Global Governance Innovation Report 2023
Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action
June 2023
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Initiated by the Stimson Center, Institute for Economics & Peace, and Charney Research, in 2022, the Global Governance Innovation Project seeks to inform and advance debates on improving global governance, and to spur collective action by governments, civil society, the business community, and international organizations. Its three main components consist of an annual Global Governance Innovation Report, a Global Governance Index, and a Global Governance Survey.

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(see annex 3 for more GGIN knowledge products)


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Road to 2023: Our Common Agenda and the Pact for the Future (2022)

Rethinking Global Cooperation: Three New Frameworks for Collective Action in an Age of Uncertainty (2022, co-published with the Doha Forum)

Global Governance Survey 2023: Finding Consensus in a Divided World (2023)
Global Governance Innovation Report 2023
Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action

In introducing novel ideas for the September 2024 Summit of the Future and New Agenda for Peace, this report seeks to encourage more ambitious, forward-looking thinking and deliberation on global governance renewal and innovation.

The world needs better ways to manage its many, growing problems. Engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures is the key to coping with today’s and future global challenges, which include, but are not limited to, renewed Great Power tensions, deepening Global North-South divides, virulent nationalism, runway climate change, and unconstrained artificial intelligence. Against this backdrop, the inaugural Global Governance Innovation Report (GGIR) aims to inform and advance debates on improving global governance, and to spur action to that end, drawing on insights from two new tools: a Global Governance Index and a Global Governance Survey. Encouraging greater ambition in preparations for the September 2024 Summit of the Future in New York and a New Agenda for Peace, the report offers proactive measures to better prevent, and failing that, limit the escalation of deadly conflict; reconsiders disarmament measures to boost conditions for conflict management and resolution; and proposes a next generation humanitarian action architecture to save more lives when conflict prevention and mitigation fail. Central to a strategy for change, GGIR’23 introduces five steps for mobilizing a broad-based, smart coalition of governments and civil society groups to maximize the generational opportunity afforded by next year’s Summit, to better ensure “the future we want and the United Nations we need” for present and future generations.
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We wish to extend a special thank you to the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the Governments of the State of Qatar and Switzerland for their partnership and generous support for the Global Governance Innovation Project, as well as the fellow founding co-sponsoring institutions of the new Global Governance Innovation Network: the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), Plataforma CIPÓ, and Leiden University. Finally, we wish to thank the Geneva Center for Security Policy for awarding the Global Governance Innovation Project 1st Prize for GCSP’s Transformative Futures in Peace and Security competition, which will facilitate the project’s refinement and growth.
To the late Prof. Charles T. “Chuck” Call, whose lifelong work on conflict prevention and building sustainable peace informed both national and international policy-makers, and inspired generations of scholars.
Foreword

In June 2015, when, as members of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance co-chaired by Madeleine Albright and Ibrahim Gambari, we helped launch the Commission’s report, Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, we argued that the world needed a new kind of leadership, combined with new tools, networks, and institutions of global governance. In the face of growing violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks, we offered both concrete proposals and a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates.

Eight years on, the need for reimagining global governance to effectively deliver on justice and security in the world has only increased. Therefore, we are delighted to introduce this new Stimson Center series, the Global Governance Innovation Report, which builds on the ideas and spirit of the Albright-Gambari Commission and an impressive body of follow-on research and policy dialogues through the Global Governance Innovation Network. Drawing insights from the inaugural editions of the Global Governance Index and Global Governance Survey (pioneered by Stimson’s partners, the Institute for Economics & Peace and Charney Research, respectively), the new report series aims to inform and advance debates on improving global governance and to spur action by all relevant actors, including governments, civil society, the business community, and intergovernmental organizations. Such analysis and leadership are needed more than ever, as the violent conflicts, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic inequalities we documented in our 2015 report have only grown more acute, punctuated over the past sixteen months by Russia’s war on Ukraine.

With Great Power tensions at the heart of Europe and in the Asia-Pacific, alongside levels of violent conflict worldwide not seen in decades, the task of forging a New Agenda for Peace could not be more vital. In light of the changing nature of conflict, the UN’s conflict management toolbox (including the “4P’s” of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding) requires targeted upgrades, alongside fundamental Security Council, General Assembly, and Peacebuilding Commission reforms. Here again, we wish to express our appreciation to the Stimson Center team for delving, incisively and through original research methods, into this year’s chosen thematic focus on “Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action.” Importantly, they offer practical guidance for how renewed disarmament efforts can boost conditions for applying the “4P’s” and collective security architecture changes effectively, which, together, can enhance how the global humanitarian architecture functions.
Beyond peace, security, and humanitarian issues, next year’s Summit of the Future offers a rare, once-in-a-generation opportunity to repurpose our global governance system to keep pace with the broader moral and practical imperatives of our time, including fighting extreme poverty and delivering on the broader set of Sustainable Development Goals, defending basic human rights, building a more accessible and safe digital space, and tackling the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Inspired by reform proposals found in this study, the Albright-Gambari Commission report, and related research, we hope that world leaders and civil society will work together in the run-up to the 2024 Summit, to ensure that present and future generations realize a vision of justice and security for all.

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Table of Contents

Foreword .................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
List of Illustrations ........................................................................................................................................................................... 7
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................. 10
I. Introducing the Global Governance Index and Survey ................................................................. 15
  Diagnosing the World: A New Global Governance Index and Survey ......................................................... 16
  International Peace, Security, and Humanitarian Action ................................................................................. 19
  Socioeconomic Development and Pandemic Response .............................................................................. 21
  Environmental Governance and Climate Action ....................................................................................... 23
  Human Rights, the Rule of Law, Inclusive Governance, and Civic Space ........................................ 26
  Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership ............................................................................. 28
II. Conceptual Advances toward Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action .................................................. 31
  Looking Forward: Steps toward “Mutually Assured Survival” and Rethinking Global Governance ............ 38
III. Reimagining Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (The “4P’s”) .................................................. 41
IV. Whither Disarmament? WMDs, Conventional Weapons & New Tech ................................................. 59
V. Next Generation Humanitarian Architecture ......................................................................................... 72
VI. No More NAPping: A New Agenda for Peace & Summit of the Future that Matter ......................... 91
  Collective Security Renewal through a New Agenda for Peace .................................................................. 92
  A Smart Coalition for Maximizing the Summit of the Future ................................................................... 96
  Making the Most of the New Agenda for Peace & Summit of the Future ....................................... 103
Endnotes ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 105
Annex 1: Global Governance Index Methodological Summary .............................................................................. 113
Annex 2: Logframes for Sections III, IV, and V .......................................................................................... 116
  Annex 2.1: Section III - The 4P’s, Logframe ................................................................................................. 116
  Annex 2.2: Section IV - Whither Disarmament?, Logframe .................................................................. 118
  Annex 2.3: Section V - Next Generation Humanitarian Architecture, Logframe .................................. 119
Annex 3: List of resources on global governance innovation from the Stimson Center and its GGIN partners ........................................................................................................... 120
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................................ 121
List of Illustrations

**Figures**

Figure 1.1: Total Global Governance Index Scores .......................................................... 17  
Figure 1.2: Fatalities by Type of Violence (Excluding Rwanda 1994), 1989-2021 .............. 19  
Figure 1.3: GGI - Peace & Humanitarian Leadership through Global Institutions .......... 20  
Figure 1.4: GGI - Socioeconomic Development and Pandemic Response Leadership  
through Global Institutions .......................................................................................... 22  
Figure 1.5: Total Number of Persons Displaced by Climate-related Disasters (2021) ........ 23  
Figure 1.6: GGI - Environmental Leadership through Global Institutions .................. 25  
Figure 1.7: Global Overview of Political Regimes by Country ........................................ 26  
Figure 1.8: GGI - Human Rights and Inclusive Governance Leadership  
through Global Institutions .......................................................................................... 27  
Figure 1.9: GGI - Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership  
through Global Institutions .......................................................................................... 29  
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Innovation and the Summit of the Future .................................. 32  
Figure 3.1: Armed Conflict by Region, 1946-2021 ......................................................... 42  
Figure 3.2: Number of Civil Wars with Mediation on an Annual Basis ......................... 49  
Figure 3.3: Approximate Regional Breakdown of DPPA Standby Team Assignments .... 50  
Figure 3.4: A4P+ on Increasing Transparency for Reform in Peace Operations ............. 53  
Figure 4.1: World Military Expenditure by Region, 1988-2021 ..................................... 60  
Figure 5.1: Forcibly Displaced Persons Worldwide as of Mid-2022 .................... 73  
Figure 5.2: Key Principles of an Emergency Platform .................................................. 78  
Figure 5.3: Direct Funding to Local Actors (as of 2022 reporting) .............................. 83  
Figure 6.1: Roadmap to the 2024 Summit of the Future .............................................. 98

**Boxes**

Box 2.1: Ten Constituent Principles of Effective Multilateralism .................................. 35  
Box 3.1: Peacemaking for the Modern Era ..................................................................... 48  
Box 5.1: Steps to Increase Localization through the OCHA Cluster System .............. 86  
Box 5.2: Principles for a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index Framework .......... 89  
Box 6.1: Operationalizing the New Agenda for Peace to Meet 21st Century Challenges 93  
Box 6.2: Averting Great Power War while Planning for Ukraine’s Reconstruction: UN Roles? 100

**Tables**

Table 3.1: UN Conflict Management Tools - Progress & Setbacks ............................ 45  
Table 4.1: Major International Disarmament Treaties ................................................. 62  
Table 4.2: Cybersecurity & Cybercrime Treaties ......................................................... 69  
Table 5.1: Three Decades of Reform in Humanitarian Action .................................... 76  
Table 5.2: An Example - COVAX and the Emergency Platform ............................... 80  
Table 5.3: UN Humanitarian Coordination Leadership—The Cluster Approach ......... 85
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4P's</td>
<td>Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACUNS</td>
<td>Academic Council for the United Nations System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>(UN) Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>(UN) Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOSG</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Emergency Platform</td>
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<td>ESG</td>
<td>Environmental, Social, and Governance</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GGI</td>
<td>Global Governance Index</td>
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<td>GGIR</td>
<td>Global Governance Innovation Report</td>
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<td>GGS</td>
<td>Global Governance Survey</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HLAB</td>
<td>(UN) High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>(UN) Inter Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>International Fund for Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAWS</td>
<td>Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MAS</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Survival</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MSU</td>
<td>DPPA’s Mediation Support Unit</td>
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<td>MVI</td>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index</td>
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<td>NA4P</td>
<td>New Agenda for Peace</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>OAJ</td>
<td>(UN) Office of Administration of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Our Common Agenda</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>(UN) Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>(UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>(UN) Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGA</td>
<td>President of the General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>(UN) Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>new PBC</td>
<td>(UN) Peacebuilding Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGA</td>
<td>President of the United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2Pre</td>
<td>Responsibility to Prevent</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG(s)</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>(UN) Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SIDS</td>
<td>Small Island and Developing States</td>
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<td>SOTF</td>
<td>Summit of the Future</td>
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<td>SVI</td>
<td>Social Vulnerability Index</td>
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<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN60</td>
<td>United Nations’ 60th anniversary</td>
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<td>United Nations’ 75th anniversary</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UPR</td>
<td>Universal Periodic Review</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Executive Summary

“Inspired by reform proposals found in this study, the Albright-Gambari Commission report, and related research, we hope that world leaders and civil society will work together in the run-up to the 2024 Summit, to ensure that present and future generations realize a vision of justice and security for all.”

— Haifa Fahoum Al Kaylani, José Antonio Ocampo, Shyam Saran, and Jane Holl Lute (Foreword to GGIR’23).

The world needs better ways to manage its many, growing problems. Engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures is the key to coping with today’s and future global challenges, which include, but are not limited to, renewed Great Power tensions, deepening Global North-South divides, virulent nationalism, runaway climate change, unconstrained artificial intelligence, and a persistent and growing global trust deficit.

Against this backdrop, the analysis and recommendations presented in this inaugural Global Governance Innovation Report (GGIR) are intended to encourage more imaginative and forward-leaning policy conversations in the run-up to the 2024 Summit of the Future in New York—a generational opportunity to refashion our approaches to tackling complex global problems that no single country or institution is capable of addressing on its own. This inaugural GGIR focuses on Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action, while helping to further refine and operationalize the concepts and proposals introduced in UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ forthcoming New Agenda for Peace.

Today, global governance has come to denote a particular telos (purpose) and a particular modus (method). Its overarching goal is the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and tackle global challenges effectively. For global governance to be legitimate and authoritative in contemporary terms, it needs to be conducted in an evidenced-based, inclusive, networked, equitable, and future-oriented way.

Informed by this understanding, the GGIR debuts two new annual diagnostic tools for measuring contributions to global leadership and cooperation, initially of G7 and BRICS countries: a Global Governance Index and a Global Governance Survey. The Index ranks the twelve countries across five thematic domains of global leadership, emphasizing leadership of and support for multilateral institutions. In this inaugural Index, Germany earned the highest overall score, and Russia the lowest.
For the Global Governance Survey, citizens of the twelve countries were surveyed regarding the same five domains. Asked whether they thought the world was “going in the right [or wrong] direction,” “wrong” led by nearly two to one overall, though Chinese and Indian respondents saw a world moving in the “right” direction by substantial majorities. Primary reasons given by other countries’ citizens for their pessimism included: war and conflict (flagged by 50 percent of respondents), worsening economy / jobs / inflation / poverty (noted by 38 percent), and increasing corruption (23 percent).

GGIR’23 further explores how such global challenges to international peace and security aggravate existing—and create new—humanitarian crises. It has long been recognized that the international community needs to think beyond existing responses and capacities to empower itself to tackle these challenges. Underlying such a recognition is also a broader paradigmatic shift in understanding peace, security, and humanitarian action in the current age, which is indispensable for a true reimagination of the global governance architecture, the way it operates, and the tools it should wield.

Recently, the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) coined the term “mutually assured survival” and called for the Summit of the Future to adopt a new definition of collective security that goes beyond traditional threats and covers, for instance, environmental challenges, socioeconomic inequalities, and technological risks. This reconceptualization is a culmination of several decades of modernizing our thinking about global peace and security, which includes such breakthrough concepts as positive peace (the integration of human society), human security, the responsibility to protect, and, more recently, networked and inclusive multilateralism, as defined in the Secretary-General’s 2021 report, Our Common Agenda. This approach also reinforces an understanding of humanitarian action aimed at alleviating human suffering, protecting lives, and meeting the basic needs of affected populations, in response to armed conflict and natural disasters.

With more violent conflicts active now than at any time since the end of the Second World War, GGIR’23 adopts—beginning with its cover design—a “traffic light approach” on the Road to the 2024 Summit, with an emphasis on proactive measures to prevent and lower the risk of deadly conflict before crises can escalate into massive human suffering and material damage (Green Light). Cautious yet deliberate steps toward disarmament can build short-term confidence and boost longer-term security conditions for applying conflict management tools effectively—and avoiding any head-on collisions in the form of an armed confrontation (Yellow Light). Finally, when all steps to mediate, improve confidence and security, and avert the outbreak or recurrence of violence fail, a humanitarian catastrophe may ensue, requiring a different kind of international response and institutional set-up, with the overriding and urgent goal of saving lives (Red Light, aka Red Alert). With an eye toward raising the ambition of the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace and the wider agenda for the Summit of the Future, among the report’s two dozen chief recommendations are:
Reimagining Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (The “4P’s”)

**Early Warning and Action:** Improving conflict analysis, early warning, and early action capabilities within the UN’s major intergovernmental organs for peace and security means first designating responsibility within and equipping the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations with the tools, resources, and mandate to work out—with the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, and General Assembly—the signs and factors associated with mass atrocity events. An upgraded early warning system could, in turn, support a new Peacebuilding Audit, modeled on the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. The monitoring of various national indicators linked with conflict outbreaks would better inform decision-making by major UN bodies, enabling earlier and more effective preventive action.

**New Civilian Response Capability:** The initiative could include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical expertise, along with fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General, with emphasis on recruitment of women and youth leaders in support of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding objectives. Ideally, these teams would be complemented by a standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants, up to two thousand strong, drawn voluntarily from across the UN system.

Whither Disarmament? WMDs, Conventional Weapons & New Tech

**Reinforce Existing Nuclear Policy Infrastructure and Build Conditions for a New Paradigm:** As the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows to levels unseen in decades, it is crucial to reinforce arms control and disarmament efforts, wherever possible, by upholding current agreements, introducing or sustaining confidence-building between nuclear states, and cooling the rhetoric of threats (even implicit) to use nuclear weapons. This requires efforts to stabilize existing nuclear infrastructure, while moving toward a renewed arms control and disarmament agenda. Rather than replicate our nuclear history over the next century, going forward global and national security must be pursued with greater attention to human and environmental security imperatives that align better with the positive peace agenda underscored in this report.

**New Treaty on Fully Autonomous Weapons:** A legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems is urgently needed to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force and life-or-death decisions, as artificial intelligence and AI-controlled weapons pose unique threats to peace and security by making warfare more deadly and efficient—and autonomous. Since such weapons challenge established rules and regulations, an international advisory board is needed that brings together experts in international humanitarian law and rules of engagement, military ethicists, and technical experts, as well as religious and interfaith leaders, to explore the implications for warfare from lethal autonomous weapons.
Next Generation Humanitarian Architecture

**New Emergency Platform:** Further fleshing out the Secretary-General’s proposal, the Emergency Platform should work with the newly suggested UN Futures Lab as a data hub with inputs that are sensitive to threats on impacted populations and outputs made freely available. The Emergency Platform should further serve a knowledge management function as a convener of different streams of institutional and external knowledge, and as a self-learning system so as to evolve its response between consecutive global shocks.

**Financing the Localization Agenda:** Past efforts by donors to allocate 25 percent of their funding to local and national humanitarian organizations have faltered (with less than 2 percent directed at local actors, despite two recent attempts at a “Grand Bargain”). One underutilized method for achieving longer-term, more sustainable sources of local funding is “Pooled Funding”—a combined pool of funds from individual donors—which can harness resources and reduce risks more effectively than individual funding to a given organization or project. Reducing regulatory and bureaucratic barriers and differences between development entities can facilitate such mechanisms. Building upon this approach, donor organizations should develop common baseline requirements for compliance and accountability to increase the likelihood of long-term funding.

**A New Agenda for Peace & Summit of the Future that Matter**

To mobilize an inclusive, smart coalition of governments, civil society, business groups, and international organizations to help ensure that the 2024 Summit of the Future realizes its full potential, five steps are necessary:

**For Member States:** *Commence substantive negotiations without further delay.* It is time to get beyond “modalities” considerations for next year’s summit. A powerful, reframed narrative and communications strategy should underscore the high stakes and how—by generating high-level political support, financial and technical assistance, and conceptual clarity for improved global governance—the Summit of the Future and this September’s SDG Summit positively reinforce each other.

**For the UN Secretary-General:** *Stand behind the best recommendations in Our Common Agenda, from the HLAB, and from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General’s Policy Brief series.* More than ever, the Secretary-General must look to the moral compass that the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide: a global civic ethic that empowers him, uniquely and unapologetically, to speak for humanity and the planet. He has little to lose and much to gain by staying the course and continuing to navigate the likely political minefields to achieve overdue changes in how the world is governed.
For Civil Society: Be relentless in convincing UN Ambassadors and their capitals that civil society’s thoughtful and novel ideas on reinvigorating multilateralism can directly impact UN Member States in positive ways. Civil society has stood up a new Summit of the Future Information Bulletin to provide both civil society and UN Missions up-to-date analysis of the various Summit negotiation tracks. Additionally, it brought together in March more than 2,000 representatives registered worldwide for the inaugural, hybrid Global Futures Forum, held across from UN headquarters, to finalize and promote an interim People’s Pact for the Future (iPP) as a civil society declaration of creative reform ideas. While advocacy consultations in New York are helpful to know the lay of the land and build consensus within civil society around select major reforms, the real work in moving governments must be undertaken in capitals, as this is where significant decisions are made.

For the Pact for the Future and all related Tracks: As done for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (creating individual targets and tracking indicators for all 17 individual SDGs), design a comprehensive Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism to ensure accountability and facilitate course corrections in implementing agreed Summit of the Future outcomes. To encourage successful execution of the Pact for the Future and related strategic frameworks (e.g., a New Agenda for Peace, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations), the UN Secretariat could design an annual progress report to assess implementation gaps and recommend early corrective action.

For Summit of the Future Follow-through: Consider a comprehensive Charter Review process through Article 109, culminating in 2026, to realize several anticipated Pact for the Future commitments requiring Charter amendment. The framers of the UN Charter in 1945 foresaw that it was an imperfect instrument that would need to be updated to reflect changing global political realities, threats, and opportunities, to ensure the organization’s continued practical relevance and decision-making efficiency. Member States could recommend a high-level Article 109 UN Charter Review Conference, to be held by late 2026 and preceded by an appropriate preparatory process, to take forward Summit of the Future commitments requiring Charter revision. This would ensure that momentum is sustained, in 2025 and 2026, to facilitate effective follow-through.

Through a combination of critical mass, quality ideas, and deft multilateral diplomacy, civil society can team up with champion governments and forward-leaning leaders in global and regional institutions to maximize the impact of the New Agenda for Peace and Summit of the Future. Together, they must demonstrate the many tangible ways a modernized United Nations and related global and regional bodies can help countries and communities deliver on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as help them to avoid new outbreaks (or recurrence) of deadly conflict. Equally pivotal, they must work skillfully to ensure that this generational opportunity to define “the future we want” for today’s younger generation—and all future generations—really becomes the future we and they get.
I. Introducing the Global Governance Index and Survey

“We have started 2023 staring down the barrel of a confluence of challenges unlike any other in our lifetimes. Wars grind on. The climate crisis burns on. Extreme wealth and extreme poverty rage on. The gulf between the haves and have nots is cleaving societies, countries and our wider world. Epic geopolitical divisions are undermining global solidarity and trust. This path is a dead end. We need a course correction.”

—UN Secretary-General António Guterres.¹

A course correction for the world is what this new Global Governance Innovation Report (GGIR) series, launched fifteen months before the Summit of the Future (SOTF), is all about. The world needs better ways to manage its many, growing problems—engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures—to better cope with a variety of 21st century challenges. These include renewed Great Power tensions, deepening Global North-South divides, virulent nationalism, violent extremism in fragile states, pandemics, refugees, climate change, cross-border economic shocks, cyber-attacks, unconstrained artificial intelligence, and a persistent and growing global trust deficit.

Against this backdrop, the analysis and recommendations presented in this report are intended to encourage more ambitious, forward-looking thinking and deliberation on global governance renewal and innovation in the run-up to the September 2024 Summit in New York. With this year’s thematic focus on “Redefining Approaches to Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action,” this report further aspires to help refine and operationalize the concepts and proposals introduced in the Secretary-General’s (July 2023) New Agenda for Peace.

As elaborated in section two, we define global governance to mean the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and tackle global challenges effectively. In adopting a future-oriented approach, global governance helps to generate (the closely related concepts of) global public goods and sustainable development by improving conditions for meeting present generational needs without foreclosing future generational development options. Among other expected priorities, global governance can help to steward the global commons (the oceans, atmosphere, Antarctica, outer space, and even for some cyber-space),
by facilitating the effective and equitable management of areas and natural resources that are not subject to the national jurisdiction of a particular state. Before putting forward novel and carefully constructed proposals for rethinking and revitalizing global governance, it is important to be able to measure global governance in action, including by drawing on people’s perceptions of what is working and what is not working.

**Diagnosing the World: A New Global Governance Index and Survey**

The *Global Governance Innovation Report* series aims to inform and advance debates on improving global governance and to spur action by all nations and peoples, drawing on insights from a new Global Governance Index and Global Governance Survey. The **Global Governance Index (GGI)** represents the first-ever attempt to measure and compare, in a composite way, the ability and inclination of individual nations to better manage global public goods. In doing so, the annual Global Governance Index aims to inspire competitive pressure to join a “race to the top” in global governance performance and support.

While the efficient management of global public goods is unequivocally a multilateral affair, the actions of individual states invariably impact global outcomes and the nature and direction of this work. Given an increasing number of global challenges, a better understanding of these country dynamics is critical, particularly as it pertains to globally influential states. Here, the GGI can make an important contribution.

Measuring and revealing attitudes towards global issues and support for existing and possible new modes of global governance, as well as identifying the most effective messaging to promote them, would also help policy-makers, policy analysts, and policy advocates seeking to improve global governance. The **Global Governance Survey (GGS)** offers a portrait of these critical trends as they stand in the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which together account for around 51 percent of the world’s population and 70 percent of global GDP.

With the questions raised about future international cooperation in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine, it has become even more necessary to take stock of global attitudes on these issues and track how they change in the future. Similar to the GGI, the GGS is intended to become a yearly effort, which will allow tracking of trends over time while addressing new governance issues as they emerge. It will have a core set of themes to track year-to-year, as well as a specific annual thematic focus (aligned with the *Global Governance Innovation Report’s* annual thematic focus).

Together, these diagnostic tools will enable the GGIR series to accumulate trend data that steadily increases in value as the time-series lengthens, but the data will also maintain immediate relevance through the Global Governance Survey’s annual deep dives.
For an overview of the Global Governance Index’s methodology, see annex 1. For an overview of the Global Governance Survey’s methodology and a detailed presentation of data of the major questions surveyed for the GGS’ inaugural edition, see the companion report, Global Governance Survey 2023: Finding Consensus in a Divided World.3 Future Global Governance Surveys plan to cover, at a minimum, the G20 countries, and the hope is to expand coverage of the Global Governance Index beyond that to include, eventually, all 193 UN Member States, modeled on the near-universal coverage of the Institute for Economics & Peace for its annual Global Peace Index, Global Terrorism Index, and Ecological Threat Report Index. The teams producing the annual Global Governance Index and Global Governance Survey very much welcome and appreciate constructive feedback, including for such issues as methodological design for the two instruments, the choice and weighting of indicators for the GGI, and the choice of questions and how their responses are assessed for the GGS.

The Global Governance Index assesses commitment to global governance across five domains for the G7 and BRICS countries:

1. International Peace, Security, and (Conflict-related) Humanitarian Action
2. Socioeconomic Development and Pandemic Response
3. Environmental Governance and Climate Action
4. Human Rights, the Rule of Law, Inclusive Governance, and Civic Space
5. Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.29</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1: Total Global Governance Index Scores

Source: Original Figure, Institute for Economics & Peace and Stimson Center.
Results for each of these domains are elaborated in this section, and figure 1.1 presents the twelve countries’ full Global Governance Index scores, which represent unweighted averages across all five domains. Germany earned the highest composite score among the twelve countries, with a score of 6.53 out of 10, and Russia the lowest with a score of 4.29. Germany earned the highest scores in three domains: socioeconomic development; human rights; and global collective action and citizenship. Conversely, Russia ranked last in two domains (environmental governance and climate action, as well as global collective action, citizenship, and leadership), and it never ranked higher than the bottom three in the remaining three domains.

It was rare for a country to exceed 7 points (out of 10) in a single domain or thematic category. Future editions of the GGI will permit comparing G7 and BRICS performance with other UN Member States, several of which (e.g., Senegal, Singapore, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries) have strong records of global leadership through multilateral institutions.

For the Global Governance Survey, citizens were surveyed in the G7 and BRICS countries across the same five domains. In response to the question, “Generally speaking, do you think things in the world are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?”, by a factor of almost 2 to 1 (57 percent to 30 percent), respondents felt the world was moving in the wrong direction. Of note, both Chinese (at 83 percent) and Indian (at 64 percent) participants, by large majorities, viewed the world as moving in the right direction, whereas the remaining countries’ citizens surveyed held overwhelmingly pessimistic views. Primary reasons given for their pessimism were war and conflict (flagged by 50 percent of respondents), worsening economy / jobs / inflation / poverty (flagged by 38 percent), and increasing corruption (23 percent).

Compared to a decade ago, 28 percent of G7 and BRICS countries respondents view global leadership and cooperation as worsening, 21 percent say it has improved, and 39 percent saw little change. In responding to the question “If you were describing the state of the world now, which two of the following words would you choose?” over 30 percent chose either “Dangerous,” “Worsening,” or “Divided” to describe the world, while less than 14 percent chose “Prosperity,” “Improving,” or “Cooperation.” A substantial 62 percent of respondents felt that more needed to be done to improve the living standards of the poor; 57 percent expressed similar dissatisfaction with efforts to promote international peace and security; and 55 percent felt that more work was needed to protect the interests and natural resources of future generations.

Now let us turn to some major findings from the five individual domains...
Compared to the early 2000s, the past decade has witnessed an alarming uptick in violent conflict (figure 1.2). From the South Sudanese civil war to the decades-long crisis in Yemen, the most acute conflicts have intensified already difficult humanitarian situations across Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Moreover, deadly wars represent a primary obstacle to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals for many struggling countries.

At the same time, fears of nuclear proliferation are on the rise again with respect to North Korea, Iran, and China. Meanwhile, the first major interstate war in Europe in nearly eight decades grinds on. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, beginning in February 2022, resulted in approximately eight million refugees and left close to six million Ukrainians internally displaced. The year 2023 has seen the re-emergence of deadly conflict in Sudan, where armed conflict erupted following a faltering transition from military to civilian-led government in April 2023 (leading to hundreds of civilian deaths and 250,000 fleeing the country).

**Figure 1.2: Fatalities by Type of Violence**

(Excluding Rwanda 1994), 1989-2021

Under the domain of international peace, security, and humanitarian action (see figure 1.3), the Global Governance Index ranked twelve countries against a composite measure involving five indicators: 1) Troop and police contributions to peacekeeping; 2) Disarmament treaties (ratified or signed); 3) Fulfillment of UN peacekeeping funding obligations; 4) Contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, unearmarked (as a percent of GDP); and 5) Military expenditure (as a percent of GDP). For the troop and police contributions to peacekeeping indicator, India was by far the highest scoring country. Brazil was the lowest scoring country in this domain, in part due to its underperformance in peacekeeping financial commitments. At the same time, Brazil scored well (alongside Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) on indicator three (disarmament treaties ratified or signed), whereas China and India ranked relatively low on this indicator. Overall in this domain, India, China, and Germany had the highest scores, while Russia, the United States, and Brazil had the lowest.

![Figure 1.3: GGI - Peace & Humanitarian Leadership through Global Institutions](image)

The corresponding Global Governance Survey in this domain explored public perceptions of the world’s performance as well as the contributions of individual countries through multilateral institutions. For instance, when individuals from BRICS and G7 countries were asked about the world’s response to refugees and people displaced by war, 36 percent thought it “Fairly Poor,” and only 14 percent believed it was performing “Very Well.” Perhaps colored by daily reports of Russia’s sustained war of aggression against Ukraine and ongoing conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the perceptions shared indicate a high
level of popular dissatisfaction, if not disillusionment, with the international community’s response to fundamental peace, security, and humanitarian challenges.

At the same time, most people across the countries polled favor severe diplomatic and financial consequences for aggression. Non-recognition of territory taken by aggressors in principle is supported by 67 percent, reducing or cutting off trade with them by 72 percent, and reparations for war damage they cause by 76 percent. Opposition is limited on all these issues, ranging from 22 percent to just 13 percent.

**Socioeconomic Development and Pandemic Response**

Economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic was unexpectedly swift and strong for countries that could afford extensive stimulus packages. In the United States, for example, growth rates had returned to their pre-pandemic level by the second quarter of 2021. In Italy, Japan, and the UK, fiscal stimulus packages for pandemic recovery equaled or exceeded 35 percent of GDP, whereas the average for lower middle-income countries was just 4 percent. Inequality between countries has intensified in recent years, further tipping the balance against those countries where targeted development interventions can have the greatest marginal return. Globally, up to 677 million people were living in extreme poverty in 2022—almost 100 million more than in projections made before “the combined crises of the pandemic, inflation, and the war in Ukraine.”

Intersecting complexities in multilateral governance systems are raising the stakes of the “breakdown or breakthrough” scenarios found in the UN Secretary-General’s *Our Common Agenda* report and related studies, where the global human costs of not “course correcting” could leave vulnerable groups permanently behind. At the halfway point of the 2030 Agenda, despite initial positive trends shortly after 2015, an assessment of the SDGs’ 140 targets shows that only 12 percent are on track to be met, almost 50 percent are moderately or severely off track, and 30 percent have either seen no progress or regressed below the 2015 baseline.

To assess the performance of twelve major countries within multilateral institutions in the area of socioeconomic development and pandemic response, the Global Governance Index considers five indicators: (1) Contributions to GAVI (as percentage of GDP); (2) Contributions to UNDP (unearmarked, as a percentage of GDP); (3) Number of signed or ratified public health agreements; (4) Human Development Index score; and (5) Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic. In this domain, Germany comes out on top (7.5)—just above the United Kingdom (7.3) and Canada (6.5)—by scoring highly across all indicators, but India, China, and Brazil have ratified or signed more public health agreements than the other G7 and BRICS countries (figure 1.4). Russia, India, and South Africa earned the three lowest scores in this domain. All twelve countries scored above average on the Human Development Index score but, with the exception of Germany, their unearmarked contributions to UNDP are low.
Public sentiment portrayed through the Global Governance Survey varies. While 69 percent of the populations assessed in the G7 and BRICS countries say the world is doing well in combating COVID-19, only 32 percent of respondents felt the world is doing a good job in fighting poverty. Respondents in China and India, in particular, thought that their governments were doing a much better job on development and pandemic response than their countries’ corresponding GGI scores suggested. Respondents from the United Kingdom, on the other hand, thought their country’s performance on these issues to be rather worse than the GGI indicates.

Public sentiment in the United States most closely reflected actual country performance, with 37 percent of respondents saying pandemics are combatted fairly well and 22 percent fairly poorly. Roughly 46 percent and 42 percent of respondents in Russia and China, respectively, thought their governments were doing “fairly well” in this domain. In improving living standards for the poor, only around 1 percent of Japanese respondents say that the world is doing “very well”—meanwhile, Japan itself scored an impressive 9.3 out of 10 in indicator four (the Human Development Index). In contrast, 30 percent of Indian respondents say that the world is doing “very well” in improving living standards, though India has the lowest HDI score of all twelve cases.

The Global Governance Survey further asked about establishing Biennial Summits on the World Economy between the G20 (which includes all the nations in this poll) and the General
Assembly, which includes all UN Member States, to discuss how to strengthen and better manage the world economy. Fully 66 percent across the twelve countries polled are in favor, with just 14 percent opposed. The proposal enjoys a majority in support in eleven countries, rising from 57 percent in Canada to 86 percent in China, and a 50 percent plurality in Russia.

Environmental Governance and Climate Action

Figure 1.5: Total Number of Persons Displaced by Climate-related Disasters (2021)

More than 1,000,000
500,001 - 1,000,000
100,001 - 500,000
50,001 - 100,000
Less than 50,000
No data on this metric
10 countries reporting the highest figures

5.9 million internally displaced people as a result of disasters in 84 countries and territories as of 31 December 2021

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Total Number of Persons Displaced by Climate Related Disasters, 2021.

Between increased rates and intensity of droughts and diminishing groundwater supplies, an estimated five billion persons worldwide will face limited access and water stress by 2050. Pollution, acidification, and overfishing are also driving ocean biodiversity levels precariously low, where some estimates put more than half of the world’s ocean reefs and dependent species at risk of degradation by 2100. Land degradation and the onset of desertification has the potential to further threaten arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas, which compose roughly 46 percent of the global land surface—areas upon which millions of persons in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East depend for agricultural subsistence. The brunt of the 12,000 natural disasters between 1970 and 2021 has been borne by the Least Developed
Countries and the Small Island Developing States. Meanwhile, some 12,000 natural disasters, between 1970 and 2021, have upended countries and livelihoods, with developing states having sustained 60% of the economic damage from these climate-related catastrophes. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center recorded that extreme weather events linked to climate change, in 2021, accounted for nearly six million internally displaced persons (see figure 1.5). According to the most recent report of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the median five-year period during which the Earth’s average temperature increase is projected to reach 1.5°C is 2030-2035.

In response to the climate crisis, countries continue to coordinate and update policies and commitments—building upon the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement through their annual Conference of the Parties—in working to keep the shift in global temperatures to under 2°C. The 5th UN Environment Assembly, in February 2023, dedicated itself to “effective, inclusive and sustainable multilateral actions to tackle climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution.” International environmental governance further witnessed gains through the completion of the High Seas Treaty and the convening of the UN 2023 Water Conference (both in March 2023), building on last year’s UN General Resolution A/RES/76/300 on “The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment” and the earlier (March 2015) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Yet despite Secretary-General Guterres’ declaration that the world has “never been better equipped to solve the climate challenge,” global shocks such as the Ukraine Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic have precipitated climate financing shortfalls.

“For tracking major countries’ contributions to environmental governance and climate action through multilateral approaches and institutions, the Global Governance Index measured progress across five indicators: 1) Multilateral environmental agreements (ratified or signed); 2) Ecosystem Vitality Score; 3) Contributions to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), unemararked as a percentage of GDP; 4) Average Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) score; and 5) CO₂ Emissions per capita. Among the twelve G7 and BRICS nations, France scored highest overall, in part because it led on UNEP contributions and tied for first with Italy on the ESG score (see figure 1.6). Germany finished a relatively close second, partly thanks to its “perfect 10” in ratifying or signing multilateral environmental agreements. At the other end of the spectrum, India, Russia, the United States, and China scored poorly overall, but not that much worse than Canada or Brazil. Russia recorded the lowest ESG score, while India recorded the lowest Ecosystem Vitality Score, yet had low net carbon emissions per capita. Russia and Germany scored well for signing or ratifying multilateral environmental agreements; which is, of course, distinct from implementation.”
Overall, 41 percent of respondents agreed with the view that voluntary, specific, and increasing national pledges on carbon emissions reduction, the Paris Climate Accord approach, is the only way to get the whole world moving. Slightly more (43 percent) take the stance that it would be better to require limits and reductions to greenhouse gas emissions, even if some countries reject them. The latter is the preponderant view in nine countries polled, though by fairly narrow pluralities in seven and with majority support in only Italy and Brazil. In contrast, the voluntary approach is supported by majorities in South Africa, India, and China. Some 16 percent of the sample have no opinion on the issue.

The Global Governance Survey further revealed that: i) Cutting the foreign debts of the poorest countries if they take action against climate change is supported by 67 percent of the respondents polled; ii) Action by the International Court of Justice to specify a duty for countries to act on climate change and compensate those hurt by it is backed by 68 percent; and iii) Making willful, widespread, or long-term damage to the environment across borders an international crime that could be prosecuted in international courts is favored by 69 percent.
Human Rights, the Rule of Law, Inclusive Governance, and Civic Space

Today, seventy-five years after the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the state of human rights, the rule of law, and inclusive governance is under immense pressure worldwide.\textsuperscript{27} Despite some progress in recent years (e.g., safeguarding reproductive rights in Latin America\textsuperscript{28} and UN recognition of the human right to a clean and healthy environment),\textsuperscript{29} substantial challenges remain globally,\textsuperscript{30} including in the areas of meaningful civic engagement and protecting the human rights of civilians in conflict zones.\textsuperscript{31} Of particular note, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine was a key global inflection point for human rights and the rule of law; since February 2022, Russia has committed numerous human rights violations and war crimes in Ukraine, including sexual violence, torture, unlawful killings, and kidnapping of children.\textsuperscript{32}

Numerous human rights violations abound elsewhere, including ongoing war crimes perpetrated against the Tigrayan population in Ethiopia, reprisal killings of Afghan citizens by the Taliban, China’s mass detention of Uyghurs, and Israel’s indiscriminate air strikes and other unlawful attacks against Palestinians.\textsuperscript{33} The inability of powerful governments to voice a clear condemnation of human rights abuses and apply the standard equally to all offending countries—allies or otherwise—remains a chief obstacle that undermines the safeguarding of human rights worldwide.\textsuperscript{34}

Figure 1.7: Global Overview of Political Regimes by Country

Another concerning global trend is the backslide toward autocracy, perhaps starkest in Russia, Türkiye, and Hungary. Autocratic regimes employ illiberal, exclusionary forms of governance to repress dissent, ultimately degrading the rule of law globally (figure 1.7). In recent years, this has led to limitations on the freedoms of assembly and speech through legislative (e.g., Russia) or violent (e.g., Iran, Peru) means, including the unlawful detention and sometimes torture of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society leaders (e.g., Afghanistan, Belarus, Ethiopia, and Mali).

The ranking of the twelve G7 and BRICS countries in the human rights, rule of law, inclusive governance, and civic space domain stems from their ratings on five key indicators: 1) Human Rights Protection Score; 2) Contributions to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (Unearmarked, percent of GDP); 3) Universal Periodic Review (UPR, proportion of human rights recommendation endorsed by recipient country); 4) International human rights treaties (ratified or signed); and 5) Freedom House Index. China had the lowest score overall for this domain, while Germany scored highest (figure 1.8). More specifically, China scored relatively low across all five indicators and ranked last in the Universal Periodic Review indicator. Conversely, Germany scored relatively high in all indicators but ranked first in only one (the Human Rights Protection Score). All countries scored poorly on the only financial commitment indicator (OHCHR Contributions). Similarly, all countries but Brazil scored poorly on the UPR indicator; Brazil scored a 7.1.
For issues of human rights, rule of law, inclusive governance, and civic space, the Global Governance Survey indicates mixed public sentiment. When participants were asked their opinion on how well the world was doing in terms of protecting human rights and the rule of law, the majority of participants (52 percent) indicated an overall poor global performance; this finding is almost identical to the 51 percent who signaled poor performance worldwide in the promotion of inclusive governance. At the same time, when asked how they believed their own individual countries were performing in terms of protecting human rights and the rule of law, respondents chose “performing well” 49 percent of the time. Interestingly (given China, India, and Russia’s relatively low scores in the Global Governance Index above), only 23 percent of Chinese, 25 percent of Indian, and 35 percent of Russian respondents signaled that their country is performing fairly or very poorly.

Moreover, 70 percent of those polled across the G7 and BRICS countries agree with the notion that an International Anti-Corruption Court should be established to deal with cases that national governments and their tribunals cannot handle. Only 15 percent are opposed. A substantial majority is in favor in all twelve countries polled.

**Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership**

A growing focus on global public goods and global commons has brought to the fore several global agendas, the notions of collective global responsibility and global citizenship, and the means to act in the best interests of both people and the planet today and for future generations. Many of the trends examined above, including setbacks to fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals, are directly influenced by the quality of global leadership and level of affinity between citizens worldwide; they have further informed the UN Secretary-General’s call for more inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism.\(^{37}\) Increasingly, principles of collective action and leadership are evoked in official deliberations on collective security and the governance of the commons, as well as the High-Level Advisory Board for Effective Multilateralism (e.g., in connection with debt relief and broader global financial architecture reforms).\(^{38}\) Reflecting this spirit, new governance innovations are leveraging the talents and ideas of citizens at multiple decision-making levels; regions, cities, and municipalities are granted special status in growing numbers of multilateral treaty negotiations; and parliamentarians and their allies in civil society are championing the creation of a UN Parliamentary Network, to name a few.\(^{39}\) Though globally there is widespread agreement on the need for collective action writ large, progress has, on the whole, been mixed in moving beyond positive rhetoric to positive, concrete, and well-resourced actions for improved global governance.

In this final domain, the Global Governance Index assessed the cross-cutting issues of global collective action, citizenship, and leadership along five major indicators: 1) International Sentiment Score; 2) Interconnectivity Score; 3) Contributions to the UN (unearmarked, as a percent of GDP); 4) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index Score; and 5) Innovation Index Score. Overall, Germany scored highest, fueled by holding the top spot for two indicators,
UN contributions and SDG Index Score, alongside high performance across the other three indicators (figure 1.9). At the other end of the spectrum, Russia ranked lowest, generally registering poor results across all five indicators. Russia’s International Sentiment indicator, in particular, was significantly lower than the other eleven countries. This means that, as measured by automated aggregations of news reports from around the world, the content and character of bilateral exchanges between Russia and all other countries in the last year were much more heavily weighted toward criticism and condemnation than consultation and collaboration. All four western European countries scored among the top five countries, with Japan sandwiched in between. Compared to the Global Governance Index’s other four domains, the twelve countries demonstrate less variation within this thematic area.

The Global Governance Survey gives further insight into recent trends in this domain. Large majorities of those polled prefer that their countries work together through international organizations, rather than act unilaterally on these key topics. Fully 71 percent favor multilateralism to promote international peace and security, and a similar percentage prefers multilateral approaches to reduce climate change. Almost two-thirds (66 percent) would rather have multilateral responses to combat pandemics like COVID-19. Even on a more controversial subject, that of promoting human rights and the rule of law, three-fifths (60 percent) say working through international organizations is better than unilateralism.

Moreover, the majority of respondents consider themselves global citizens, but this perspective is more common in the G7 countries than in the BRICS. The global citizen view
is predominant in all the developed G7 countries, with majorities ranging from a plurality of 48% in the U.S. and 52 percent in the U.K. and Germany to 78 percent in Japan and 76 percent in Italy. The global citizen perspective is somewhat weaker in the more nationalistic BRICS, despite their citizens’ generally supportive views on multilateralism. In Russia and India, where the global citizen label is accepted by only 36 percent and 40 percent, it is rejected by majorities of 56 percent and 52 percent, respectively.

Finally, a clear majority of respondents positively viewed a Global Governance Survey proposal to help connect the UN with its member countries further—through parliamentary representatives—by establishing a United Nations Parliamentary Network, to inform parliamentarians of the UN’s agenda and obtain their feedback on it. This is favored by 62 percent and opposed by 17 percent across the sample. This idea is also favored by majorities in eleven countries (ranging from 55 percent in the U.K. to 84 percent in China) and by a plurality of 47 percent in Russia.

The Global Governance Innovation Report, Global Governance Index, and Global Governance Survey aspire to have a major impact on policy debates and outcomes on global governance within governments, multilateral institutions, and civil society. For a select group of countries in this inaugural edition, the GGI shows comparative national standings on global governance on various issues, as well as in the aggregate, enabling comparison and encouraging countries to compete to improve their standing. The GGS makes citizens’ collective views on global issues and governance highly visible and (its full accompanying report) reveals opportunities to promote action worldwide. The GGIR brings together ideas and innovations for discussion and testing in the field and outlines strategies for reform for their full adoption and implementation. The results of all three knowledge products are intended to contribute to building and extending policy networks connecting thinkers and doers, to suggest and demonstrate the feasibility of actions, and to track those that are actually undertaken.

Before turning to innovative proposals for reshaping the conduct of global governance, it is useful, indeed necessary, to explore conceptual advances toward peace, security, and humanitarian action: the thematic focus of this inaugural Global Governance Innovation Report. Importantly, this requires unpacking key themes and redefining approaches for achieving just, sustainable, and inclusive peace (section two). The report then considers the changing nature of conflict, including specific challenges facing conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding (section three).

Disarmament, another critical topic revisited in this report, can boost conditions for applying these conflict management tools effectively (section four), which, together, can enhance how the global humanitarian architecture functions (section five). Against the backdrop of renewed Great Power competition, virulent nationalism, and ongoing wars in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, the analysis and recommendations presented in GGIR’23 are intended to encourage more imaginative and forward-leaning conversations on the future of global governance in the run-up to the 2024 Summit of the Future in New York (the report’s concluding section six).
II. Conceptual Advances toward Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action

“If the core goal of the UN in 1945 was to prevent the massive human suffering resulting from world wars, the goal of the UN today must be to prevent the human suffering and global instability caused by...multiple, interrelated threats to our collective security. Achieving this goal requires a paradigm shift.”

—High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, A Breakthrough for People and Planet.⁴⁰

As the previous section demonstrated, major global trends pose significant challenges to international peace and security, aggravating existing and creating new humanitarian crises. At the same time, it has shown, through the examples of several vanguard countries, that there is the political will to innovate and lead in tackling these challenges. It has long been recognized that the international community needs to think beyond existing responses and capacities to empower itself to tackle these challenges. Underlying that recognition is a broad paradigmatic shift in understanding peace, security, and humanitarian action in the contemporary age which is indispensable for truly reimagining the global governance architecture, the way it operates, and the tools it should wield.

While such a reimagining is indispensable for letting go of outdated frames of mind, the consequences of such a paradigm shift must unfold within the context of current political realities. Therefore, this report’s approach is to chart a course that, on the one hand, goes beyond merely incremental reforms for an outdated framework, while, on the other, offering specific and realizable proposals to give tangible expression to the paradigm shift in the medium term. In other words, the report’s approach to global governance innovation and strengthening is to seek out the most progressive approach within the existing political and legal bounds of possibility.

This section is dual-facing. First, it retraces the origins of current calls for a paradigm shift in how we understand peace, security, and humanitarian action in light of a changing conception of global governance (this new Global Governance Innovation Report series’ anchor concept), for which Our Common Agenda (OCA) and the recent report of the Secretary-General’s High-

Efforts to promote conceptual renewal in the area of global governance have received a boost recently in the form of the much-anticipated HLAB report, *A Breakthrough for People and Planet*, published in April 2023.

The report plays off, and flips, the Cold War concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), emphasizing instead the goal of “mutually assured survival.”\(^1\) It argues that the international community “must stop thinking in narrow, nationalistic frames and accept that our collective survival depends on equitable investments in peace and sustainable
development as global public goods.” It then calls for the Summit of the Future to adopt a definition of collective security that goes beyond traditional threats and covers “a broader range of risks, including from the triple planetary crisis [climate change, biodiversity loss, and environmental pollution], transnational organized crime, and deepening socioeconomic inequalities” and that also acknowledges “the risks associated with technological advancement, including artificial intelligence and cyberweaponry.”

The concept of mutually assured survival and the call for an official redefinition of collective security are innovative in that they highlight the interdependence and urgency of contemporary questions of peace, security, and humanitarian action in an evolving understanding of global governance. At the same time, they build on and bundle conceptual “stepping stones” from past decades that have challenged prevailing nation-centric frames. These include positive peace, human security, humanitarian action, the responsibility to protect (R2P), global public goods, just security, and, indeed, global governance itself.

**CONCEPTUAL STEPPING STONES OF THE PAST DECADES**

As the High-Level Advisory Board stresses, its notion is one of “positive peace, where investments gradually shift away from military spending and towards those activities that will build more resilient, flourishing societies.” The notion of positive peace was coined more than half a century earlier by the Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung, who first distinguished negative peace, that is, “the absence of violence, absence of war” from positive peace, defined as “the integration of human society.” Positive peace as a concept is still looming large in policy and academic discourses, as evidenced, for example, by the *Positive Peace Report* of the Institute for Economics and Peace.

The concept of human security—the notion that security should not (or not only) refer to national security but should instead be people-centered—was intellectually developed by Mahbub ul Haq in the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) *Human Development Report 1993* and *1994*. As defined by UNDP, human security comprises the seven dimensions of economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The concept’s popularity in policy and academic discourses has waxed and waned since—as have other concepts, such as the responsibility to protect (elaborated below). Nevertheless, to frame security today—an age of interdependence and transnational threats—in strictly national terms is dangerously outdated.

Humanitarian action is the third main conceptual focus in this inaugural *Global Governance Innovation Report*. Modern humanitarian action, which has its roots in the 20th century, is typically characterized as a response to armed conflict and natural disasters, entailing activities aimed at alleviating human suffering, protecting lives, and meeting the basic needs of affected populations. Closely related, the term “humanitarian space” refers to the physical,
political, and legal environment that allows humanitarian actors to operate based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. These principles were first formally established by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1991, with the exception of independence which was added in 2004.\textsuperscript{50}

Humanitarian action’s core principles are underpinned by precedents in international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Convention of 1949.\textsuperscript{51} The historical evolution of humanitarian action and humanitarian space sets the foundation for understanding the current challenges and opportunities in the humanitarian field. Today, the humanitarian space is characterized by a diverse array of humanitarian actors, an increasing number of compounding crises globally, and a high degree of complexity.

Acknowledging and building on the concept of human security, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose creation was sparked by the failures of the global security architecture, including the UN Security Council, to prevent mass atrocities such as the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides in the 1990s, issued a landmark report in 2001 defining the concept of “the responsibility to protect.” R2P recast sovereignty as a matter of responsibility to protect populations from harm. The ICISS report stressed that “the primary responsibility in this regard rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place.”\textsuperscript{52}

Importantly, R2P was not merely conceived of as a responsibility to react, but also as the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” (topics revisited in section three of this report).\textsuperscript{53} At the UN, R2P was officially acknowledged in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.\textsuperscript{54} Though suffering from initial growing pains, and still a source of contention in certain quarters, it continues to reverberate in international policy discourses.

In addition to developing the concept of human security, UNDP played a crucial role, in the 1990s, in developing the concept of global public goods.\textsuperscript{55} Global public goods can best be understood as goods “marked by nonrivalry in consumption and non-excludability”\textsuperscript{56} and whose benefits are quasi-universal. Examples include a healthy environment, public health, and peace. Global public goods are also future-oriented in that their provision must meet “the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations,”\textsuperscript{57} which echoes a defining feature of “sustainable development,” coined in the 1987 report \textit{Our Common Future} led by Gro Harlem Brundtland.\textsuperscript{58} The enduring—and arguably increasing—prominence of future-oriented thinking as a key ingredient of global governance is also reflected in the fact that it features among the HLAB’s ten core principles (see box 2.1).\textsuperscript{59}
Global public goods are further connected to the notion of the global commons, in that the latter often serves an important role in providing certain global public goods. In contrast, however, the resources of the global commons are “rivalrous,” as overconsumption of their resources by one or more actors will inhibit others’ possibility to benefit from them. This “tragedy of the commons” was already pointed out at the local level, in 1968, by the American ecologist Garrett Hardin, and it is also applicable to the global level. Global commons can be defined as “areas and natural resources that are not subject to the national jurisdiction of a particular state but are shared by other states, if not the international community as a whole.” These usually include the high seas and deep seabed, the polar regions, the atmosphere, outer space, and potentially cyberspace. Already back in 1995, the Commission on Global Governance called, in its report Our Global Neighborhood, for an updated UN Trusteeship Council to focus on environmental stewardship of the global commons.

Combining notions of human security with global justice and global governance, the 2015 report of the Albright-Gambari Commission, Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, stressed that “both security and justice are indispensable to human development” and, hence, that the concept of “just security” is about forging a “mutually supportive system of accountable, fair, and effective governance and sustainable peace globally.” While security had been reconceptualized from the national to the human level (see above), the dominant theories of justice of the twentieth century have been equally critiqued to focus excessively on the national level. More recent thinking on justice has stressed its global dimension, as well as the need to think beyond institutional considerations and emphasize actual effects on societies and the need for better public dialogue.
In their Foreword to the follow-on 2018 companion volume, *Just Security in an Undergoverned World*, Madeleine Albright and Ibrahim Gambari refer to just security's significance by arguing that:

“*The increasingly evident nexus between security and justice in global governance often exhibits short-term trade-offs and tensions but also reveals ways in which justice and security are mutually reinforcing, and lends urgency and fresh perspective to the search for solutions to long-standing global and regional problems.*”

Lastly, it should be recalled that the term “global governance” only entered the broader policy discourse during the 1990s, via the Commission on Global Governance, and as pioneered by scholars such as Thomas Weiss. Among its main innovations is the acknowledgment of an interdependent world that faces a range of global challenges that can only be addressed by some form of collective action. Moreover, it served to broaden our thinking to capture a fuller range of actors, norms, and forms of cooperation to tackle these challenges.

The 1995 Commission defined “governance” as going beyond intergovernmental cooperation and including non-state actors at the local, national, regional, and supranational levels, and including informal arrangements. Moreover, beyond formal (legal) rules and institutions, global governance has also come to highlight the importance of informal norms, practices, and networks. This definition expands our understanding of who matters in global governance and how cooperation can be organized and carried out. At the same time, such a broad definition risks becoming all-encompassing with no clear delimitation. Therefore, this report stresses two core elements that characterize contemporary discourse on global governance: Its *telos* (purpose) and *modus* (method).

“...*global governance is essentially about the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and tackle global challenges effectively.*”

Staying true to the etymology of “governance” (from the ancient Greek word for “steering”), global governance is essentially about the steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and tackle global challenges effectively. Such steering requires not only power but also legitimacy and authority. Here, an emerging consensus becomes visible, including through the principles and ideas permeating the OCA and HLAB reports, that for global governance to be legitimate and authoritative in contemporary terms, it needs to be conducted in an evidenced-based, inclusive, networked, equitable, and future-oriented way. Global governance innovation typically involves reform initiatives to advance global institutional, legal, policy, normative, and operational change.
New momentum for a paradigm shift in global governance was generated, in 2020, by the adoption by all 193 UN Member States of the UN75 Declaration. In addition to its own, generally worded principles, the Declaration called upon the UN Secretary-General to draft a report “with recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges.” In response to this mandate, and following extensive global consultations, the Secretary-General published, in September 2021, *Our Common Agenda*. The OCA also kept the momentum for a paradigm shift and broader reforms going by calling for both a High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism and a Summit of the Future. The HLAB’s own report of April 2023, incorporating extensive multistakeholder consultations, is the latest cumulation of efforts to consolidate the intellectual foundations of the new global governance and peace and security architecture for today’s and future global challenges.

The OCA report puts forward three key conceptual innovations, namely a New Social Contract, a New Global Deal, and Networked and Inclusive Multilateralism. These build upon the conceptual innovations outlined above and also help to inform the High-Level Advisory Board’s notion of and core principles associated with “mutually assured survival.”

OCA stresses that social contracts anchored in human rights and human security establish the foundation for cooperation, both nationally and internationally. It issues a note of caution regarding a “growing disconnect between people and the institutions that serve them” and a rise in “inward-looking nationalist agendas.” It conceptualizes New Social Contracts as resting on the triple foundation of: i) trust; ii) inclusion, protection, and participation; and iii) measuring and valuing what matters to people and the planet. These dimensions are also reflected in the HLAB’s approach, including the principle of being “mission-focused,” which includes “clear, measurable targets with meaningful benchmarks for assessing progress.”

The New Global Deal, designed to complement the renewed social contracts, picks up and combines the aforementioned concepts of the global commons and global public goods. It calls for the better protection and governance of the global commons, so that they can continue to provide key global public goods, underscoring that they “cannot be adequately provided by any one State acting alone, and they concern the welfare of humanity as a whole.” As the High-Level Advisory Board further elaborates, effective multilateralism needs to be well- resource to be able to “deliver global public goods, including key planetary resources.” In addition, transparency in the sense of access to information and knowledge is underlined by the Board as a prerequisite for delivering global public goods.

The OCA further calls for Networked and Inclusive Multilateralism. Transcending cooperation solely among groups of states, the report exhorts a broad coalition of state and non-state actors to engage with each other “as part of open, participatory, peer-driven and
transparent systems, geared at solving problems by drawing on the capacities and hearing the voices of all relevant actors rather than being driven by mandates or institutions alone.”

The networked principle of the HLAB report offers a very similar definition, but adds “encouraging constructive competition” as a new element. Rather than “inclusiveness,” the HLAB report prefers the notion of “representativeness,” which should also allow “representative majorities to make and implement decisions” as a clear response to the well-known problems associated with the abuse of veto powers. Moreover, its principle of “equitable” multilateralism can be seen as another expression of inclusiveness, not least because it calls for gender equality and “prioritizing delivery for vulnerable and historically excluded communities.”

The OCA emphasizes that, “the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law remain timeless, universal and an indispensable foundation for a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.” The HLAB report picks up this notion in the form of “accountable” multilateralism. Both reports seem to recognize the importance of abiding by the international rules-based order, while acknowledging that the status quo may reinforce historical power imbalances and exclusion in the shaping of international law. Therefore, both initiatives stress the need to develop international law further, with the HLAB report explicitly calling for the adoption of “common, enforceable rules that cannot be broken with impunity by any actor and which are reinforced by empowered and legitimate bodies and processes.”

Looking Forward: Steps toward “Mutually Assured Survival” and Rethinking Global Governance

The OCA and the HLAB report illuminate the need to restructure global governance and offer principles and guidelines to follow in doing so. Here, we contextualize their recommendations with a focus on three critical policy areas, presenting the thinking behind the specific recommendations made for each area in sections three, four, and five of this report.

PREVENTION, PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING, AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

The HLAB report’s call for a paradigm shift towards mutually assured survival and a reconceptualization of collective security to counter a range of interrelated threats clearly indicate a renewed emphasis on rethinking approaches to the “4P’s” conflict cycle of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding. A revival of the “responsibility to prevent” aspect of the R2P doctrine is prevalent in this context.
As section three of this report details, violent conflicts are on the rise, including in the Middle East and Africa, but also in Europe due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and mounting instability in many regions. The international community struggles to keep pace with these developments, as the UN Security Council remains deadlocked on crucial issues and UN peacekeeping remains undervalued and underfinanced. With the Secretary-General’s introduction of a New Agenda for Peace in July 2023, now is the time for pursuing its full realization by generating adequate financial resources and updating the UN conflict management toolbox, especially in light of the changing nature of conflict since the 1992 Agenda for Peace.

**DISARMAMENT, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND WMDS**

The Cold War notion of deterrence through “mutually assured destruction” is powerfully challenged by the HLAB’s “mutually assured survival.” While the latter is formulated in positive terms and covers the full gamut of global challenges, this should not detract from the fact that the challenges associated with MAD remain embodied in the world’s nuclear arsenals and have intensified lately. As societal survival can really only be assured by preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, and use remains possible while rivalrous possession is all too common, nuclear disarmament remains a pressing need even if less visible than other global challenges, from climate change to rising debt and inequality and future global pandemics.

To renew disarmament efforts in a period of heightened geopolitical competition, a shift is needed away from the relatively narrow concern for maintaining international security to improving conditions for a holistic conception of peace, combining the attributes of both negative (the absence of war) and positive (building more just, peaceful, and inclusive societies) peace. As section four elaborates, WMDs remain a major threat—particularly in light of the challenge to global peace and security posed by the war in Ukraine—global arms expenditure is on the rise, and new technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons and cyber attacks, pose additional risks. The international community’s response, through treaties, codes, and policies, remains inadequate to manage these current and over-the-horizon hazards. Thus, it is imperative that both mutually assured survival and a new definition of collective security do not lose sight of these “hardcore” national and human security concerns. They must also seek to inspire measures to contain the renewed arms race, limit the proliferation of weapons ranging from nuclear warheads to small arms and light weapons, regulate new technologies, and lead the way toward disarmament, especially the more distant but no less desirable goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.
NEXT GENERATION HUMANITARIAN ARCHITECTURE

“...the global humanitarian architecture’s last resort ‘when-all-else-has-failed’ response remains a fundamental backstop for rebuilding trust in multilateral institutions...”

Mutually assured survival that is people-centered, and a reconceptualization of collective security as focused on countering human suffering and increasing human security, require innovative investments in the global humanitarian architecture. With rising distrust in governing institutions at all levels, fueled by nationalist and populist leaders, the global humanitarian architecture’s last resort “when-all-else-has-failed” response remains a fundamental backstop for rebuilding trust in multilateral institutions, a prerequisite for achieving mutually assured survival.

As section five examines, humanitarian needs are on the rise, not least due to ever-rising forcible displacement of persons due to myriad, concurrent global and regional crises. Current humanitarian bodies are overstretched and often struggle, with their expansive mandates and insufficient resources, to cover the vast geographic spaces and reach the civilian populations in acute need.

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The post-Cold War era has given rise to a series of new concepts to frame the international order that allow us to rethink approaches to peace, security, and humanitarian action, and to rebuild the global structures needed to meet global needs in these areas. While the prominence of certain ideas peaks and declines, the overall thrust of the discourse has undeniably been the need to come to terms with a reality of multiple, acute contradictions: where non-state actors assume increasingly important roles, both benign and nefarious, while states remain both the main pillars of and main threats to peace and security. Moreover, an emerging reality in today’s (still undefined) “post-post Cold War world” is that human ingenuity—technological, but social and political too—is both the origin and key to the solution of many global challenges.

Even though reflections on global governance may have become less optimistic (as detailed in this report’s companion volume, Global Governance Survey 2023: Finding Consensus in a Divided World), this has not stopped conceptual innovations from moving forward. In this spirit, the remaining sections of GGIR’23 set out a series of recommendations in the three thematic areas of peace, disarmament, and humanitarian action, aspiring to translate sometimes abstract, if analytically potent, concepts into consequential global governance reform innovations, capable of capturing the imagination of diverse governments and civil society groups in the lead-up to the September 2024 Summit of the Future.
III. Reimagining Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (The “4P’s”)

“A peacebuilding project must be based on context analysis and comprehensive and inclusive consultation with local communities. Often, what we see on the surface are symptoms of conflict, such as displaced people, armed groups and damaged infrastructure. To really tackle conflict, it is important to identify what causes it and work to address the cause.”

—Islamic Relief, Introduction to Peacebuilding: An Islamic Relief Practitioner’s Guide. 78

The 1992 Agenda for Peace pioneered new thinking on how the United Nations approaches the “4P’s” of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding. Given the changing nature of war and political violence, Great Power tensions, and the financial pressures placed on traditional UN conflict management donors, the time is ripe for a New Agenda for Peace that updates how these powerful concepts and their associated operational instruments are applied. Considering current challenges, the international community’s response in adapting the world’s conflict management toolbox to changing political and practical imperatives has met limited success. Therefore, this section introduces several reform ideas to reimagine UN prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding for stopping the outbreak, and improving the management and eventual resolution, of intractable violent conflicts, both in the present context and over-the-horizon.

Challenges

The UN Security Council and broader UN conflict management toolkit face aggression and intransigence on a global scale. Wars today are fueled by a range of factors, including political instability, economic hardship, ethnic or religious tensions, and competition for resources.79 Non-state actors of many stripes engage in violent actions, challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty and complicating efforts to resolve conflicts through traditional diplomacy.80 The further impact of climate change on resource availability, migration patterns, and social and economic stability has aggravated many conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Sahel, areas already affected severely by poverty and political instability.81
As shown in figure 3.1, following a steady increase in conflicts from the mid-1950s through the early 1990s, conflict in some regions diminished in the mid-to-late 1990s. This reduction could be attributed to the end of the Cold War, rising living standards, and the signing of peace agreements such as the Oslo Accords and the Good Friday Agreement. But Asia and Africa did not join this trend, and since 2012, conflicts in those regions and the Middle East have driven a significant spike in armed conflict.

The ongoing conflict in Syria exemplifies the challenges to the United Nations as a security actor when a veto-wielding member of the Security Council is a party to the conflict. In the case of Syria, the Council has been paralyzed by repeated vetoes from Russia and China. This paralysis has intensified an already massive humanitarian crisis, with the displacement of millions of Syrians. Although the UN welcomed the oversight of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to investigate and oversee the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, the OPCW has faced difficulties accessing all relevant sites and determining responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in that conflict.

Other conflicts are also becoming harder to settle, due in part to the actions of global and regional powers that finance proxies to fight wars abroad, as in Yemen and Libya. Violent internal conflicts involving long-standing local grievances are also rebranded as counterterrorism operations, as has been the case in Myanmar.
UN preventative measures, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding, face enormous political and financial obstacles in addressing such protracted and “internationalized internal” conflicts. Peacebuilding, for example, is critical to preventing the recurrence of conflict and promoting sustainable peace, but historically, UN funding for peacebuilding has nearly always been inadequate.\textsuperscript{86}

Meanwhile, the current system for UN peacekeeping financing relies for the majority of its funds on the Security Council’s permanent members. Thus, when a major contributor like the United States decides to withhold or reduce its funding unilaterally, the result is a significant shortfall in UN peacekeeping operational funds. This can lead to delays in the deployment of troops, shortages of critical supplies, and other operational challenges that may compromise the success of a peace operation.\textsuperscript{87}

The UN peacekeeping budget reached an all-time high of U.S. $8.27 billion in its 2015-16 fiscal year, declining since then as several missions ended, standing at U.S. $6.06 billion for 2022-23. Financing for peacekeeping remains under significant pressure, even as global military expenditure reached an all-time high of U.S. $2.24 trillion in 2022 (see figure 4.1 in section four).\textsuperscript{88}

**International Community’s Responses to Date**

The United Nations has long sought to grow and enhance its prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding capabilities, but signs of improvement are mixed with severe limitations continuing. For instance, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has been heavily criticized for its lack of effectiveness and for failing to protect civilians, including persistent charges of sexual exploitation and abuse.\textsuperscript{89} The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been criticized for failing to trust and invest in local communities, failing to protect civilians during outbreaks of violence, and being too passive in its approach to addressing the root causes of the country’s conflict.\textsuperscript{90}

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced his seminal (1992) Agenda for Peace to both revisit and upgrade the world body’s conflict management toolkit. It emphasized the need for a more integrated and coordinated approach to peacebuilding, involving all actors in the international community, including civil society and regional organizations. Moreover, the Agenda for Peace helped to shift the focus of international peace efforts from reactive measures, such as peacekeeping, to proactive measures, such as conflict prevention and peacemaking.\textsuperscript{91}

Responding to the challenges and limitations faced by peacekeeping initiatives in the 1990s, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the “Brahimi Report”), released in 2000, presented strategies for promoting peace in the 21st century.\textsuperscript{92} The report recommended a stronger focus on politics and a clear political strategy for UN
peace operations, emphasizing the importance of local actors in peacebuilding. This helped shift the focus in peacekeeping from a purely military approach to a more political one, while improving rapid deployment, coordination, and partnerships with regional organizations.

Subsequent efforts to improve the UN’s collective security architecture resulted in the establishment, in 2005, of a new “Peacebuilding Architecture,” consisting of a Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding Support Office, to help fragile states access tailored support and financial assistance for building sustainable peace. But such institutional reforms have had limited impact. For example, as an advisory subsidiary body of the General Assembly and Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission lacks independent authority or decision-making power and is, thus, unable to effectively coordinate UN peacebuilding efforts.

The Peacebuilding Fund further relies on voluntary contributions from a small number of donors. As a result, it continues to fall short in its ability to meet demand for peacebuilding initiatives. Moreover, the tendency of donors to earmark finances can politicize and skew peacebuilding priorities away from the urgent needs of conflict-affected populations. The third component of the Architecture, the Peacebuilding Support Office, existed outside the UN’s departmental peace and security policy and operational hierarchy, until folded into a reorganized Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in January 2019.

In response to growing demand for civilian capacity in UN field-based activities, the UN established the Civilian Capacity Initiative (CIVCAP, 2009-2014) and “CAPMATCH”, its former online civilian capacity sourcing platform. CAPMATCH was used, for instance, to provide country-level support to institution building efforts in Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire. Besides a failure to sustain donor interest, the CIVCAP/CAPMATCH lacked sufficient UN system operational buy-in from prospective first-tier beneficiaries of this proposed civilian surge capacity mechanism, including the then Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Political Affairs, as well as other major UN agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF, and several international financial institutions. In the face of these initiatives, the need persists to improve the UN’s ability to find, vet, deploy, and retain civilian staff for its many field missions.

Insights from the 2015 High Level Panel on Peace Operations, Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, and Review of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace & Security exposed that peace and security promotion efforts within the UN continued to be underfunded and deprioritized, revealing the ways in which the system has stymied its own goals through failing to provide the necessary resources and policy choices needed to advance peace and security reforms. Alongside recent progress in country-level and regional engagements worldwide, UN approaches to prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding continue to face myriad challenges in confronting the diverse factors fueling violent conflict (see table 3.1).

At the same time, the September 2005 UN60 World Summit—that created the Peacebuilding Architecture, upgraded the Human Rights Commission into an empowered Council with new
tools, and adopted a new norm of “Responsibility to Protect” rooted in the UN’s commitment to human rights—demonstrated that course corrections are possible. As in 2004-05, another period of reflection and change with the promise of reform and innovation has emerged from the UN75 Declaration in 2020, in particular through the planned September 2024 Summit of the Future. This holds out the promise that “unfinished business” from the 2015 UN peace and security reform exercise, let alone more recent studies’ recommendations presented throughout this report, will merit serious consideration in the run-up to next year’s Summit, including through a New Agenda for Peace.

### Table 3.1: UN Conflict Management Tools - Progress & Setbacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors fueling violent conflict</th>
<th>Prevention and Peacemaking Responses</th>
<th>Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Wars exacerbated by, for example, resource competition, ethnic and religious exclusion, and political despotism</td>
<td>UN mediation/dialogue programs encourage militias to embrace peace by participating in political processes. For instance, the UN facilitated negotiations between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But challenges persist in sustaining the peace process.</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding responses to civil war often integrate broader UN system-wide strategies to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and political exclusion. Failing to do so can create roadblocks toward achieving a more inclusive, durable peace deemed legitimate by the broader population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorism exacerbated by, for instance, ideological beliefs and political exclusion</td>
<td>Deaths from terrorism fell in 2022 to 6,701, representing a 9% decrease from the prior year. At the same time, failure to adopt more flexible prevention and peacemaking approaches can undermine efforts to adapt to the changing dynamics of international terrorism.</td>
<td>Peacekeepers face the threat of growing violence in often increasingly hostile environments. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, peacekeepers are targeted regularly by armed groups. This, in turn, undermines their efforts to protect civilians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Major Elements of the Global Policy Framework

Recognizing the gaps between the UN’s ability to translate rhetoric for the maintenance of international peace and security into practice, Secretary-General António Guterres called for a “New Agenda for Peace” in his seminal 2021 report, Our Common Agenda, affording an opportunity to reimagine prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict
peacebuilding methods from the top down and bottom up. Specifically, to advance efforts to prevent violent conflict and make, keep, and sustain the global public good of peace, the Secretary-General called for “... a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict, a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks.” The Stimson Center’s 2022 reports, *Road to 2023* and *Rethinking Global Cooperation*, offered concrete proposals in support of the New Agenda for Peace. The following additional recommendations aim to further improve the UN’s conflict prevention and management toolkit to better respond to contemporary and over-the-horizon threats and challenges (as detailed below, but also presented in a logical framework in annex 2.1):

## PREVENTION

Prevention is at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations. As a platform for diplomatic dialogue, borne out of the failure to prevent the Second World War, mechanisms for the peaceful settlements of dispute are ingrained in many of its Articles. However, despite prevention being embedded in each of the world body’s three-main policy “pillars” (peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights), the precise tools for effective prevention and early action require updating and renewal. Additionally, while the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect recognizes the importance of prevention, directing concerted and practical investments toward the “Responsibility to Prevent” can further elevate and enhance the UN’s range of prevention tools aimed at building more resilient and peaceful societies, in alignment with Sustainable Development Goal 16.

### Early Warning and Action

Improving conflict analysis, early warning, and early action capabilities within the world body’s major intergovernmental organs for peace and security (the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, and General Assembly) means first designating responsibility within and equipping the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), through their “shared structure”, with the tools and resources for effective conflict analysis and sufficient monitoring for early warning of both crises and opportunities. Besides interfacing closely with other UN departments, programs, funds, and agencies in this space, DPPA and DPO are well-placed to tap the expertise and networks of the international financial institutions and regional and sub-regional organizations. Moreover, they can facilitate high-level discussions through the Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and General Assembly to work out the signs and factors associated with mass atrocity events.

In an effort to further operationalize and prioritize conflict prevention, the latest thinking from within the broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding community should be joined with
the recommendations of the Secretary-General to enhance the UN’s system-wide integrated analysis and planning capacity, and its capacity for early action that builds upon the earlier Human Rights Up Front initiative and works in concert with other international partners. Reaching a high-level agreement on the warning signs of mass atrocities, for example, may prove politically challenging but there is a growing body of serious work to draw upon, including from the UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System, and a growing number of NGOs.

Efforts to bridge the gap between early warning and early action must focus on four key areas: knowledge and relationships; framework diplomacy; strategic planning and communication; and creating “pathways to peace.” Importantly, an upgraded early warning system could, in turn, support a new Peacebuilding Audit, modeled on the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review. The monitoring of various national indicators linked with conflict outbreaks would better inform decision-making by major UN bodies, enabling earlier and more effective preventive action.

Furthermore, DPPA and UNDP should make use of their Peace and Development Advisers deployed worldwide to work with national counterparts in collecting data for an ever-improving set of conflict analysis and early warning systems, loosely coordinated globally by the UN Secretariat, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and General Assembly.

**Responsibility to Prevent**

The “Responsibility to Protect” norm, adopted by UN Member States in 2005 during the UN60 World Summit, can be invoked too late to be of major help in fast-moving atrocity scenarios. Moreover, the Security Council should not be seen as the only UN organ with authority relevant to its invocation if preventing atrocities is to be taken seriously. Consequently, in 2015, the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance called for a focus on the Responsibility to Prevent (R2Pre). This would entail having all major UN agencies and programs develop a plan of action to review the relevance of their work on the responsibility to prevent, thereby privileging a unified UN perspective on the challenge of preventing and addressing atrocities.

In 2017, Secretary-General Guterres made prevention a cornerstone of his first (five-year) term in office and introduced a new High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation as part of his “surge in diplomacy for peace.” Besides participating in several workshops and trust-building seminars, however, there is little evidence that this eminent group of current and former world leaders has provided direct mediation and conflict prevention services, including by providing additional support to UN Envoys and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

With the continued uptick in political violence detailed in this report, the time is ripe to revive the need for Responsibility to Prevent action plans in all major UN agencies and programs,
drawing upon the world body’s unique potential, embodied in entities such as the High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation. In addition, UN system-wide conflict prevention action plans, shepherded by Peace and Development Advisers, can complement UN agency and program global action plans, as well as feed critical perspectives and data into conflict analysis and early warning systems designed to better inform Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and General Assembly decision-making. Global and national-level action plans should also seek to further strengthen the role of women in preventive action and peacebuilding more generally, as women continue to be largely excluded from peacebuilding some two decades following the adoption, in 2000, of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.\footnote{112}

### PEACEMAKING

As referenced earlier, conflicts abound worldwide, from civil and asymmetric warfare to a resurgence of interstate aggression, such as Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.\footnote{113} One might expect a corresponding rise in the practice of peacemaking, best understood as international efforts to foster political solutions to violent conflict through mediation and other methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes (for an overview of core peacemaking principles, see box 3.1).

#### Box 3.1: Peacemaking for the Modern Era

Among the most commonly cited peacemaking principles in the academic and policy literature are: \textbf{firstly}, any approach to mediation must be uniquely and narrowly tailored to the circumstances of a given conflict, which requires in-depth knowledge not only of the circumstances themselves, but of the cultural, linguistic, political, and social dimensions which have shaped the conflict. \textbf{Secondly}, peacemaking is most effective as a multi-level, inclusive process that takes place simultaneously on local-community and elite-national governmental tracks. Inclusivity regarding groups that are marginalized (such as women, youth, and indigenous populations), ubiquitous (such as civil society), or directly affected (such as victims or displaced persons) is paramount. \textbf{Thirdly}, mediation performed by international institutions must be carried out by credible, neutral, and unbiased third-party actors in order to foster trust among the negotiating parties. \textbf{Fourthly}, peacemaking must be proactive, in that even when establishing a peace process is impossible, there are steps that can be taken in order to demonstrate the credibility of potential peacemakers, address humanitarian concerns, and lay the foundations for a path toward a negotiated peace in the future.

This, however, has not been the case. Despite historically high levels of institutional capacity for mediation, the number of civil wars engaging in mediation has dropped sharply since the 1990s and experienced a partial recovery at the turn of the century, as illustrated in figure 3.2. Many factors have likely contributed to this trend, including, as explored in this section, the design and skill in applying today’s peacemaking instruments—and whether both are keeping pace with the changing character of current and over-the-horizon threats to peace and security.

Addressing this trend, how can demand for peacemaking through mediation services be increased? Two reform innovations for tackling this question are: further tailoring the UN Mediation Support Unit’s capacities to actual needs on the ground; and the adoption of a comprehensive, data-driven, measurable, and holistic “Barometer Methodology” for peacemaking implementation.

![Figure 3.2: Number of Civil Wars with Mediation on an Annual Basis](image)


**Tailoring UN Mediation Support Unit Capabilities**

Under Article 99 (in Chapter XV) of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General may “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten international peace and security,” and Chapter VI of the Charter details (in Articles 33-38)
measures for the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” including “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Against this backdrop, Secretary-General Guterres has encouraged conflict pre-emptive measures through the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to reinforce diplomatic efforts for peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries worldwide. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the MSU has supported peacemaking efforts across Africa, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific, as of 2021. Thematically speaking, it has contributed to “process design”, “constitutional advice”, and “ceasefire and security arrangements” counseling, among other areas.

Since its inception in 2006, the Mediation Support Unit has provided an additional support leg for ongoing peacemaking and political missions that build and maintain sustainable peace. Its unique comparative advantage is in providing tools and advice on tactics to facilitate peaceful dialogue between parties to a conflict, whether at global, regional, national, or local levels. In recent years, the MSU's technical expertise has been sought in connection with, for example, the implementation of constitutional reforms and steps to improve the inclusion of women in decision-making.

Supported by DPPA’s voluntary Multi-Year Appeal, the Mediation Support Unit must continue to tailor its peacemaking support services to the changing nature of violent conflict in the third decade of the 21st century. Specifically, as detailed earlier in this section, this
means a greater focus on water and climate-induced conflicts, understanding the role of new technologies in warfare, responding to the evolution of international terrorist organizations, and making societies more inclusive through the Women, Peace & Security and Youth, Peace & Security agendas.

It also acknowledges that the United Nations’—and by extension the MSU’s—comparative strength lay in its ability to foster stability and improve “enabling conditions” and tools for regional, national, and local mediators to better succeed in managing and, eventually, addressing the root causes of a protracted deadly conflict (which happens, not coincidentally, to speak to the essence of Sustainable Development Goal #16).

A Barometer Methodology for Enhancing Peacemaking

To innovate the practice of peacemaking in a country-specific context, Dr. Jason Quinn from the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and a team of researchers have introduced a new peace agreement implementation verification methodology in Colombia. Known as the “Barometer Methodology,” it monitors and evaluates implementation of the 2016 Colombia Peace Accord in collaboration with the agreement’s negotiating parties.

This instrument’s approach is grounded in the identification of “concrete, observable and measurable commitments” within a peace agreement, each determined through direct discourse with the signatory parties. Those engaged may also include civil society groups, local administrations, as well as international actors providing active implementation and mediation support, such as the United Nations’ Peace and Development Advisors, Mediation Support Unit, and issue-specific experts. Implementation is evaluated using qualitative and quantitative scales, unique to each commitment and updated monthly so that implementation gaps and slowdowns can be identified quickly and corrected.118

The novel methodology was designed to improve upon several weaknesses identified in earlier peace agreement verification mechanisms. First, prior instruments did not give all types of commitments equally robust coverage. Short-term implementation goals like demobilization-related security received comparatively stronger monitoring attention than longer-term political and social reforms. Instead, the Barometer Methodology provides holistic, wide-ranging, long-term verification of all commitments in an agreement.119

Second, previous peace implementation review bodies were retrospective and not designed around the idea of promoting continuous course correction through contemporaneous data collection and analysis. The new methodology is built around the idea that much faster feedback loops between implementation research and implementation practice are necessary and possible.120
Third, it was recognized that policy goals and what constitutes implementation are often ambiguous and socially contested. The Barometer Methodology seeks to increase the amount of transparency, openness, and deliberation with respect to evidence, sources, and the process of measuring implementation. One of the mandates of the Colombian Barometer is to give researchers access to the underlying source materials and raw data to promote broad analysis.\textsuperscript{121}

Despite successive shifts in presidential administrations and political dynamics, the Colombia Barometer continues to raise levels of standardization and generalizability in peace agreement verification.\textsuperscript{122} Furthermore, it may be replicated in future national or political contexts, including through the support of UN actors such as the Mediation Support Unit and country-focused Special Political Missions and Peace and Development Advisers. A recommended, widely-accessible guidance manual (co-designed by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the United Nations’ Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs), combined with regular training workshops, could prove invaluable both to UN system staff and other partners from the wider conflict resolution and peacebuilding community.

**PEACEKEEPING**

“Other frequent challenges faced by UN peacekeeping include difficult operating environments, engagements in settings without a peace agreement, and issues concerning host nation consent.”

In practice, peacekeeping has evolved since its inception seventy-five years ago, each evolution building upon the foundations from the previous era. In the present era, however, international donor constraints and Great Power tensions have coincided to contribute to a reduction in overall demand for such missions through the United Nations. Indeed, the last new UN-mandated peacekeeping operations—MINUSCA in the Central African Republic—was initiated in 2014. Currently, twelve UN peacekeeping missions (six of which are thirty years or older) operate across three continents; several are up for review and possible drawdown in 2023. Other frequent challenges faced by UN peacekeeping include difficult operating environments, engagements in settings without a peace agreement, and issues concerning host nation consent.\textsuperscript{123}

Responding to these trends, the UN Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) initiative makes the case for a new method to deliver “a clearer sense of where existing commitments are progressing and where they are falling short” (see figure 3.4).\textsuperscript{124} That is, the UN aims to be transparent on the need for reform to achieve a higher level of efficacy in its peace operations.
In this same spirit and against the changing nature of violent conflict outlined above, the UN must work to better navigate and conduct its missions without necessarily having to impose peace. Simultaneously, it must also ponder the decline in demand for peacekeeping missions at national and local levels, occurring alongside growing geopolitical tensions, in order to better comprehend how to proceed. Insights on possible ways forward can be found through consideration of more hybrid and partnership-oriented peace operations, as well as improved management of mission personnel in line with the highest ethical standards, which the world body is expected to uphold.

**Hybrid and Partnership-Oriented Peacekeeping**

Most peacekeepers have deployed under a UN flag but many are merely/simply under UN authority. For instance, the Australian-led coalition INTERFET (1999-2000)—mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1264—received political and logistical support from the UN to protect the UN’s initial political mission in Timor, UNAMET, after the independence referendum it had conducted returned an overwhelming vote for independence from Indonesia, sparking violence by pro-government gangs. INTERFET was replaced by a new UN “transitional administration” mission, UNTAET (1999-2002), charged with governing...
East Timor until a new Timorese government could be established. The UN has also provided logistical support to the African Union operation in Somalia (AMISOM from 2009, ATMIS since 2022), and the AU and UN shared command of a fully hybrid peace operation in Darfur (UNAMID, 2007-2020). Hybrid and partnership-oriented operations—where more than one entity has military or civilian presence on the ground—have become more common, as have missions in unstable situations.

For more than a decade, the African Union has been building an African Standby Force on the basis of rapidly deployable regional brigades, including an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. At the same time, the experience of UNAMID demonstrates that the African Union relies on UN resources to intervene at scale in a complex and costly situation in Africa, while the UN depends on AU political support both to secure host state consent and to rally African troop-contributing countries.

Though all regional organizations are different, possessing different levels of capacity to contribute to multidimensional peacekeeping and local capacity development, they can bring additional knowledge, language skills, and perhaps most importantly, political and cultural sensitivity and regional backing to both hybrid and partnership-oriented peacekeeping with the United Nations. While they undoubtedly create new interoperability challenges and other bureaucratic complexities—as manifested in a former head of UNAMID’s frustrations in attempting to channel mission funds toward quick impact projects—joint missions, of various kinds, wield the added benefit of demonstrating to increasingly skeptical donors that the target region is willing to make sacrifices and lend tangible support.

Hybrid and partnership-oriented peacekeeping operations are consistent with the Secretary-General’s new direction for strong and transparent operations, as found in A4P+ initiative presented above, as well as the SG’s push to deepen UN partnerships across the board with regional organizations. Their appeal rests upon the active incorporation of regional expertise, political leadership, and financial resources to deliver more effectively on the UN’s aim to stabilize a situation and sustain peace. Even in cases where a regional organization is leading a peace operation, as manifested lately by the African Union in Somalia, the United Nations can offer practical logistical support, monitoring, and political analysis functions to buttress a regionally-led effort.

**Curbing Sexual and Exploitation Abuses**

A UN peacekeeping operation’s basis of legitimacy stems from the trust that peacekeepers are there to help rather than harm. It is alarming then that substantial allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed within peacekeeping operations continue to be documented every year. This is particularly troubling given the equally chronic failure of UN Member States to consistently punish individual perpetrators of such incidents who are under their exclusive authority, such as military personnel, as mandated by the Secretary-
General’s “Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law” bulletin (1999), and reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/63 (2007).\textsuperscript{132}

Despite Secretary-General Guterres’ February 2023 report (alongside multiple earlier reports) outlining many UN commitments to address SEA, a major gap exists regarding Member States accountability for prosecuting perpetrators of such crimes.\textsuperscript{133} The persistence of SEA and an inability, perceived or real, to effectively pursue justice can significantly damage the trust of local communities toward peacekeepers. This applies just as much to the civilian as the military aspects of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{134}

One principal avenue for better addressing SEA in UN peacekeeping is the expansion of jurisdiction over peacekeeping personnel to fall upon the UN itself; this would imply that the United Nations Internal Justice System would be judicially responsible for the investigation and criminal punishment of abuses committed. Doing so would allow for greater direct oversight authority by the UN, help to better redress such violations, and potentially deter SEA incidences in the future. Whereas the current standard is for individuals found by an Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigation in violation of UN policy to be repatriated to their country of origin for punishment, an expansion of jurisdiction would place the onus of such a process upon the UN instead.\textsuperscript{135}

This reform could be approached through the expansion of the UN’s Office of Administration of Justice (OAJ), as well as mission-specific mobile courts modeled after those supported by UNDP in Sierra Leone, Somaliland, and the DRC.\textsuperscript{136} Where the mobile courts would be able to provide civil and military juridical processes both to those alleged violators and victims, a dedicated tribunal in the OAJ or OIOS would be able to coordinate sentencing and punishment. This would necessarily be conducted in conjunction with representatives of the UN Member State involved to facilitate the best chances of agreement on the verdict and punishment when warranted.\textsuperscript{137}

**POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING**

During the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War period one predominant peacebuilding narrative presumed that peacebuilding followed a linear sequence, beginning with a ceasefire, followed by political and socioeconomic settlements, disarmament, reintegration of armed groups, transitional justice, and constitutional processes that result in elections.\textsuperscript{138} This approach, however, is not emblematic of the empirical realities of peacebuilding, as exemplified in Mali, where an ongoing international presence and millions of dollars invested annually have failed to alleviate the ethnic tensions, extreme poverty, and escalating violence and instability that plague the country.\textsuperscript{139}

Understanding that peacebuilding rarely, if ever, follows a logical, linear path is critical so that peacebuilding initiatives can become increasingly dynamic and long-term, both in design
and operation. Melding civil society-led “social justice peacebuilding” and government-led “stability peacebuilding” strategies can help to build cohesion between these two approaches, resulting in a reimagining of how peacebuilding is approached at all levels.\textsuperscript{140} It entails combining bottom-up and top-down strategies and targeted resources to maximize the ultimate aim of peacebuilding: to develop indigenous capacities for improved management and eventual resolution of a protracted violent conflict and its causes.

Reimagining peacebuilding that is effective, durable, and sufficiently malleable to address the changing nature of conflict requires centering on the voices of those affected by conflict across decision-making levels, as well as filling the gap in critical civilian capacities identified above. In practical terms, adopting a people-centered (yet combined bottom-up and top-down) approach to peacebuilding could be advanced through a new International Fund for Peacebuilding and a New UN Civilian Response Capability.

\textbf{An International Fund for Peacebuilding}

A new International Fund for Peacebuilding (IFP) could serve to directly empower national and local peacebuilding actors directly, thereby supporting a “localization agenda” for peacebuilding—akin to longstanding localization debates within the humanitarian community (see section five of this report). Created as a separate entity formally outside of the United Nations structure, the fund would operate as an autonomous institution that pursues a holistic approach to financing local and national capacities to prevent violent conflict and build and sustain peace.\textsuperscript{141}

Uniquely, the IFP could involve local and national stakeholders from the public, private for-profit, non-profit, and academic sectors to meet, work out priorities, and plan for long-term peacebuilding, with guidance and support provided by UN country-level operating entities. It would further help to market country plans in tandem with local stakeholders, using the fund’s own pledge of support to leverage long-term commitments from public and private donors outside of a country.

Drawing inspiration from such international financing mechanisms as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the IFP could source financing from both private and government support. Investments of around U.S. $10 million would be needed for the fund’s initial pilot phase, with a goal of U.S. $2 billion per annum as the IFP’s ultimate financial target (designed to attract and leverage other financial resources too, beyond the fund, from governments, the private sector, and philanthropic institutions).\textsuperscript{142}

The International Fund for Peacebuilding’s comparative advantages lie in its innovative design and execution. From a financing standpoint, international donors and the private sector have shown a preference for financing special funds that are impartial to the politics of the UN, so the IFP’s inception could provide donors and the private sector with an
attractive, alternative structure for peacebuilding investments that are long-term in nature. For instance, the 2020-2024 UN Peacebuilding Fund Strategy of the Secretary-General acknowledges how a majority of peacebuilding initiatives require long-term, medium-sized investments for which funding is increasingly difficult to secure.

While playing an invaluable, catalytic role in the peacebuilding community, the UN Peacebuilding Fund’s modus operandi inhibits the allocation of much-needed investments to these kinds of peacebuilding initiatives given that its resources draw from a small donor pool and it caps project support at three years. An International Fund for Peacebuilding would diverge from this structure by employing an intergenerational approach to financing to secure sustained, long-term financing plans for conflict-affected countries from one generation to the next.

**New UN Civilian Response Capability**

The establishment of a UN Civilian Response Capability, as first proposed in the 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, has the potential to source greater civilian capabilities for: a) improved post-conflict institution-building by enabling the UN’s existing structures (e.g., DPPA, DPO, and UNDP) to collaborate better with local counterparts; b) broadened and deepened expertise for peacebuilding; and c) enhanced regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation in building and sustaining peace.

The initiative could include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical expertise, along with fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General, with emphasis on recruitment of women and youth leaders in support of objectives outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2250. Ideally, these teams would be complemented by a standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants, up to two thousand strong, drawn voluntarily from across the UN system—including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund—and beyond, to tap specialized skill-sets (including judges, municipal-level administrators, engineers, and technical specialists—particularly those with newly needed skills in areas such as cybersecurity).

With twenty-four special political missions and twelve peacekeeping operations operating on four continents with thousands of civilian personnel, the UN’s need for technical, operational, and leadership expertise is unremitting. Directly addressing heightened threats to vulnerable populations requires preventive action and experts who are readily available for deployment. By investing in a system that provides immediate civilian leadership and expertise, the potential to reduce the outbreak and recurrence of violent conflict grows as critical new civilian staff are deployed with relevant training, experience, and tools for effective conflict management. This could diminish the need for costly, large-scale, and more politically intrusive interventions from the international community.
Integral to the creation of a new UN Civilian Response Capability is the understanding that fragile and conflict-affected environments require skillfully tailored assistance that addresses the specific needs of the local population. Consequently, civilians deployed should privilege capacity development of national and local peacebuilders, rather than implement priorities that reflect an outside perspective. In short, this new capability would enable the world body to better respond quickly to nascent conflicts before they metastasize, while simultaneously targeting resources at developing critical national and local capacities for peace (in short, the essence of effective peacebuilding).

Overcoming Potential Spoilers and Other Bottlenecks

Reimagining and upgrading United Nations approaches to prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding is likely to encounter resistance. Potential spoilers and bottlenecks could likely include veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, seeing potential threats to their sovereignty, and ongoing financial constraints as the world slowly emerges from a global pandemic.

More specifically, the case for renewed investment in preventive action faces perennial difficulties in proving when such measures are indeed effective, especially given growing pressures on the public finances of poor and rich nations alike. Recent demand for external mediation of civil wars has sunk to levels not seen since the Cold War, requiring the UN to adapt both to how it provides peacemaking services (from direct mediation to facilitator and “enabler” functions) and to the kinds of new conflict-inducing factors it seeks to address.

Great Powers and donor countries will also find it more compelling to renew their political commitments to and financial investments in multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, when they view the United Nations as adapting to contemporary conflict management requirements and when they sense that new, non-traditional actors are bringing new capabilities to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding’s effectiveness. This further entails redirecting resources toward enabling the world body’s field staff to better develop national and local capacities for peace. Through the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace this July, and in the run-up to the September 2024 Summit of the Future, it remains to be seen whether the UN and its Member States will embrace this shift, including through consideration of the above proposals. A similar transformation is needed in the field of disarmament too, a subject to which we now turn.
“In nuclear weapon attacks, cities and their citizens are the targets. Profound consequences on a global scale are to be inflicted by their use, well beyond the direct and immediate casualties, including devastating environmental and economic effects and grave risks for much of humanity who will face starvation in a ‘nuclear winter.’ Nuclear weapons are thus the greatest threat to the safety and security of citizens’ lives.”

—Mayors for Peace

Recent threats to international peace and stability, such as the war in Ukraine, the rise of lethal autonomous weapons, and increasing fears of a nuclear exchange due to geopolitical tensions, have put into doubt the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament efforts globally. Ten years since the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, two of the world’s major arms producers, the United States and Russia, are yet to ratify the Treaty. Even worse, the United States in 2019 issued a letter of no intention to become a party to the Treaty. In the context of these and related trends, this section explores the obstacles facing a sustainable disarmament agenda going forward. While aware of the international community’s limitations in overcoming these hurdles, it explores innovations in global governance to revitalize disarmament dialogues in the three critical areas of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and new technologies.

Challenges

In 2022, global military expenditure reached an all-time high of U.S. $2.240 trillion (see figure 4.1). The ongoing war in Ukraine has created a strong case for increasing military spending further, alongside other historic changes in military policy, across Europe and parts of Asia. For instance, Germany has increased its military spending to €60 billion euros per year, while Japan has pledged to double its defense spending to two percent of gross domestic product by 2027.
Concurrent with rising tensions among major powers are new asymmetric warfare tactics, the increased use of treaty-banned weapons such as anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, rapid developments in autonomous weapons technology, and an overall lack of political appetite for arms control, let alone disarmament.\(^\text{158}\)

![Figure 4.1: World Military Expenditure by Region, 1988–2022](source)

Concerning weapons of mass destruction, since January 2023 the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ “Doomsday Clock”* has been set at 90 seconds to midnight, the highest risk of a nuclear catastrophe, as assessed by its committee of experts, since the clock’s creation in 1947.\(^\text{159}\) Prospects for negotiations for a replacement of New START, due to expire in 2026, dimmed when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his country’s suspension of the agreement on February 21, 2023.\(^\text{160}\)
Concurrently, evidence points to China investing heavily in the growth and modernization of its nuclear arms stockpile.\(^{161}\) North Korea continues to test its intercontinental as well as short-range ballistic missiles, and prospects for the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program remain slim.\(^ {162}\) In short, mindsets toward weapons of mass destruction in key places are leaning away from disarmament and toward deterrence.

Continued proliferation of conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions, and landmines, also enables organized crime and creates weapons and ammunition management problems, humanitarian hazards, and increasingly lethal local conflict.\(^ {163}\) Many countries have to deal with issues of illicit weapon stockpiling and illicit weapons trading without proper tracing and disarmament capabilities.\(^ {164}\) While the international community has sought to regulate the creation and usage of potentially dangerous weapons through such initiatives as the UN Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, they have consistently fallen short in addressing adequately the threats posed by arms proliferation, due to a lack of universalization and ineffective implementation of the treaties.\(^ {165}\)

Beyond conventional weapons, new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and increasingly capable drones are fast becoming centerpieces of disarmament conversations, as their potential applications to warfare rapidly multiply.\(^ {166}\) Advancements in technology often occur too quickly for disarmament and arms control working groups, expert forums, and intergovernmental institutions to respond effectively, and software is often designed to operate in ways that can circumvent existing regulations through creative illicit loopholes.\(^ {167}\) Such disruptive technologies can foster non-linear escalation of conflict as they allow bad actors (state and non-state) to leapfrog technologies on the road to inflicting violence against an adversary; simultaneously, they can disrupt nuclear and other kinds of disarmament initiatives by challenging classical approaches to deterrence.\(^ {168}\)

**International Community’s Responses to Date**

Commitment #3 of the UN75 Declaration in 2020 reaffirmed the United Nations’ central role in disarmament and the promotion of peace and security. It called for urgent steps to tackle nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and measures to address the challenges posed by autonomous weapons.\(^ {169}\) However, despite repeated efforts and commitments by UN Member States (see table 4.1), the international community has made, in recent years, limited progress on these and other major disarmament issues.\(^ {170}\)

This failure is partly due to global headwinds over the past two decades fueling the increased militarization of societies, the diversification and proliferation of weapons and technology, and the private sector’s growing role in the arms trade.\(^ {171}\) Moreover, permanent members of the UN Security Council have used their veto power to block Council resolutions on disarmament and armaments sanctions. For example, in May 2022 China and Russia vetoed
a U.S.-proposed draft resolution (S/2022/431) condemning ballistic missile testing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in violation of Security Council sanctions.\textsuperscript{172}

### Table 4.1: Major International Disarmament Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Opened for Signature</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Ratifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>July 1, 1968</td>
<td>March 5, 1970</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
<td>April 10, 1972</td>
<td>March 26, 1975</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
<td>January 13, 1993</td>
<td>April 29, 1997</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</td>
<td>September 10, 1996</td>
<td>September 24, 1996</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>December 3, 2008</td>
<td>August 1, 2010</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
<td>June 3, 2013</td>
<td>December 24, 2014</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>September 20, 2017</td>
<td>January 22, 2021</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the international community has long advocated for eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and countering their proliferation, primarily through the promotion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has only partially succeeded in deterring nuclear proliferation or WMD development.\textsuperscript{173} Lack of political will toward disarmament is a chief obstacle, particularly for those countries that possess nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{174}

Moreover, technical and financial barriers impede disarmament efforts. The process of monitoring and verifying disarmament can be complex and costly, and some countries may not have the resources or expertise to participate effectively. This is, in part, due to the sensitive nature of the information involved, as well as the potential for cheating and deception by states seeking to maintain or gain a strategic advantage.\textsuperscript{175}

Cybercrime and new technologies pose further international challenges involving national sovereignty and privacy. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has involved one of the first large-scale uses of cyber warfare operations (both infrastructure and data damage), showcasing the need for strategies that can regulate a States’ cyber sovereignty.\textsuperscript{176} Twenty-two years following the signing of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, initiated by the Council of Europe, the UN still has not adopted a truly global treaty to address cybercrime. Although an Ad Hoc Committee was set up to “Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on
Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purpose” in February 2022, and momentum is building for countries to join the Budapest Convention and its Second Additional Protocol, the (Euro-centric) manner in which it was established may neglect diverse regional contexts and the needs of non-Western countries.  

While the need for disarmament and arms control is widely recognized, generating and sustaining a political consensus for achieving both is fraught with political, technical, financial, and other obstacles. The limitations facing the international community in this area are numerous and complex, further exacerbated by ongoing regional conflicts. In the final analysis, sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions on securing the safety of their people; this means that they will be willing to cooperate with disarmament initiatives only if they are viewed as meeting, rather than posing, a threat to their national security.

Major Elements of the Global Policy Framework

The proliferation of disarmament challenges, and the limited effectiveness of efforts to address them, necessitates a “strategic re-think” of the approach to disarmament. It is clear that so long as states continue to prioritize a narrow, Realist perspective toward international security (i.e., self-reliance, especially the value of one’s own strategic arsenal, and a fundamental suspicion towards the intentions of other states and non-state actors), a comprehensive agenda for disarmament cannot move forward.

Indeed, this agenda’s foundation is fundamentally flawed, as it prioritizes and promotes the maintenance of international security over efforts toward building peace. This seemingly small, yet significant distinction can alter the prospects of disarmament initiatives. The promotion of positive peace (introduced in section two) as the goal of disarmament allows for alternative, multi-dimensional, and multi-pronged approaches to achieving that goal, as the recommendations in this section will explore.

The promotion of robust, positive peace places an emphasis on inclusive societies and the rule of law and would, for instance, privilege the needs of vulnerable populations, such as women and children, who are too often excluded from conversations on disarmament, the harms caused to them being viewed as secondary issues to be dealt with through other forums. While international bodies, such as the Security Council (through Resolutions 1325 and 2250), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), have underscored the necessity of including women and youth in political processes dealing with disarmament, these demographics are still considerably underrepresented in such forums. For instance, UNIDIR reports that in smaller forums with less than 100 participants, women’s participation averages around 20 percent, with men heading most arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament delegations.
In short, adopting a positive peace approach includes adopting a gender and youth lens, whereby multilateral and bilateral institutions and negotiating forums work to identify and map relevant local and international women’s and youth organizations’ campaigning in this field, and to remove the barriers to their participation in disarmament discussions. Women and youth should be sought for national disarmament delegations, while the UN should institute quotas for women and youth participation in disarmament committees dealing with i) weapons of mass destruction, ii) conventional weapons, and iii) new technologies, to ensure a more equal balance. These three subject areas remain central to the UN and other actors committed to disarmament to improve conditions for just and sustainable peace (as detailed below, but also presented in a logical framework in annex 2.2).

**WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, beginning in 2014 and further intensified since February 2022, have raised concerns about the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. While the NPT and the more recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons provide intergovernmental frameworks to address nuclear risks, mixed levels of political buy-in from major nuclear states pose a threat to these treaty instruments and their stated disarmament goals. Consequently, an effective approach toward nuclear disarmament requires aligning the interests of nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, and “extended deterrent” states under the protection of nuclear weapon states, by building pathways to strengthened and new agreements for promoting and safeguarding peace.

Greater transparency among nuclear armed states is also required on the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons in their arsenal. Moreover, an intergovernmental agreement is needed on peaceful nuclear activities (updating the current NPT) that could continue alongside nuclear disarmament, the monitorable limits that should be placed on related research and development, and the type of weapons that would be allowed or forbidden. Despite the global focus on nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons cannot be forgotten as a crucial part of the conversation on the governance of weapons of mass destruction. Progress in these areas can be achieved through a tri-pronged approach:

**Reinforce Existing Nuclear Policy Infrastructure and Build Conditions for a New Paradigm**

As the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows to levels unseen in decades, it is crucial to reinforce arms control and disarmament efforts wherever possible by upholding current agreements, introducing or sustaining confidence-building between nuclear states, and cooling the rhetoric of threats (even implicit) to use nuclear weapons. Immediate goals must include re-engaging Russia in New START and pursuing a new nuclear arrangement.
Confidence-building is also necessary to work toward transparent and open discussions between China, the U.S., and Russia; China, however, stated consistently that it will not join trilateral negotiations until the U.S. and Russia reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Furthermore, any attempts to facilitate a nuclear disarmament agreement must ensure effective engagement with France, the UK, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Israel. This also requires immediate efforts to stabilize existing nuclear infrastructure, while moving toward a renewed arms control and disarmament agenda.

Given rising tensions between nuclear states, the lapse of the last major bilateral arms control agreement between the two primary nuclear weapons states, and the likelihood that nuclear stockpiles could further increase over the next decade, the sustainability of the current nuclear policy status quo faces serious doubts. Rather than replicate our nuclear history over the next century, global and national security must, henceforth, be pursued with greater attention to human and environmental security imperatives that align better with the positive peace agenda introduced in section two of this report.

Human and environmental security frameworks, stressing the potential damage that nuclear proliferation stands to cause, call for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. A strong first step in this direction involves diversifying the nuclear weapons policy field, ensuring that voices across the racial, gender, age, and global spectrum are amplified in conversations in order to reset priorities, highlight the full spectrum of human and planetary risks posed by nuclear weapons, and increase accountability among nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Connecting nuclear policy to a justice-oriented approach may also mobilize greater civil-society engagement and support, re-energizing nuclear non-proliferation and, eventually, abolition efforts.

**Bolster the Chemical Weapons Convention**

Chemical weapons pose a significant threat to global security, despite the existence of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). While it has been partially effective in curbing retention and use of chemical weapons, it faces emerging threats such as the acquisition and use of chemical weapons by non-state actors. As a result, further measures should be taken to enhance the chemical weapons non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, such as increasing transparency and information sharing among states and promoting universal membership and adherence to the CWC regime.

For instance, while the CWC incorporates verification protocols, there are few mechanisms to ensure that parties violating the CWC are identified and held accountable, such as the informal mechanisms established by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to establish the investigation and identification team in 2018. Nevertheless, states should be encouraged to communicate, for example, the use of Novichok chemical weapons, in order for the CWC to remain current with this newly integrated class of weapons. Furthermore,
signatories to the CWC should prioritize accountability for treaty violations, and support non-
governmental organizations in collecting and retaining information of use to prosecutors.\textsuperscript{195}

\textbf{Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention}

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) faces new threats today, including new technologies, increased risk of countries operating illegal bioweapons programs, and the growing trend of states publicly accusing one another of bio-warfare activity.\textsuperscript{196} In order to maintain its utility, this Convention must integrate new verification protocols into the next generation of treaty implementation. Verification protocols mimicking those under effect in the Chemical Weapons Convention are crucial to confidence-building, transparency, and overall strengthening of the BWTC.\textsuperscript{197} Such protocols could require states to issue detailed declarations of their biological weapons stock and facilities, as well as submit to regular visits by inspectors who would collect and release all state data.\textsuperscript{198}

Correcting the rejection of verification protocols by the United States two decades ago, an international corps of inspectors should be assigned to ensure state adherence to the BTWC.\textsuperscript{199} Furthermore, parties to the treaty should ensure full use of the Convention’s cooperation database, while strengthening international cooperation and capacity-building under the auspices of the BTWC.\textsuperscript{200} The treaty’s parties should encourage the implementation of integrated approaches to addressing malevolent disease-related threats, while enhancing stakeholder engagement and consistently engaging in Peer Review exercises.\textsuperscript{201}

\textbf{CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS}

Despite the proliferation of treaties regulating the spread and use of conventional weapons, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the unregulated flow of conventional arms globally remains prolific.\textsuperscript{202} As such, a renewed conventional weapons disarmament focus by governments, including in the two areas underscored below, is necessary to build confidence and security for the more effective functioning of the UN’s conflict management toolbox, as detailed in section three of this report.

\textbf{Increase Transparency and Security in the Arms Trade}

Myriad challenges surrounding conventional weapons proliferation require a multi-
pronged and multi-dimensional approach to disarmament. While the Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force in 2014, seeks to regulate the international conventional weapons
trade, enhanced transparency measures are still needed to facilitate treaty compliance. An initial assessment of the ATT’s impact to prevent diversion of conventional arms conducted by UNIDIR, the Stimson Center, and Conflict Armament Research found that despite considerable investment by States in preventing diversions, further action is required to comprehensively prevent, mitigate, and address the risks of diversion of conventional arms on global and national levels. The study therefore proposes a voluntary Counter-Diversion Assessment Tool (CDAT) for use by States who wish to assess their capacities to address diversion and implement additional measures to improve their capacities.

Moreover, poorly designed treaty instruments can hamper the achievement of treaty goals, particularly in light of Great Power tensions and the skepticism toward arms control they induce. Consequently, existing arms control treaties should be reviewed or amended and new ones introduced following SMART goals, namely goals that are specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and time-based, while guarding against an unnecessary/ineffective proliferation of treaties or duplication of efforts without achieving the intended outcomes.

In addition, clearer and stricter accountability mechanisms, such as Review Conferences, are needed to reinforce legally binding obligations whereby the international community can institute particular sanctions regimes to serve simultaneously as disarmament tools and instruments of remediation. Such conferences can also facilitate an exchange of good practices and lessons learned from effective treaty implementation among countries from different geographical regions and support universalization of disarmament treaties and efforts.

Another approach to arms control entails increased transparency in the arms trade. Specifically, standards for disaggregated military spending reports and data on arms sales/transfers are necessary for shedding light and providing insights on particular categories of military spending and annual arms imports and exports. Itemized disaggregated information could lead to more responsive governments and increased confidence among countries. Increased awareness of the importance/benefits of transparency in enhancing confidence building among countries and preventing destabilizing accumulations of arms would facilitate a more open and secure global arms trade.

**Transnational Crime and the Impact of Illicit Small Arms Trade on Women**

To ensure the sustainability of disarmament efforts, the impact of transnational crime at all levels of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, conflict prevention, and other peace operations/processes merits discussion. Illicit criminal networks play roles at all stages of conflict and utilize illegally obtained small arms and light weapons to carry out harmful acts, yet the guidance on how to handle this phenomenon is limited. Databases are needed to track the nature of transnational crime groups that operate in different regions.
This may include the creation and implementation of legislation to address specifically illicit actors’ role in the arms trade. Increased cooperation among states would prove useful in this context, providing a united front and increased shared knowledge on the actions of criminal offenders.

When dealing with the proliferation of illicit weapons and their associated harms in communities, the deleterious effects of illicit small arms and light weapons violence on women and children requires special attention. Even when these groups consistently face increased harm, they are rarely afforded a seat at the table in curbing the misuse of small arms. A 2019 UNIDIR study highlighted the gender discrepancy in disarmament diplomacy, showing that in disarmament meetings over the past 40 years, women have comprised only 32 percent of participants. Women offer a unique perspective on disarmament issues and should be seen as constructive agents of peace, rather than as the helpless victims of crime.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES

“...a human-centered approach is necessary when tackling the gray zone of hybrid and cyber conflict, particularly the applicability of non-intervention principles in the cyber domain.”

New technologies have given rise to a variety of new methods of warfare, including cyber-attacks, lethal autonomous weapons systems, and the militarization of facial recognition software, to name a few. The malevolent use of the cyber domain and new technologies by nefarious state and non-state actors not only challenges the traditional understanding of state sovereignty but poses considerable risk to the livelihoods and security of individuals and communities, including both mental and physical harm.

While various treaties on cyber-crime exist (see table 4.2), a human-centered approach is necessary when tackling the gray zone of hybrid and cyber conflict, particularly the applicability of non-intervention principles in the cyber domain. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions, as stated in the Geneva Conventions (forming the core of international humanitarian law), should also be respected in the cyber domain. Accordingly, the international community should incentivize further global action, both by governments and civil society, toward the creation of global norms on the illegality of certain kinds of cyber behavior, such as the utilization of cyberspace to disrupt essential medical supply chains.
## Table 4.2: Cybersecurity & Cybercrime Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Opened for Signature</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Signatories (ratified)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention)</td>
<td>November 23, 2001</td>
<td>July 01, 2004</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist or Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems</td>
<td>January 28, 2023</td>
<td>March 01, 2006</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU General Data Protection Regulation (The Right to be Forgotten)</td>
<td>April 14, 2016</td>
<td>May 25, 2018</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence</td>
<td>November 17, 2021</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Council of Europe, African Union, Council of the European Union.

To ensure that debates on cyberspace and disarmament are inclusive of the diverse views of technology companies, civil society, and youth, they need to facilitate each group’s effective participation, while broadening and inviting the emergence of a global consensus. Further norms and guidelines are needed at the global level to address a growing “infodemic” of disinformation and misinformation, with particular reference to addressing state-led propaganda against other states, both in times of war and peace.

### Cyberspace and CBRN Infrastructure

There is currently no treaty to address the expectations and limitations of states with regard to cyberattacks targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Infrastructure. As large segments of civilian populations rely on these, the international community must discuss expectations and limitations regarding cyberattacks on the networks that manage CBRN infrastructure.

Consequently, the New Agenda for Peace could call for the establishment of norms and mechanisms to enforce “cyberpeace,” while suggesting the need for a politically binding cybersecurity program of action, similar to what exists for Small Arms and Light Weapons. Since much CBRN infrastructure is owned by the private sector, it is imperative for countries to commit to bringing together state authorities and industry operators to develop defense mechanisms that protect this infrastructure from cyberattacks (whether by foreign states or non-state actors).
An international treaty that recognizes (and prohibits deliberate) attacks on networks connected to CBRN infrastructure as intentional attacks on civilian populations—and, therefore, a war crime—is needed. Moreover, an international research body could be formed to allow countries to collectively research non-military cyber terrorist threats to networks connected to CBRN infrastructure.

**Lethal Autonomous Weapons and Artificial Intelligence**

The rapid development of other technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and AI-controlled lethal autonomous weapons, pose unique threats to peace and security by making warfare more deadly and efficient—and autonomous. They further risk civilian casualties and racial profiling. A legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems is urgently needed to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force and life-or-death decisions. The UN General Assembly provides a suitable forum to negotiate such a treaty, beginning with the introduction of a resolution through the Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Indeed, in his briefing to the General Assembly on Priorities for 2023, the Secretary-General highlighted the need to re-center disarmament and arms control as part of the global agenda, including instituting “internationally agreed limits on lethal autonomous systems.”

“The rapid development of other technologies...pose unique threats to peace and security by making warfare more deadly and efficient—and autonomous.”

The use of autonomous weapon systems, which can identify and attack targets without direct human intervention, raises considerable moral and ethical implications. Since such weapons challenge established rules and regulations, an international advisory board is needed that brings together experts in humanitarian law and rules of engagement, military ethicists, and technical experts, as well as religious and interfaith leaders, to explore the implications for warfare from lethal autonomous weapons. The Alliance for Multilateralism offers eleven guiding principles to place Autonomous Weapon Systems under the umbrella of international humanitarian law and to safeguard these new technologies from falling into non-state hands.

Several organizations and individuals additionally hold the view that human control must be maintained over weapon systems to guarantee compliance with international law. Much like the prohibitions against landmines and biochemical weapons, countries must adopt norms that constrain the autonomy and automatization of weapons systems. The international community should propose rulings that limit the targets of lethal autonomous weapons to those of similar uncrewed but remotely piloted weapon systems.
Overcoming Potential Spoilers and Other Bottlenecks

Observing the increased usage of P5 veto power in debates on disarmament in the UN Security Council, a key concern arises about how effectively disarmament and security agendas can be pushed within this apex body of the global collective security system. Equally concerning is how, in recent years, several major governments have increased military spending significantly, which could be construed as a form of neo-military Keynesianism. While the effectiveness of military spending as a means of promoting economic growth is debatable, its effects on security and peace (as well as sustainable development and societal well-being) should be viewed even more critically. Furthermore, even if this trend were somehow reversed and, over time, complete physical weapons disarmament on our planet became a viable option, questions would still abound about containing the growing spread of (digital) weapons in both cyberspace and outer space.

Among the recent and upcoming international events with at least some potential for advancing disarmament and arms control efforts globally are the First International Day for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Awareness (March 5, 2023), the Fourth Substantive Session (June 5-9 2023) of the Open-ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition Management towards a Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, the SDG Summit and its Goal #16 on peaceful societies (September 19-20, 2023), and the Summit of the Future (September 22-23, 2024). These intergovernmental activities provide an opportunity to push the needle forward on the promotion of positive peace as a key facet of the disarmament agenda. As such, advocacy efforts should be geared toward leveraging opportunities provided by these unique events.

Furthermore, it is encouraging that—in the run-up to the Summit of the Future—the Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism recently recommended the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2045, and for the Summit to mandate a global commission to make recommendations on the immense risks associated with the military use of nuclear weapons. Such recommendations, in line with the proposals recommended in this section, can further help to foster a renewed political commitment worldwide to disarmament in the years ahead. Along with the application of new approaches to prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding (as outlined in the previous section), effective disarmament can also enhance how the global humanitarian architecture functions, the subject of the next section.
V. Next Generation
Humanitarian Architecture

“The idea that we have entered an age of permanent crisis, that humanity is lurching from one global disaster to another without drawing breath, is rapidly gaining ground. Indeed, the word ‘perma-crisis’ was named 2022’s English word of the year. And it’s not hard to see why.”

—Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs & Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, UNOCHA.223

In 1991 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 outlined an overarching framework of guidelines and principles for humanitarian action. In the succeeding decades, and as elaborated in section one of this report, the complexity, uncertainty, and frequency of global and regional crises and shocks have increased significantly. This section considers possible system changes and tools to move into a next-generation approach to humanitarian architecture design. It aims to be ambitious enough to meet the needs of the 21st century, while grounded in the political and technical realities of an increasingly interconnected world.

The approach taken here parallels the recommendations of sections three and four of this report as humanitarian action most often kicks in when institutions for upholding peace and security have failed. In particular, we explore challenges related to recipient needs, operating principles, the structure of the current architecture, and the implementation and coordination gaps that have opened in the last three decades despite cycles of reform.

The current humanitarian response system lacks speed and flexibility in the face of rapidly increasing numbers of persons vulnerable to sudden, often violent and life-changing, events. As steps to address these shortcomings, this section: i) examines an enhanced Emergency Platform to respond to global shocks (building on the Secretary-General’s (SG) recent recommendation in his 2021 Our Common Agenda report and March 2023 Policy Brief); ii) revisits the 2016 Grand Bargain on humanitarian action to re-emphasize its “localization” agenda, with particular stress on the “cluster approach” developed by the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) to better implement that agenda; and iii) advocates enhancing early warning for humanitarian action through a composite Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index.
Challenges

The changing character of conflict, the deepening of geopolitical tensions, and their respective humanitarian impacts pose serious challenges to the current international/multilateral humanitarian support system in three key areas: recipient needs, operating principles, and structures of humanitarian governance.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS: CONSTRAINTS AND COMPLEXITY

The contemporary humanitarian space is characterized by a heterogeneous landscape of needs and actors, an expanding scale and cost of action, and a high degree of embedded uncertainty, which have complicated and constrained the global humanitarian system. This has not been made easier to navigate by increasing nationalism and Great Power competition in world affairs, as well as a differentiated understanding of whether humanitarian action is to provide relief from conflict and its secondary effects, or to address new rising complexities. Beginning in 2020, new crises have included COVID-19, the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, global inflation, the food crisis growing out of the invasion of Ukraine, a civil war in Sudan, and earthquakes in Syria and Türkiye. As of 2022, the humanitarian relief system supported a record 103 million people worldwide whose lives have been upended by wars, pandemics, or other disasters.

Figure 5.1: Forcibly Displaced Persons Worldwide as of Mid-2022

While a full picture is yet to be established, UNHCR estimates that global forced displacement has reached 103 million at mid-2022.

This upward trend raises concern about sheer numbers, as multiple crises may intersect, overlap, and amplify their total impact, increasing both the required volume of aid and the situational and political complexity of humanitarian response. This was evident, for example, in the disparity of aid provision after the February 2023 earthquake affecting southern Türkiye and northern Syria. Due to a combination of factors—including extant sanctions, political and security concerns, and physical impediments to transportation—there was a lag in the initial provision of aid to Syria. For example, by the time the US approved a temporary exemption to sanctions hampering earthquake aid to Syria four days after the quake, the death toll there was already over 22,000.228

Humanitarian response in general is further constrained by the lack of coordination between humanitarian and other actors with the resources to support action, such as governmental and military actors, leading to resource deficiencies and to competition for available humanitarian resources. This tension has been particularly evident at the local level and among international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).230 Simply adding more institutional actors to the present humanitarian regime, therefore, may be insufficient to tackle issues of increasing complexity and impact.

**HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES: TENSIONS AND GAPS**

Weak attention to localization—characterized by a lack of inclusivity and collaborative co-design with local partners in humanitarian programs—often results in disconnects between the existing architecture and the needs of people on the ground.231 The World Humanitarian Summit, held in 2016 in Istanbul, attempted to address some of these tensions, but its “Grand Bargain” in support of localization efforts has suffered from significant implementation gaps, as detailed below. Much of this is attributed to inequalities in operational environments, where different crisis-affected populations experience unequal opportunities to avail themselves of humanitarian rights and resources. Moreover, where localization has increased, power imbalances between local and international actors leave locals more liable to risks on the ground.

Humanitarian action is often a last resort, responding to serious failures in local or regional governance—buying time for threatened populations while other actors address those governance systems failures. At the same time, increasing frequency, scope, and complexity of global shocks and crises have led to calls for more foresight (“anticipation”) and planning in humanitarian systems and design.232 This raises the question of whether uncertainties can be diminished without overloading an already overburdened humanitarian system, including by adding more institutions to an already complex regime.
HUMANITARIAN STRUCTURES: COORDINATION AND EFFICIENCY

The current humanitarian architecture is both overwhelmed and overstretched with greater conflict complexity (see section three) and humanitarian agencies having to operate in more locations and over a longer duration than ever before. Moreover, current systems are set up to give people in need what donor agencies deem is best, not necessarily what those seeking relief actually require. Unclear mandates and a lack of feedback between headquarters and field missions within humanitarian agencies, as well as between populations in need and agencies, are salient. So, too, are turf wars, as agencies scramble for funds and profiles that can generate funds.

The overstretched nature of the system, combined with an increasing number of shocks and crises that cross over the mandates of any specific part of the humanitarian or wider UN architecture, creates a barrier to truly effective, rapid, and coordinated responses with the interests of those frontline actors on the ground and most vulnerable. Additionally, given the reactive nature of crisis response, often what is most lacking is clear political vision and will, as well as a commitment to invest heavily in and take the risks associated with rethinking system-level coordination of the humanitarian architecture.

International Community’s Responses to Date

In 1991, the General Assembly passed Resolution 46/182, which outlined an overarching framework of humanitarian guidelines and principles. Since then, the international community has taken several steps to rethink and upgrade institutions and approaches to humanitarian action.

A cyclical pattern may be observed over the past two decades in the humanitarian sphere: a crisis is followed by humanitarian response; inadequacies in that response lead to calls for reform; the efficacy of that reform is then called into question when the next crisis arises. The nature of various reforms adopted since the mid-1990s have shared the same essence, each calling for improved coordination, financing, local leadership, and preventive measures to better respond to humanitarian crises and provide timely, quality aid to those most in need of assistance.
## Table 5.1: Three Decades of Reform in Humanitarian Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Reform Response (Implementing Actors)</th>
<th>Composition of Reform</th>
<th>Implementation &amp; Coordination Gaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>1991 UNGA Resolution 46/182 (UN agencies, funds and programmes)</td>
<td>Overarching humanitarian framework based on principles of impartiality and neutrality; Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) made part of OCHA to improve cohesion between UN actors and select multilateral entities within the global humanitarian aid system.</td>
<td>Principles notwithstanding, aid delivery continues to be politicized and delivered on the basis of state/NGO/INGO interests; IASC has lacked capacity to effectively assemble actors for cohesive responses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987–1989 Isaaq Genocide</td>
<td>2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
<td>Humanitarian Reform Agenda &amp; Adoption of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). OCHA “cluster approach” established to improve coordination amongst humanitarian actors to quicken responses.</td>
<td>The OCHA cluster system was created with the goal of improving IASC member coordination in the field, but falls short in improving humanitarian actors’ ability to deliver effective, timely, and coordinated responses between the multitude of humanitarian actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1995 Genocide in Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>2005 UN World Summit (UN Member States, UNOCHA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1995 Rwanda Genocide</td>
<td>2005 UN World Summit (UN Member States, UNOCHA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998–1999 Kosovo War</td>
<td>2005 UN World Summit (UN Member States, UNOCHA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011 Transformative Agenda (IASC)</td>
<td>Reassessment of the guiding humanitarian architecture and the role that UNHCR must play in sector coordination and collaboration.</td>
<td>Greater role for UNHCR in eliciting effective humanitarian collaboration, but produced no novel mechanisms for coordination amongst various humanitarian players.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake in Haiti; Floods in Pakistan</td>
<td>2011 Transformative Agenda (IASC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
<td>The Framework detailed an innovative and comprehensive approach to understanding risk and better mitigating disaster impacts. The Summit sought donor pledges to allocate 25 percent of funding to local and national humanitarian organizations by 2020. The Compact stressed the need for governments, private actors, and humanitarian actors to equally share the burden and responsibility of hosting and caring for refugees.</td>
<td>The Framework’s mitigation approach lacks an inter-institutional mechanism to collect systemized information needed for monitoring success. Some portions of the Grand Bargain, such as needs assessment, are behind in their development. Consensus lacking on what successful localization may/should look like. The Compact lacks commitment to IDPs and consistent implementation; existing resettlement targets are a particular weak point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola Outbreak in West Africa; Syrian Refugee Crisis; War in Yemen; South Sudan Conflict; Somalia Drought</td>
<td>2016 World Humanitarian Summit “Grand Bargain”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2018 Global Refugee Compact (UN Member States, INGOs, NGOs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 shows three decades of efforts to increase coordination in the humanitarian governing architecture. Among the initiatives noted, the Sendai Framework in 2015 detailed an innovative and comprehensive approach to understanding risk, so as to better mitigate against the adverse impacts of disasters and to prevent the outbreak of full-fledged humanitarian crises.238 The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit was also a significant political milestone.239 Donor governments adopting the Grand Bargain at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit pledged to allocate 25 percent of their relief funding to local and national humanitarian organizations by 2020, in order to enable these organizations to prioritize use of this aid.240 Together, these two approaches signaled a potential shift in the future of humanitarian assistance but, in actuality, one that has failed to engender the flexibility and agility needed to coordinate policy and action across the entire system in times of major humanitarian shocks. Rigidity of funding and barriers to information sharing still hamper the inclusion of local actors in decision-making related to humanitarian assistance and can even make greater inclusivity counterproductive by increasing competition for still-sparse sharable resources.241

The introduction of the “Grand Bargain 2.0” in 2021 by the Facilitation Group—representatives of each of the four original signatory groups including donor Member States, UN organizations, INGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement—revealed that the humanitarian sector had been struggling to translate rhetoric into practice.242 The reform package acknowledged that commitments made by signatories in 2016 had gone largely unfulfilled, giving rise to the need to reassert and reify commitments under a new, upgraded Grand Bargain.243

The Sendai Framework midterm review, in 2023, indicated notable improvements in disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies at the country level, but alongside more limited progress in implementing local-level DRR strategies.244 Several least developed countries, small island developing states, and landlocked developing countries reported that their local governments and communities, for the most part, lacked any sort of DRR strategies. Given that these countries are disproportionately impacted by adverse effects caused by climate change and violent conflict, the fragmented progress worldwide on disaster risk reduction and lack of global data on vulnerability remain vital concerns.245

**Major Elements of the Global Policy Framework**

The following recommendations build on previous research reports and policy briefs by the Global Governance Innovation Network and reports and proposals by the UN Secretary-General.246 They focus on: i) enhancing the SG’s proposed Emergency Platform idea for rapid humanitarian response to a crisis; ii) on implementing effective localization of humanitarian response; and ii) on the need to develop a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index to support both prioritization and localization of response, including toward refugees and internally displaced persons (as detailed below, but also presented in a logical framework in annex 2.3).
The Secretary-General’s proposal for an Emergency Platform (EP) was introduced in Our Common Agenda in 2021, in response to the increasing complexity of global humanitarian shocks. As explained in the Secretary-General’s more recent policy brief, the Platform would entail a set of protocols (as opposed to a new institution), activated quickly but for a finite period in response to a “global shock,” to increase predictability, coordination, and inclusivity of humanitarian response. Funding for the EP would draw from the existing budgets of UN organs and other relevant actors, with the possibility of mission-specific fundraising if necessary. Such funding for the EP would not be “foreign aid” but investment in collective action capabilities and a fairer world order.
“The focus of the new Emergency Platform ought to be catalyzing, convening, and cajoling existing response mechanisms, thereby filling some of the implementation gaps described above, while dispelling concerns of duplication.”

It is important to clarify what the EP is intended to be. It would offer a set of protocols that lead the Secretary-General to confer with major stakeholders. When need is identified, the EP would enable the Secretary-General to spearhead coordination across the UN system’s crisis response architecture, especially for “intersecting” challenges with global reach and impact (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020-2023), where swift international response and coordination may be lacking. The EP should not be an alternative to existing first-response mechanisms or a cause of “mission creep” for other UN bodies. (For discussion of the implications of failure to limit its mandate, see the forthcoming, October 2023, Global Governance Innovation Network Policy Brief on the Emergency Platform.)

The focus of the new Emergency Platform ought to be catalyzing, convening, and cajoling existing response mechanisms, thereby filling some of the implementation gaps described above, while dispelling concerns of duplication. Indeed, duplication and inefficient resource allocation in times of crisis are more likely to occur under the status quo, where no overarching coordination mechanisms exist to stock-take prior to action. Additionally, of concern is ensuring that protocols abide by the UN Charter, especially on matters of sovereignty, and that accountability mechanisms exist for multisectoral actors. Table 5.2 suggests where gaps could have been filled had the EP been activated for the COVAX initiative, in response to the COVID-19 global shock.

Importantly, while the EP increases the convening power of the Secretary-General, its legitimacy will come from meaningful cooperation and transparency with actors most affected by the global shocks. For example, this means hearing and addressing concerns from G77 Member States that “multistakeholder” inclusion can often be in favor of Global North, and therefore placing emphasis on the role of local, grassroots humanitarian actors in the work of the platform. The EP should further draw on the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board for Effective Multilateralism’s call for more cooperation, especially in preparedness and response, with regional organizations and actors.
## Table 5.2: An Example - COVAX and the Emergency Platform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covid Pandemic responses</th>
<th>What the availability of an Emergency Platform might have changed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2020: COVAX launched at the Global Vaccine Summit with direction from GAVI (the Vaccine Alliance), WHO, CEPI, and UNICEF. The goal: to enable equitable access to COVID vaccines, tests, and therapies to low and middle-income countries.</td>
<td>Speedier start time to vaccine equity efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-income countries continue to secure bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers. COVAX unable to drive market price for vaccines.</td>
<td>Better coordination with pharmaceutical corporations and high-income countries to set vaccine prices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To entice wealthy countries, COVAX agrees to allow wealthy countries to secure doses for 50 percent of their population rather than the 20 percent permitted to low- and middle-income countries.</td>
<td>Accountability mechanism for high-income countries to participate in the program without special treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income countries remain underdosed, even by modest goals. COVAX falls short of the 2021 goal by 1 billion doses.</td>
<td>Improved attention, advocacy, and coordination efforts by the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVAX relies heavily on a charity model, with high-income countries under-pledging to global needs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Original Table, Stimson Center; WHO, “COVAX calls for urgent action to close vaccine equity gap,” May 20, 2022; Paolo Mancini, Donato, Chelsea Bruce-Lockhart, Andres Schipani. “Covax falters as rich countries buy up Covid vaccines,” October 24, 2021.

### Activation and De-Activation

The Secretary-General’s policy brief defines a complex global shock—as “an event with severely disruptive consequences for a significant proportion of the global population that leads to secondary impacts across multiple sectors.”\(^{255}\) In other words, while every shock may be a crisis, not every crisis is a shock. Climate change writ large, for example, is an ongoing crisis, and while it may result in global shocks such as floods, or food system collapses, it is not a shock in itself. There are other mechanisms within the UN to address the climate crisis, and reform proposals exist to elevate the priority accorded the environment across the UN system.\(^{256}\)

The SG gives two recent examples of complex, global shocks: the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) and the global cost of living crisis (2022).\(^{257}\) Examples of potential future shocks range from new pandemics and “events leading to disruptions to global flows of goods, people or finance,” to large-scale destructive activity in cyberspace or disruptions to global digital connectivity and “Black Swan” unforeseeable events.\(^{258}\)

It is worth noting then what constitutes “global” in many examples listed in the Secretary-General’s policy brief yield consequences for the Great Powers and states in the Global North.
Events such as the 2018 famine in the Horn of Africa, the Tigray War in Ethiopia, and the collapse of Somalia are all events that affected vast portions of the Horn of Africa with ripple effects outside the region and across sectors. Yet there it seems that Great Powers, and large parts of the Global North, are to be affected for a global shock to be designated. Such differential attention is a by-product of the historical, unequal structures of global governance itself: shocks impacting areas that are not global epicenters of commerce and trade are more likely to be limited by regional boundaries. The current, modest scope and high activation threshold of the EP will likely prevent activation on shocks that do not severely impact both countries in the Global North and Global South.

One approach to reining in such decision bias would be to activate the EP automatically once metrics defining a “global shock” exceed some agreed threshold. Such pre-defined metrics would need to be carefully selected and interconnected, and they should not preclude decision-makers from choosing activation sooner, especially for a Platform intended, indeed designed, to respond to the uncertain and unforeseen. Thus, another approach is to place the power of qualitative assessment and activation in the hands of the Secretary-General, in consultation with the presidents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, “relevant national authorities and/or regional organizations,” and relevant UN entities, drawing on key metrics reflecting the reach, severity, and complexity of shocks, and with an eye on the capacities of existing response mechanisms.

To maintain trust, the SG must clearly communicate his reasoning for activation, and provide regular communications to Member States during the life of the EP, including on the involvement of private sector stakeholders. Upon consultation with relevant parties, the Secretary-General should convene a multistakeholder shock-specific task force for the EP that refines the necessary protocols, convenes relevant parties for an active EP, and monitors data, impact, and checks on policy recommendations in relation to the SDGs and foresight. This task force would serve as the secretariat of the EP while the platform is active, and be responsible for evaluation and knowledge sharing with the Secretary-General’s office upon deactivation.

Furthermore, a task-specific sunset clause should also be associated with each activated EP, in order to ensure devoted action to targeted response goals. Finally, each EP should conclude with a review by the General Assembly in order to evaluate and capture lessons learned.

A broad formal review process could also be attached to preparations for the conclusion of the 2030 Agenda, in order to ensure a set timeline for deeper adjustments to the EP protocols in tandem with broader conversation surrounding the future goals and strategies of the UN.

The EP will provide the Secretary-General with new and clarified responsibilities, which will inevitably be subject to some degree of politicization. However, the politicization will bear the standard of the politics of global human security, rather than Great Power politics that might stem from granting the Security Council and the General Assembly more than
a consulting role. With the EP, the SG should employ his good offices role to give voice to people suffering from shocks and carve out space for human-centric politics.\(^\text{263}\)

**Strategic Foresight, SDGs, and Knowledge Management Systems**

The protocols of the EP ought to be designed with the Futures Lab’s Global Risk Report in mind, to incorporate strategic foresight planning into its proposals. The EP should, therefore, operate with an “SDG and Future Generations check,” to ensure that the policies it proposes for responding to global shocks are in line with methodologies for sustainable development and achieving the 2030 Agenda, and in line with a potential Declaration on Future Generations. This is crucial to ensure that shocks do not derail the global system from its focus on the SDGs, but instead use the SDGs as a framework for recovery.

Some level of anticipatory action and strategic foresight is required in the design of protocols for the EP. The first set of protocols for potential global shocks should be designed based on the forecasts of the new UN Futures Lab’s—built to ensure long-term thinking, based at UN Headquarters, but with “spokes” across the globe—upcoming Global Risk Reports,\(^\text{264}\) and shocks predicted by scientific bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Pollution, Health, and Environment Unit of the United Nations Environmental Program. In this way, the EP must represent a strong interconnect between science, policy, action, and assessment. Once activated, the platform should work with the Futures Lab as a data hub with data inputs that are sensitive to threats on impacted populations and made freely available.\(^\text{265}\) This data should help to evolve the protocols and mandates of future platforms once activated, especially concerning more vulnerable groups affected by a shock.

Finally, the EP in itself would serve as a knowledge management platform; as a convenor of different streams of institutional and external knowledge, and as a self-learning system so as to evolve its response between consecutive global shocks. This means, if the Secretary-General is to convene the EP, his office must serve as a knowledge management system for the same, and work with entities to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of protocols with each activation. Here, civil society can support the learning of the EP through its collective expertise and experience.

**LOCALIZATION AGENDA**

As noted above, the 2016 “Grand Bargain” has fallen short in implementation, its sheer breadth and scope proved problematic, and led to a narrower focus on quality funding and localization as key enablers in 2021’s Grand Bargain 2.0, at which point the share of humanitarian funding directed at local actors was less than 2 percent of total funds (figure 5.3).\(^\text{266}\) The original Grand Bargain, nonetheless, demonstrated a heightened commitment to placing the localization agenda at the center of the world’s humanitarian architecture. Such
localization of funding can empower local leadership (and mitigate against dependency and paternalism) in the allocation of resources and improve handling realities on the ground, giving affected people more influence over aid and rebuilding more inclusive institutions or enhancing their capacity. It can also lead to greater resource alignment between local needs and donor priorities, leveraging funds for more projects or providing greater funding to existing projects.267

Figure 5.3: Direct funding to local actors (as of 2022 reporting)


In order to overcome the gaps in the Grand Bargain, two central elements of a renewed localization agenda are financing and better translating aims into actions.

Financing the Localization Agenda

As stressed earlier, past efforts by donors to allocate 25 percent of their funding to local and national humanitarian organizations have faltered. One underutilized method for achieving longer-term, more sustainable sources of local funding is “Pooled Funding”—a combined pool of funds from individual donors—which can harness resources and reduce risks more effectively than individual funding to a given organization or project.268 Reducing regulatory and bureaucratic barriers and differences between development entities can facilitate such mechanisms. Building upon this approach, donor organizations should develop common baseline requirements for compliance and accountability to increase the likelihood of long-term funding.
Building on the recent recommendations of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board for Effective Multilateralism in repurposing multilateral development banks (MDBs) to support private and public investment, the private sector’s role in potentially catalyzing local funds in the humanitarian space merits further consideration too. While in development financing, the goal is to de-risk private investment through repurposed MDBs, in humanitarian finance this ought to be coupled with higher quality and flexibility of funding. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s independent review shows through a series of interviews with donors that higher quality and more targeted funding at the local level came from private donors and foundations.

In such proposals to reconsider channels of global finance, there is a blurred line between development assistance and humanitarian action. Channeling funding into institutional capacity building at the local level can better equip local agents to utilize funding, while also supporting the wider development agenda, including SDGs 11, 16, and 17. This goes some way in reconciling the tensions between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term resilience building.

**Translating Localization Aims into Action**

Aligning global humanitarian and development incentives with localization efforts can help ensure that the policies transnational and local actors adopt achieve sustainable results. To foster alignment, local organizations must play the critical role in identifying needs, tracking progress, and reporting on results, which can ensure that reporting reflects the lived experiences of those participating in aid programs. Empowering multilateral and bilateral donor agencies’ regional bureaus, which can promote the localization agenda at the regional level, is also important.

More generally, global humanitarian actors need to match their desire to empower local actors with a commensurate level of confidence in them to successfully complete humanitarian projects. This confidence should be translated into practical policies, such as reviewing and streamlining contracting practices to better prioritize locally determined and led humanitarian efforts. Too often, local actors are overlooked during contracting, and placing them at the front of the line when deciding on humanitarian assistance contracts is pivotal to carrying out localization. Furthermore, international aid organizations should commit to hire directly more local staff, freeing up yet more resources for locally-led initiatives. Privileging local staff hires will also provide international aid organizations with greater capacity for sustaining humanitarian projects over the longer-term.

Crucially, any approach to localization that is not context driven will run into challenges. Therefore, structures and approaches that generate this context must also be considered.
Rethinking OCHA’s Cluster Approach

To further reinforce localization efforts, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Cluster Approach should reduce members’ involvement in disbursing funds, while concentrating on strategic, long-term guidance in humanitarian action. Since its introduction in 2005, the cluster system has sought to provide leadership and accountability in key areas of humanitarian response and bolster system-wide preparedness and technical capacity.\textsuperscript{277}

### Table 5.3: UN Humanitarian Coordination Leadership—The Cluster Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Lead Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>FAO (UN Food and Agricultural Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management</td>
<td>UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) for conflict internally displace persons (IDPs) and IOM (International Organization for Migration) for disaster situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery</td>
<td>UN Development Programme (UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>UNICEF (UN Children's Programme) and Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter</td>
<td>UNHCR and IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecomms</td>
<td>WFP (World Food Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>WHO (World Health Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>UNHCR (for conflict IDPs), together with UNICEF and OHCHR (the Office of the UN High Coordinator for Human Rights) for disasters and civilians affected by conflict other than IDPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“At the field level, the [Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator] HC/RC is responsible for designating Cluster Lead Agencies for all key humanitarian response sectors, in consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). This is applied in all countries facing major new or on-going complex and/or natural humanitarian emergencies. Effective cluster and inter-cluster coordination are widely recognized as an essential part of any humanitarian response.”

“At the strategic level, inter-cluster coordination takes place within the HCT, under the leadership of the HC/RC. The HCT comprises the Cluster Lead Agencies (at Country Representative/Director level) and selected operational partners involved in the response, and it is within the framework of this strategic decision-making forum that the overall humanitarian response operation is guided and led. At the operational level, inter-cluster coordination generally takes place within the framework of an inter-cluster coordination forum/group (at Cluster Coordinator level).”

Source: Excerpted from UNOCHA, \textit{Humanitarian Coordination Leadership}.
At the local and national level, the cluster system’s purpose is to strengthen partnerships, predictability and accountability of responses. However, the system has become process heavy and could benefit from streamlining. The second IASC cluster evaluation report states:

“In their current implementation, clusters largely exclude national and local actors and often fail to link with, build on, or support existing coordination and response mechanisms. Among other reasons, this is due to insufficient analysis of local structures and capacities before cluster implementation, as well as a lack of clear transition and exit criteria and strategies. As a result, the introduction of clusters has in several cases weakened national and local ownership and capacities. Furthermore, most response clusters do not use or promote participatory approaches.”

Box 5.1 presents possible steps for reducing the barriers that the OCHA cluster system could potentially place on localization initiatives.

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**Box 5.1: Steps to Increase Localization through the OCHA Cluster System**

1. **Progressive local engagement**: Integrated, sub-national hubs would increase direct contact with local municipalities, elevate the geographical focus of response, and align crisis response goals better with the needs of local actors. Facilitating local participation would go a long way to empowering local stakeholders. This would also require devolving more resources towards local languages and translation services to ensure local actors’ buy-in.

2. **Ensuring independence of sub-national coordination**: Investing in improving information sharing amongst sub-national structures would accelerate the reorientation of lead clusters as last resort providers, change the statistics of resource provision in favor of national NGOs and local organizations and empower a hybridized planning architecture more suited to respond to local needs. This would also reduce the informational asymmetry between national and local level clusters.
3. **Prevention of double/triple-hatting**: Cluster leads in the field doubling as cluster agency heads creates a conflict of interest insofar as accountability, transparency and workload adequacy is concerned. Devolving more responsibilities to the heads of structures can streamline focus in responding to crises, improve the efficacy and granularity of recording needs, freely leverage the national level cluster systems to lead strategy, analyze outcomes, collect data, and ensure sustainability of adopted procedures. This may also increase timely and adaptive responses.

4. **From “Sectors” to “Geographies”**: Shifting focus from assessing existing gaps in cluster approaches to analyzing existing capacities and needs will power an area-based set of deliverables. It will also avoid an improper transplantation of sector-based priorities across crisis-struck populations while successfully integrating local projects, local governments capacities, and settlement provisions, and create more space and opportunities for multistakeholder engagement.

5. **Enhancing the “triple nexus” (humanitarian, development, and peace)**: Humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding assistance need to be approached in a coherent, systemic fashion as they are inextricably linked and, done well together, can be mutually reinforcing. However, development and peacebuilding, for example, largely get left out in the OCHA cluster system’s focus on the struggles of individual clusters. Peace interfaces and possible inroads for development strategies can be better analyzed at the local level.


**ANTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE FOR REFUGEES THROUGH A MULTILATERAL VULNERABILITY INDEX**

The Global Refugee Compact and the Migration Compact, both adopted in 2018, sought to revitalize the global governance systems for the displaced, strengthening safeguards for migrants and refugees, while streamlining avenues of support for host countries. However, the challenges and trends described above and in section one indicate a weakening of political resolve in support of the far-reaching commitments articulated in both Compacts.
To facilitate a course correction for support of still growing numbers of vulnerable internally displaced persons and refugees, in line with an overarching narrative of prevention and preparedness, a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) should be established ahead of the Summit of the Future in 2024. It should serve to inform both the Emergency Platform Protocols and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in resource allocation decisions, as well as the mobilization of the New UN Civilian Response Capability and new International Fund for Peacebuilding (as proposed in section three of this report).

“In order to increase the monitoring capabilities for early warning systems...and increase preparedness, multidimensional data is key.”

Countries with greater structural vulnerability and lower resilience are more likely to see forced migration, internally displaced persons, and refugees (see section one). In order to increase the monitoring capabilities for early warning systems (as discussed in section three) and increase preparedness, multidimensional data is key. However, no international, widely accepted, quantitative benchmarking system currently exists to measure structural vulnerability or lack of resilience across multiple dimensions of sustainability at the national or sub-national level.281

The President of the General Assembly appointed a High-Level Panel to work in coordination with Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) on the development and implementation of an MVI tool, following resolution A/76/211 recommending the principles of multidimensionality, universality, and exogeneity for an index.282 Importantly, such an index would support effective resource allocation to states whose vulnerability does not show in gross national income (GNI) and GDP composite measures. Without a comprehensive measurement tool to capture their vulnerabilities, UN Member States, including SIDS, have faced high barriers to financing for development and, ultimately, building stronger local institutions to increase resilience against global shocks and crises.283

Small Island and Developing Countries have advocated for an MVI for the last three decades, but this agenda has remained on the fringes of UN development policy discourse. Framing the MVI as an intersecting tool for development and anticipatory action, which can also directly benefit vulnerable refugee and displaced populations, creates important openings in both the upcoming SDG Summit (September 2023) and Summit of the Future (September 2024) agendas. The key principles for a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index are described in box 5.2.
Refugees, displaced persons, and forced migration are a collective result of failed governance systems in peace, security, and humanitarian assistance, among other factors. While indices such as the Global Peace Index and State Resilience Index exist, no global index currently combines structural vulnerability and resilience which lays at the heart of the proposed Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index. In a rapidly changing climate—geopolitically, naturally, and technologically—diagnosing the most vulnerable states is key to both preventing crises and building resilience to future shocks. Therefore, adopting a short-term and long-term approach to humanitarian action, supported by anticipatory tools, has become a practical and moral imperative. Such an index could be meaningfully used by the newly proposed Emergency Platform, as well as the humanitarian community’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee and OCHA cluster system, for a more efficient and effective allocation of life-saving resources to vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons.

**Overcoming Potential Spoilers and Other Bottlenecks**

Many of these reform proposals have existed, in one form or another, for several years. Their largest bottlenecks involve political will and financing, though it is worth noting that the appropriation of relevant technologies may also have lasting effects on the humanitarian architecture’s ability to keep pace with effective responses.
“The G77 therefore has reason to take ownership of such recommendations that call for improved collective action in resilience, preparedness, and capacity development.”

It will be important to capitalize on the upcoming summits—the SDG Summit (2023), Summit of the Future (2024), and proposed World Social Summit (2025)—to generate the political will and associated financing for successful reform. More than ever, global trends indicate that current structures of governance are simply not sufficient (see GGIR’23 section one), and across several recent consultations, UN Member States have agreed. In the case of the humanitarian architecture, low and middle income countries often feel the highest impacts of reform and have the most to gain. The G77 therefore has reason to take ownership of such recommendations that call for improved collective action in resilience, preparedness, and capacity development.

On financing, within the humanitarian sector, spoilers may constitute donors that promote competition among agencies or an agency that deviates from collective action, due to their own interpretation of humanitarian action or organizational agendas. Additionally, there are inherent tensions across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, which result in conflicting objectives that can undermine, for instance, anticipatory action principles and create discrepancies between short-term assistance and long-term resilience building.

Some humanitarians argue that investing in resources that focus on risk rather than solely on need can prevent large-scale crises, enabling action before full-fledged humanitarian responses may be required. Other humanitarians argue that investing in preventive action falls squarely under development and peacebuilding, potentially diverting scarce resources from humanitarian responses. As the complexity of our global systems and challenges increases, the fluidity of these lines must be accepted and the breaking of silos reflected in various parts of a 21st century humanitarian architecture.

The issues to be overcome for a next generation architecture are not merely those of producing the blueprint for organizational arrangements. Rather, reaching a political consensus on what the blueprint is intended to achieve, as well as making available and sustaining the requisite resources, are equally essential steps requiring deft diplomatic and political mobilization skills—two important subjects to which we now turn.
VI. No More NAPping: A New Agenda for Peace & Summit of the Future that Matter

“The global architecture to manage disagreements and de-escalate conflicts has become weaker. Longstanding commitments, particularly in the areas of nuclear disarmament and strategic stability, have eroded. There is no question that this is a difficult time to talk about a New Agenda for Peace. We are under no illusions. And yet, challenging as this task might be, it could not be more vital.”

—Dr. Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

The UN Charter confers upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Yet time and again, geo-political tensions and the veto power of the Council’s permanent members—which last year alone hampered collective action toward Russia’s war against Ukraine, North Korean missile tests, and the Syrian civil war—have kept the world body from realizing its primary purpose. Not since the depths of the Cold War has the specter of nuclear weapons use seemed so real, while the growing number of intractable conflicts worldwide has taken a toll on the UN’s conflict management system. More violent conflicts are currently active than at any time since the end of the Second World War, with, for instance, 45 armed conflicts recorded in the Middle East and North Africa, 35 in Africa, and 19 in Asia. Average conflict duration has lengthened, and “settled” conflicts are relapsing more often.

Against this backdrop, Secretary-General António Guterres recommended and the General Assembly committed to convening a Summit of the Future (SOTF) on 22 and 23 September 2024 in New York, aimed at “reaffirming the Charter of the United Nations, reinvigorating multilateralism, boosting implementation of existing commitments, agreeing on concrete solutions to challenges and restoring trust among Member States.” Integral to the Summit is the preparation of a New Agenda for Peace, which the Secretary-General is to unveil in July 2023. In his 2023 priorities briefing to the General Assembly, he argued that this new Agenda should “... represent a holistic view of the peace continuum that ... invests in prevention to avoid conflicts in the first place, focuses on mediation, advances peacebuilding and includes much broader participation from women and young people.”
This concluding section explores how the New Agenda for Peace and the Summit of the Future can be fully maximized over the coming fifteen months, by building consensus on urgently needed, substantial global governance reforms. After briefly summarizing the thinking of the Secretary-General and his High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, and building on the recommendations of sections three, four and five above, this section considers what the New Agenda for Peace must achieve and what fundamental reforms the Security Council, General Assembly, and Peacebuilding Commission require to be effective going forward. It then outlines five critical steps to mobilize an inclusive, smart coalition of governments, civil society and business groups, and international organizations to help ensure that next year’s Summit realizes its full potential to advance an agenda of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights and dignity (with climate and the environment enveloping all of these issues).

Collective Security Renewal through a New Agenda for Peace

The recent issue of *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2023) is entitled, “The Nonaligned World: The West, the Rest, and the New Global Disorder,” where essays from policy-makers and scholars in Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia explore the dangers from a world somewhat divided over Russia’s war in Ukraine and decades of neglect of the issues most important to their countries. Meanwhile, in building the case for his New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General points to devastating conflicts, exacerbated by geostrategic competition, in Asia, Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Most notably, he underscores escalating bloodshed in the heart of Europe, where he expresses the “… fear [that] the world is not sleepwalking into a wider war. I fear it is doing so with its eyes wide open.”

Rather than delving into operational and technical obstacles to peace, the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace is anticipated to confront “strategic challenges of our time” and make a solemn plea to the UN’s 193 Member States to both recommit to the UN Charter’s principles and rebuild a global consensus for more effective collective security. Six core areas are expected to anchor the agenda: i) reducing strategic risks; ii) strengthening international foresight and capacities to identify and adapt to new risks; iii) reshaping responses to all forms of violence; iv) investing in prevention and peacebuilding; v) supporting regional prevention; and vi) putting women and girls at the center. Alongside other issues raised during Member States’ informal consultations in 2023, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism will also be taken up in the world body’s new peace agenda.

While international partners of the UN should review the New Agenda for Peace with an open mind, this new framework for action may come up short if it only speaks at the “strategic” level (pitching to heads of state and elite-level diplomacy) to a “forward-looking vision of international peace and security …” This report has argued that the UN’s operational tools and concepts require urgent updating to keep pace with the changing nature of conflict, as highlighted in Box 6.1.
Box 6.1: Operationalizing the New Agenda for Peace to Meet 21st Century Challenges

**New Civilian Response Capability** (section three): The initiative could include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical expertise, along with fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General, with emphasis on recruitment of women and youth leaders in support of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding objectives. Ideally, these teams would be complemented by a standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants, up to two thousand strong, drawn voluntarily from across the UN system.

**New Treaty on Fully Autonomous Weapons** (section four): A legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons systems is urgently needed to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force and life-or-death decisions, as artificial intelligence and AI-controlled lethal autonomous weapons pose unique threats to peace and security by making warfare more deadly and efficient—and autonomous. Since such weapons challenge established rules and regulations, an international advisory board is needed that brings together experts in international humanitarian law and rules of engagement, military ethicists, and technical experts, as well as religious and interfaith leaders, to explore the implications for warfare from lethal autonomous weapons.

**New Emergency Platform** (section five): Further fleshing out the Secretary-General’s proposal, the Emergency Platform should work with the newly suggested UN Futures Lab as a data hub with inputs that are sensitive to threats on impacted populations and outputs made freely available. The Emergency Platform should further serve a knowledge management function as a convener of different streams of institutional and external knowledge, and as a self-learning system so as to evolve its response between consecutive global shocks.


The High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) further offers several constructive ideas on how to advance the New Agenda for Peace operationally. For instance, it recommends establishing a Multi-Stakeholder Security Transparency Platform “to bring existing arms control bodies and registries together with a range of scientists and security experts to generate high-quality information, counter disinformation, increase knowledge of global arms flows and technological risks, and gradually build toward greater confidence and
trust. Lending support to the new peace agenda’s anticipated prioritization of investments in regional prevention, the HLAB further calls for a new collective security framework between the UN and major regional bodies based on three pillars of cooperation: i) security (fundamental freedoms, confidence-building measures, and military transparency); ii) economic/sustainable development (including scientific and environmental cooperation, anti-corruption, and financial sector risks); and iii) humanitarian cooperation (food/water security and basic protections).

As with the 2005 (UN60) World Summit and the substantial policy research, recommendations, and diplomacy that preceded it, the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace must successfully feed into the peace and security section of the intergovernmental Pact for the Future, the anticipated chief outcome of next year’s Summit of the Future. In particular, the Pact for the Future must incorporate long-overdue structural reforms of the UN collective security system, beginning with the Security Council, General Assembly, and the Peacebuilding Commission (which was a product of the UN60 Summit). Together, these core institutions of collective security—each in need of significant repair and innovation—guide and underpin the UN’s conflict management, disarmament, and humanitarian work.

Garnering greater political momentum and encouraging the give-and-take diplomacy that is the hallmark of multilateral negotiations, the Pact for the Future can also bring greater focus and a much-needed deadline to the ongoing Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform, the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the General Assembly, and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review. Recommended priority ideas to be championed in building the Pact in the run-up to the September 2024 Summit—variations of which were introduced initially by the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance—include:

**EXPAND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND ALLOW RE-ELECTION OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS**

Many proposals have called for expanding the Security Council, particularly its permanent membership. But any negotiation for Council expansion is limited by geopolitical constraints, as manifested in the more than decade-long effort of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform (and its precursors back to 1993). For this reason, the international community should focus on more limited, feasible reform measures, even some that may also require Charter amendment. Among these would be expanding the number of non-permanent seats by six, and allowing the immediate re-election of non-permanent members, who are currently not allowed to serve consecutive terms, through a simple amendment of UN Charter Article 23 (removing the sentence: “A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.”). Allowing for immediate re-election would bring more regional expertise to UNSC decision-making and create incentives for elected Member States to act fairly and take responsibility in the Council.
The General Assembly should also redraw the regional groups for the allocation of non-permanent UNSC seats, with particular regard for the impact on Sub-Saharan countries in the Africa Group (where most UN peacekeeping operations occur). Though some will argue that against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S.-China tensions the political conditions are not favorable for any meaningful changes in the Security Council’s composition, recent public polling suggests otherwise. In response to the question: “To better represent the developing world, it has been suggested Brazil, India, and South Africa should also be permanent members. Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this idea?” in the Global Governance Survey 2023 (see section one), more than 67 percent of citizens polled from the G7 and BRICS countries expressed agreement, compared to 19 percent voicing disagreement (a more than 3-to-1 differential).

**ASSERT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY’S ROLE THROUGH THE UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION**

On March 2, 2022, the General Assembly, acting under *Uniting for Peace*, denounced the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine with the support of 141 Member States. It was followed, on April 26th, by the consensus passage of Resolution 76/262, which calls for the President of the General Assembly to convene the UNGA “within 10 working days of the casting of a veto” and to hold a debate on the subject of the veto. An initiative of Liechtenstein, Resolution 76/262 should complement more frequent use of the *Uniting for Peace* resolution when the UNSC fails to act in critical matters of international peace and security. To avoid appearing to usurp the Security Council’s primacy, invocation of *United for Peace* should require a two-part process initiated by a procedural vote of a qualified majority of the UNSC determining that a veto was used in “bad faith,” followed by a two-thirds majority vote in the UNGA, as is required for important questions. The debates mandated by Res. 76/262 on veto usage might inspire UNSC members to initiate this process.

**UPGRADE THE PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION TO AN EMPOWERED COUNCIL**

A more authoritative UN Peacebuilding Council (“new PBC”) could complement and assist in the Security Council’s challenging task of maintaining global peace and security. With an expanded mandate, the Peacebuilding Council would have enhanced powers and responsibilities to lead on conflict prevention (including through a new Peacebuilding Audit tool) and peacebuilding policy development, coordination, and resource mobilization on second- and third-order conflicts, freeing up the Security Council to concentrate on first-order conflicts that most threaten international peace and security. The new PBC would focus on countries and regions in non-peacekeeping and post-conflict environments where it can monitor and coordinate actions to prevent conflict recurrence. This proposed upgrade would follow the precedent of the UN Commission on Human Rights, transformed in 2006 into the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In addition, a reinvigorated focus
on prevention calls for adequate, predictable, and sustained funding of the Peacebuilding Fund, including from assessed contributions, to strengthen the world body’s core mission of sustaining peace.308 Lending support for this proposal, the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism argues for a new Peacebuilding Council with “an expanded mandate to address a broader range of risks and resourced with greater investigative and decision-making powers.”309

In terms of next steps for the New Agenda for Peace, after it is introduced in July to UN Member States by the Secretary-General, it appears that this September’s Ministerial Forum (focused on the September 2024 Summit of the Future) will decide how to proceed with this new instrument. However, the situation is overall unclear and may require some negotiations, which would likely take place in the next General Assembly (78th session, September 2023-September 2024) and directly involve the Secretariat. As noted above, a complementary relationship will need to be established, ideally by this September, between the New Agenda for Peace and the anticipated peace and security section of the intergovernmental Pact for the Future.

A Smart Coalition for Maximizing the Summit of the Future

At the core of Our Common Agenda was the Secretary-General’s call for all 193 UN Member States to convene a Summit of the Future to reinvigorate multilateralism, among other related goals. Further to the wide-ranging thematic consultation sponsored by the President of the General Assembly in February-March 2022, and a “modalities resolution” adopted by the General Assembly the following September, formal preparations for the United Nations’ September 2024 Summit of the Future began in earnest in February 2023. In rapid succession (February 13-15), the Secretary-General released an update to Our Common Agenda, and initial Member States consultations and then broader stakeholder consultation began.310

Despite a well-conceived and carefully consulted “roadmap” by the Summit’s co-facilitators (the Permanent Representatives of Namibia and Germany to the United Nations) and eleven carefully crafted Policy Briefs by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), the current approach to Summit preparation involving consultations with Member States and other stakeholders has been disappointing. Process-oriented, it has focused lately on “scope and elements” to determine the precise number of intergovernmental negotiating tracks and specific chapters of the Pact for the Future, and the degree of ambition within each track and chapter, risking delays to substantive work on both the summit’s main outcome document (a Pact for the Future) and related instruments.311 As the Permanent Representative of Singapore, Ambassador Burhan Gafoor, expressed in a preparatory discussion on April 20, 2023, at UN Headquarters, “Let’s avoid negotiating about what to negotiate, as we already have the basis for the scope [of the SOTF].”312
Without determined leadership by Member States and the Secretary-General—buttressed by well-researched and timely reform proposals and the active support of civil society—instead of having a draft Pact for the Future and associated instruments ready for initial deliberation at this September’s Ministerial Forum, it seems almost inevitable that only another process-oriented document (addressing unfinished business from the modalities resolution) will inform discussions during the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Week. Conversely, long-overdue discussions on substance are needed urgently to improve the methods and institutions for better enabling the UN to face an expansive and critical agenda that runs across its three pillars of peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights—and their absence is keeping the international community “from achieving the United Nations we need for the future we want.”

Somewhat acrimonious modalities resolution negotiations last year already delayed the Summit of the Future to 2024. Now, a major diplomatic fault-line has opened between several influential developing countries and a large proportion of the UN’s membership, the Secretariat, and many civil society groups. This schism stems from a continued perceived competition between the SOTF and this September’s mid-point SDG Summit. In particular, Cuba, on behalf of the G77 and China, has repeatedly reiterated in recent months its lingering concerns that the Summit of the Future’s multiple tracks could divert political attention, financial resources, and precious time, especially for smaller UN missions, away from the “main priority” of achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In actuality, the two summits are already highly compatible, and both skillful multilateral diplomacy and “smart coalition-building” can enhance their interplay further, as elaborated below.

FIVE CRITICAL STEPS FOR MAXIMIZING RESULTS FROM THE SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE

To build a smart coalition of states and non-state actors to prepare for the SOTF, with the ultimate goal of raising its ambition to a level commensurate with meeting today’s global challenges as detailed in this inaugural Global Governance Innovation Report, five preparatory and follow-through steps (many running in parallel) are both necessary and desirable (see figure 6.1).
1. For Member States:
   Commence substantive negotiations without further delay.

It is time to get beyond a focus on scope, elements, and other “modalities” considerations for next year’s Summit, if this intergovernmental exercise is to realize its full potential. Continued false trade-offs, contending that the Summit of the Future somehow undermines preparations for this September’s SDG Summit, must be superseded by a powerful, reframed narrative and communications strategy that underscore the high stakes. Indeed, in at least three tangible ways—generating high-level political support, financial and technical assistance, and conceptual clarity for improved global governance—the two summits positively reinforce each other.315

Similarly, fears that the September 2024 Summit is only advancing Western interests, that it represents a power-grab by the UN Secretariat, or that past (e.g., for the UN75 Declaration or Our Common Agenda) and current consultations have lacked transparency or good faith are simply unfounded and merit resolute, diplomatic pushback. Here India, Brazil, and South Africa, in leading the G20 in 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively, can perform critical
leadership roles both outside and within major UN deliberative bodies. At the same time, to afford all countries and their UN Missions the opportunity to contribute equally to the multiple tracks feeding into the 2024 Summit: (a) sufficient lead time should be ensured; (b) full transparency should be maintained at all times; and (c) the Co-Facilitators for each negotiation track or Pact for the Future chapter should share documentation well in advance of a preparatory meeting.

Finally, to expand the knowledge base and ability (especially of smaller UN Missions) to contribute substantively to multiple, concurrent SOTF negotiation tracks, Member States should: first, welcome the participation of at least one civil society and one youth representative on national delegations from the start of Summit preparations; and second, allow one civil society representative and one youth representative to contribute a consolidated set of ideas, immediately following government interventions and on behalf of civil society and youth, respectively, at all Pact for the Future and individual track intergovernmental negotiations feeding into the Summit.

2. For the UN Secretary-General:

Stand behind the best recommendations in Our Common Agenda, from the HLAB, and from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General’s (EOSG) Policy Brief series.

Now in his second and final term of office and with sound science informing policy-makers that the world faces multiple, intersecting crises (including the risk of war between Great Powers for the first time in decades, see box 6.2), this is not the time for the UN’s chief to yield ground to ill-considered, short-term-focused, or the narrow national concerns of powerful UN Member States. More than ever, the Secretary-General must look to the moral compass that the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide: a global civic ethic that empowers him, uniquely and unapologetically, to speak for humanity and the planet.316

Compared to several past Secretaries-General, Mr. Guterres has widely consulted Member States and major stakeholder groups in formulating the often daring and creative proposals in Our Common Agenda, in support of his largely independent HLAB report (A Breakthrough for People and Planet), and the EOSG’s Policy Brief series, each designed to inform and raise the bar at the Summit of the Future. He has little to lose and much to gain—in terms of a world organization better capable of delivering global public goods, but also in the broader sweep of world history—by staying the course and continuing to navigate the likely political minefields to achieve overdue and, in many ways, paramount changes in how the world is governed.
Box 6.2: Averting Great Power War while Planning for Ukraine’s Reconstruction: UN Roles?

If the climate crisis and severe socioeconomic knock-on effects from the COVID-19 pandemic—both hampering efforts to deliver on the 2030 Agenda—were not reasons enough to revisit ways to strengthen and innovate the global governance system, the Security Council’s paralysis in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, together with the Secretary-General’s underwhelming diplomatic role (with the exception of the Black Sea Grain Initiative), raise serious concerns about the UN’s ability to keep Great Power tensions from further escalating to dangerous levels. Despite repeated UN General Assembly votes in support of Ukraine and calling for a cessation in hostilities (in 2022 on March 2, April 7, September 16, October 12, November 14, and in 2023 on February 23), continued deep divisions among veto-wielding, permanent members of the Security Council have kept this central body from fulfilling its (UN Charter stipulated) “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security …”

While the General Assembly’s demonstrated leadership merits praise, the United Nations Secretariat—led by the Secretary-General and a proposed Special Envoy with the support of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs—should, as nearly all wars end in negotiations, now begin to lay the groundwork in realizing its fundamental peacemaking role, as manifested vis-à-vis countless wars since the world body’s creation. UN Charter Article 99 grants the Secretary-General such authority, and as elaborated in this report’s section three, the Charter further equips him or her with the necessary tools for the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” (Articles 33-38). When given the opportunity to apply these measures, the UN should advise the warring parties on the need to prioritize practical outcomes over abstract principles, and to set from the outset clear basic parameters for a settlement while maintaining flexibility and neutrality.

Moreover, given Ukraine’s immense reconstruction needs (including help for millions of expected returnees and other vulnerable groups), it is never too early to begin planning for broad socioeconomic recovery from the country’s devastating war with its neighbor. Here again the innovations introduced in section three of this report, including a New UN Civilian Response Capability and International Fund for Peacebuilding, could prove invaluable in offering the Ukrainian people tangible, targeted resources, effective coordination among multiple multi/bilateral development actors, and leading-edge expertise to drive all aspects of their country’s reconstruction.

The soon-to-be-released New Agenda for Peace is further anticipated to offer updated guidance and insights for building a durable and just peace after an agreement is
signed by warring factions. The upcoming (June 21-22, 2023) Ukraine Recovery Conference in London (taking forth the “Lugano Principles”) can also serve as an important milestone. In short, the UN has a duty both to prevent a widening of the Ukraine-Russia conflict (which could bring substantial new risks), and to help facilitate Ukrainian-led reconstruction planning for when, ultimately, a negotiated settlement is finally reached.

Sources: UN, United Nations Charter, 15-16, 19-21, 50; Ashford, “The Ukraine War Will End With Negotiations.”

3. For Civil Society:
Be relentless in convincing UN Ambassadors and their capitals that civil society’s (many) thoughtful and novel ideas on reinvigorating multilateralism can directly impact UN Member States in positive ways.

Civil society has proven vital in countless UN policy-making fora over the years, including in preparations for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement. Civil society organizations and coalitions can offer creative proposals, ground-truthed at the grassroots, while mobilizing political support for progressive ideas within sympathetic governments and international organizations. While advocacy consultations in New York are helpful to know the lay of the land and build consensus within civil society around select major reforms, the real work in moving governments must be undertaken in capitals, as this is where significant decisions are made.

To support civic voices in organizing around the Summit of the Future, civil society groups have recently stood up a new SOTF Information Bulletin to provide both civil society and UN Missions up-to-date summaries and analysis of the various intergovernmental negotiation tracks feeding into the September 2024 Summit. Additionally, over three days (March 20-22, 2023), they brought together more than 2,000 representatives registered worldwide (online and in-person across from UN headquarters in New York) for the inaugural Global Futures Forum to finalize and begin to promote—including among UN Missions and senior Secretariat officials—an interim People’s Pact for the Future (iPP) as a civil society declaration of creative reform ideas for consideration at the SOTF. Led by the Coalition for the UN We Need, Global Governance Innovation Network, and more than 100 partner organizations worldwide, preparations are now underway for an even larger Global Futures Forum in 2024—with even greater grassroots and Global South participation and preceded by Global People’s Assemblies, Regional Futures Forum, e-consultations, more policy research and webinars, and Global Policy Dialogues—to both bring more diverse perspectives into the iPP and harness civil society’s networks and positive change ideas in support of the UN75 call to action for the “Future We Want and United Nations We Need.”
4. For the Pact for the Future and all related Tracks:

As done for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (creating individual targets and tracking indicators for all 17 individual SDGs), design a comprehensive Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism to ensure accountability and facilitate course corrections in implementing agreed Summit of the Future outcomes.

Setbacks of various kinds—political, financial, and operational—are inevitable when fostering and implementing significant global governance reform. To encourage successful execution of the Pact for the Future and related strategic frameworks (e.g., a New Agenda for Peace, Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations) to be agreed at the SOTF, the UN Secretariat could design an annual progress report, from which the Summit’s teams of Co-Facilitators, the President of the General Assembly, and participating stakeholders could further assess implementation gaps and recommend early corrective action to relevant international bodies. Ultimately, the goal would be to hold world leaders and international institutions accountable for their decisions.

Learning from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’s assessment toolkit, from the Human Development Index, and other examples, three sets of technical instruments that could enhance this monitoring and tracking mechanism would be: (a) logical frameworks featuring precise goals, outcomes, indicators, and means of verification for each of the Summit of the Future’s commitments (for one illustrative example, see annex 2); (b) a Global Governance Index to measure and compare, in a composite way that combines multiple indicators, the ability of all 193 UN Member States to manage global public goods, thereby inspiring competitive pressure to join a “race to the top” in global governance performance and support; and (c) a Global Governance Survey to measure and reveal attitudes towards global issues and support for existing and possible new modes of global governance, as a means to help policy-makers, policy analysts, and policy advocates to identify the most effective messaging when seeking to improve global governance. Investing early on in such an ongoing monitoring and evaluation platform will also help to forge and sustain an inclusive, smart coalition of governments (with “champions” identified and celebrated through the GGI and GGS annual diagnostic tools), civil society and business groups, and international organizations that aspire to stoke the fire of ambition for the September 2024 Summit in New York.

5. For Summit of the Future Follow-through:

Consider a comprehensive Charter Review process through Article 109, culminating in 2026, to realize several anticipated Pact for the Future commitments requiring Charter amendment.
Arguing that the UN Security Council represents “the highest profile example of failure in the multilateral system,” the HLAB’s report calls for a “Charter Review conference focused on Security Council reform.”19 Beyond preparing the Council to better respond to major risks to international peace and security, it is possible, if not likely, that the full realization of several of the anticipated Pact for the Future commitments may require Charter amendments too (e.g., for improved global economic and climate governance, fighting corruption, safeguarding human rights, and averting future pandemics).

“The important thing is that all our thinking and all our actions be based on the realization that it is in fact only a first step ... This Charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or perfect instrument. Changing world conditions will require readjustments...to find a way to end wars.”

—President Harry S. Truman, June 26, 1945, San Francisco, California, in his remarks accompanying the signing of the United Nations Charter.20

The framers of the UN Charter in 1945 foresaw that it was an imperfect instrument that would need to be updated to reflect changing global political realities, threats, and opportunities, to ensure the organization’s continued practical relevance and decision-making efficiency. As a direct outcome of the SOTF, Member States could recommend a high-level Article 109 UN Charter Review Conference, to be held by late 2026 and preceded by an appropriate preparatory process, to take forward the commitments from the Summit of the Future requiring Charter revision. This would ensure that momentum is sustained, in 2025 and 2026, to facilitate effective follow-through, while also focusing on “unaddressed business” coming out of the September 2024 SOTF.

Making the Most of the New Agenda for Peace & Summit of the Future

With simmering Great Power tensions in the Asia-Pacific and at the heart of Europe, alongside levels of violent conflict in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere not seen in decades, the task of forging a New Agenda for Peace could not be more vital. Central to this instrument’s success is the need to upgrade the UN’s conflict management toolbox (including the “4P’s” of prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding) in light of the changing nature of conflict over the past three decades, while, simultaneously, refurbishing—through the intergovernmental Pact for the Future—the collective security architecture, beginning with fundamental Security Council, General Assembly, and Peacebuilding Commission reforms. Disarmament efforts, as manifested in this report, can boost conditions
for applying these conflict management tools and institutions effectively, which, together, can enhance how the global humanitarian architecture functions.

“In the nascent ‘post-post Cold War world’ now taking shape... world leaders should commit themselves, over these next critical fifteen months before the Summit of the Future, to repurposing our global governance system to keep pace with the moral and practical imperatives of our time.”

Civil society has an important role to play in helping to navigate the myriad minefields threatening progress—from virulent nationalism and resurgent authoritarianism to a world still reeling from the severe socioeconomic knock-on effects of a major, unexpected pandemic. Through a combination of critical mass, quality ideas, and deft multilateral diplomacy, civil society can team up with champion governments and forward-leaning leaders in global and regional institutions to maximize the impact of the New Agenda for Peace and SOTF. This high-ambition, smart coalition for progressive change wields immense potential power to make necessary, global “good trouble.” Especially by drawing lessons from past successful smart coalitions (for instance, in support of an International Criminal Court, a landmine ban, debt-relief, and, most recently, expanding global access to the Internet and life-saving vaccines), the transition from a shared conception of the problems to be fixed to taking bold, creative actions is within our reach.

In the nascent “post-post Cold War world” now taking shape (still undefined—perhaps the start of a new era of Global Enlightenment or maybe one of Global Existential Threats?—but with an increasingly clear choice), world leaders should commit themselves, over these next critical fifteen months before the Summit of the Future, to repurposing our global governance system to keep pace with the moral and practical imperatives of our time. Going forward, they must demonstrate the many tangible ways a modernized United Nations and related global and regional bodies can help countries and communities deliver on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as help them to avoid new outbreaks (or recurrence) of deadly conflict. Equally pivotal, they must work skillfully to ensure that this generational opportunity to define “the future we want” for today’s younger generation—and all future generations—really becomes the future we and they get.
I. Introduction

7. Hruby, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 1.
20. Ibid.

Endnotes

II. Conceptual Advances toward Peace, Security & Humanitarian Action

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37. United Nations, Secretary-General, Summary of Secretary-General's Report “Our Common Agenda.”
III. Reimagining Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (The “4Ps”)

78 Islamic Relief, “Introduction to Peacebuilding: An Islamic Relief Practitioner’s Guide.”
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Annex 1: Global Governance Index
Methodological Summary

The Global Governance Index (GGI) represents the first known effort to score a group of countries on their levels of international collaboration and follow-through on key areas of global concern using a standardized set of uniform, quantitative metrics. Global governance in the Global Governance Innovation Project—consisting of the GGI, a Global Governance Survey, and this Global Governance Innovation Project—is understood to mean (see section two of this report for an elaboration):

The steering of institutions and resources to provide for global public goods and tackle global challenges effectively. Such steering requires not only power, but also legitimacy and authority. Here, an emerging consensus becomes visible, including through the principles and ideas permeating the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda and High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism reports, that for global governance to be legitimate and authoritative in contemporary terms, it needs to be conducted in an evidenced-based, inclusive, networked, equitable, and future-oriented way.

The GGI focuses on twelve highly influential countries in the world system—the members of the Group of Seven (G7) and the “BRICS” countries. Together, these twelve countries—Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States—represent about 51 percent of the global population and about 70 percent of global GDP. The GGI was developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), in partnership with the Stimson Center, and it forms an integral part of the Global Governance Innovation Report. This short methodological summary presents the results and the principal methodological components of the GGI. As part of the larger GGIR, the GGI assesses commitment to global governance across five domains:

1. International Peace, Security, and (Conflict-related) Humanitarian Action
2. Socioeconomic Development and Pandemic Response
3. Environmental Governance and Climate Action
4. Human Rights, the Rule of Law, Inclusive Governance, and Civic Space
5. Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership
Each domain is measured using five indicators, which were identified based on three themes:

1. **Global engagement** *(10 indicators)*
   Active and direct participation in international frameworks for cooperation. Global engagement is demonstrated through formal agreements, treaties, responsiveness, and connections with international organizations.

2. **Financial commitment** *(6 indicators)*
   Unearmarked, voluntary financial contributions to multilateral bodies as a percentage of GDP. The indicators in this theme demonstrate states’ unconditioned commitment to supporting multilateral organizations’ mandates and goals, rather than specific programs or initiatives.

3. **National performance** *(9 indicators)*
   Country-level outcomes and policies related to areas of global concern. Indicators within this theme are used to assess countries’ progress in managing global public goods within their own jurisdictions. These indicators focus on the national policy agenda and the internal performance of a state.

**Mechanics of the Index:**
The GGI has been constructed based on the following features:
- Unit of analysis: Country
- Weights: Equal weighting of indicators
- Scale: Scores for all indicators were banded and normalized on scale of 0-10, with 10 representing the best possible score and 0 representing the worst possible score

**Directions for future research:**
*Broadening country coverage:* Including more countries in the GGI would help offer a more complete picture of how the countries of the world engage with one another and manage their common affairs. This could help to provide a more comprehensive view of global trends and patterns in global governance and avoid biases or blind spots. A larger sample of countries could also provide a more meaningful basis for comparison across regions. It could also encourage accountability among policy-makers from a larger number of countries.

*Periodic updates to mark trends in global governance:* IEP envisions that the GGI could be updated at regular intervals to track change in global governance over time. As the concept of global governance is constantly evolving, GGI updates could help capture those changes in structures, practices, and outcomes over time. This could stimulate the debate about global governance practices and motivate relevant actors to improve and strengthen their efforts.

*A full Global Governance Index technical report may be furnished upon request.*
*We welcome feedback for further refining the GGI’s methodology with the goal of strengthening its policy impact.*
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Human Rights Treaties (Ratified or Signed)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom House Index</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domain 4 Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domain 5: Global Collective Action, Citizenship, and Leadership</td>
<td>International Sentiment</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Innovation Index</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmental Membership Interconnectivity</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Contributions (Unearmarked, % of GDP)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domain 5 Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FULL INDEX SCORE</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.05</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.75</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.53</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.04</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.84</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Original Figure, Institute for Economics & Peace and the Stimson Center.
Annex 2: Logframes for Sections III, IV, and V

Annex 2.1 : Section III - The 4P’s, Logframe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section III: The 4 P’s</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem:</strong> Current UN conflict management tools inadequately address the complex (and changing) nature of conflict.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission:** To strengthen UN operational capacity through new tools in the areas of conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (the “4P’s”).

**Goal 1 - Prevention:** To prevent conflict by improving analysis, crisis warning, and targeted actions.

- **Outcome 1A:** Designation of responsibility, within the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) through their “shared structure”, for analysis and warning to enable quicker decision-making
  - Establishment of new early warning system that secures high-level agreement on signs of mass atrocities
  - # of cases where tensions between two or more groups reached a level capable of inciting violence but was de-escalated through UN good offices
  - DPPA and DPO
  - UCDP and DPPA stats

- **Outcome 1B:** Development of action plans in all relevant UN departments, agencies, funds and programs focusing on Responsibility to Prevent
  - # of conflicts demonstrably avoided through implementation of R2Pre action plans
  - # of conflicts de-escalated through implementation of R2Pre action plans
  - Independent consortium of country-focused scholars
  - UCDP

**Goal 2 - Peacemaking:** To increase multi-level, multi-actor peacemaking efforts with uniquely tailored and inclusive practices that foster a proactive and trustworthy approach to peace.

- **Outcome 2A:** Increased demand for the Secretary General’s peacemaking tools within the Mediation Support Unit
  - # of conflicts where Mediation Support Unit services were requested
  - DPPA stats

- **Outcome 2B:** Implementation of a Barometer Methodology for monitoring and evaluating peacemaking effort success
  - # of conflicts applying Barometer Methodology
  - Kroc Institute database
  - UCDP
## Annexe 2.1 : Section III - The 4P’s, Logframe (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section III: The 4 P’s</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 3 - Peacekeeping:</strong> To enable UN peace support operations to better address contemporary conflict dynamics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3A: Expanded reach and impact of Hybrid and Partnership-Oriented Peace Operations, supported by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO)</td>
<td># of hybrid and partnership-oriented peace operations initiated or sustained with DPO support</td>
<td>DPO stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of conflicts involving hybrid or partnership-oriented peace operations where the country avoided conflict recurrence during its first five years</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3B: Expanded jurisdiction over UN peacekeeping personnel within the UN Internal Justice System to properly address systemic Sexual Exploitation and Abuse within peace missions</td>
<td># Peacekeeper SEA complaints filed and processed</td>
<td>DPO stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Peacekeeper SEA convictions and sentences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 4 - Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:</strong> To ensure durable and widely accepted peace in a conflict-affected country by strengthening post-conflict peacebuilding.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 4A: UN Civilian Response Capability with rapidly deployable international staff developed to provide technical expertise and specialized aid post-conflict</td>
<td># of conflicts where UN Civilian Response Capability services were requested</td>
<td>DPPA and DPO stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of conflicts engaging the new UN Civilian Response Capability where the country avoided conflict recurrence during the first five years</td>
<td>UCDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 4B: A new International Fund for Peacebuilding to unite stakeholders from different sectors and create sustainable financing for long-term peace solutions</td>
<td>Establishment of a new International Fund for Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Int’l Fund for Peacebuilding Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of countries receiving Int’l Fund for Peacebuilding financial support and amount disbursed annually</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Problem:
Disarmament efforts to curb dangerous uses of WMDs, conventional weapons, and emerging technologies are being stalled by ineffective global policies and insufficient political commitment.

### Mission:
To create global policies and safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons and facilitate disarmament.

### Goal 1 WMDs:
To reduce risk of catastrophic nuclear, chemical, and/or biological incidents by increasing the creativity, diversity, and scope of Weapons of Mass Destruction policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1A: Facilitate transparent and open discussions between China, the U.S., and Russia on their nuclear stockpiles</th>
<th># of joint trilateral meetings between China, U.S., and Russia on nuclear stockpiles</th>
<th>IAEA stats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1B: Increase accountability to ensure adherence to Chemical Weapons Convention protocols</td>
<td># of violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention reported to OPCW</td>
<td>OPCW stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1C: Implementation and integration of verification protocols under the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention</td>
<td># of states who have implemented and integrated verification protocols to date</td>
<td>UNODA stats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Goal 2: Conventional Weapons:
To decrease proliferation of SALWs and other conventional weapons by altering the global arms trade infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2A: Increase transparency and security in the arms trade</th>
<th>Establishment of and # of countries utilizing a new Counter-Diversion Assessment Tool</th>
<th>ATT Secretariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of countries reporting disaggregated spending info.</td>
<td>UNODA stats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2B: Increased transparency of transnational crimes linked to illegally obtained SALW</td>
<td>Establishment of a new database to track transnational crime</td>
<td>UNODA and UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of transnational crimes identified linked to illegally obtained SALW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Goal 3 New Technologies:
To decrease threats to the international community through new global regulation of emerging conflict-related technologies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 3A: To address CBRN infrastructure cyber attacks through the creation of new, legally binding treaty and mechanisms</th>
<th>Establish a new treaty to prohibit CBRN infrastructure cyber attacks</th>
<th>UNODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of CBRN infrastructure cyber attacks tracked</td>
<td>UNODA stats and new inde. research consortium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3B: Increased limitations on the use of lethal autonomous weapons through a legally binding treaty and verification mechanism</td>
<td>Establishment of a Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) treaty</td>
<td>UNODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of an international advisory board on LAWS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section V - Next Generation Humanitarian Architecture</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Means of Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: Existing aid structures fail to adequately address acute humanitarian needs brought about by the complex (and changing) nature of conflict and natural disasters.</td>
<td>Establishment of new Emergency Platform with activation and deactivation thresholds</td>
<td>EOSG and OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of lives lost compared to earlier crises of a similar scale (prior to EP engagement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission: To better equip the international community to care for those most vulnerable in crises through better coordination, improved preparedness, and stronger protection policies.</td>
<td>Establishment of a system to promote Global Risk Reports and related UN system strategic foresight analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in international response times compared to earlier crises of a similar scale (prior to EP engagement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 1 Emergency Platform: To improve coordination between relevant humanitarian (and related) actors and create a reliable methodology for emergent shock response through implementation of a global Emergency Platform.</td>
<td>Increase in percentage of donor funding allocation to local and national humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>OCHA stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of direct, local level staff employed in aid organizations (compared to previous years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1A: The inclusion of activation and deactivation thresholds in the new Emergency Platform to lessen bias in protocols</td>
<td>Establishment of new Emergency Platform with activation and deactivation thresholds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1B: The promotion of a new UN Future Lab Global Risk Report and related UN system strategic foresight analysis</td>
<td>Establishment of a system to promote Global Risk Reports and related UN system strategic foresight analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in international response times compared to earlier crises of a similar scale (prior to EP engagement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 2 Localization Agenda: To better respond to humanitarian crises by situating local communities at the center in the delivery of aid resources, policy decision-making, and implementation.</td>
<td>Increase in # of local actors directly contributing to decision-making on foreign aid disbursement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2A: Increase long-term funding for local organizations to develop sustainable aid projects</td>
<td>Increase in percentage of donor funding allocation to local and national humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>OCHA stats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of direct, local level staff employed in aid organizations (compared to previous years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2B: Restructure the OCHA cluster system to shift its focus to long-term guidance</td>
<td># of integrated, subnational hubs established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2C: Place local actors at the center of humanitarian aid decision-making</td>
<td>Increase in # of local actors directly contributing to decision-making on foreign aid disbursement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal 3 Refugees: To provide sufficient protections for refugee communities and IDPs in the wake of crises by enhancing international community preparedness.</td>
<td>Establishment of a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) for anticipatory action to measure lack of resilience, including for refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3A: Creation of a Multi-Dimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) for anticipatory action to measure lack of resilience, including for refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>Increase in # of refugees and IDPs receiving aid in countries applying the MVI</td>
<td>OCHA stats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: List of Resources on Global Governance Innovation from the Stimson Center and its GGIN Partners

**Reports and Books**
- *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance* (June 2015)
- *An Innovation Agenda for UN75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020* (June 2019)
- *Reimagining Governance in a Multipolar World* (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2019)
- *UN 2.0: Ten Innovations for Global Governance - 75 Years beyond San Francisco* (June 2020)
- *Coping with New and Old Crises: Global and Regional Cooperation in an Age of Epidemic Uncertainty* (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, December 2020)
- *Fulfilling the UN75 Declaration’s Promise: An Expert Series’ Synthesis of Major Insights and Recommendations* (June 2021)
- *Beyond UN75: A Roadmap for Inclusive, Networked & Effective Global Governance* (June 2021)
- *Building Back Together and Greener: Twenty Initiatives for a Just, Healthy and Sustainable Global Recovery* (co-published by the Doha Forum and Stimson Center, September 2021)
- *Road to 2023: Our Common Agenda and the Pact for the Future* (June 2022)
- *Interim People’s Pact for the Future: 2023 Civil Society Perspectives on the Summit of the Future* (published by the Coalition for the UN We Need, March 2023)

**Action Plans from the Global Policy Dialogues series**
- *Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace & Global Governance* (Doha Institute, Dec 2018)
- *Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement and Beyond* (Seoul: Global Green Growth Institute, October 2019)
- *Roadmap for the Future We Want & UN We Need: A Vision 20/20 for UN75 & Beyond* (UN75 Global Governance Forum, September 2020)
- *Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis* (Recife, Brazil: Plataforma CIPÓ)

**Global Governance Innovation Network policy brief series**
- *Towards Multiple Security Councils* (June 2020)
- *Multilateralism for Chronic Risks* (June 2020)
- *Closing the Governance Gap in Climate, Security, and Peacebuilding* (September 2020)
- *Strengthening the Rules-Based Global Order* (September 2020)
- *Responsibility Chains—Building Global Governance for Forest Risk Commodity Chains* (August 2022)
- *Bolstering Arms Control in a Contested Geopolitical Environment* (November 2022)
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Interview with Peter Hoffman, Associate Professor of International Affairs, The New School. April 17, 2023.


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Stimson Center | 129


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USA for UN High Commissioner for Refugees. “Ukraine Emergency: Aid, Statistics and News: USA FOR UNHCR.”


Vision of Humanity. “Global Peace Index”

Fund for Peace. State Resilience Index.


The world needs better ways to manage its many, growing problems. Engaging new voices, instruments, networks, knowledge, and structures is the key to coping with today’s and future global challenges, which include, but are not limited to, renewed Great Power tensions, deepening Global North-South divides, virulent nationalism, runaway climate change, and unconstrained artificial intelligence. Against this backdrop, the inaugural Global Governance Innovation Report (GGIR) aims to inform and advance debates on improving global governance, and to spur action to that end, drawing on insights from two new tools: a Global Governance Index and a Global Governance Survey. Encouraging greater ambition in preparations for the September 2024 Summit of the Future in New York and a New Agenda for Peace, the report offers proactive measures to better prevent, and failing that, limit the escalation of deadly conflict; reconsiders disarmament measures to boost conditions for conflict management and resolution; and proposes a next generation humanitarian action architecture to save more lives when conflict prevention and mitigation fail. Central to a strategy for change, GGIR’23 introduces five steps for mobilizing a broad-based, smart coalition of governments and civil society groups to maximize the generational opportunity afforded by next year’s Summit, to better ensure “the future we want and the United Nations we need” for present and future generations.

Figure 6.1: Roadmap to the 2024 Summit of the Future (recommended)

Navy Circle Intergovernmental (and Multi-Stakeholder) Track*

- PGA OCA Thematic Consultations commenced
- Our Common Agenda launched, followed by GA Res.
- SEPT 2021

Light Blue Circle Civil Society-led Track (with UN / Government participation) *

- SEPT 2022
- FEB 2023
- SEPT 2023
- OCT 2024
- SEPT 2026

- Pact for the Future negotiation commences
- Pacts for the Future adopted, multiple instruments
- Monitoring & Tracking Mechanism established

Preparation of the Summit’s “Pact for the Future” Outcome Document, Other Instruments

- Policy Research, e-Consultations, Regional Futures Forums (Mid ’21–’24)
- Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation (MAR 2022)
- Global Policy Dialogue on the Triple Planetary Crisis (JUNE ’22–’24)
- Global Futures Forum convened (JAN 2023)
- Global People’s Assembly convened (MAR ’23 & MAY ’24)
- Global Policy Dialogue on the Future of Africa in GG (SEPT ’23 & ’24)
- People’s Pact for the Future finalized (JAN 2024)
- Global People’s Assembly convened (MAR ’23 & MAY ’24)
- Global Policy Dialogue on the Future of Africa in GG (SEPT ’23 & ’24)
- People’s Pact for the Future finalized (JAN 2024)
- Mobilize support for UN Charter Review Conference (OCT ’24–’26)

* Only select recommended activities listed. Source: Original Figure, Stimson Center.

Innovative Ideas Changing the World

The Stimson Center promotes international security and shared prosperity through applied research and independent analysis, global engagement, and policy innovation.