),” accessed March 28, 2025; SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 18; UNGA56, “[Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#),”; and Álvarez, “[The risks and inefficiencies of AI systems in military targeting support](#).”

Alongside recent progress in bridging the digital divide (with 68 percent of the world’s population now online compared to only 53 percent in 2019), gender parity improved in 2024, with 65 percent of female and 70 percent of male populations using the internet. The greatest challenge continues to be the rural-urban divide, with 83 percent of urban populations but only 48 percent of rural populations online. Following the Security Council’s first meeting on AI (2023), two new forums, the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) and AI Safety Summit, were created to focus on AI transparency, interpretability, bias, and the need to test and evaluate advanced AI systems.⁷⁸

PACT CHAPTER 3: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AND DIGITAL COOPERATION

The three illustrative Actions monitored in Chapter Three of the Pact for the Future involve *developing countries’ access to science and technology*, *protecting indigenous knowledge*, and *strengthening the UN’s role in promoting international cooperation in science and innovation*.

Action 29 - We will scale up the means of implementation to developing countries to strengthen their science, technology and innovation capacities.

Action 29 aims to enhance developing countries’ science, technology, and innovation capacities through scaled-up financial resources, technology transfer, and collaborative partnerships. Global research and development (R&D) spending grew to 5.9 percent in 2021—measured as the global average annual growth rate—bouncing back from a pandemic-era slowdown (3.2 percent in 2020) and aligning with the 2015-2019 average of 5 percent growth.⁷⁹ Major disparities persist though, with high-income regions investing over 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in R&D, while many lower-income regions stay below 1 percent, limiting overall global research capacity.⁸⁰ The 2025 UN High-Level Political Forum will reflect on progress, answering the Global Digital Compact’s calls for inclusive AI governance through its proposed new Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and Global Dialogue on AI Governance, where developing countries can better reap the benefits of new technologies.⁸¹

In the GGIR'25 [logframe](#), 30 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.8: Action 29 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Ensure that science, technology and innovation contribute to our efforts to eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions and hunger, and to reduce inequalities, in addition to areas such as food security and nutrition, health, education, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, climate and environment;		
(a2) Contribution of science, technology, and innovation to eradicate [reduce] hunger and inequality in food security and nutrition	SDG 2.a.1 [Increase] Agricultural Orientation Index for government expenditures	Although government spending on agriculture has risen in recent years, the Agricultural Orientation Index decreased from 0.50 globally in 2015 to 0.43 in 2023. A value greater than 1 means the agriculture sector receives a higher share of government spending relative to its economic value; a value less than 1 reflects a lower orientation to agriculture.
	Increase in value added as % of global GDP spent on agriculture, forestry, and fishing	As of 2023, agriculture, forestry, and fishing value added as a percentage of global GDP was 4.1%, according to the World Bank.
Sub-Action (b) Increase efforts to support developing countries, in particular by developed countries and those developing countries in a position to do so, with capacity-building in science, technology and innovation through policy exchanges, knowledge-sharing, technical assistance, financing, joint international research and personnel training tailored to specific needs, policies and priorities of developing countries;		
(b1) Increase efforts to support developing countries, in particular by developed countries and those developing countries in a position to do so, with capacity building in science, technology, and innovation	SDG 17.7.1 [Increase] Total amount of funding for developing countries to promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies	Global trade in environmentally-sound technologies totaled U.S. \$2.36 trillion in 2020, up only slightly from U.S. \$2.25 trillion in 2015. However, for least developed countries, trade in environmentally-sound technologies declined by 43% from U.S. \$15.28 billion in 2015 to U.S. \$8.78 billion in 2020.
	SDG 9.5.1 [Increase] Research and development expenditure as a proportion of developing countries' GDP	As of 2025, Northern Africa and Western Asia increased research and development spending from 0.80% to 1.05% of GDP, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, while other developing regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, remain at a lower 0.32% average.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: FAO, "[2.a.1 – Agriculture Orientation Index for Government Expenditures](#)," accessed April 28, 2025; World Bank, "[Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added \(% of GDP\)](#)," accessed April 28, 2025; OECD, *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and Inclusive Architecture*, 204; UNESCO, "[Explore the latest progress on SDG 9.5: Research & Development through key indicators – February 2025](#)"; and UNGA56, "[Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#)."

There are shortcomings in the alignment of agricultural expenditure with its economic significance—as of 2023, agriculture accounted for 4.1 percent of world GDP, yet it remains underfunded in terms of research and innovation.⁸² This imbalance is particularly important to developing economies, where agriculture provides significant employment. Despite improved global R&D spending in recent years, major gaps remain, with Sub-Saharan Africa spending just 0.32 percent of GDP on R&D versus 1.05 percent in North Africa and Western Asia.⁸³

Action 32 - We will protect, build on and complement indigenous, traditional and local knowledge.

Action 32 of the Pact aims to protect, integrate, and complement indigenous, traditional, and local knowledge through legal safeguards, equitable benefit-sharing frameworks, and institutionalized participation in environmental governance. Recent developments include the 2025 High-Level Expert Advisory Group convening on fair trade and the COP16 UN Biodiversity Conference’s decision to create a permanent indigenous decision-making mechanism for biodiversity governance.⁸⁴ Intergovernmental fora in support of this Action include the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Article 8(j) working group, prior informed consent mechanisms of the Nagoya Protocol, and World Intellectual Property Organization’s ongoing negotiations for traditional knowledge protections under the Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic Resources.⁸⁵ The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Reports also promote the incorporation of indigenous knowledge within global policy processes.⁸⁶

The GGIR’25 [logframe](#) identifies one specific Sub-Action Initiative and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data for this Action. One noteworthy Sub-Action is:

Table 2.9: Action 32 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Foster synergies between science and technology and traditional, local, Afrodescendent and Indigenous knowledge, systems, practices and capacities.		
(al) Foster synergies between science and technology and traditional knowledge, indigenous knowledge, local, systems, practices and capacities	Increase in % of global Key Biodiversity Areas overlapping with Indigenous Peoples’ lands	As of 2019, the UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Center reported 36% of the global area covered by Key Biodiversity Areas overlaps with Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ lands.
	Establishment of High-Level Expert Advisory Group to accelerate action on benefit-sharing, value addition, and fair trade	On April 21, 2025, at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Secretary-General announced that a UN High-Level Advisory Group will soon be launched to accelerate action on benefit-sharing, value addition, and fair trade.
	Creation of a permanent subsidiary body for Indigenous Peoples to participate in decision-making on biodiversity	At COP16 on Biodiversity, Member States committed to create a permanent new subsidiarybody, as a space for Indigenous Peoples and others to participate in decision-making on biodiversity.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: WRI, “[Indigenous and Community Forests Indicator](#)”; Guterres, “[Secretary-General’s remarks at the opening ceremony of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues](#)”; UNSDG, “[COP16: Landmark Biodiversity Agreements Adopted](#)”; UNDESA, “[Trust Fund for the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples](#)”; and UNGA56, “[Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.](#)”

While 36 percent of Key Biodiversity Areas overlap with Indigenous Peoples’ lands, their exclusion from resource allocation and policy design persist.⁸⁷ The permanent COP16 subsidiary body and High-Level Expert Advisory Group on benefit-sharing and fair trade aim to address structural inequities, but they require robust funding and enforcement to ensure that Indigenous communities shape benefit-sharing frameworks, particularly in mineral-rich regions threatened by energy transition exploitation.⁸⁸ The UN Secretary-General’s emphasis on redirecting financial flows to Indigenous priorities, and aligning energy transition with rights-

based principles, underscores the urgency of scaling participatory mechanisms, as outlined in the Pact for the Future, to transform symbolic commitments into tangible resource redistribution and co-governance.⁸⁹

Action 33 - We will support the Secretary-General to strengthen the role of the United Nations in supporting international cooperation in science, technology and innovation.

As science and technology disparities between developing and developed countries persist, multilateral cooperation efforts are necessary to promote universal access to frontier technologies.⁹⁰ The UN has moved to institutionalize this function through the Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board and the High-Level “10-Member Group” on Science, Technology, and Innovation for the SDGs, which provides scientific input to policy-making.⁹¹ Intergovernmental fora moving this agenda forward include the 10th Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals,⁹² where inclusive innovation is a focus, and the Global Digital Compact follow-through negotiations on improved AI governance and digital equity.⁹³

The GGIR’25 [logframe](#) identifies four specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.10: Action 33 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Strengthen the capacities of the United Nations to leverage science, technology and innovation in the work of the Organization, including planning, futures thinking and foresight, and to monitor and measure ongoing global progress to bridge the science and technology gap within and between developed and developing countries;		
(a1) Strengthen the capacities of the United Nations to leverage science, technology and innovation in the work of the Organization, including planning, futures thinking and foresight	Increase in # of UN staff trained in science foresight topics through the UN Strategic Foresight Community of Practice	As of 2024, each interactive session of the UN Strategic Foresight Community of Practice has engaged more than 100 participants from more than 40 UN organizations. Over 2,300 UN staff members are actively participating in these sessions.
	Increase UN capacity in data, innovation, digital, and foresight expertise through the UN 2.0 Quintet of Change initiative	As of September 2023, 0.3% of ODA was allocated to data and statistics, 0.7% to innovation, 0% to foresight, and 0.4% to digital initiatives annually. (In 2026 and beyond, we hope to report on progress in implementing the UN 2.0’s modernization initiative.)
(a2) Strengthen the capacities of the United Nations to monitor and measure ongoing global progress to bridge the science and technology gap within and between developed and developing countries	Decrease in the Frontier Technologies Index gap between developed and developing countries	From 2021 until 2023, the Frontier Technology Readiness Index value for developed economies has an average of 0.80 points; for developing economies 0.50.
Sub-Action (b) Support national Governments to leverage science and technology for sustainable development, including by exploring ways to strengthen the capacity and expertise of United Nations country teams.		
(b1) Support national governments to leverage science and technology for sustainable development	Increase in # of national science and technology strategies adopted to support sustainable development	Since the 2021 adoption of UNESCO’s Recommendation on Open Science, 11 countries have introduced open science policies, strategies, and legislative frameworks, nearly doubling the global count of such policies.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UN Futures Lab, “UN Strategic Foresight Community of Practice,” accessed April 28, 2025; UNCTAD, *Technology and Innovation Report 2023: Opening Green Windows – Technological Opportunities for a Low-Carbon World*, 32; UNESCO, “Number of countries with open science policies has almost doubled since adoption of UNESCO Recommendation”; and UN 2.0, “Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 11: UN 2.0 Foresight Chapter.”

Persistent gaps in the Frontier Technology Readiness Index—0.80 for developed versus 0.50 for developing economies—highlight systemic inequities in science, technology, and innovation infrastructure. Accelerating progress in Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States, where levels of readiness remain low, is particularly urgent.⁹⁴ Scaling-up also depends on integrating foresight tools into UN Country Team operations to bridge technology implementation gaps, as well as consideration of recommendations from the forthcoming International Scientific Panel on AI.⁹⁵

PACT CHAPTER 4: YOUTH AND FUTURE GENERATIONS

“At the global level, 251 million children and youth remain out of school, a reduction of only 1 percent since 2015. Key intergovernmental and multistakeholder fora for advancing young people’s social and economic development are the Youth2030 Strategy... the High-Level Steering Committee of SDG 4...the UN Youth Delegate Programme, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, the UN Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development, and the Second World Summit for Social Development.”

Three illustrative Actions monitored in Chapter Four of the Pact for the Future stress *greater investment in children and youth, protecting their human rights and fostering inclusion, and meaningful youth participation at the international level.*

Action 34 - We will invest in the social and economic development of children and young people so that they can reach their full potential.

Action 34 of the Pact speaks largely to SDG 3 on addressing global health and well-being issues, to SDG 4 on providing children and young people access to inclusive and quality education, and to overall social and economic development needs, such as youth job opportunities. At the global level, 251 million children and youth remain out of school, a reduction of only 1 percent since 2015.⁹⁶ Key intergovernmental and multistakeholder fora for advancing young people’s social and economic development are the Youth2030 Strategy by the United Nations Youth Office, the High-Level Steering Committee of SDG 4 as the main body for advancing the Youth Declaration on Transforming Education, the UN Youth Delegate Programme, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, the UN Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development, and the Second World Summit for Social Development.

The GGIR’25 [logframe](#) identifies 28 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.11: Action 34 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Scale up investment from all sources in essential services for young people and ensure that their specific needs and priorities are integrated in national, regional and international development strategies, ensure that services are accessible to all young persons and invite the Secretary-General to update Member States on the proposal for a Global Youth Investment Platform to attract and better finance youth-related programming at the country level;		
(a4) Specific needs and priorities [of young people] are integrated in international development strategies	Increase in # and/or % of UN entities that maintain youth participation and youth programs	In 2023, 97% (32 of 33) of UN entities established partnerships and/or funded innovations on youth to address challenges across sustainable development, human rights, peace and security, and humanitarian action.
	Increase in integration of young people's priorities in international development strategies	In 2023, 76% (38 of 50) of UN entities incorporated priorities of youth in their strategic planning processes and instruments.
Sub-Action (d) Create decent jobs and livelihoods for youth, especially in developing countries and particularly for young women and young people in vulnerable situations, while dismantling inequalities in the care economy, and establish and ensure young people's access to universal, adequate, comprehensive, sustainable and nationally owned social protection systems;		
(d1) Create decent jobs and livelihoods for youth, especially in developing countries	Decrease in developing country youth "Not in Employment, Education and Training" rate	In 2023, the global "Not in employment, education, or training" youth rate of 20.4% was exceeded in Sub-Saharan Africa at 21.9%, and the Middle East and North Africa at 24.4%.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNYO, *Youth2030: A Global Progress Report, 2024*, 37, 58; ILO, "Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 Sub-Saharan Africa," 1; and ILO, "Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 Middle East and North Africa."

Action 35 - We will promote, protect and respect the human rights of all young people and foster social inclusion and integration.

According to a 2022 United Nations Children's Fund U-Report poll, 70 percent of children and young people feel discriminated against, while nearly half report that discrimination has significantly impacted their lives or those of others."

Pact Action 35 addresses discrimination and unlawful practices, such as child labor and trafficking of youth and children, affecting, in particular, young women, youth with disabilities, and youth in developing countries. This Action builds from SDG 5 on promoting gender equality and SDG 10 on reducing inequality within and among countries. According to a 2022 United Nations Children's Fund U-Report poll, 70 percent of children and young people feel discriminated against, while nearly half report that discrimination has significantly impacted their lives or those of others.⁹⁷ Current international fora supporting this Action are the UN Human Rights Council and High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Youth Office's Youth2030 Strategy, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action advanced at CSW69, and this November's (2025) Second World Summit for Social Development.

In the GGIR'25 [logframe](#), 11 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.12: Action 35 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (c) Address the challenges faced by all young women and girls, including by combating gender stereotypes and negative social norms and eliminating discrimination, harassment, all forms of violence against young women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence, and harmful practices, including female genital mutilation and child, early and forced marriage;		
(c3) Eliminating harmful practices, including female genital mutilation and child, early and forced marriage	SDG 5.3.2 [Decrease] Proportion of girls and women aged 15-49 years who have undergone female genital mutilation	As of 2024, an estimated 230 million girls and women worldwide had undergone FGM—a 15% increase, or 30 million more, compared to 8 years ago.
	SDG 5.3.1 [Decrease] Proportion of women aged 20-24 years who were married or in a union before age 15 and before age 18	In 2023, an estimated 640 million girls under age 18 were married globally—1 in 5 girls (or 19%)—down from 1 in 4 in 2000.
Sub-Action (d) Enhance inclusion and eliminate all barriers that hinder young persons with disabilities from attaining and maintaining maximum autonomy, independence and full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life and invest in assistive technologies that can promote their full, effective and meaningful participation in society;		
(d1) Enhance inclusion and eliminate all barriers that hinder young persons with disabilities	Reduce barriers to assistive technology among young persons with disabilities	Data specific to young persons with disabilities is currently unavailable. Globally, high costs, low availability, and lack of support are the most common barriers to accessing assistive products, which are predominantly obtained through the private sector with out-of-pocket payments or family support.
	Increase accessible education for young persons with disabilities	In 2021, out-of-school rates for children with disabilities ranged from 19%-36% at the primary level, 28%-36% at lower-secondary level, and 43%-59% at upper-secondary level.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNGA56, “Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,”; UNGA79, “Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, Report of the Secretary-General,” 11; WHO and UNICEF, *Global report on assistive technology*; and UNICEF, *Seen, Counted, Included: Using data to shed light on the well-being of children with disabilities*, 71.

Action 37 - We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the international level.

Pact Action 37 speaks largely to meaningful inclusion and youth engagement within the UN, its intergovernmental bodies, and its processes, with an emphasis on increasing participation of marginalized youth—such as young women, youth from developing countries, youth with disabilities, and other youth whose voices are often underrepresented. New principles for youth engagement across the UN system, anticipated by the Secretary-General in September 2025, could mark a pivotal opportunity to reinforce institutional accountability and youth-inclusive governance within the United Nations.⁹⁸ The UN Youth Office, Youth2030 Strategy, UN Youth Fund, and the proposed Global Youth Investment Platform are chief drivers of Action 37.

The GGIR’25 logframe identifies seven specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.13: Action 37 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (b) Encourage the inclusion of youth, including youth delegates, in national delegations to the United Nations;		
(b1) Encourage the inclusion of youth, including youth delegates, in national delegations to the United Nations	Increase the % or # of UN system initiatives that include youth engagement mechanisms	In 2023, 57% (75 of 131) of UN Country Teams had in place two or more youth engagement policies and processes.
	Increase the % or # of youth participation within the UN system	In 2023, 80% (105 of 132) of UN Country Teams included youth in joint communication and advocacy plans.
Sub-Action (d) Request the Secretary-General to continue to develop core principles, in consultation with Member States and young people, for meaningful, representative, inclusive and safe youth engagement in relevant intergovernmental processes and across the work of the United Nations, for the consideration of Member States;		
(d1) Request the Secretary-General to continue to develop core principles, in consultation with Member States and young people	Report from the Secretary-General to develop core principles for youth engagement, in consultation with Member States and young people	UN Secretary-General Report on core principles for youth engagement anticipated in September 2025.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNYO, *Youth2030: A Global Progress Report, 2024*, 53 and 80; and Interview with Sudha Balakrishnan (UNYO) on April 18, 2025.

PACT CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The twelve illustrative Actions monitored in Chapter Five of the Pact for the Future address transformations in the *Security Council*, *UN Peacebuilding Commission*, and *international financial architecture; how development is measured*; and *how the international community responds to complex global shocks*.

UN Security Council Reforms (Pact Actions 39-41)

Action 39 - We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

Action 40 - We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

Action 41 - We will strengthen the response of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its relationship with the General Assembly.

Representing a growing consensus on potentially far-reaching UN Security Council reforms not witnessed in decades, Pact for the Future Actions 39-41 signal significant steps toward making the Council more legitimate, inclusive, and effective, including by expanding its membership to align better with today's geopolitical realities. Doing so could create new opportunities for more countries, the General Assembly, regional organizations, local authorities, and non-state actors to contribute to the UN's vital prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions, while curbing the misuse of the Permanent Five's (P-5) veto power. Since its inception in 2008 (in accordance with General Assembly Decision 62/557), the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council

Reform has served as the chief vehicle for reform and strengthening of the Council, and it is expected continue in this role with respect to advancing Pact Actions 39-41.⁹⁹

In the GGIR'25 [logframe](#), Actions 39-41 identify 19 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions found in these Actions are:

Table 2.14: Actions 39-41 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Action 39. Sub-Action (b) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current United Nations membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world and, taking into account our commitments of Sustainable Development Goal 16.8, increase representation of developing countries and small and medium-sized States;		
(b1) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current United Nations membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world	Increase in the # of permanent UNSC seats	Current # of permanent seats: 5 (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). In 2024-2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models, involving additional permanent seats, with the goal of working toward a "consolidated model" (based on a convergence of five clusters of states, and other models presented by individual Member States) as a basis for future negotiations.
	Increase in the # of elected (non-permanent) UNSC seats	Current # of elected (non-permanent) seats: 10 (alternating between regional groups every 2 years). In 2024-2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models, involving additional non-permanent seats, with the goal of working toward a "consolidated model" (based on a convergence of five clusters of states, and other models presented by individual Member States) as a basis for future negotiations.
	Consideration of earlier UNSC enlargement proposals	One of the earliest reforms, introduced in 1963 (taking effect in 1965) centered on increasing non-permanent seats from six to ten, in order to expand representation of newly decolonized nations. In contrast, the 1997 Razali Proposal addressed both permanent and non-permanent categories. Though never adopted, it reflects a shift in the conversation toward more consequential, structural reform.
	Consideration of recent UNSC enlargement proposals	Though official agreement on UNSC enlargement (whether permanent or non-permanent seats) remains elusive, some four different enlargement models have been introduced, post-2005, by clusters of states. These major proposals include: 1. G4 Proposal (2005-present) 2. African Union Proposal-Ezulwini Consensus (2005-present) 3. Uniting for Consensus Proposal (2005-present) 4. L.69 Group of Developing Countries Proposal (2007-present)
Action 39. Sub-Action (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use;		

(d1) Intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto	Increase in the # of Intergovernmental Negotiations on veto modification	Since 2008, the IGN has convened over 40 sessions to curb the misuse of the P-5's veto authority, especially in cases involving the threat or realization of mass atrocities.
	Increase in the # of proposals adopted by the UNGA to curb the veto's misuse	On April 26, 2022, the landmark General Assembly Resolution (A/77/L.52) was adopted without a vote, deciding that the GA's President shall convene the Assembly within ten days of a P-5 member casting a veto and hold a debate about the situation giving rise to a veto by one or more permanent members. The "Liechtenstein Veto Initiative" has triggered several such convenings in the Assembly since its inception.
	Increase in the # of UN Member States proposals on Security Council veto reform	From 2000-2022, six proposals on veto reform were introduced by Member States, including a focus on better addressing mass atrocities and genocide. In contrast, in only 2023-2024 alone, nine more proposals were introduced.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNSC, "[Security Council Membership](#)," accessed March 27, 2025; UNGA59, [A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility](#); African Union, [Common African Position on UN Reform \(Ezulwini Consensus\)](#), 2–5; UNGA78, [Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform](#), 1–4; Security Council Report, "[In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2024 and Looking Ahead to 2025](#)"; Oxfam, "[Vetoing Humanity: How a few powerful nations hijacked global peace and why reform is needed at the UN Security Council](#)"; Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, "[Code of Conduct regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes](#)"; Permanent Missions of France and Mexico to the UN, "[Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities](#)"; UNGA, "[General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Aimed at Holding Five Permanent Security Council Members Accountable for Use of Veto](#)"; and United Nations, "[General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Aimed at Holding Five Permanent Security Council Members Accountable for Use of Veto](#)."


“According to the Security Council Report, 60 percent of UN Member States have never had the chance to serve on the UN Security Council.¹⁰⁰ In 2024 and 2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models—including both new permanent and non-permanent seats—with the goal of soon having the long-elusive “consolidated model” (Pact Action 40) serve as the basis for future negotiations.”

Global South Member States emphasize that the Security Council does not reflect their fast changing political, economic, and demographic significance, stressing that the Council's composition has remained largely unchanged since 1965 (when it was expanded from six to ten non-permanent members, or an increase from eleven to fifteen Member States in total—including the P-5 members China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States). According to the Security Council Report, 60 percent of UN Member States have never had the chance to serve on the UN Security Council.¹⁰⁰ In 2024 and 2025, the IGN continued consideration of different models—including both new permanent and non-permanent seats—with the goal of soon having the long-elusive “consolidated model” (Pact Action 40) serve as the basis for future negotiations. Based on a convergence of five clusters of states, and other models presented by individual Member States, the “consolidated model” negotiations have the potential to trigger deliberation on amendments to the UN Charter, in accordance with its Articles 108 or 109.

At the same time, prospects for Security Council veto reform remain fraught with political disagreements. No less than nine formal proposals for amending the P-5's veto authority were presented to the IGN

between 2023 and 2024—more than doubling the six proposals that were submitted between 2000 and 2022 (see figure 2.3). This rise reflects growing dissatisfaction among Member States with the frequent use of veto by certain P-5 Members (namely, China, Russia, and the United States), particularly amid crises such as those in Ukraine and Gaza.¹⁰¹ Although some argue that veto reform would disrupt the UN Charter’s balance of power, others contend that restricting or eliminating the veto in cases involving the threat or realization of mass atrocities or genocide would, in effect, strengthen the Council’s legitimacy.¹⁰² Given the surge in humanitarian crises, however, non-binding efforts such as the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group Code of Conduct and the French-Mexican plan for curbing misuses of the veto might be more practical at this time than pursuing formal Charter revision.¹⁰³

Figure 2.3: Increase in UN Security Council Veto Reform proposals



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center. Data sources: Security Council Report, *The Veto: Research Report No. 3, 5*; African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*; UNGA59, *“Uniting For Consensus’ Group Of States Introduces Text On Security Council Reform To General Assembly”*; Global Centre for the R2P, *Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities*; ACT Group, *Code of Conduct regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes*; United Nations, *“General Assembly Adopts Landmark Resolution Aimed at Holding Five Permanent Security Council Members Accountable for Use of Veto”*; UNGA78, *L.69 Group Submission on Security Council Reform*; Schwalger, *Joint Statement on Security Council Reform*; CARICOM, *Submission on Security Council Reform*; PSIDS, *Security Council Climate Security Proposal*; and S5 Group, *Revised Veto Proposal*, 2023.

Action 44 - We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.

Action 44 of the Pact for the Future aims to improve conflict prevention and peacebuilding by further innovating the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). With nearly one billion people living in fragile and conflict-affected settings in 2024, the need for effective, coordinated, and lasting peacebuilding has never been greater.¹⁰⁴ However, the 2024 Multilateralism Index noted a “dramatic deterioration” in the performance of the multilateral system in preventing violent conflict and building peace.¹⁰⁵ Key opportunities to enhance the PBC’s performance, funding, and partnerships are currently sought through the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR)—a process that entered its formal phase in January 2025 (see [figure 2.4](#)), the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), and the annual Peacebuilding Commission Report.¹⁰⁶


In the GGIR’25 [logframe](#), 16 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.15: Action 44 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission;		
(a1) Building and sustaining peace worldwide, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts	Increase in societal safety and security, reflected in % change in the Global Peace Index average societal safety and security score	While the average country peacefulness level deteriorated by 0.56% in 2024, the safety and security score improved, with 81 countries recording improvements, while 77 deteriorated.
	Decrease in ongoing domestic and international conflicts, reflected in % change in Global Peace Index average ongoing conflict score	The Global Peace Index’s ongoing conflict score declined in 2024, with 85 countries recording a decline. “Deaths from internal conflict” and “internal conflicts fought” indicators recorded the largest deterioration.
	Decrease in militarization, reflected in % change in Global Peace Index average militarization score	The militarization score deteriorated by 1.7%, with 108 countries recording deteriorations. The main driver was rising military spending, with 86 countries increasing military expenditure.
Sub-Action (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States’ progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the advisory, bridging and convening role of the Commission, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the mandate of the Commission;		
(b2) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States’ progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts	Increase in direct Commission support to Member States in advancing nationally owned and led peacebuilding, sustaining peace, and prevention efforts, as reflected in the number of settings engaged per year by the Commission	In 2024, the Commission directly supported nine separate country- and region-specific settings, a decrease from the ten engaged in 2023. The Commission broadened its geographic scope, holding its first meetings in Guatemala, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and Principe.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: IEP, *Global Peace Index 2024: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*; PBC, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Seventeenth Session*; and PBC, *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Eighteenth Session*.

Figure 2.4: 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review Framework



International Financial Architecture Reforms (Pact Actions 47–52)

Action 47 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to address the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Action 48 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries.

Action 49 - We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to mobilize additional financing for the Sustainable Development Goals, respond to the needs of developing countries and direct financing to those most in need.

Action 50 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.

Action 51 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen its capacity to support developing countries more effectively and equitably during systemic shocks and make the financial system more stable.

Action 52 - We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that it can meet the urgent challenge of climate change.

Reforming the global financial framework involves a complete transformation of international financial systems to make them more just, efficient, and attuned to the requirements of developing nations, thus speeding up the achievement of the 2030 Agenda. At present, developing countries encounter an annual financing deficit of about U.S. \$4 trillion for the SDGs, which is a 50 percent rise from estimates prior to the pandemic; developing nations also typically pay about twice as much in interest on sovereign debt as developed nations.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, at the COP29 United Nations Climate Change Conference, in November 2024 in Baku, governments committed to a U.S. \$300 billion per annum target (by 2035) in support of developing countries' climate action, though climate experts estimate that U.S. \$1.3 trillion is actually needed.¹⁰⁸

Despite representing over 80 percent of the world's population and being the primary beneficiaries of World Bank operations, developing countries collectively hold less than 40 percent of the Bank's voting power.¹⁰⁹ To address this and other disparities, the 2024 UN Financing for Development Forum helped to lay the groundwork for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), planned for June 30-July 3, 2025 in Seville, aiming to catalyze comprehensive reforms in global financial governance.¹¹⁰ Other critical vehicles for driving international financial architecture reforms outlined in the Pact for the Future are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Executive Boards (including ministerial-level meetings each April and October); a new Biennial Summit on the Global Economy with the potential for meaningful engagement and coordination with the G20, international financial institutions, World Trade Organization, and UN General Assembly; the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable; and the Climate COPs, Green Climate Fund, Global Environment Facility, and related climate financing institutions.

In the GGIR'25 logframe, Actions 47–52 identify 41 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data. Six noteworthy Sub-Actions found in these Actions are:

Table 2.16: Actions 47–52 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Action 47. Sub-Action (a) Continue to pursue deeper reforms of the international financial architecture to turbocharge implementation of the 2030 Agenda and achieve a more inclusive, just, peaceful, resilient and sustainable world for people and planet, for present and future generations.		
(a1) Reforms of the international financial architecture to turbocharge implementation of the 2030 Agenda	Decrease in annual SDG financing gap	Financing gaps for sustainable development are significant and increasing, with 2024 estimates suggesting that U.S. \$4 trillion is needed annually, representing a 50% rise from pre-pandemic levels.
	Decrease in global public debt-to-GDP ratio	Global public debt reached 91% of GDP in 2022, a 4% decline from 2021, yet still 7.5% higher than pre-pandemic levels. While some developed economies have improved in their debt-to-GDP ratios, many developing countries continue to grapple with significant debt vulnerabilities.

<p>Action 48. Sub-Action (a) Encourage the Board of the International Monetary Fund to take further steps to continue to support a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced institution and improve the voice and representation of developing countries, in particular through the ongoing work of the Executive Board of the Fund to develop by June 2025 possible approaches as a guide for further quota realignment, including through a new quota formula, under the seventeenth general review of quotas, while protecting the quota shares of the poorest members;</p>		
(a1) Support a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF	Increase in total IMF quotas	As of December 2023, the IMF Board of Governors approved a 50% increase in quotas under the 16th General Review, raising total quotas to SDR 715.7 billion (approximately U.S. \$960 billion). This increase aims to strengthen the IMF's quota-based nature and reduce reliance on borrowed resources. Implementation of this increase is pending member countries' consent.
<p>Action 49. Sub-Action (a) Deliver a robust and impactful twenty-first replenishment of the International Development Association that includes contributions and strong policy commitments from both new and existing donors that significantly increase the resources of the Association, and work towards establishing a pathway to significantly and sustainably increase the Association by the 2030 replenishment;</p>		
(a1) Deliver a robust and impactful twenty-first replenishment of the International Development Association [IDA] that includes contributions and strong policy commitments from both new and existing donors	Increase in total IDA21 replenishment amount compared to IDA20	The IDA21 replenishment secured U.S. \$100 billion—up from U.S. \$93 billion in IDA20—with U.S. \$24 billion from donors and the rest from markets and internal resources.
<p>Action 50. Sub-Action (a) Strengthen the multilateral response to support countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens, with the meaningful participation of the countries concerned and all relevant actors, ensuring an approach that is more effective, orderly, predictable, coordinated, transparent and timely to enable those countries to escape debt overhang and prioritize government expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals;</p>		
(a1) Strengthen the multilateral response to support countries with high and unsustainable debt burdens	Decrease in U.S. \$ paid in interest on foreign debt	In 2023, developing countries paid a record U.S. \$1.4 trillion to service foreign debt, with interest payments soaring nearly 30% to U.S. \$406 billion, a 20-year high, putting severe pressure on public expenditure. The poorest countries, eligible for World Bank IDA support, paid U.S. \$96.2 billion, including a record U.S. \$34.6 billion in interest (four times more than a decade ago).
<p>Action 51. Sub-Action (a) Call on countries that are in a position to do so to voluntarily rechannel special drawing rights from the 2021 allocation, and for those countries to also consider rechanneling at least half of their special drawing rights, including through multilateral development banks, while respecting relevant legal frameworks and preserving the reserve asset character of special drawing rights;</p>		
(a1) Encourage countries, that are in a position to do so, to voluntarily rechannel at least half of their special drawing rights from the 2021 allocation	Increase in total SDR amount (in U.S. \$ equivalent) rechanneled to developing countries annually	No rechanneling of SDRs to developing countries was reported in 2024. As of March 2025, 23 Resilience and Sustainability Trust partners have channeled or committed to channeling U.S. \$47 billion to the RST, which provides affordable long-term financing for countries to address structural challenges.
<p>Action 52. Sub-Action (a) Increase the availability, accessibility, and impact of climate finance to developing countries;</p>		
(a1) Increase availability and accessibility of climate finance to developing countries	Increase in annual amount of climate finance dispersed to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation	In 2023, the World Bank Group provided U.S. \$38.6 billion in climate financing to developing countries. This rose 10% in 2024, reaching a record U.S. \$42.6 billion.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UNDESA, *Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2024*; UNDESA, *Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2023*; OECD and UN-Habitat, *Global State of National Urban Policy 2024: Building Resilience and Promoting Adequate, Inclusive and Sustainable Housing*; IMF, “IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota Increase Under 16th General Review of Quotas”; Atlantic Council, “Inequality at the Top: Democratic Challenges at Bretton Woods Institutions”; UN-OHRLS, “History of the MVI,” accessed May 29, 2025; World Bank, “A Record Funding Round Replenishes the Best Deal in Global Development”; World Bank, “Developing Countries Paid Record \$1.4 Trillion on Foreign Debt”; ODI, “Common Framework, Uncommon Challenges: Lessons from the Post-COVID Debt Restructuring Architecture”; IMF, “Annual Update on SDR Trading Operations”; IMF, “Special Drawing Rights,” accessed May 6, 2025; IMF, “Review of Charges and the Surcharge Policy-Reform Proposals”; World Bank, “Climate Finance Fiscal Year 2024 Snapshot”; IEA, “Scaling Up Private Finance for Clean Energy in Emerging and Developing Economies,” accessed May 6, 2025; IEA, *Reducing the Cost of Capital*; and World Bank, “Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Database,” accessed May 6, 2025.

In a noteworthy step to tackle the disparity between developing country membership (75 percent) and actual voting power (37 percent), the International Monetary Fund has added a 25th chair to its Executive Board specifically for sub-Saharan Africa, effective November 1, 2024, thereby improving the region’s representation in the Fund’s decision-making activities.¹¹¹ Additionally, the ongoing 17th General Review of IMF Quotas, which is set to conclude by June 2025, aims to adjust quota shares to better reflect members’ positions in the global economy, while safeguarding the shares of the poorest members.¹¹²

Another important international financial governance innovation, where the Summit of the Future lent crucial political support (in Action 48 of the Pact), is its emphasis on a Biennial Summit on the Global Economy “at the level of Heads of State and Government to strengthen and establish more systemic links and coordination between the United Nations and the international financial institutions ...”¹¹³ By substantively engaging all 193 UN Member States of the General Assembly, alongside powerful groupings of states through the G20 forum and World Trade Organization, a Biennial Summit—convened every two years during UNGA High-Level week in New York—is also poised to advance the Pact’s underscoring of “inclusive participation” in respect to this new initiative of the Secretary-General, as well as its call (in Action 51) to better support developing countries during systemic shocks.¹¹⁴

Ensuring that countries can borrow sustainably for long-term development is critical, especially as many developing nations grapple with escalating debt burdens that hinder their progress toward SDGs delivery. In 2023, developing countries’ external debt reached a record U.S. \$11.4 trillion, equivalent to 99 percent of their export earnings, with 54 nations allocating at least 10 percent of government funds to debt interest payments.¹¹⁵ Notably, the poorest countries paid a record U.S. \$96.2 billion to service their debt in 2023, with interest costs surging to an all-time high of U.S. \$34.6 billion, four times the amount paid a decade ago.¹¹⁶ These figures underscore the urgency of reforming the international financial architecture to provide more effective, predictable, and transparent mechanisms for debt restructuring and relief.

Innovative instruments like Climate Resilient Debt Clauses, which allow for the deferral of debt repayments in the event of natural disasters, are gaining traction, with five multilateral development banks—including the World Bank and the African Development Bank—committing to their adoption.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, developing countries face disproportionately high capital costs, limiting their access to climate finance, while global investment in renewable energy remains insufficient to meet Paris Climate Agreement targets. Closing these gaps requires urgent structural reforms to financial mechanisms that not only expand climate finance and lower barriers for vulnerable economies, but also encourage greater private sector investment in sustainable solutions. This November’s Climate COP30 Belém, as well as related climate financing and grant-making bodies (including the Green Climate Fund and the Global

Environment Facility), are well-positioned to leverage public-private partnerships, including through blended financing mechanisms, to accelerate progress toward meeting global climate goals.

Action 53 – We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.

Action 53 directly correlates with SDG target 17.19; both aim to redefine measures of progress for sustainable development, moving beyond Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by more fully integrating environmental, social, and governance dimensions of national progress. While GDP remains the dominant metric for economic performance, its focus on market transactions is limited in capturing socioeconomic inequalities, environmental degradation, and overall standards of living within countries. For example, while industrial land expansion represents a leading factor for GDP growth in developing countries, it also drives CO2 emissions in those countries—a health and environmental risk that is unaccounted for in GDP.¹¹⁸ Key vehicles for developing and taking forward new quality of life metrics are the High-Level Committee on Programs Core Group on Beyond GDP, UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Report Office, and High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development.

In the GGIR’25 [logframe](#), 5 specific Sub-Action Initiatives and corresponding Indicators (including Targets) and Baseline Data are identified for this Action. Two noteworthy Sub-Actions are:

Table 2.17: Action 53 Logframe

Sub-Action Initiative	Indicator and Target	Baseline Data
Sub-Action (a) Request the Secretary-General to establish an independent high-level expert group to develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product, in close consultation with Member States and relevant stakeholders, taking into account the work of the Statistical Commission, building on the global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to present the outcome of its work during the eightieth session of the General Assembly;		
(a2) An independent high-level expert group will develop recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable indicators of sustainable development that complement and go beyond gross domestic product	High-level expert group produces recommendations for a limited number of country-owned and universally applicable sustainable development indicators that complement and go beyond gross domestic product	In 2023, the UN Secretary-General presented three proposals on a universal and comprehensive measurement of progress and sustainable development to complement GDP. On March 26, 2025, the Secretary-General note that “the Expert Group called for in the Pact to develop measures of progress that go beyond gross domestic product will soon be announced and will work throughout the year before an intergovernmental process takes over in 2026.”
Sub-Action (b) Initiate a United Nations-led intergovernmental process following the completion of the work of the independent high-level expert group in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the Statistical Commission, international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and regional commissions, in line with their respective mandates, on measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go beyond gross domestic product, considering the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s high-level expert group.		
(b1) Initiate a United Nations-led intergovernmental process on measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go beyond gross domestic product	UN-led intergovernmental process on measures of sustainable development progress that complement or go beyond gross domestic product is initiated	A UN-led intergovernmental process on measures of sustainable development is anticipated in 2026.

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “[Valuing What Counts: United Nations System Wide Contribution Beyond Gross Domestic Product](#)”; UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “[Beyond GDP](#),” accessed May 7, 2025; Guterres, “[Valuing What Counts: Framework to Progress Beyond Gross Domestic Product](#)”; and United Nations, “[Secretary-General Outlines Four Areas of Focus in Implementing Pact for Future](#).”

Action 54 – We will strengthen the international response to complex global shocks.

Action 54 aims to strengthen the international community’s capacity to respond to complex global shocks by enhancing coordination, clarifying institutional roles, and skillfully stewarding and rationalizing the use of finite financial resources. These shocks, such as pandemics, climate disasters, and food, energy, and wider economic disruptions, have exposed serious gaps in preparedness, including fragmented responses and funding shortfalls. The *Global Risks Report 2025* portrays global shocks as increasingly frequent, interconnected crises that are particularly driven by climate disasters, technological disruptions, and geopolitical conflict, stressing the need for global cooperation, enhanced risk anticipation, and systems capable of withstanding compounding risks.¹¹⁹ Improving the UN system’s response under Action 54 requires further consultations on new protocols and other requirements for improved international response between major global and regional multilateral bodies, governments with global reach, and resourceful non-state actors, ensuring alignment with existing mandates, preventing duplication of efforts and other inefficiencies, and upholding the UN’s coordination role in humanitarian emergencies. It is hoped that, in 2026, the *Global Governance Innovation Report* will have gathered sufficient data to assess UN Secretariat-led progress on Action 54.

“Improving the UN system’s response under Action 54 requires further consultations on new protocols and other requirements for improved international response between major global and regional multilateral bodies, governments with global reach, and resourceful non-state actors, ensuring alignment with existing mandates, preventing duplication of efforts and other inefficiencies, and upholding the UN’s coordination role in humanitarian emergencies.”

Major Takeaways from Year 1, Planning for Years 2-4

While still early days in implementing the Pact for the Future, several trends and noteworthy initial takeaways are starting to emerge, including:

- **Slow yet visible progress overall:** Given that initial data gaps were anticipated (with more data to evaluate progress expected in 2026 and beyond), GGIR’25 monitoring in Year 1 has focused on a combination of process deliberations, existing official SDG indicators, and employing proxy indicators that speak to the essential meaning of a select few Pact Actions. On the whole, slow yet visible progress is observed across key elements of the Pact. For instance, steps toward strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission (Action 44) are underway through the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, and the recent (April 2025) World Bank-IMF Spring Meetings and (June-July 2025) Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) are helping to sustain momentum on certain international financial architecture reforms (Pact Actions 47-52). Meanwhile, and purposely gleaned insights from data trends preceding the Pact’s adoption,

for Action 27 Sub-Action (c) on bridging the digital divide, 68 percent of the world's population was online in 2024, compared to only 53 percent in 2019—which could be accelerated further through initial Member States steps now underway this year, in support of Pact Chapter Three and Global Digital Compact Objective #5, to stand-up an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and Global Dialogue on AI Governance.

- ***Worries about steep cuts in foreign aid and international organization financing:*** At the same time that initial progress is observed, proposed steep funding cuts are anticipated to hurt Pact implementation across the board, as many countries begin to pull back from foreign aid and international organization financing. It is estimated that Official Development Assistance (ODA) alone could decline by 20 to 40 percent in the coming years amidst geopolitical shifts, resulting in a reduction of U.S. \$50 to U.S. \$115 billion less aid per annum compared to 2023.¹²⁰ Figures already point to a decline of 7.1 percent in ODA in 2024 compared to 2023—the first drop after five years of growth.¹²¹ Calls to raise military spending in the U.S., U.K., and EU countries—which together provided 63 percent of all ODA flows in 2023—could further divert funds from development.¹²² Moreover, the Trump Administration has recommended to Congress U.S. \$1.7 billion in cuts for most assessed and all voluntary contributions to the UN and other international organizations, on top of another proposed U.S. \$1.6 billion reduction to the UN's peacekeeping budget (where the U.S. is already U.S. \$1.1 billion in arrears).¹²³ UN agencies are already feeling the strain: the UN humanitarian office faces a U.S. \$58 million shortfall, forcing it to cut 20 percent of its staff; the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) anticipates a 20 percent budget reduction; and the UN migration agency expects a 30 percent funding drop—potentially impacting 6,000 jobs.¹²⁴
- ***Intergovernmental leadership matters both within and outside the UN system:*** From the seventeen intergovernmental processes overseen directly by the President of the General Assembly (see table 4.1) to other international fora beyond the UN proper in New York, including the World Trade Organization in Geneva, G20/G7/BRICS+, Climate COPs managed out of Bonn, and regional organizations, creative and resourceful leadership—both individually and collectively by Member States—are fundamental to advancing the 291 (out of 361) government-led Sub-Actions in the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations. Initial evidence suggests (for instance, in the realm of peace and security Actions tracked in Chapters Two and Five of the Pact) that specific Sub-Actions can garner momentum when they are championed by even a small number of diverse and committed governments.
- ***Civil society groups are poised to help maximize Pact implementation, especially through multistakeholder ImPact Coalitions:*** By mobilizing broad-based political support and financial resources, providing technical and research-based inputs, and shining light on both progress and setbacks, the diverse ImPact Coalitions—backstopped by the Coalition for the UN We Need and working across the Pact for the Future agenda—can buttress the central leadership role of governments and international organizations in driving meaningful changes. In particular, their contributions are recognized in the run-up to this June-July's FFD4 Conference (Actions 4, 47, 49, and 52), the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (Action 44), and work on advancing AI and other cybertech cooperation (Actions 27, 29, and 33, and the Global Digital Compact Objective #5).
- ***Robust Pact for the Future follow-through can be a firewall in the defense and reform of multilateralism:*** The Pact responds to detractors of the United Nations and other multilateral

bodies by demonstrating that: a) a broad international consensus can be reached on urgent reforms toward making the global governance system “fit-for-purpose”; and b) initial steps toward delivering on these commitments from last September’s Summit of the Future are beginning to bear fruit. The Pact, in many ways, can serve as a proxy for those governments and non-state actors seeking to invest in multilateral approaches for global problem-solving. Rather than increasing financial burdens or expanding international bureaucracy, many Pact Actions tracked in this report (including those associated with UN 2.0 technological and foresight applications) should align well with the Secretary-General’s “UN80 Initiative” to “update the UN’s structure, priorities, and operations for the 21st century.”¹²⁵ Conversely, the UN80 Initiative can help to advance the ambitions of the Pact for the Future by creating a more agile, cost-effective, and impactful multilateral system.

“By mobilizing broad-based political support and financial resources, providing technical and research-based inputs, and shining light on both progress and setbacks, the diverse ImPact Coalitions—backstopped by the Coalition for the UN We Need and working across the Pact for the Future agenda—can buttress the central leadership role of governments and international organizations in driving meaningful changes.”

This section of *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* highlights major findings from the first edition (Year 1) of a new logframe tracking tool, as an integral part of a broader Pact Monitoring Toolkit—including three other components detailed earlier. These conclusions help form the analytical basis for the report’s initial work on a Pact Innovation Plan (see [section four](#)), including by informing policy-makers where measures to achieve intended policy and institutional changes are taking root, and which Pact Actions may require new approaches, resources, and partnerships to fulfill. In subsequent years (2026, 2027, and 2028), especially as lessons learned are integrated and the tailor-made indicators and data sources become more robust, the GGIR series logframe’s overall reach could expand in assessing far more individual Actions and Sub-Actions, spread equitably across the Pact for the Future’s five chapters.

While the UN Secretary-General’s principals-led Steering Committee, six Working Groups and Two Task Teams—alongside the President of the General Assembly overseeing, in 2025, seventeen Intergovernmental Negotiating Tracks and a three-part Interactive Dialogue with Member States on Pact implementation—have each contributed to these five main initial (Year 1) takeaways, considerable challenges, threats, and opportunities await for 2026 and beyond (Years 2–4). Before turning in [section four](#) to creative ways to maximize the catalytic and broader leadership roles performed across the UN system and by UN Member States with civil society partners, a significant lacunae within the Pact for the Future—especially in terms of advancing meaningful policy and institutional innovations—is the subject of this report’s next section. Indeed, a failure to grapple effectively with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution can undermine continued anticipated progress within most of the Pact’s 56 Actions and hundreds of Sub-Actions, as well as its Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations.

III. Innovative Environmental Governance for a Post-1.5°C World

“At the end of the day, where there is more community mobilization, when there is enough political will, when there is enough Global North-Global South collaboration, when there is enough grassroots, indigenous people, women, and girls, when we see everyone coming together, taking action and taking the climate crisis as a serious issue, then we will hopefully see more change.”

—Fatou Jeng, United Nations Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change.¹²⁶

Of the 604 extreme weather events cataloged by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 2024, 289 were classified as “unusual” and 147 as “unprecedented.”¹²⁷ More frequent and intense heat waves, droughts, floods, rising sea levels, ocean acidification, melting glaciers, and species loss are all symptoms of the three intersecting crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste. These components of this “triple planetary crisis” are deeply interconnected: as pollution enters the environment, biodiversity and ecosystems deteriorate, exacerbating climate change and undermining nature’s ability to absorb humanity’s collective effluents, creating an unremitting cycle of environmental degradation.¹²⁸ Addressing these intersecting crises demands urgent action to innovate and reform environmental governance.


This section begins by highlighting major challenges in tackling the triple planetary crisis. It then examines the international community’s response to date, exposing institutional shortcomings and the improbability of meaningful improvement without innovative and forward-looking policy interventions. Governance reforms are then proposed for each arm of the crisis, along with cross-cutting governance frameworks, including a Global Environment Organization (GEO).

Challenges

The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement set 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels as an intended limited (over time) on global temperature rise. Less than a decade later, in 2024, the world crossed the 1.5°C warming threshold.¹²⁹ Similar trends are evident in the complex, interconnected problem-sets of biodiversity loss, pollution, and waste. Across these environmental challenges, three key barriers to concrete action stand out: the rising complexity and interconnectedness of planetary risks; low accountability and high uncertainty; and the inequality between those causing environmental damage and those suffering its effects.

VICIOUS CYCLES AND INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF PLANETARY RISKS

Despite global climate pledges, carbon emissions are projected to reach a new record of 41.6 billion metric tons in 2024, primarily driven by fossil fuel emissions accounting for 37.4 billion metric tons.¹³⁰ Even if current Paris emission reduction targets were fully implemented, temperature rise would still only be limited to 2.6-2.8°C.¹³¹ Simultaneously, unchecked emissions and unsustainable consumption patterns intensify air, water, and materials pollution (especially plastics), creating significant health and environmental hazards.¹³² The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that 99 percent of the global population lives in areas where air pollution exceeds WHO guideline limits,¹³³ while plastic waste damages human health and exacerbates climate change, ocean acidification, and biodiversity loss, threatening every other planetary system boundary (figure 3.1).¹³⁴ Despite these alarming trends, production of fossil fuels and plastics is expected to surge by 70 percent by 2040.¹³⁵



Failure to address any aspect of the triple planetary crisis will inevitably undermine progress in the other areas. Avoiding this vicious cycle requires coordinated governance initiatives. Innovative and comprehensive policies and organizations are essential to break out of the crisis cycle and enable accountability across what is currently a fragmented system merely sparring with an interconnected, increasingly existential global crisis.

LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND INCREASING UNCERTAINTY

Current global climate governance relies on fragmented, often inefficient, and non-binding institutions, resulting in widespread failure to monitor, report, and meet Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) established under the Paris Climate Agreement. The risks to people and planet outlined above, including the failure to meet the Paris emissions targets, underscore the urgent need to innovate global governance to ensure ambitious, science-led climate action. Unfortunately, current geopolitical shifts, escalating tensions, and the prioritization of national growth over international cooperation are rapidly reshaping global governance mechanisms, posing further challenges in responding to the triple planetary crisis.

For example, in early 2025, the United States (U.S.) announced its withdrawal from several multilateral frameworks, including the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, the WHO, and the UN Human Rights Council.¹³⁶ This dealt a significant blow to global multilateralism, not least due to the U.S. having previously contributed to approximately 21 percent of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) annual budget.¹³⁷ As the world's second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the U.S. decision to exit the fight not only disrupts financing for key climate mechanisms, but it also weakens institutional follow-through, undermines national commitments, and creates a vacuum in international accountability, leadership, and cooperation.¹³⁸ Argentina's decision to withdraw from the WHO similarly reflects a growing wave of nationalist disengagement from global governance frameworks,¹³⁹ a trend that is also evident in the widespread reduction of Official Development Assistance (ODA), with countries like Sweden recently ending their longstanding commitment to allocate one percent of gross national income to global development efforts.¹⁴⁰ For the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UNFCCC, such retrenchment from major contributors exacerbates existing challenges, especially given their reliance on discretionary funding and their limited authority to drive implementation and ensure accountability. This trend threatens to stall climate progress, deepen global inequalities, and leave international governance systems ill-equipped to respond to accelerating environmental crises.

UNEQUAL CAUSE AND IMPACT

Crucially, the triple planetary crisis impacts states unequally. Countries least responsible for climate change, pollution, and waste tend to bear the brunt of environmental disasters, creating a large divide in both impact and incentive for change between emitting countries and climate vulnerable countries. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the 46 least developed countries (LDCs)—home to about 1.1 billion people—have faced the worst consequences of the triple planetary crisis, with over 69 percent of climate-related deaths occurring in LDCs,¹⁴¹ but they account for only about 9 percent of per-capita world CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes.¹⁴² A recent Oxfam report reveals that the richest 10 percent of the global population, mostly living in high-income, high-emissions countries, are responsible for 50 percent of carbon emissions.¹⁴³ The divide between those countries and climate vulnerable countries poses significant challenges to global governance in tackling climate adaptation and mitigation, and ensuring that funds for climate loss and damages reach the communities most affected by the climate crisis.

This asymmetry extends beyond emissions and impacts knowledge production and institutional representation in global environmental governance. Localized expertise from LDCs often does not reach international discourse due to barriers in finance, language, and support capacity. Governance often then relies on westernized models and knowledge, developed by institutions in high income countries

that may not account for regional contexts and vulnerabilities.¹⁴⁴ Additionally, high-income emitting countries tend to have outsized influence in key multilateral settings like the Group of Twenty (G20) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)—including the World Bank, where the Group of Seven (G7) and European Union (EU) countries control more than 50 percent of the weighted votes—meaning climate vulnerable countries often lack sufficient decision-making power to shape mitigation and adaptation financing frameworks.¹⁴⁵ Current global funding for climate mitigation and adaptation in climate-vulnerable nations is nowhere near the required funding, estimated by the International Energy Agency to be U.S. \$2.7 trillion a year by 2030.¹⁴⁶ Without structural reforms in loss and damage financing, stronger institutional representation, and coordinated international agreements to address climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste, the current system will continue to inadequately serve the states facing the greatest environmental risks.

International Community’s Response to Date

Over the last decade, global efforts to address the triple planetary crisis have intensified, but they remain deeply uneven in effectiveness due to financing shortfalls and geopolitical fragmentation. Efforts like the Loss and Damage Fund operationalized at the 2023 Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COP28), the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, and attempts to address plastic pollution are constrained by weak accountability mechanisms, voluntary commitments, and a fragmented governance landscape.¹⁴⁷ Looking ahead, the international community must consider how it could adapt to shifting geopolitical winds to still meet the challenges posed by the triple planetary crisis (see [box 3.1](#)).

For decades, the United Nations Environmental Programme has faced criticisms from scholars and practitioners for its limited authority, lack of resources, and institutional inefficiencies—prompting persistent calls for reform.¹⁴⁸ With limited capacity for monitoring progress and ensuring accountability in environmental agreements, UNEP relies heavily on voluntary implementation commitments.¹⁴⁹ As a programme rather than a specialized agency, it occupies a relatively weak coordinating position within the UN system.¹⁵⁰ As environmental challenges grow in complexity—intersecting with economic crises, geopolitical tensions, and social inequalities—UNEP’s existing mechanisms and limited mandate appear increasingly inadequate to drive the systemic transformations necessary to address the triple planetary crisis.

CLIMATE

In recent years, the Climate Conference of the Parties has faced a growing crisis of credibility and trust among civil society and climate-vulnerable nations. In 2023, COP28 came under fire when reports emerged that its president had used the summit to promote the continued use and expansion of fossil fuels.¹⁵¹ COP29 ended with a compromise of U.S. \$300 billion annually to support mitigation and adaptation efforts—a figure widely regarded as inadequate compared to the U.S. \$1.3 trillion called for by climate-vulnerable countries.¹⁵² Notably, fossil fuel lobbyists received 1,700 passes to attend the conference in Baku, far outnumbering the delegates from the 10 most climate-vulnerable nations combined.¹⁵³ India dismissed the financial pledge as “a paltry sum,” while representatives of Small Island Developing States walked out of negotiations in protest, further demonstrating the erosion of trust in the Climate COPs.¹⁵⁴

Box 3.1: Scenario Outlook—Environmental Governance Per Status-Quo from 2025 to 2030 to 2050

The trajectory of environmental governance in the medium-term, from 2025 to 2030, will be heavily influenced by anticipated diminishing political will, particularly in nations where economic and security concerns dominate policy agendas. If current geopolitical tensions—such as trade conflicts, rising militarization, and eroding trust in a fractured multilateral system—continue, governments may prioritize national security over environmental goals. Such resource diversion could especially affect vulnerable populations in Global South countries that already bear a disproportionate burden of environmental disasters. Global emissions would continue to rise, biodiversity loss might accelerate, and unchecked pollution would ultimately threaten the ecosystems that sustain human life. In this context, multilateral environmental agreements and funding mechanisms designed to help the most at-risk countries adapt and mitigate environmental change would likely continue to fall short of their targets. The financial gap could further widen.

In the medium-term, one critical step would be reinforcing the global financial architecture to ensure that funding for climate change, biodiversity, and pollution control is shielded from geopolitical disruptions (see section two, *Pact Actions 47-52*). With climate change increasingly referred to as a “threat multiplier” by both scholars and practitioners, multilateral institutions must integrate environmental goals into security and economic planning, creating synergies that can withstand shifting priorities. With the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) financing gap projected to be U.S. \$6.4 trillion by 2030 without major reforms, enhancing sub-state and non-state actor engagement and promoting sustainable financing mechanisms also becomes essential.

Looking ahead to 2050, environmental governance will hinge on the evolving relationships between states and how that influences the authority and capacities of institutions, both state and non-state. In the coming decades, climate change is projected to reduce labor productivity by six percent in lower-income countries, compared to just 0.2 percent in wealthier nations. At the same time, the World Bank estimates that developing countries could cut emissions by up to seventy percent by 2050, if global investments in low-carbon strategies average just 1.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually. Therefore, to protect planetary boundaries in this longer-term scenario, we need new models of international cooperation that transcend traditional structures dependent on short-term and fickle political support and concessional resources.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data sources: Brown, “Trends in Climate and Geopolitics for 2025”; Allan et al, “State of Global Environmental Governance 2024,” 7-9; Ngcamu, “Climate Change Effects on Vulnerable Populations in the Global South: A Systematic Review”; UNEP, *Adaptation Gap Report 2023*; Goodman and Baudu, “Climate Change as a “Threat Multiplier”: History, Uses and Future of the Concept”; OECD, *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and Inclusive Architecture*; Eib, “Innovative Climate Finance: The Role of Non-state Actors”; Hale, “The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes”; World Bank, *People in a Changing Climate: From Vulnerability to Action*; and World Bank, *Climate and Development: An Agenda for Action*.

Meanwhile, COP28's Loss and Damage Fund has received pledges totalling just over U.S. \$700 million as of March 2025—an amount dwarfed by the estimated annual losses faced by climate-vulnerable nations (approximately U.S. \$200-400 billion).¹⁵⁵ Similar climate-positive initiatives—like the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) intended to accelerate decarbonization in emerging economies—remain hamstrung by political resistance, complex financing structures, and a lack of concessional funding.¹⁵⁶ The Global Goal on Adaptation framework,¹⁵⁷ while an important step in establishing adaptation metrics, also lacks the financial backing necessary to close the adaptation gap.¹⁵⁸

BIODIVERSITY

Biodiversity conservation gained renewed focus with the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework in 2022, whose signatories committed to halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030.¹⁵⁹ However, the voluntary nature of these commitments and financing deficits remain critical weaknesses, and biodiversity often receives far less media and political visibility—diminishing momentum for global action.¹⁶⁰ While Kunming-Montreal sets ambitious targets,¹⁶¹ it does not fully address the structural weaknesses that undermined its predecessor—the 2011-2020 Strategic Plan and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets.¹⁶² More than half of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have failed to present concrete plans to meet the framework's flagship “30-by-30” goal—protecting 30 percent of land and sea areas by 2030.¹⁶³ Despite pledges to mobilize U.S. \$200 billion annually by 2030, concrete mechanisms to secure and allocate these funds remain unclear, and the framework encourages cooperation among biodiversity-related treaties without establishing binding structures for integration.¹⁶⁴

While the Pact for the Future reaffirms the urgency of biodiversity conservation, protection, and restoration,¹⁶⁵ concerns have been raised over its lack of a clear, actionable roadmap for strengthening biodiversity governance; its unbalanced emphasis on climate change at the expense of biodiversity and pollution;¹⁶⁶ and its lack of structured mechanisms needed to translate global commitments into effective national and local policies. Without stronger accountability measures and implementation strategies, the future of the Kunming-Montreal framework remains uncertain.¹⁶⁷

POLLUTION AND WASTE

Despite mounting evidence of their damage, pollution and waste also remain a weak and fragmented focus of global governance. In 2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) mandated the creation of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) under UNEP to develop a legally binding instrument on plastics pollution by the end of 2024.¹⁶⁸ While this was initially hailed as a major step forward, progress has stalled. The fifth INC session, held in Busan in late 2024, ended without consensus and left fundamental issues unresolved—including the scope of the agreement, binding obligations, and mechanisms for implementation.¹⁶⁹ The Pact for the Future called for the swift conclusion of a plastics treaty but lacks implementation timelines and accountability mechanisms.¹⁷⁰

Meanwhile, pollution and waste continue to disproportionately affect climate-vulnerable communities and exacerbate existing inequalities, while their governance remains caught in a cycle of ambitious rhetoric and weak execution—underscoring the urgent need for reforms in the global environmental governance

space. Without such immediate changes, the global response to pollution and waste will remain reactive and insufficient, jeopardizing progress across all dimensions of the triple planetary crisis and beyond.

Major Elements of the Global Policy Framework

This section presents recommendations and roadmaps for dealing with the interconnected challenges of the triple planetary crisis. The Climate COPs need reform to center equity, transparency, and financial justice with an eye toward COP30 this November, hosted by Brazil. Biodiversity governance must evolve from negotiation to implementation, prioritizing political integration, sector-wide engagement, and structured accountability, such as standardized reporting frameworks. The fight against pollution and waste is multifaceted, but in this section, the emphasis is on an inclusive, transparent negotiation toward finalizing a legally-binding Global Plastics Treaty—one that addresses the full lifecycle of plastic and is backed by sustainable financial mechanisms. Beyond these focused measures, cross-cutting reforms are recommended, including transforming UNEP into a Global Environment Organization or “GEO” with legislative, implementing, and accountability functions; “Responsibility Chains” to enforce biodiversity and broader environmental commitments; and a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT) to halt fossil fuel drilling expansion, ensure a fair phase-out, and support just transitions to renewables. Together, these proposals envision a bold, coherent, and equitable environmental governance system to navigate the post-1.5°C world without transgressing critical planetary system boundaries.

CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: ENHANCING THE CLIMATE COPS

Turning the Climate COP process toward the implementation of equitable climate action is a key to realigning governance to maintain planetary boundaries. The upcoming COP30 in Belém presents a critical opportunity to advance reforms focusing on Indigenous leadership, financial justice, and greater representation of vulnerable countries.

Prior COPs have been criticized for their limited inclusivity (in terms of meaningful engagement), lack of transparency, and inadequate implementation of climate commitments. Increasing their effectiveness requires restoring their legitimacy and changing the institution into a more representative platform that centers equity, accountability, and financial justice.¹⁷¹

Brazil, as the COP30 host, is already advocating for reforms to address the implementation gap, proposing a “Climate Change Council” under the aegis of the UN to serve as a central coordinating body for climate action to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement.¹⁷² Engaging influential countries at a high-level, the Council could integrate non-state actors and increase alignment and collaboration of fragmented institutions, while strengthening the UNFCCC as the anchor for multilateral rule-making and accountability. Following Brazil’s proposal, the Council should be established through a UN General Assembly resolution later this year or in 2026, building on the precedent set by the UN Human Rights Council in 2006 (see [box 4. 2](#)).¹⁷³

Additionally, complimenting Club of Rome recommendations,¹⁷⁴ Brazil could implement a series of reforms at COP30 to increase meaningful participation of affected stakeholders, recognize the leadership of Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon, and regulate the influence of emitters on the COP agenda. Four steps, in particular, merit urgent consideration:

- i. To overcome chronic deadlocks in climate negotiations, Climate COP decision-making should adopt weighted or supermajority voting to mitigate obstruction by emitting minority countries.¹⁷⁵ Voting reform requires amending UNFCCC’s Rule 42, either through a General Assembly resolution or by expanding the scope of decisions that can pass by a two-thirds majority.¹⁷⁶
- ii. To address criticisms of fossil fuel influence on the COP Presidency and its delegates, the COP host should implement a conflict-of-interest policy that would mandate disclosure and prevent entities with private interests from being able to serve as delegates or on the Presidency team.¹⁷⁷
- iii. The Climate COP should further encourage multistakeholder dialogues through representation in the Presidency team, recognizing the important role of civil society, scientific institutions, and Indigenous Peoples as key stakeholders in a just transition away from fossil fuel dependence. COP28’s inclusion of a “Youth Climate Champion,” a high-level role on the COP Presidency leadership team mandated to ensure meaningful youth input,¹⁷⁸ should be used as a model and replicated in the COP30 Presidency team to increase the meaningful participation of other stakeholders and underrepresented groups most affected by the climate crisis.
- iv. As COP30 will be held in the Brazilian Amazon on unceded Indigenous territories, Brazil should consider seriously the request of Indigenous Peoples to include them as co-hosts of COP30, thereby allowing co-creation of the agenda and rebuilding trust in the negotiations.¹⁷⁹ This step follows naturally from the COP30 President’s call to “acknowledge and expand the role and contributions of Indigenous Peoples and of local communities in nature stewardship and climate leadership.”¹⁸⁰

COP30 presents strategic opportunities to establish carbon taxation and equitable distribution of climate finance, anchored in Brazil’s global leadership in the promotion of financial justice. Brazil’s recent hosting of the G20 Summit, as well as its role within the BRICS+ grouping of influential developing countries (hosting its next summit-level gathering this July in Rio de Janeiro), offers unique leverage to bridge climate and tax justice agendas. The BRICS environment ministers’ priorities for COP30 recognize the need for “adequate climate finance for developing countries,” signaling support from key Member States for comprehensive financial accountability mechanisms.¹⁸¹ Brazil and other climate-vulnerable nations should leverage the upcoming BRICS+ Summit to ensure that closing the climate finance gap is a global priority at COP30.

The Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce, for example, provides a key opportunity toward achieving fiscal justice goals at COP30, as it will introduce recommendations and a path toward implementation.¹⁸² The Taskforce, launched at COP28, aims to introduce levies on polluting industries to finance development and climate adaptation and mitigation.¹⁸³ Adopting its recommendations could raise hundreds of billions of dollars a year to tackle the triple planetary crisis.¹⁸⁴ The Taskforce is chaired by Barbados, France, and Kenya, and it has already received the support of key partner organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UN, UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G20, the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G24), European Commission, African Union, and the Coalition of Finance Ministers.¹⁸⁵

BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: RETHINKING THE BIODIVERSITY COPS

The present era of biodiversity action confronts both persistent and emerging challenges that demand innovative approaches to accelerate the protection of nature. With an eye toward the 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP17)—to be held in Armenia in 2026—bold strategies and fresh forms of engagement are required to elevate biodiversity on the global agenda. The following proposal draws on lessons learned from the lack of success in actioning the old framework, while highlighting opportunities to strengthen implementation going forward.

After the most recent CBD COP in October 2024, the institution must evolve to meet the demands of the Kunming-Montreal era. While COP16 marked some progress—most notably the establishment of the Cali Fund and decisions to strengthen the role of Indigenous Peoples and local communities—it also underscored persistent limitations in how the Biodiversity COPS function. Negotiations on key financing mechanisms stalled, and concerns around the slow pace of domestic implementation also mounted.¹⁸⁶ The scale and urgency of biodiversity loss calls for a shift in the way these conferences operate—not through formal structural reform, but by reimagining their function as catalysts for “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” implementation, which the Kunming-Montreal Framework describes as crucial for the implementation of the convention.¹⁸⁷

To achieve the framework’s goals, the Biodiversity COPS must serve not only as political negotiating forums, but as strategic platforms for accelerating implementation. This means evolving into dynamic convening spaces that connect political leadership, non-state actors, and sectoral ministries around shared biodiversity outcomes. In their next phase, the CBD COPS should focus on four core priorities: i) broadening the internal scope of governmental engagement; ii) enhancing non-state actor participation; iii) institutionalizing measures to report and track implementation; and iv) developing methods to bring biodiversity to the top of the global political agenda.

First, effective implementation requires that biodiversity action move beyond the purview of environmental ministries and into the core of national policies—through so-called “biodiversity mainstreaming.”¹⁸⁸ Just as climate has gained visibility and traction within finance, agriculture, and trade sectors, biodiversity must now follow suit.¹⁸⁹ The CBD COPS can play a catalytic role by becoming high-profile political moments that engage ministries across sectors and generate visible pressure for domestic implementation.¹⁹⁰ To support this, future presidencies must secure high-level political engagement by bringing in heads-of-state and key line ministries, while linking COP deliverables to national policy planning, budgeting processes, and measurable biodiversity outcomes. Furthermore, the Biodiversity COPS should encourage and support national governments in reconciling conflicting sectoral agendas in areas such as agriculture and energy, by fostering synergies and emphasizing mutual benefits to drive coherent, cross-sectoral action for biodiversity.¹⁹¹

Second, non-state actors must be empowered as implementation partners to accelerate action. While the CBD already includes progressive mechanisms for Indigenous, youth, and civil society participation, greater coordination is needed to channel the contributions of businesses, financial institutions, subnational governments, and other stakeholders. Drawing inspiration from the UNFCCC’s Climate Action Agenda,¹⁹² the CBD COPS should develop a structured “Biodiversity Action Agenda” supported by semi-formal roles, such as biodiversity champions.¹⁹³ With the backing of the CBD Secretariat and

Presidencies, these figures could serve as connectors across the real economy, helping to translate Kunming-Montreal’s targets into action at scale.

Third, the CBD COPs should evolve into regular implementation checkpoints that provide structured opportunities for assessing progress, strengthening accountability, and building political momentum for delivery. As part of this, Parties should consider reforms to enhance the work of the Secretariat Support Units, particularly the Implementation Support Division. One such crucial discussion point should focus on the National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) and auxiliary National Reports, which currently serve as the primary monitoring tools under Kunming-Montreal.¹⁹⁴ At present, these reports are voluntary, idiosyncratic, and difficult to assess across countries.¹⁹⁵ To address this, COPs should mandate a standardized, SMART-aligned reporting framework—Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound—submitted on a regular cycle, ideally every two-years ahead of COP meetings.¹⁹⁶ This would enable cross-country learning and more robust assessments of national progress. To elevate biodiversity within broader sustainable development efforts, the CBD Secretariat and COP presidencies should promote integration of biodiversity commitments into the Voluntary National Review (VNR) process under the 2030 Agenda.¹⁹⁷ Biodiversity COPs should also establish a public, consolidated database to track national commitments and progress,¹⁹⁸ which would improve transparency and enable independent analysis by civil society and researchers.

Fourth and finally, biodiversity must claim its place within global political discourse. Despite increased attention, biodiversity still risks being sidelined in favor of climate or economic priorities.¹⁹⁹ Strategic alignment with climate processes—such as attempts to embed the Kunming-Montreal framework within climate finance and mitigation dialogues—can help to elevate its profile. The CBD COPs must actively link biodiversity to the most pressing global challenges of our time, from food security to climate resilience and sustainable development.

An evolved Biodiversity COP process is not about overhauling the architecture of the CBD, but about rethinking what the COPs actually do and whom they mobilize. As the Kunming-Montreal Framework enters its critical implementation phase, the Biodiversity COPs have the potential to become engines for implementation, not just diplomatic dialogue. The high stakes involved demand a shift from agreement to action, and from inclusive participation to high performance.

POLLUTION & WASTE GOVERNANCE: FINALIZE AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL PLASTICS TREATY

Despite widespread understanding of the impacts of fossil fuels and plastic pollution, their production continues to expand, emissions targets are unmet and lacking ambition, and the 2022 plan for a global instrument to reduce plastic pollution remains unfulfilled.²⁰⁰ Yet these closely interacting issues offer a major opportunity for innovation and reform. To end plastic pollution, as called for by UNEP,²⁰¹ the following substantive and procedural considerations lay out what needs to be done ahead of, at, and after the second part of the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.2), taking place from 5 to 14 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland ([figure 3.2](#)).

A capable global plastics treaty is closely linked to the idea of Responsibility Chains (see below) in that it must address the full lifecycle of plastics waste, including microplastics, from production to waste-management. Crucial aspects here include the prohibition of a wide range of chemicals of concern, the expansion of circularity both through enhanced recycling and ecological design, ambitious and legally-

binding global and national production reduction targets, and effective financing mechanisms to ensure technology transfer and capacity-building.²⁰²



These issues are most prominently captured in articles three, five, six, and eleven of the INC chair text, and the months leading-up to INC-5.2 should be used to achieve consensus on them to avoid stalling negotiations in Geneva.²⁰³ To increase buy-in for such a strong treaty, especially among those whose economies rely on plastics, it is crucial to incentivize change through an economically supportive transition away from plastics. Not only must plastics importers and consumers seriously communicate their declining demand, the treaty should also include mandatory fiscal incentives such as tax breaks or subsidies for sustainable alternatives to plastics, as well as technical and financial assistance mechanisms for transitioning countries.²⁰⁴

Procedurally, three crucial interconnected issues are at stake: the form of the treaty, its voting rules, and the negotiation mechanism itself.

A strong and effective global plastics treaty should take the form of a substantive convention with clear global and national obligations and regulatory measures. Although the mandating United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) 2022 resolution does not prescribe a binding approach, its ambitious goal to comprehensively address “the full lifecycle of plastics” is clearly best addressed through a legally-binding substantive convention.²⁰⁵ Even if few states were to initially ratify the convention, its uptake could still be expected to be much quicker than under a high-level framework convention built around weak obligations.²⁰⁶ Tied to the strong obligations of a substantive convention, annexes could offer an effective way to expand the treaty’s ambitions over time and ensure its application to additional items.²⁰⁷

In order to allow for strong annexes, however, the treaty must entail voting provisions that allow for majority-votes (or even super majorities requiring 80% of votes in favor) rather than relying on consensus or unanimous support. The lack of such specific decision-making mechanisms has a history of weakening multilateral environmental agreements, as it allows for the unilateral obstruction of progress on negotiations.²⁰⁸ If no agreement can be reached on majority-voting, including for annexes, a minimum provision should be the reduction of informal meetings to increase transparency toward the Member State(s) stalling the negotiations.²⁰⁹ This is particularly important as the plastics treaty process so far has been marked by the exclusion of civil society observers from intersessionals and closing “informals.”²¹⁰

Both in preparation of and during INC-5.2, civil society must be allowed to meaningfully participate in negotiations or, at the very least to promote greater transparency, to be informed about the undergoing discussions. Equally important, high-level participation in the preparatory process must be increased, to ideally resolve the current disagreements on articles three, five, six, and eleven before the Geneva meeting.²¹¹ This is crucial to avoid a perpetuation of the deadlock encountered in Busan in 2024, and such an adopted approach could be extended to changing the negotiation format at INC-5.2 (for example, by setting up a Ministerial Chair and/or adopting a “Cartagena Setting,” in which only one or two spokespersons per negotiating group and the Chair are facing each other at a roundtable).²¹²

Addressing these procedural and substantive issues in the coming two months will be crucial for the successful conclusion of a strong and ambitious global plastics treaty to protect our health and environment from pollution and make headway on improved environmental governance.

CROSS-CUTTING ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATIONS

The following three recommendations address all three major dimensions of the triple planetary crisis. Their intentionally cross-cutting nature respond to the interconnected complexity of the climate, biodiversity loss, and pollution-waste crises, highlighting the need for a coordinated and innovative global governance strategy in a post-1.5°C world.

Establishing a Global Environment Organization

Global environmental governance has proven too fragmented, unrepresentative, authoritatively weak, and inefficient in maintaining planetary boundaries. Upgrading UNEP into a Global Environment Organization (GEO) would reflect the urgent, global, and cross-cutting nature of the climate crisis to address governance, implementation, and knowledge-sharing gaps in the multilateral system.²¹³


As a centralized global authority on climate and the environment, GEO would establish coherent environmental law, monitoring, and implementation mechanisms that will increase mitigation and adaptation capacities in climate-vulnerable countries, while holding emitters accountable (figure 3.3). Building on existing scholarship around this concept, below is a roadmap for a series of reforms to upgrade UNEP into a GEO capable of addressing complex planetary environmental challenges:

- i. Expand the UN Environment Assembly, UNEP's governing body, into a more representative decision-making body. Building on the focus of UNEA-6 (2024) on effective multilateralism, UNEA-7 (2025) should pilot majority voting for select issues, aiming to move away from consensus-based decision-making and the use of veto power. UNEA should also formalize roles for underrepresented non-governmental vulnerable stakeholders (youth, women, Indigenous Peoples, etc.) in deliberations.
- ii. Harmonize Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) under UNEP to create coherent environmental law, reduce fragmentation, and increase coordination over implementation. This can build on the adoption of [UNEA Resolution 6/7](#) on synergistic implementation of MEAs on climate, biodiversity, and pollution,²¹⁴ and follow the model of the Basel, Rotterdam, and Stockholm conventions to integrate MEA secretariats under a unified framework.²¹⁵
- iii. Reform finance mechanisms by shifting from voluntary contributions to assessed contributions. Funding for GEO could follow models of mandatory contributions set by the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Labor Organization (ILO), and International Maritime Organization. For instance, mirroring the International Maritime Organization's approach—where mandatory contributions are calculated based on the tonnage of a Member State's merchant fleet—GEO could be funded by assessing Member States according to their tonnage of greenhouse gas emissions.²¹⁶

Incremental reforms to enhance funding, centralize and unify MEAs, and increase representation would expand UNEP's mandate and institutional capacity, building toward a transformation of UNEP into a Global Environment Organization. The Global Pact for the Environment could provide the legal framework to set the foundations for GEO's mandate.²¹⁷ Several heads of state support the Global Pact, and in 2018 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution launching negotiations for the Pact.²¹⁸ Similarly, passing Brazil's resolution on a UN Climate Change Council, to be proposed soon to the UNGA (see overview above), could also serve as a foundation for stronger, more centralized climate governance.²¹⁹ The mandate of the Pact and the Council would allow the GEO to set robust and actionable global standards with clear targets and oversight, based on representative input and scientific knowledge. In particular, it should perform five core functions:²²⁰

- i. **Knowledge provision:** Bridging gaps in access to information and ensuring science-based solutions, while recognizing the importance of localized knowledge from the Global South.
- ii. **Deliberation and legislation:** Facilitating inclusive decision-making with input from the most vulnerable communities and establishing common environmental law addressing the triple planetary crisis.
- iii. **Enabling and implementing:** Providing resources and support for solutions and action at all levels of governance, while recognizing and addressing financial and carbon inequalities between emitting countries and climate-vulnerable countries.

- iv. **Trust and justice building:** Increasing transparency (e.g. through Global Stocktakes, modeled after the Paris Agreement), resolving disputes, and promoting equity. The Justice function could be enhanced by establishing an International Court for the Environment under GEO, as proposed by the Climate Governance Commission.²²¹
- v. **Continuous reflexivity:** Promoting comprehensive responses to complex challenges.



Embedding Responsibility Chains in Global Environmental Governance

Environmental irresponsibility—manifested in unsustainable sourcing practices, deforestation, poor waste management, and other harmful activities in agriculture, corporate operations, manufacturing, and infrastructure development—has a direct impact on the planetary boundaries, driving habitat destruction and threatening ecosystems.²²² Yet, while accountability remains a cornerstone of environmental governance frameworks, it has proven insufficient on its own. Addressing the scale and urgency of the triple planetary crisis requires a reimagined, coordinated approach that centers responsibility as a normative and relational foundation for global action.

Drawing on the work of Luigi Pellizoni, responsibility, in an environmental governance context, comprises four dimensions: care, liability, accountability, and responsiveness.²²³ While governance efforts have traditionally emphasized accountability, the dimension of responsiveness—characterized by openness to external concerns, anticipatory engagement, and a willingness to reconsider established goals—has remained largely overlooked, despite its critical role in addressing uncertainty and rebuilding legitimacy.²²⁴ This neglect undermines the capacity of institutions to address complex environmental challenges, as responsiveness requires attentiveness to expectations, emerging risks, and shared commitments.

To embed this fuller understanding of responsibility within the UN system, Responsibility Chains should be established to identify and connect governance actors across sectors and levels who share responsibility for environmental harms—and their solutions. These would not act as simple reporting or monitoring mechanisms, but as a normative framework to cultivate both collective awareness and coordinated action to stall and reverse environmental degradation.

To this end, a dedicated Responsibility Chains Task Force should be convened within the above-proposed Global Environment Organization (GEO). Drawing on the work of Adriana Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maja Groff on forest-risk commodity chains,²²⁵ this potentially transformative idea could be scaled to trace responsibility across environmental domains. The proposed task force would assess governance gaps, map chains of responsibility across public and private sectors, and identify institutional barriers to coordinated environmental action across all three pillars of the planetary crisis. Institutionalizing this model would involve three core steps:

- i. **Mandate Mapping:** The task force should review the existing governance landscape to expose overlaps, blind spots, and fragmented mandates across UN entities and MEAs.
- ii. **Chain Identification:** Develop methodologies to trace environmental responsibility across global value/supply chains—linking states, corporations, consumers, and international institutions. Use digital platforms to make these chains open access and actionable.
- iii. **Integration into GEO Functions:** Embed Responsibility Chains within the Global Environment Organization’s five core functions (outlined above)—especially its knowledge provision, legislation, and implementation roles—ensuring that responsibility is integrated across governance and decision-making processes.

Responsibility Chains do not replace accountability; rather, they anchor it in a shared institutional context that elevates responsiveness across the system. By bringing into view the actors whose decisions hinder or could advance progress on climate, biodiversity, and pollution, a responsibility-driven framework embedded within GEO offers a pathway to close governance gaps—not merely by tracking performance, but by defining shared duties, clarifying roles, and accelerating coordinated action. In doing so, it shifts global environmental governance from fragmented response to anticipatory stewardship.

Establishing a Multilateral Fossil-Fuel Nonproliferation Treaty (FF-NPT)

As detailed above, phasing out fossil fuels is a crucial and unavoidable measure to effectively combat the triple planetary crisis and to avoid wholesale transgressions of several planetary system boundaries. However, the fossil industrial complex has long been successful in avoiding any language on curtailing

fossil fuels in global environmental policy-making.²²⁶ The landmark Paris Climate Agreement, for instance, does not mention fossil fuels, and it was only in 2023 that a Climate COP agreement explicitly addressed the need for a fossil fuels phase out.²²⁷ Calls for an international moratorium on fossil fuels extend back to 2015, and they have been consolidated into initiatives by, most notably, the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative.²²⁸ All of these have a respectable and growing body of support, across governments and from individuals, organizations, and civil society.²²⁹ Building on the work of the latter, the recommendation here is to address all fossil fuels and support the establishment of a multilateral Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT).

A draft for the FF-NPT is yet to be crafted. This is a crucial next step and should be done in a timely manner to create a document upon which to center future discussions and eventual intergovernmental negotiations. There are different approaches such a treaty could take, ranging from a binding instrument to voluntary commitments (see [figure 3.4](#)). Regardless of its form, the FF-NPT should involve the private sector, as well as governments, and it should be led by those whose own economies are reliant on fossil fuels. Some governments actively supporting the FF-NPT initiative at present include East Timor, Colombia, and Pakistan.²³⁰ Their leadership should be complemented by an independent multilateral expert commission and a civil society-led consultative mechanism.²³¹ The treaty's development and implementation would be further boosted by the simultaneous establishment of the GEO outlined above.


Learning from the successes of earlier multilateral agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Ottawa Treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines, four areas will be key to increase momentum toward an FF-NPT, regardless of its final form: *first*, building an evidence-base to transparently document both the harm posed by fossil fuels and possible solutions; *second*, building a dense and integrated broad-based coalition across different sectors; *third*, crafting a narrative for change, supported by well-placed norm entrepreneurs; and *fourth*, convening pioneering countries to convene strategic meetings and increase diplomatic advocacy.²³² At the same time, the FF-NPT must avoid the pitfalls and perceived hypocrisy of earlier multilateral agreements and could do so through putting strong emphasis on addressing structural problems and ensuring that enforcement and punitive measures for non-compliance apply to everyone equally.²³³

To this end, the FF-NPT should rest on three pillars: a “non-proliferation pillar,” ending all new exploration and extraction of fossil fuels; a “fair phase-out pillar,” directing a coordinated reduction in fossil fuel production (for example, through extraction limits and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies); and a “just transition pillar,” enabling economic diversification and the transition to renewable energy alternatives.²³⁴ The latter is particularly important to respect common but differentiated responsibilities, while at the same time allowing all economies to transition.²³⁵ As fossil fuels are closely tied to a variety of industries, they equally need to be encompassed in the transition, ideally through decoupling plastic production from fossil fuels (currently making up over 90 percent of feedstock for plastic materials), and replacing them, for example, with biomass feedstocks (also see the Global Plastics Treaty above).²³⁶

Implementation measures should make use of both established instruments such as expanding Special Drawing Rights (as proposed, for example, by the Bridgetown 2.0 Initiative), and new mechanisms, such as the recommended Global Transitions Fund, which could operate under the umbrella of the UN Green Climate Fund (GCF).²³⁷ The Global Transitions Fund could draw upon a global carbon tax, distributing proceeds across energy transition efforts and rechanneling repurposed fossil fuel subsidies for the same purpose.²³⁸ In 2022, global fossil fuel subsidies alone amounted to roughly U.S. \$7 trillion, more than

enough to close the global financing gap of U.S. \$2.7 trillion/year to finance the global transition to clean energy.²³⁹ While the path to adoption and ratification of an FF-NPT might seem challenging, other treaties have shown how buy-in from some can change the acceptability of the narrative for many, and cause significant change over time. The FF-NPT wields the potential to generate new momentum, reducing global pollution while improving human livelihoods and the natural habitat.

Figure 3.4: Components and approaches to a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty



Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

Overcoming Potential Spoilers and other Bottlenecks

“The lack of political will and the prioritization of national interests over multilateral cooperation has resulted in fragmented institutions, voluntary and unmet intergovernmental commitments, and huge financing gaps.”

Although the state of the science and ethics of environmental governance are clear, institutional responses to date remain insufficient. The lack of political will and the prioritization of national interests over multilateral cooperation has resulted in fragmented institutions, voluntary and unmet intergovernmental commitments, and huge financing gaps. Complementing and expanding on existing efforts to improve environmental governance, the recommendations introduced in this section address all three of these tensions and mismatches. They seek to integrate different intergovernmental processes and stakeholders (especially through the creation of a Global Environment Organization and the reimagining of the Climate and Biodiversity COPs), increase accountability and implementation (including by finalizing a strong Global Plastics Treaty and creating Responsibility Chains for environmental governance), and address global injustice through innovative financing (especially through Climate COPs reform and establishing a multilateral Fossil-Fuel Nonproliferation Treaty).

“Ambition and reality thus need to be well-matched, for instance, by developing incentives for producer countries and the private sector. This will be key to overcoming anticipated spoilers and bottlenecks, even more so in the current geopolitical climate, which sees some major emitters turn away from existing institutions and agreements.”

As such, while offering innovative ways forward, they are likely to face stiff resistance for proposing to change long-standing power balances, resource materials flows, and decision-making mechanisms, especially by major greenhouse gas producers and emitters. Ambition and reality thus need to be well-matched, for instance, by developing incentives for producer countries and the private sector. This will be key to overcoming anticipated spoilers and bottlenecks, even more so in the current geopolitical climate, which sees some major emitters turn away from existing institutions and agreements. Upcoming opportunities to advocate and deliberate upon this report’s proposals are plentiful, including the INC-5.2 meeting in Geneva (5 to 14 August 2025), COP30 in Belém (10 to 21 November 2025), and the COP17 Convention on Biological Diversity in Armenia (2026).

Given the cross-cutting nature of the triple planetary crisis, the measures proposed above will need to be complemented by equally ambitious initiatives in other areas of global governance. [Section four](#) returns to the Pact for the Future and its broader multilateral system reform themes covered earlier in this report, proposing a Pact Innovation Plan to catalyze effective action on several of the most complex and interconnected transnational problems of the present era.

IV. Taking the Pact for the Future Forward: A Multistakeholder Governance Approach

“The world belongs to us all. People want a say in the decisions that affect them. And while Governments have primary responsibility that we do not deny, we will not solve today’s global problems without contributions from all of society: from civil society and young people (...), from business and finance (...), from scientists, innovators and academics.”

—António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General, at the Opening of the Summit of the Future Action Days.²⁴⁰

The vision articulated in the Pact for the Future provides a unique opportunity for innovating global governance in two main ways. *First*, whereas stakeholders have traditionally operated in thematic silos (verticals)—such as the peace and security community, climate scholars, and digital rights advocates—the cross-cutting (horizontal) nature of the Pact presents a comprehensive approach to bring these groups together and form a broad, system-wide global governance constituency to foster interdisciplinary knowledge-sharing, novel solutions, and action. *Second*, the intense geopolitical environment in which the Pact for the Future was negotiated meant that groups of champions for ambitious reforms had to band together, shrinking the gaps between the United Nations system, civil society, and Member States and building greater trust through both formal connections—such as the multistakeholder ImPact Coalitions launched at the May 2024 UN Civil Society Conference in Nairobi—and more informal convenings, including the jointly hosted September 2024 Summit of the Future Action Day events.

By renewing political will, establishing normative frameworks, and providing institutional anchors, the Pact, in many ways, can serve as a proxy for those governments and non-state actors seeking to invest in multilateral approaches to global problem-solving by demonstrating, specifically:

- how a broad consensus, even with growing challenges to international cooperation, can be reached on urgent steps toward making the global governance system “fit-for-purpose.”
- how initial progress is now observed toward delivering on the Actions, principles, and commitments made at last September’s Summit of the Future by the UN’s 193 Member States (see [section two](#)).

Amidst expanding financial gaps and pressure for reform of the UN’s bureaucracy, the UN 2.0 technological and foresight applications, alongside many other Pact Actions, reinforce Secretary-General António Guterres’ UN 80 Initiative to enable a more functional and efficient multilateral system in an era of global polycrisis.

“...the 2024 UN Financing for Development Forum helped to lay the groundwork for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4)... aiming to catalyze comprehensive reforms in global financial governance. Other critical vehicles for driving international financial architecture reforms outlined in the Pact for the Future are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Executive Boards.”

Against this challenging backdrop for multilateral cooperation today, the momentum achieved in the run-up to the September 2024 Summit of the Future provides fertile ground for innovative approaches to Pact for the Future follow-up. The following section seeks to contribute to a roadmap for Pact follow-up. It begins by outlining obstacles to advancing the Pact, maps key milestones to build momentum for Pact implementation, and then draws on research from a few recent experiences to consider how a *Pact Innovation Plan* could serve as a catalyst for innovation and, ultimately, the successful realization of the commitments in the Pact, during the coming four critical years and beyond.

Pathways and Pitfalls in Advancing the Pact for the Future

Together with the accompanying Declaration on Future Generations and the Global Digital Compact, the Pact for the Future outlines 361 specific commitments (“Sub-Actions”)—a practical agenda for multilateral cooperation, with 291 of these (around 80 percent) requiring direct leadership from Member States.

Although the Pact was adopted by consensus—along with the Declaration on Future Generations and the Global Digital Compact—negotiations were, at times, contentious and fraught with challenges. As such, maintaining momentum among governments is essential to ensure that this landmark agreement leads to tangible results. However, translating this energy into meaningful action requires a clear-eyed analysis of potential bottlenecks to Pact implementation.

These challenges can be grouped into three key areas: i) the need to ensure effective coordination among multiple stakeholders who, in turn, establish clear responsibilities and effective accountability mechanisms; ii) the importance of implementing the Pact as a cohesive and inclusive framework capable of breaking down institutional silos; and finally, iii) the need for sustainable financing and consistent political will to navigate the uncertain geopolitical and economic landscape.

COORDINATION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN TODAY’S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Ensuring the effective implementation of the Pact for the Future hinges on strong coordination and clearly defined responsibilities among stakeholders to foster alignment and coherence. Yet, the Pact unfolds within a complex landscape where Member States, civil society, and the private sector must navigate competing priorities, asymmetrical financial and political resources, and divergent operational frameworks. Without structured efforts to bridge these divides, the collective responsibility required to realize the Pact risks erosion, leading to weakened accountability and inconsistent outcomes.

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda offers a key lesson in this regard, as coordination challenges significantly limited its effectiveness in the areas of resource mobilization and development financing oversight.²⁴¹

While major donor countries sought to integrate Financing for Development (FFD) oversight into existing institutions like the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), most participants advocated for independent monitoring,²⁴² resulting in misalignment across international, regional, and national levels, exacerbated by weak follow-up mechanisms and capacity constraints.²⁴³ Consequently, many low and middle-income countries encountered resource mobilization difficulties, fragile private-public partnerships, and increasing external debt burdens.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, while the role of the private sector was clearly defined, that of civil society remained ambiguous, despite its critical function in ensuring that both private and public financing supports social inclusion.²⁴⁵ Follow-up to the Pact for the Future must, therefore, be approached with intentional design choices that address capacity constraints head on, while avoiding the coordination pitfalls, institutional misalignment, and stakeholder ambiguities that limited the Addis Ababa Action Agenda's impact.

MAINTAINING THE PACT'S FULL INTEGRITY

“The Pact itself, to have significant constitutive or regulative effects on the plenitude of specific representations, must be allowed to attain global coherence and integrity even as it comes into play in varied contexts of activity”

—Constantinos Berhutesfa Constantinos, Senior Policy Advisor, United Nations Development Programme.²⁴⁶

The voluntary nature of the Pact for the Future raises a critical concern: the risk of the Pact being perceived as a menu of options for countries to pick and choose from, rather than a comprehensive package for reform where the integrity of its five chapters and fifty-six actions are respected. Without binding commitments, stakeholders may prioritise certain aspects of the Pact based on their own interests, often at the expense of more balanced and comprehensive implementation. A similar pattern emerged with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), where states tended to focus on specific goals that aligned with their national political or economic interests.²⁴⁷ This became particularly evident in the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs), where SDG 1 (“No Poverty”) and 8 (“Decent Work and Economic Growth”) received disproportionate attention due to their synergy with pre-existing national development policies and definitions of development, where countries mistakenly equate development mainly with economic growth.²⁴⁸

Indeed, since global agreements are often treated as substitutes rather than complementary frameworks, the Pact risks being viewed mistakenly as a trade-off to the Sustainable Development Goals, rather than reinforcing the 2030 Agenda. The absence of binding obligations, combined with the potential for fragmented implementation, could deepen trust deficits among those more skeptical of the Pact's prospects, fostering uncertainty about whether all parties will uphold their pledges and, ultimately, weakening the foundations for collective action.²⁴⁹

FINANCING AND OTHER BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION

“Implementation of the Pact for the Future also faces mounting geopolitical uncertainty that seemingly threatens its long-term viability...a first step in addressing the above challenges to Pact follow-through is developing a common understand of milestones and opportunities to build and maintain momentum around the Pact.”

Successful Pact implementation requires securing a sustainable financing structure. However, overlapping crises, beginning with the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic downturn, geopolitical conflicts, rising debt distress, and increased military spending at the expense of development aid have all strained global financial resources.²⁵⁰ In the present landscape, states increasingly prioritize short-term national economic and strategic interests over the long-term benefits that would accrue from multilateral commitments, which limits the political will to fund the Pact’s medium to long-term goals. Navigating these constraints requires concerted efforts to unlock new financial resources, streamline debt restructuring, and coordinate international financial architecture reforms, including through a new Biennial Summit on the Global Economy (Pact Action 48). Moreover, the Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative (see [section one](#)) could play a pivotal role in addressing the UN’s liquidity crisis and enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness in response to shrinking global contributions.²⁵¹ By enabling the objectives of the Pact, this initiative could help to build a more resilient global system for tackling long-term challenges.

Implementation of the Pact for the Future also faces mounting geopolitical uncertainty that seemingly threatens its long-term viability.²⁵² Heightened rivalries between major powers, economic competition, and shifting alliances have repeatedly obstructed global cooperation. All three trends are manifested in the individualized and, ultimately, unaccountable nature of the Paris Climate Agreement,²⁵³ where a combination of tensions between developed and developing nations over financial commitments, energy security concerns exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine war, and inconsistent U.S. leadership on climate policy have, together, hindered sustained progress.²⁵⁴ These same dynamics risk turning the Pact into a geopolitical battleground, where states prioritise short-term strategic interests over collective progress, ultimately weakening its transformative potential.

“Moreover, the Secretary-General’s UN80 Initiative could play a pivotal role in addressing the UN’s liquidity crisis and enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness in response to shrinking global contributions. By enabling the objectives of the Pact, this initiative could help build a more resilient global system for tackling long-term challenges.”

Mapping the Landscape for Pact for the Future Follow-Up

A first step in addressing the above challenges to Pact follow-through is developing a common understanding of milestones and opportunities to build and maintain momentum around the Pact for the Future. To this end, the following sub-section maps a landscape of key UN Secretariat and General

Assembly-driven processes, wider intergovernmental fora, and civil society-led moments for Pact for the Future follow-up. This contribution (including the work done by other organizations such as Coalition for the UN We Need)²⁵⁵ seeks to perform three key functions: i) it visualizes chronological priorities and allows for a focused approach to Pact implementation; ii) it takes stock on where follow-up mechanisms already exist for specific Actions and cross-cutting themes, and simply need to be capitalized on—versus where there is a clear gap in opportunities for implementing new Actions; and finally, iii) by looking across multiple calendars, one can begin to delineate responsibilities and roles in Pact follow-up across different stakeholder groups to support the wider Pact follow-through ecosystem.

The following maps Pact Actions against four key intergovernmental and multistakeholder processes, events, and activities. The first focuses on the UN General Assembly (UNGA) calendar, seventeen distinct intergovernmental processes, and initiatives spearheaded by the Secretary-General; the second considers wider international forums including the Climate COPs, WTO, G20, BRICS+, and G7; and the third specifically looks at civil society-led moments. The timeline mappings draw from an informal roundtable on a Pact Innovation Plan conducted with over 35 UN Member States in February in New York, as well as a six-week multistakeholder e-consultation.²⁵⁶

While the mapping here provides only illustrative examples (a more comprehensive yet still initial mapping will soon be found at the GGIN's Pact Innovation Forum website),²⁵⁷ it brings into initial focus an ambitious timeline and roadmap for Pact for the Future implementation. Key to leveraging major upcoming events is to consider the intergovernmental and multistakeholder processes associated with the milestones beyond the event itself—this idea is further developed at the end of this section in considering a Pact Innovation Plan.

“The following maps Pact Actions against four key intergovernmental and multistakeholder processes, events, and activities. The first focuses on the UN General Assembly (UNGA) calendar, seventeen distinct intergovernmental processes, and initiatives spearheaded by the Secretary-General; the second considers wider international forums including the Climate COPs, WTO, G20, BRICS+, and G7; and the third specifically looks at civil society-led moments.”

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND UN SECRETARIAT DRIVEN PROCESSES

Across the UN calendar from June 2025 through the end of the year, key opportunities for follow-up to the Pact include the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), the UN80 Initiative, the Peacebuilding Architecture review, and the World Social Summit, to name a few. It is critical to treat all these processes as a comprehensive package on Pact follow-up and implementation. Hedging all bets on one or two key moments creates a binary of success and failure of the Pact; taking an incremental yet consistent and firm approach to implementation is key. Along these lines, it is worth noting where chronological clustering of issues occur. For example, from June to July 2025, there is a specific focus on financial reform and social matters. From September to November 2025, there is a stronger focus on peace and security, and technology. A potential gap might be the relatively low emphasis (outside of specific forums) on ongoing humanitarian crises unless they are integrated into broader discussions at major events like the General Assembly or the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Figure 4.1: UNGA Pact Follow-Up Timeline

(June–Dec 2025, suggested)*

Pact Chapter Key

Sustainable Development and Financing for Development

International Peace and Security

Science, Technology and Innovation and Digital Cooperation

Youth and Future Generations

Transforming Global Governance

JUNE

2 JUNE

States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 31st meeting

A7, A26

5 JUNE

UN Secretary-General Selection Process begins Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations

A7, A16, A46, A55

5 JUNE

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

A38, A42, A45

9–13 JUNE

UN Ocean Conference

A9, A10, A22

10–12 JUNE

Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 18th session

A7, A46

18–20 JUNE

ECOSOC Humanitarian Affairs Segment

A1, A2, A6, A7, A15, A46, A54

23–27 JUNE

States parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35th meeting

A22

24 JUNE

States parties to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 12th meeting

A7, A46

25 JUNE

Plenary meeting: The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

A14, A18

26 JUNE

80th Anniversary of the UN Charter

A1–A56

30 JUNE – 3 JULY

4th International Conference on Financing for Development

A2, A4, A5, A6, A47–A52

JULY

7–11 JULY

World Summit on the Information Society +20 High-Level Event

A28–A33

14–18 JULY

Economic and Social Council, High-level political forum on sustainable development, convened under the auspices of the Council, eleventh session — SDGs 3, 5, 8, 14, 17

SDG 3 - Health - A1, A3, A6

SDG 5 - Gender - A8, A19, A31

SDG 8 - Economic Growth - A4, A5, A6, A20, A34

SDG 14 - Oceans - A10, A22

SDG 17 - Partnerships - A4, A5, A47–52, A55

21–25 JULY

Open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021–2025, 11th session

A27, A28, A29, A30, A31, A32, A33

28 JULY

Informal interactive dialogue of the Assembly on the implementation of the Pact for the Future — Looking ahead to 2028

A1, A12

AUG

4–8 AUGUST

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, 1st session
A4, A24, A47-52

11–15 AUGUST

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, 2nd session
A4, A24, A47-52

SEPT

23 SEPTEMBER – 3 OCTOBER

General Assembly, General debate, 80th session
A1, A9, A13, A38, A39, A45, A47, A54, A55

SEPTEMBER

General Assembly, Commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
A25, A26

OCT

OCTOBER

Secretary-General Selection Process begins
A38, A39, A42, A45, A55

BETWEEN OCTOBER – DECEMBER

Adoption of Peacebuilding Architecture Review Outcome
A13, A18, A19, A20, A21, A44

1 OCTOBER – 26 NOVEMBER

General Assembly, Second Committee, 80th session: Economic and Financial
A1, A2, A4, A5, A6, A9, A10, A12, A24, A34, A43, A47-A53

3 OCTOBER – 7 NOVEMBER

General Assembly, First Committee, 80th session: Disarmament and International Security
A13, A14, A18-A27, A41, A44, A56

3 OCTOBER – 19 NOVEMBER

General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 80th session: Special Political and Decolonization
A18, A21, A44, A56

3 OCTOBER – 21 NOVEMBER

General Assembly, Third Committee, 80th session: Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural
A2, A6, A7, A8, A11, A13, A14, A15, A19, A20, A23, A24, A27, A34, A35, A36, A37, A46

6 OCTOBER – 21 NOVEMBER

General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 80th session: Legal
A17, A22, A23, A24

6 OCTOBER – 8 DECEMBER

General Assembly, Fifth Committee, 80th session: Administrative and Budgetary
A4, A21, A39, A40, A45

6–24 OCTOBER

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 92nd session
A7, A8, A18, A31, A46

NOV / DEC

4–6 NOVEMBER

World Social Summit
A2, A3, A6, A7, A8, A11, A13, A15, A16, A18, A19, A20, A34, A35, A36, A37, A54, A55

10–21 NOVEMBER

Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, 3rd session
A4, A24, A47-52

25 NOVEMBER

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Special meeting in observance of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People
A7, A6

8–12 DECEMBER

United Nations Environmental Assembly, 7th Session
A1, A4, A9, A10, A28

In addition to the major milestones listed in [figure 4.1](#), two groups of intergovernmental and UN associated processes are worth showcasing as the main ways to drive input into the milestones identified and maintain momentum between key events. First are the seventeen Intergovernmental Negotiating Tracks overseen by the President of the General Assembly ([table 4.1](#)), and second are the six Working Groups and two Task Teams overseen by the Secretary-General and his principals-led Steering Committee ([table 4.2](#)).

Table 4.1: UNGA 79th Session Intergovernmental Negotiating Tracks

	Intergovernmental Process	Co-Facilitators (Permanent Representatives of)	Relevant Resolution(s)
1	Negotiations on equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council	Austria (until Jan 2025) and Kuwait	Decision 78/561
2	Second World Summit on Social Development	Belgium and Morocco	Resolutions 78/261 & 78/318
3	Ad Hoc Working Group on General Assembly Revitalization	Romania and South Africa	Resolution 77/335
4	Declaration of the Ocean Conference (to support implementation of SDG 14)	Australia and Cape Verde	Resolution 78/128
5	Establish an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI	Costa Rica and Spain	Resolution 79/1 & Global Digital Compact
6	High-Level Meeting on the 30th Anniversary for the World Programme of Action for Youth	Ireland and Malawi	Resolution 78/179
7	Ad Hoc Working Group on Global Reporting and Assessment of the Marine Environment	Netherlands and Saint Lucia	Resolution 75/239
8	Open-ended Consultative Processes on Oceans and Law of the Sea	Barbados and Iceland	Resolution 79/144
9	Fourth High-Level GA Meeting on Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases	Luxembourg and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Resolution 73/2
10	High-Level Meeting on the 30th Anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women	Jordan and Monaco	Resolution 78/182
11	Ambassadorial meeting of the Steering Committee on Partnerships for Small Island Developing States	Latvia and Maldives	Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS
12	High-Level Meeting to implement the Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons	Cyprus and Tajikistan	Resolutions 76/186 & 78/228
13	High-Level Conference on Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar	Finland and Malaysia	Resolution 79/278
14	Peacebuilding Architecture Review	Egypt and Slovenia	Resolution 75/201
15	High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (2026)	Italy and Vietnam	Resolution 78/3
16	Implementation of outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society	Kenya and Lithuania	Resolution 70/125
17	Outcome of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development	Mexico, Nepal, Norway, and Zambia	Resolution 78/231

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data source: Office of the President of the General Assembly, *Co-facilitators and Co-chairs of the intergovernmental processes in the 79th session of the General Assembly*, accessed May 15, 2025.

Ahead of the new Secretary-General elections in 2026, it is important for António Guterres to build and maintain momentum on Pact for the Future follow-up across the UN system, which will also serve as a compass for the wider Pact follow-up effort. In this respect, six suggested priorities stand out. First, continue to encourage an SDG stimulus as a follow-up to both the Pact and the SDG Summit Declaration

to turbocharge implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Second, appoint an Envoy for Future Generations to serve as a champion and coordinator of the Declaration on Future Generations across the system. Third, identify, in consultation with young people worldwide, core principles for youth engagement in the work of the UN system. Fourth, undertake a review on the future of UN peace operations and provide action-oriented recommendations to make the UN peacekeeping toolbox fit for purpose. Fifth, strengthen the role of the United Nations in governance of emerging technology, especially artificial intelligence. Sixth, and finally, provide a strong roadmap of recommendations to engage sub-national governance systems to take forward the ambitions of the Pact and, consequently, the 2030 Agenda.

Table 4.2: UN Secretary-General Working Groups for Pact Implementation*

Working Group / Task Team	Lead UN Agencies/Entities	Pact for the Future focus
Pact contributions to SDG Delivery	DCO and UNDP	Chapter 1
Peace and Security	DPPA, DPO, UNODA, and OCT	Chapter 2 + Action 44 on strengthening the PBC
Digital Technologies	ITU and ODET	Chapter 3 + Global Digital Compact
Youth	UNYO	Chapter 4
UN Governance Reform	USG for Policy	Chapter 5 (except Actions 47-52 on IFA reform and Action 53 on Beyond GDP)
IFA Reform	DESA and UNCTAD	Actions 47-52 on IFA reform
Task Team: Beyond GDP	EOSG	Action 53
Task Team: Future Generations	EOSG	Declaration on Future Generations

**Acronyms: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); Development Coordination Office (DCO); UN Development Programme (UNDP); Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA); Department of Peace Operations (DPO); UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA); Office for Counter-Terrorism (OCT); Peacebuilding Commission (PBC); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies (ODET); Global Digital Compact (GDC); UN Youth Office (UNYO); Under-Secretary-General for Policy (USG for Policy) within the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General; International Financial Architecture (IFA) reform; Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA); UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General (EOSG); Declaration on Future Generations (DFG).*

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center.

WIDER INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORA

In addition to the UNGA and Secretariat calendar, it is critical to think through how Actions of the Pact can gain momentum through various other international and intergovernmental fora (table 4.3), for example: COP30, the G20, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Not only do these forums provide an opportunity for furthering the Pact, but any real attempt at visualizing and working toward the future of the whole multilateral system must necessarily coordinate with these New York UN proper-adjacent venues.

The G20, in particular, is central to global economic and financial decision-making, and many Working Group meetings under the current South African Presidency are directly connected to the concrete implementation of Actions under the Pact for the Future. For example, through the G20’s Sherpa Track: agriculture (advances Pact Action 3), anti-corruption (advances Pact Action 4), disaster risk reduction (advances Pact Action 6), and so forth. The G20’s Finance Track further speaks to Actions 47-55, as well as various Actions in Chapter 1 on “Sustainable development and financing for development.”

Table 4.3: Illustrative Mapping of Wider Intergovernmental Fora for Pact Follow-up (June–Dec 2025)*

Date	Event	Pact Action
May 27-29	Second Education Working Group Meeting [G20]	34
Jun 2-3	Hamburg Sustainability Conference	1-12, 47-52
Jun 9-10	Third International Financial Architecture Working Group Meeting [G20]	47, 52
Jun 10-12	Fourth Health Working Group Meeting [G20]	1, 8
Jun 12-13	Third Sustainable Finance Working Group Meeting [G20]	4
Jun 24-25	Third Framework Working Group Meeting [G20]	53
Jun 23-27	Internet Governance Forum (IGF)	29
Jun 24-27	World Trade Congress on Gender	8
Jul 9-10	Third Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group Meeting [G20]	6
Jul 14-18	Second Climate and Environment Sustainability Working Group Meeting [G20]	9
Jul 17-18	Third Finance and Central Bank Ministerial Meeting [G20]	47-52
Jul 19	Agricultural WG Ministerial Meeting [G20]	3
Jul 24-25	Development Working Group Ministerial Meeting [G20]	1-12
Jul 28-29	Third Culture Working Group Meeting [G20]	11
Jul 29-31	Third Trade and Investment Working Group Meeting [G20]	5
Jul 29-31	Third Energy Transitions Working Group Meeting [G20]	9
Jul 29-31	Fourth Employment Working Group Meeting [G20]	31, 34
Sept 11	Third Joint Finance and Health Task Force [G20]	6
Sept 11-12	Third Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion Meeting [G20]	55
Sept 16-17	Fourth International Financial Architecture Working Group Meeting [G20]	47 - 51
Sept 25-26	Digital Economy Working Group Ministerial Meeting [G20]	29
Oct 13-18	World Bank Group Annual Meeting	47-51
Oct 30	Anti-Corruption Working Group Ministerial [G20]	4
Nov 10-21	Conference of the Parties (COP 30)	4, 9-10, 28-29, 47-52
Nov 16-19	Fourth Sherpa Meeting [G20]	1-12, 47-52
Nov 18-20	Social Summit (TBC) [G20]	1-12
Nov 22-23	G20 Leaders' Summit	1-12, 31-34, 47-52, 53, 55
Dec 6-7	Doha Forum	13-27, 30

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: *linked within the image*. *Dates accurate as of June 1, 2025.

CIVIL SOCIETY-LED MOMENTS

While civil society and other stakeholders must be meaningfully engaged across all milestones, table 4.4 shows example opportunities in the civil society-led track (for a more comprehensive overview of civil society activity on Pact Follow-up, see the Coalition for the UN We Need), which can foster informal coordination.²⁵⁸ While the activities listed above all have a civil society component, the list below illustrates unique civil society-led engagements. For example, the Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS) Annual Meeting 2025 will bring together researchers from around the world to Nairobi (the UN’s environmental hub) to explore intersections between environmental governance, social justice, and economic development, while addressing the triple planetary crisis of climate change, nature loss, and pollution (aligning, in particular, with Actions 9, 10, and 52 from the Pact). Similarly, Regional Futures Forums, organized by the Coalition for the UN We Need (C4UN), will help to mobilize interdisciplinary support for Pact follow-up by taking advantage of the ImPact Coalitions and broader cross-sectoral community advocating for better global governance formed as a result of the Summit of the Future, as well as articulating civil society’s diverse perspectives and priorities at the regional level.

Table 4.4: Illustrative Examples of Civil-Society led Moments for Pact Follow-up (June–Dec 2025)

Date	Event	Pact Action
Jun 22-25	ACUNS 38th Annual Meeting, ANUMDI 2nd Annual Meeting, and Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis	9, 10, 50, and 52 particular (alongside all five Pact chapters, the GDC, and DFG)
Jun-Aug	Regional Futures Forums	Whole Pact
Jun-Nov	Civil Society 20 (C20), Think Tank 20 (T20), and other G20 Engagement Groups	4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
Nov 1-5	CIVICUS International Civil Society Week	6, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 55
Nov 4-6	World Social Summit (civil society-led initiatives TBC)	2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 29, 34, 35, 39
Sept	Global People’s Assembly	1-56
2026	Global Futures Forum	1-56

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center. Data sources: linked within the image. *Dates accurate as of June 1, 2025.

The ImPact Coalitions formed at the 2024 UN Civil Society Conference, now supported by the Coalition for the UN We Need, can play a vital role in mobilizing follow-up to the Pact for the Future by serving as organized platforms for civil society to engage with, implement, and monitor Pact commitments.²⁵⁹ These coalitions serve as thematic hubs, focusing on issues like digital cooperation, future generations, and peace and security, by developing action plans, advocating policy solutions, and providing governments and UN bodies with structured input. They also work to mobilize public support and awareness through campaigns, events, and educational efforts, helping to sustain momentum beyond the 2024 Summit of the Future. Table 4.5 lays out the current status of the ImPact Coalitions as tracked by the Coalition for the UN We Need.²⁶⁰

Table 4.5: ImPact Coalitions – status update

ImPact Coalition	No.of Orgs	Description
AI & Cybertech Governance	50-100	The Impact Coalition on AI & Cybertech Governance works to enhance global AI and cybertech management, prioritizing safety, sustainability, and inclusion, to maximize benefits while mitigating risks for all (with a special focus on the Global Digital Compact’s Objective #5 on AI Governance).
Arts and Culture	50-100	The Arts & Culture ImPact Coalition champions artist representation in global development, advocating for equity, resilience, and economic prosperity by integrating arts and culture into UN decision-making.
Earth Governance	200-500	The MEGA (Mobilizing and Earth Governance Alliance) coordinates this ImPact Coalition which works to strengthen environmental governance through political, judicial, and executive mechanisms to uphold accountability and legal protections for the environment.
Faith-Based Solutions	50-100	The Faith ImPact Coalition unites faith and spiritual actors to advocate for the inclusion of faith-based language and shared values in UN documents, emphasizing peace, compassion, and human dignity.
Health	200-500	The Health ImPact Coalition, a network of 300 organizations, advocates for recognizing health as a cross-cutting issue in the Pact for the Future, emphasizing universal health coverage, sustainable systems, health rights, gender equity, and community participation.
Future Generations	500+	The ImPact Coalition for Future Generations advocates for long-term governance by integrating strategic foresight and intergenerational equity into global frameworks, ensuring sustainable and inclusive policies for a resilient future.
Inclusive Citizen Data	50-100	The Collaborative on Citizen Data coordinates the ImPact Coalition to fill data gaps for underrepresented groups and enhance citizen participation in governance, promoting fairness, inclusiveness, and transparency in SDG implementation.
International Financial Architecture Reform and Financing for Development (IFA-FfD)	50-100	The IMPACT Coalition advances International Financial Architecture reform and Financing for Development, focusing on multilateral financing, debt crises, governance reform, and tax cooperation to drive sustainable and equitable global progress.
LAC Regional Coalition	50-100	The LAC Regional Coalition unites key Latin American and Caribbean actors to advocate and collaborate on regional priorities for the UN Summit of the Future and its follow-through, advancing policy proposals and key messages within its five thematic axes.
International Judicial Institutions	200-500	The Judicial ImPact Coalition advocates for the universality and effectiveness of global judicial institutions, including the International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, and other tribunals, while pushing for concrete commitments in the Summit of the Future outcomes.
Peace and Security	500+	The Peacebuilding ImPact Coalition seeks to align the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) with the Pact for the Future, translating global aspirations into practical peacebuilding actions at local and national levels. Over time, it will work to advance all Pact Chapter Two “International peace and security” Actions, as well as UN Security Council Reform and PBAR in Chapter Five.
UN Charter Reform	50-100	The UN Charter Reform ImPact Coalition aims to engage Member States, build a coalition of supporters, and generate momentum for an UNGA resolution calling for a General Conference to review the UN Charter (Article 109) post-Summit of the Future.

Source: Coalition for the UN We Need, “ImPact Coalitions,” accessed May 29, 2025.

While visualizing these three tracks separately helps distill some clarity on which stakeholders take a forward-facing role in which key moments, Pact implementation will only be possible with cross-stakeholder coordination across all three tracks. This enhances accountability, aligns efforts to avoid duplication and wasted resources, boosts resources and expertise across platforms, and builds momentum and political will. Coordinated efforts across the different tracks create a stronger, more coherent, and more effective path toward the Pact’s goals—turning lofty commitments into real, measurable change.

Toward an Innovation Plan for the Pact

Capitalizing on the milestones illustrated above will require both cross-stakeholder coordination and strategic planning. Importantly, pushing forward multiple, simultaneous Actions across the Pact for the Future to generate collective impact will require innovative and evidence-based approaches that pool knowledge capital across stakeholder groups. In this vein, a *Pact Innovation Plan* could help to visualize the streams of follow-up across the UN system, Member States, and civil society. Paying attention, in particular, to where these streams intersect could generate the impetus toward greater innovation.


A Pact Innovation Plan, at its core, would be a visualization of the multistakeholder effort needed to see through the Pact for the Future. The core rationale would be to strategically combine the three main tracks identified above to maximize resources, maintain the Pact's integrity, and improve coordination and, ultimately, accountability for implementation. Such an exercise (see box 4.1) would begin to address the challenges outlined above by: i) increasing the efficient use of resources through better coordinated efforts; ii) allowing research and information to be shared across stakeholders at strategic moments; and iii) creating pockets of informal spaces for stakeholders to come together and think about creative and innovative approaches to advancing the many Pact Actions in the years ahead.

Box 4.1: Components of a Pact Innovation Plan

- **Overview:** A succinct document to help put forward—to principals, capitals, and broader networks—the main narrative and objectives of the Pact Innovation Plan.
- **Policy Research Products:** Designed to inform key negotiating moments in the follow-up to the Pact, including through evidence-based research.
- **Tracking Milestones for Pact Follow-up:** To map out implementation milestones across key constituencies and identify strategic opportunities for the UN, Member States, and other stakeholders to accelerate Pact outcomes (at FFD4, PBAR, COPs, G20, etc).
- **Visualizations of Research:** Infographics, and succinct, pithy visuals that can be used for messaging on Pact follow-up efforts.
- **Interactive Webpage and Bulletins:** Housing the Pact Innovation Plan components on a dynamic and interactive space on the GGIN website, and accompanying baseline research with a one-stop-shop for analytical bulletins and other resources ahead of milestone diplomatic gatherings and initiatives.
- **Track 1.5 dialogues & E-consultations:** Convene informal opportunities for dialogue among experts and policy champions, building on a series of recent Track 1.5 [Global Policy Dialogues](#).

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center.

Across the top-row of figure 4.2 and in support of a Pact Innovation Plan, there are several current and recommended milestones meriting the attention of governments committed to Pact implementation. Of special note is the suggested call for the President of the General Assembly to convene each May (from 2026 through 2028) a comprehensive, annual progress review and multistakeholder dialogue on Pact follow-through with the aim of monitoring progress and facilitating course corrections. During the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Week in September 2026—at the mid-point between the September 2024 Summit of the Future and September 2028 official, high-level review of the Pact—a Ministerial Dialogue on the Pact Review Framework is further recommended to assess progress to date, while renewing political support within capitals to maximize Pact implementation during the subsequent two years.



Similarly, across the bottom-row of figure 4.2 are several current and recommended milestones for continued, and, in some ways, heightened civil society-led support for Pact implementation. In this regard, a series of Track 1.5 global and regional policy dialogues are recommended, alongside a biennial Global Futures Forum and (during the off-year) biennial Regional Futures Forums, convened through civil society hubs such as the Coalition for the UN We Need. C4UN’s Global and Regional Futures Forums help to sustain momentum, monitor commitments, and strengthen participatory governance around the Pact for the Future, especially through the work of the ImPact Coalitions it supports. They are essential

in ensuring that the Pact is not just a one-time political declaration but a living framework for networked and transformative change.

Taking the Pact for the Future forward must also pay specific attention to previous lessons learned from UN reform processes and efforts. For example, while broad consultation and ownership made the Sustainable Development Goals politically durable, data and broader monitoring gaps remain a major obstacle to accountability. The technology facilitation mechanism under the Addis Ababa Agenda further showed the value of multi-stakeholder platforms, but also highlighted how hard it is to operationalize them meaningfully. Additionally, the UN75 Global Conversation demonstrated a strong public appetite for a more responsive and inclusive UN, yet there has been little—much less a comprehensive—effort to provide feedback to the general public on progress made since 2019-20.

The remainder of this section dives deeper into past experiences and forward-looking options. It first considers the creation of the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Architecture, in 2005-6, and then maps lessons learned onto specific Actions to implement the Pact for the Future.

PAST EXPERIENCES

The upgrade of the UN Commission on Human Rights to a more authoritative Council in 2006 stemmed from mounting concerns over its flawed membership process, where states with poor human rights records could still gain seats. Member States responded through the September 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1) and subsequent March 2006 General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/60/251), endorsing calls for a stronger, more credible human rights body (box 4.2). The empowered Council that followed was given an expanded mandate to address violations, promote rights implementation, and offer technical support.

Box 4.2: Creating a UN Human Rights Council in 2005-2006

- **Substance of Reform:** Key changes—by upgrading the Human Rights Commission into a more authoritative Council from 2005 to 2006—included a more rigorous membership selection process, requiring individual elections by absolute majority, and a commitment to uphold high human rights standards. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) tool was also introduced, subjecting all states to regular assessments of their human rights performance, thereby increasing transparency and accountability.
- **Enablers of Reform:** Institutional changes were backed by civil society actors like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy. These efforts were also championed by governments like Switzerland and Canada, as well as key UN leaders (notably, Jan Eliasson, 60th President of the UN General Assembly, and Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, who underscored how the Charter frames human rights as a core UN pillar alongside peace and sustainable development).

- **Strategies for Reform:** The combination of a delegitimized Human Rights Commission (symbolizing the status quo)—alongside vigorous advocacy efforts among civil society-led human rights organizations, like-minded governments, and senior UN Secretariat officials—proved fundamental to the empowered Human Rights Council’s adoption in March 2006, with overwhelming Member States support (170 in favor, 4 against, and 3 abstentions). A renewal of convictions and a sense of unity within the global human rights community were also vital for achieving subsequent innovations in both the operations and substance of the Human Rights Council’s functioning.
- **Limitations and Lessons:** Although the UPR was a significant innovation, its full development was delayed and its initial implementation faced challenges, including resource constraints and political resistance. The Council has also struggled to reach consensus on key social issues, such as LGBTQ+ rights, underscoring the difficulty of achieving universal agreement on certain sensitive human rights. Perhaps more critically, Member States’ capacity to uphold and implement human rights commitments remains problematic, as there are no clear consequences for failures to meet these obligations.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data sources: Lawrence, “[Will the Human Rights Council Have Better Membership than the Commission on Human Rights?](#)”; UNGA60, “[2005 World Summit Outcome Document](#)”; UNGA60, “[Human Rights Council](#),” A/RES/60/251; Amnesty International, “[Meeting the Challenge: Transforming the Commission on Human Rights into a Human Rights Council](#)”; United Nations, “[Statement by the President of the General Assembly to the First Session of the Human Rights Council](#)”; UNGA59, “[Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security, and human rights for all](#)”; and Dupraz-Dobias, “[Tug of War over Gender Issues at the Human Rights Council](#).”

In the 1990s, escalating conflicts left myriad countries fragile and trapped in cycles of violence. By the early 2000s, an estimated one-quarter to one-third of peace agreements faced collapse, with many countries relapsing into civil war within five years. The Secretary-General’s *In Larger Freedom* report called for reform and laid the groundwork for a new Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), which was later reinforced by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, emphasizing the need for a more integrated system to support countries emerging from conflict (box 4.3).

Box 4.3: Establishing the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) in 2005

Substance of Reform: The centerpiece of the 2005 PBA reform was the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), supported by a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBC’s mandate focuses on coordination, resource mobilization, and promoting best practices—particularly through multistakeholder collaboration with national authorities, local peacebuilders, and civil society—to prevent conflict recurrence and support long-term recovery. This foundation was strengthened by establishing the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), designed to be “flexibly and quickly deployed” to catalyze sustained engagement from development agencies and bilateral donors.

Enablers of Reform: The Peacebuilding Architecture received strong backing from governments including Germany, other EU members, Brazil, Canada, Norway, Japan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Liberia. Key UN leaders, particularly Jan Eliasson, President of the 60th General Assembly, proved instrumental in adopting its founding resolutions—General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/180 and Security Council resolution S/RES/1645. Civil society organizations played a vital role by contributing ideas, building support, and engaging in country-level work to advise the Peacebuilding Fund and inform periodic PBA reviews.

Strategies for Reform: First proposed in the 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the PBA was championed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the lead-up to the 2005 UN60 Summit, with support from like-minded governments and civil society. Over the past two decades—including through periodic reviews, most recently aligned with Pact for the Future Action 44 (2025)—this broad coalition has driven innovation across the PBC, PBF, and PBSO, advancing integrated strategies, encouraging a strengthened focus on prevention, and expanding regional engagement.

Limitations and Lessons: While the PBA has successfully provided strategic support and created a flexible fund, its advisory role constrains its overall authority, as it cannot supersede the Security Council or General Assembly. This limits the PBA’s ability to initiate, let alone lead or even seriously oversee, major peacebuilding interventions, unlike the Security Council’s direct authority in initiating and overseeing peacekeeping operations. The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (elaborated in [section two](#)) holds the promise of addressing these and other limitations, with an eye to expanding PBA capabilities for helping war-torn countries build sustainable peace.

Source: Original Box, Stimson Center. Data sources: Hearn et al, “The United Nations “Peacebuilding Architecture”: Past, Present, and Future”; Ponzio, “After Exit: The UN Peacebuilding Architecture”; UNGA59, “Report of the Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security, and human rights for all”; UNGA60, “2005 World Summit Outcome Document”; McGowen and Kotini, “Two Decades and Four Reviews Later: What Comes Next for the Peacebuilding Architecture”; UNGA60, “The Peacebuilding Commission”; UNSC, “Resolution S/RES/1645”; and United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.

FORWARD-LOOKING OPTIONS

Studying the experiences of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) upgrade and Peacebuilding Architecture’s establishment can help to uncover strategies to strengthen and streamline current Pact for the Future-led reform efforts, as well as turbocharge the Sustainable Development Goals.

In general terms, some lessons for Pact for the Future follow-up, gleaned from these earlier Human Rights Council and Peacebuilding Architecture reform efforts, are: i) to ensure that innovative new global governance tools are carefully developed by experts and widely consulted and refined among governments and other important stakeholders, learning from prior efforts to establish the Council’s

Universal Periodic Review and the Architecture’s Peacebuilding Fund; ii) to sway public opinion in support of structural change through effective communication of startling, credible data, such as the prevalence of violent atrocities against civilians and other grave human rights violations; iii) to overcome initial growing pains by navigating political, financial, and institutional impediments to progress through regular constructive critiques of the HRC and PBA; and iv) to sustain political support for an innovation long after its initial adoption by forming and nurturing a smart coalition of champion governments, international civil servants, and like-minded partners across civil society, whose ideas, networks, and capabilities are all valued and employed in unison at key intervals.

Examples of how these proven approaches can be applied to amplify the impact of specific initiatives, such as Actions 9, 37, and 44 of the Pact for the Future, are outlined below.

The following three Actions—**Action 9 on Climate Governance, Action 37 on Youth Engagement, and Action 44 on the Peacebuilding Commission**—were selected for their strategic relevance. These Actions are not only pivotal within their respective areas, but also play a crucial role in advancing broader, long-term goals outlined by the Pact for the Future, strengthening global initiatives for sustainability, inclusion, and peace. Applying the lessons learned from the reforms of the UNHRC and PBA to Actions of this kind could spur significant advancement toward the overall long-term goals of the Pact.

Action 9 of the Pact for the Future calls for urgent, sustained effort to tackle climate change by reaffirming the Paris Climate Agreement’s temperature goal and accelerating emission reductions. Progress can be tracked through indicators such as changes in global temperatures, emission levels, and country climate strategies (see [section two](#)). Drawing lessons from successful UN reforms like the creation of the UNHRC and the PBA at the 2005 World Summit, the success of this Action depends on using political windows, such as COP30 and the upcoming Global Stocktake, to drive institutional innovation and reinforce UN climate coordination mechanisms. Moving forward, the focus should be on building capacity, fostering cross-sector partnerships to improve data quality and access, and accelerating the submission and implementation of more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), in addition to more ambitious proposals found in [section three](#) of this report.

Action 37 seeks to move beyond symbolic representation and ensure meaningful youth engagement in global decision-making, with progress tracked through new policies, platforms, and principles for inclusion (see [section two](#)). From the reforms that created the HRC and PBA, the importance of strong political backing and inclusive processes that engage multiple stakeholders in the design and implementation of reforms becomes evident. To succeed, Action 37 must similarly define the roles youth play within UN bodies and build multistakeholder coalitions—especially with champion governments—to translate momentum into institutional commitment, while securing the necessary resources to sustain youth engagement.

Action 44 aims to enhance conflict prevention and peacebuilding by strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Commission, drawing from ongoing multilateral processes and reviews to identify key reform opportunities. Success in implementing this Action can be measured by indicators such as changes in the global safety, conflict, and militarization scores in the Global Peace Index, alongside increased Commission support for nationally-led peacebuilding efforts. In terms of reform, the lessons learned highlight the importance of high-level political advocacy and securing commitment from key Member States, particularly those in post-conflict peacebuilding settings or with a demonstrated peacebuilding track record. Additionally, clearly strengthening the PBC’s institutional role will be critical, especially in relation to the Security Council and

the General Assembly—and through possible new early warning and conflict prevention tools, such as a “Peacebuilding Audit” modeled on the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. Moving forward through this year’s Peacebuild Architecture Review (see [figure 2.4](#)), the next steps involve strengthening the Commission’s operational reach, including by ensuring the necessary resources to support nationally-led peacebuilding efforts. Building legitimacy through supportive multistakeholder coalitions will further enhance the Commission’s effectiveness and broaden its impact.

While each of these Pact Actions target distinct areas—climate governance, youth engagement, and peacebuilding—they share a common focus on creating systemic change through multistakeholder collaboration, political advocacy, and leveraging existing frameworks for maximum impact. Together, they provide entry points for tangible progress, while also ensuring that diverse voices and expertise shape the solutions.

The Pact for the Future presents a rare and urgent opportunity to reimagine and revitalize global governance at a time of converging crises and geopolitical fragmentation. Its success hinges on sustained and combined commitments by diverse states and non-state actors, as well as innovative coordination mechanisms and inclusive follow-through grounded in lessons from past reform efforts. As this section outlines, the development of a Pact Innovation Plan—coupled with strategic milestone tracking, robust financing frameworks, and meaningful civil society engagement—can serve as a compass to navigate the complexities of implementation. By aligning political will, institutional reform, and grassroots action, we can ensure that the Pact not only avoids becoming another aspirational document, but instead catalyzes lasting, measurable progress toward a more just, inclusive, and resilient multilateral governance system.

“The Pact for the Future ... is an affirmation that, even in times of division and doubt, humanity can choose cooperation over isolation and solidarity over narrow self-interest.”

Taking the Pact for the Future from consensus to concrete change will depend on learning from the UN’s own history of reform. Progress requires coordinated planning, inclusive participation, sustained political will, and most of all courage and imaginative thinking. This report seeks to contribute to a roadmap for overcoming implementation gaps by aligning existing mechanisms, catalyzing innovation, mobilizing global actors, and tracking progress and change.

The Pact for the Future is more than a set of Actions: It is an affirmation that, even in times of division and doubt, humanity can choose cooperation over isolation and solidarity over narrow self-interest. Now, more than ever, this multifaceted vehicle serves as a proxy for the defense and reform of multilateral institutions. The Pact’s full implementation would signal that global governance can evolve—not by inflating bureaucracy, but by embracing innovation, inclusivity, and accountability. With the combined momentum of governments, civil society, youth, the private sector, and international organizations, the Pact can transform the abstract ideals of multilateralism into concrete, life-enhancing outcomes for people and the planet alike. Let this be our generation’s legacy: that we did not let the moment pass, but seized it and rose to its most daunting challenges—renewing trust in global institutions and forging a future that is not only possible, but profoundly better.

Endnotes

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Section IV: Taking the Pact for the Future Forward: A Multistakeholder Governance Approach

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Annex 1: Pact Monitoring Logical Framework Technical Annex

The *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* presents a logical framework for monitoring and evaluating the Pact for the Future. This method focuses on a combination of **process deliberations**, existing official **SDG indicators**, and **proxy indicators** (that speak to the essential meaning of select Pact Actions) to:

- *First*, **inventory implementation gaps and data vacuums** in existing monitoring tools to discern where new indicators are needed and to promote corrective action.
- And *second*, we seek to work with Champion Governments, the UN, and ImPact Coalitions to **demonstrate tangible progress** that can, in turn, spur new strategies and further momentum on the road to the official September 2028 high-level review.

Our review to date has shown that potentially **more than half of the Pact for the Future’s Sub-Actions can conceivably leverage or be linked to existing Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators**. However, this comes with the caveat that despite their adoption, many SDG indicators lack comprehensive data or the ability to measure trends. In short, further improvements in the capacity of National Statistics Offices globally are urgently needed.

Two further practical points based on evaluation best practice: first, where a newly adopted Sub-Action of the Pact has not benefited from official SDG or other indicators or lacks reliable baseline data, our **Pact Monitoring Toolkit** (*for which the logframe is currently one of four main components; see section two for further details*) recommends **proxy indicators** that speak to the essential meaning of a specific Sub-Action and can, therefore, substitute for the lack of metrics so essential to gauging overall progress on a Pact Action. Secondly, both official and proxy indicators should adhere to a **SMART** (or Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound) **criteria** for Pact implementation measurement, alongside associated, credible, and relatively recent baseline data examples, to fill critical Pact measurement monitoring gaps.

In order to properly evaluate the Pact and propose appropriate indicators, the Pact was translated into a logical framework model:

- In the full (Master) logframe, the original **Pact for the Future Action** and **Sub-Action** language appears in **column A**.
- In **column B**, we **break-down the Action/Sub-Action** and determine the specific elements that need monitoring. This is called the **Sub-Action Initiative**. This is mostly actual Pact language, just separated into the specific elements that need to be monitored, given that each Pact Sub-Action often includes multiple elements or “calls to action.”
- **Column C** contains **Indicators**. In the interest of space and precision, indicators are combined with basic targets—e.g. increase or decrease. In an attempt to cross-reference official

indicators already created and agreed upon by governments and the UN Secretariat (or other intergovernmental bodies), the authors use SDG indicators that closely correspond with Sub-Action Initiatives. However, in some cases, SDG indicators were found to be weak and not SMART. In these cases, authors created new (closely related) indicators that more precisely capture the Sub-Action Initiative.

- The GGIR'25 report's section two narrative portion narrative portion includes two Sub-Actions per Action with two corresponding indicators for each chosen Sub-Action Initiative (though, in certain instances, such as Actions 39-41 on Security Council Reform and Actions 47-52 on International Financial Architecture Reform, we provide more than two indicators per Action or set of Actions). These were chosen to exemplify the essence of the measurement undertaken within the larger logical framework tool, and the two chosen indicators point to the essence of a particular Action.
- Where Sub-Action Initiative results cannot be measured directly, proxy indicators were assigned. For example, Action 13, Sub-Action (a) Initiative seeks to “Address the drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence, and instability” uses “SDG 16.1.2 [Decrease] Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause” as a proxy indicator, since direct measures of drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence, and instability are not possible (as credible and recent baseline data is difficult to obtain). The proxy of conflict-related deaths seems to be a reasonably correlated measurement.
- **Column D** contains **Means of Verification** (data collection method or source).
- **Column E** contains **Baseline Data**. Extensive research involving both a comprehensive literature review and multiple expert interviews were undertaken to identify the associated and most recent, credible data reported as of May 2025 (in most cases, reporting evidence from the period of 2022-2024). *Subsequent monitoring exercises and data collected will reference these baselines as points of comparison to measure progress toward Pact for the Future goals.*

It is hoped that this logical framework introduced for the Pact for the Future will be carried forward in future annual GGIR reports leading-up to the **official UN September 2028 high-level review of the Pact for the Future** during the UN General Assembly's High-Level Week. This approach offers a valuable tool—as part of the broader Pact Monitoring Toolkit—for tracking progress through (when unavailable) carefully crafted, **SMART indicators**, as well as the sourcing of credible and recent baseline data, while also identifying **broader global trends** in monitoring the Pact's implementation.

Annex 2: Pact Innovation Resources

- [United Nations Summit of the Future website](#)
- [Pact Innovation Forum](#)
- [Pact Innovation E-Consultation Summary Brief](#)
- [Coalition for the UN We Need's ImPact Coalitions Tracker](#)
- [2024 UN Civil Society Conference](#)
- [People's Pact for the Future](#)
- [UN80 SOTF Informational Clearing House Bulletin](#)
- [Promotion in New Zealand of the Pact for the Future](#)
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- [Global Governance Innovation Report 2024](#)
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- [Report of the Climate Governance Commission: Governing Our Planetary Emergency](#)
- [Civil Society Townhall with PGA at 79th Session—on ImPact Coalitions](#)
- [Governing AI for the Future of Humanity: Connecting the Declaration on Future Generations with the Global Digital Compact](#)
- [Biennial UN-G20+ Summit: Bridging the Global Economy Governance Gap](#)
- [Report of the High-Level Advisory Board for Effective Multilateralism: A Breakthrough for People and Planet](#)
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- [International Peace Institute, The Declaration on Future Generations: Moving from Vision to Reality](#)
- [Taking Stock - Moving Forward: Opportunities and Shortcomings from the Pact for Future's 'International Peace and Security' Actions](#)
- [The Good—and Bad—News About the UN's Summit of the Future](#)
- [Global Peace Index 2024](#)
- [UN Necessary Podcast](#)
- [Pact Decoded](#)
- [How Spotlight Initiative supports the Pact for the Future](#)
- [The Girls' Pact for the Future](#)
- [Summit of the Future Action Days \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – Chapter 5: transforming global governance \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – Chapter 1: sustainable development and financing for development \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future, chapeau \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – chapter 3: science, technology, innovation, and digital cooperation \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the global digital compact \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the declaration on future generations \(September 2024\)](#)
- [ICH special bulletin on the pact for the future – chapter 4 – youth and future generations \(September 2024\)](#)
- [Comparing the Rev. 4 of chapter 2 on international peace and security to the Rev. 3 \(September 2024\)](#)
- [The UN's New Pact for the Future: A Milestone that can set a Path for Change](#)
- [Informal meeting of the plenary to hear a briefing by the Secretary-General on the UN80 Initiative \(May 2025\)](#)

Annex 3: List of Relevant Global Governance Resources

REPORTS AND BOOKS

- [Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance](#) (June 2015)
- [Just Security in an Undergoverned World](#) (Oxford University Press, 2018)
- [An Innovation Agenda for UN75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020](#) (June 2019)
- [Reimagining Governance in a Multipolar World](#) (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2019)
- [UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance – 75 Years beyond San Francisco](#) (June 2020)
- [Coping with New and Old Crises: Global and Regional Cooperation in an Age of Epidemic Uncertainty](#) (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, December 2020)
- [Fulfilling the UN75 Declaration's Promise: An Expert Series' Synthesis of Major Insights and Recommendations](#) (June 2021)
- [Beyond UN75: A Roadmap for Inclusive, Networked & Effective Global Governance](#) (June 2021)
- [Building Back Together and Greener: Twenty Initiatives for a Just, Healthy and Sustainable Global Recovery](#) (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2021)
- [Road to 2023: Our Common Agenda and the Pact for the Future](#) (June 2022)
- [Rethinking Global Cooperation: Three New Frameworks for Collective Action in an Age of Uncertainty](#) (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2022)
- [Global Governance Survey 2023: Finding Consensus in a Divided World](#) (June 2023)
- [Global Governance Innovation Report 2023: Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action](#) (June 2023)
- [Future of International Cooperation Report 2023 – Building Shared Futures: Innovating Governance for Global and Regional Problem Solving](#) (co-published with Doha Forum and the Global Institute for Strategic Research, September 2023)
- [2023 Report of the Climate Governance Commission: Governing Our Planetary Emergency](#) (Climate Governance Commission, November 2023)
- [Global Governance Innovation Report 2024: Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture](#) (June 2024)
- [Future of International Cooperation Report 2024 – The Innovation Imperative: Tech-Governance, Development & Security at a Crossroads](#) (September 2024)

LATEST ACTION PLANS FROM THE GLOBAL POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES

- [Roadmap for the Future We Want & UN We Need: A Vision 20/20 for UN75 & Beyond](#) (UN75 Global Governance Forum, September 2020)
- [Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda](#) (Washington, D.C., U.S.: Stimson Center, Georgetown, and USIP, March 2022)
- [Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis](#) (Recife, Brazil: Plataforma CIPÓ, January 2023)
- [Global Policy Dialogue on the Africa we Want and the UN we Need](#) (Abuja, Nigeria: Savannah Center for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development, February 2024)
- [Global Policy Dialogue on Advancing Human Security through a New Global Economic Governance Architecture](#) (Tokyo, Japan, as part of the 2024 ACUNS Annual Meeting)

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION NETWORK LATEST POLICY BRIEFS

- [Responsibility Chains—Building Global Governance for Forest Risk Commodity Chains](#) (August 2022)
- [Bolstering Arms Control in a Contested Geopolitical Environment](#) (November 2022)
- [Enhancing Preventative Measure for Money Laundering and Corruption](#) (April 2024)
- [The Our Common Agenda as Inspiration for International Organizations](#) (April 2024)
- [Revising the United Nations Charter](#) (April 2024)
- [Biennial UN-G20+ Summit: Bridging the Global Economy Governance Gap](#) (August 2024)
- [Governing AI for the Future of Humanity: Connecting the Declaration on Future Generations with the Global Digital Compact](#) (March 2025)

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
Advancing the Pact for the Future and Environmental Governance

“Together, the Pact for the Future and COP30 offer an urgent and rare chance to revitalize global governance at a time of converging crises and geopolitical fragmentation.”

—Foreword to GGIR’25,
 María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés,
 73rd President of the General
 Assembly, Executive Director of
 GWL Voices, and former Foreign
 and Defense Minister of Ecuador

With multilateral institutions facing an extreme liquidity crisis and the international rules-based order under attack, states and civil society partners committed to collective security, sustainable development, human rights, and multilateral diplomacy must step up to defend and champion a stronger, reformed, and more capable global governance system. An enormous financing gap and eroding political support for the Paris Agreement further threaten progress on tackling the world’s most daunting challenge: climate change. Against a backdrop of divisive politics and mistrust among major powers, world leaders convened the Summit of the Future last September in New York to both renew existing international commitments and reimagine how aging international institutions can better cope with contemporary risks and opportunities. The *Global Governance Innovation Report 2025* (GGIR’25) offers tools for assessing and boosting implementation of the summit’s chief outcomes—the Pact for the Future and its Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations—and considers ways to understand and overcome bottlenecks to positive change on the road to the Pact’s official high-level review in September 2028. It further analyzes and offers outside-the-box policy and institutional reform proposals for grappling with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution—an urgent, yet downplayed concern at the summit. GGIR’25 finds a slow yet visible headway to date in realizing key goals of the Pact. Further success hinges on skillful multilateral diplomacy, sustained leadership across the UN system, active civil society engagement, and a robust, closely monitored follow-up effort to support the goals and commitments adopted at the summit.

Figure 4.2: Roadmap to the September 2028 High-Level Review of the Pact



*Only select actual and recommended activities listed. Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.



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