Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda

1-2 March 2022, Washington, DC

Report on Major Findings and Recommendations
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Even prior to the crisis of recent weeks in Europe, the world was facing a range of serious threats—from exclusionary nationalism to great power competition to growing inequality—that are preventing the international community from working together to solve other complex challenges, such as the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, and the accelerating pace of climate change. But global crises require global solutions, and through his highly anticipated report, Our Common Agenda (OCA), UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ outlined, on 10 September 2021, a new vision for more inclusive, networked, and effective multilateral cooperation.

Against this backdrop, the Stimson Center, Academic Council on the UN System, Plataforma CIPÓ, Leiden University, the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH, the Global Challenges Foundation, the Institute for Economics & Peace, and Club de Madrid convened, from 1-2 March 2022 at the Stimson Center, Georgetown University, and U.S. Institute of Peace, the Global Policy Dialogue (GPD) on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda. Bringing together online and in-person a select, yet diverse group from UN Missions and the Secretariat, think tanks, universities, the private sector, and other civil society organizations, the hybrid GPD sought to: first, offer concrete recommendations for taking forward the UN75 Declaration and the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda, including its call for a 2023 Summit of the Future; second, debate and recommend specific global institutional, policy, legal, normative, and operational innovations that could inform the agenda of the 2023 Summit, and its negotiations—which are expected to kick-off formally in early 2023; third, consider and enhance the Climate Governance Commission interim report proposals; fourth, prepare a “High Ambition Coalition” and global governance renewal action program for the Coalition for the UN We Need, Together First campaign, Global Governance Innovation Network, and Climate Governance Commission; and fifth, initiate a Global Policy Dialogue series–each on specific themes and held around the world–in support of the 2023 Summit.

From the opening plenary session with four UN Permanent Representatives, two high-level forums hosted at the U.S. Institute of Peace and Georgetown University, and a special program featuring remarks from the President of the General Assembly, H.E. Abdulla Shahid, to three discussions on the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, systems thinking, and future of climate governance, respectively, the more than one hundred participants from around the world examined methods and concepts in overcoming complex bottlenecks to the formation of more inclusive, networked, and effective global governance.

Under the four headings below, participants were also organized around “breakthrough groups” that considered intergovernmental and non-state actors’ strengths/weaknesses, putting forward twenty recommendations that both elaborate and extend beyond the OCA ideas for better global governance:

COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract

OCA Proposal: Civil Society Focal Point
OCA Proposal: Financially Underwriting the Social Contract
OCA Proposal: UN2.0: Data and Communications
Beyond OCA: World Citizens’ Initiative
Beyond OCA: UN Parliamentary Assembly

Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons
OCA Proposal: A Repurposed Global Trusteeship (or Stewardship) Council
OCA Proposal: UN Emergency Platform
Beyond OCA: Horizontal Environmental Governance and tackling misinformation via the Future Lab
Beyond OCA: Responsibilities Chain Task Force
Beyond OCA: Climate Risk Atlas

Conflict Prevention and Management and Building Peace
OCA Proposal: Reinvigorate International Peacekeeping
OCA Proposal: Foster a Culture of Peace
OCA Proposal: A New Consensus for Peace and Security through a Renewed Agenda for Peace
Beyond OCA: Investment in Conflict Prevention and Foresight
Beyond OCA: Universal Application of Rights and Values

Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods
OCA Proposal: World Social Summit
OCA Proposal: Beyond GDP
OCA Proposal: Biennial Summit of the UN-G20-IFIs
Beyond OCA Proposal: Revitalizing the WTO and Rules Based Trade System
Beyond OCA Proposal: Rethinking the International Financial Architecture

Immediately following the GPD, on 3 March, leaders from the Coalition for the UN We Need, Together First campaign, Global Governance Innovation Network, and Climate Governance Commission convened a strategy session to advance a shared vision and mobilize political pressure for a common action program for 2022 and beyond on global governance inclusion and renewal (see separate report). In addition, participants shared updates on upcoming GPDs under consideration for Geneva (23 June - on Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, Trade, and Disarmament), Recife (1-2 December - on the Triple Planetary Crisis), Abuja (February 2023 - New Agenda for Peace), and Puerto Vallarta (December 2023 - the Future of Global Economic Governance).

From Russia’s war with Ukraine to the many obstacles faced in forging a broad-based, durable, and green recovery from the pandemic—to name just two fundamental challenges to multilateral cooperation today—the dynamic community now emerging worldwide (initially in small pockets but with the potential to grow into a powerful global movement), to support the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda and ratchet up the ambition and vision of the September 2023 Summit of the Future, becomes an ever-more urgent moral and practical imperative.
2. SPECIAL FORUMS AND LUNCHEON SUMMARIES

2.1 Opening Session: “Our Common Agenda and Road to 2023”
The opening session of the Global Policy Dialogue set the scene, whereby discussants were encouraged to debate and offer concrete recommendations in response to the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the climate crisis, recovery from the pandemic, and other global challenges. During the rich exchange, participants noted the “interconnected nature” of global challenges, threats, and opportunities, and that governance processes must “address multiple priorities simultaneously”, through “increased cooperation and solidarity within a reinvigorated United Nations.” Additionally, there was heavy emphasis placed on the need for diversity and inclusion, particularly involving women, youth and indigenous peoples, across all levels of governance and decision-making processes. Participants further stressed the need to “prioritize human rights” and “empower people and communities” as the basis of a renewed social contract. Noting a “gap between words and deeds”, panelists in the opening session highlighted moving forward by doubling down on “climate mitigation and post-covid recovery” and utilizing Our Common Agenda (OCA) “as a roadmap to achieve a sustainable world.” Discussants agreed that to achieve these aims an enhanced and more efficient General Assembly would be required, which can contribute to “a new era in global peace and security cooperation.”

2.2 Luncheon Discussion: Furthering recommendations across thematic areas of the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism
The session on the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) emphasized the need to engage diverse groups of experts to feed into the work of this independent advisory group of the Secretary-General. The objectives of the luncheon session were three-fold: (1) identifying specific roadblocks that might prevent permeability of information between the HLAB and other stakeholders; (2) encouraging proposals that could be bought up and considered during forthcoming HLAB meetings; and (3) finding out what moments, processes, and platforms are on the agenda of organizations in attendance, over the next eleven months, that could be brought to the attention of HLAB. Further, colleagues outlined a series of expert dialogues underway, informed by introductory framing notes, on issue specific themes that invite experts from academia, think tanks, and across civil society to provide substantive inputs to the HLAB. Specific ideas shared with the HLAB secretariat included a building a de-risking facility to ease access to and scale up the finance in developing countries for renewable energy development and deployment; Paris-Agreement-style framework for oceans; outlining moments to continue the conversation (e.g., at Stockholm +50 in early June); and the importance of including youth voices in a discussion on global public goods and effective multilateralism. Interventions also underscored the need to consider the private sector as an active agent and stakeholder in multilateral cooperation and, specifically, concerning the promotion of global public goods.

2.3 Introduction: Systems Approach to Global Governance & Peacebuilding
The Institute for Economics and Peace, delivered a presentation on systems thinking, highlighting a new approach (dubbed Halo) which can be used to practically map out and unpack the dynamics of local, national, regional, and institutional systems. Decision-makers and program developers can
use Halo’s step-by-step process to better understand the unique elements driving systemic change, and use them to evaluate how well national and multilateral efforts match the underlying social system being studied. This can serve to inform future recommendations, programs, and initiatives. A case study in relation to the Sahel was shared. IEP’s latest work on “Positive Peace, Systems, and the Halo Approach”, including the Sahel case study, can be found here.

2.4 Special Evening Program: “Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda”

This Special Evening Program on, “Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda,” was co-sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Global Policy Dialogue Co-Sponsors, and the Missions of Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Spain to the United Nations, as well as the Embassy of the State of Qatar to the United States. Esteemed speakers during the program’s reception connected the war in Ukraine to efforts to strengthen and modernize the UN system. The Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda has, in effect, become more important than ever, as the international community comes together to halt aggression between states and build a more effective global security system. Panelists during the program’s moderated dialogue emphasized how the Ukraine crisis manifests the need to reinvest in the multilateral system and have youth believe in a future with rules that can protect them. The speakers noted how the proposed 2023 Summit of the Future and 2025 Social Summit must be seen as points of arrival (rather than departure) as the future is happening now. At this moment, “pessimism is not a luxury that we can afford”; instead, a narrative of hope and action are necessary. It was further emphasized that indifference, and a failure to achieve political traction and ownership, by UN Member States are not options and must be overcome in today’s multilateral systems. When looking to the future, it was noted that although there have long been many global governance reform options on the table, few ambitious changes have been undertaken since World War II, reflecting a lack of global political will. How can past international mistakes teach us to reinforce or rebuild structures to deal with the next vital global threat that comes along? At its core, efforts to improve global governance must empower people, creating opportunities and addressing the needs of humanity.

2.5 President of the General Assembly Remarks: Taking Forward the UN75 Vision & Commitments

The Day 2 opening session, which began with a video presentation by the President of the UN General Assembly (PGA), His Excellency Abdulla Shahid, centered around the role of the General Assembly in taking forward the commitments of the Our Common Agenda report, particularly through the PGA’s Thematic Consultations on Our Common Agenda. He noted that the OCA report contains recommendations across four key areas: “solidarity between peoples and future generations, a new social contract based in human rights, social commons management and global public goods.” The President of the General Assembly highlighted how ongoing crises have created an opportunity for “renewed and reinvigorated multilateralism,” including through the United Nations. He described the GA’s High-Level week as the “first transformative step as a follow up to the OCA” report, and emphasized the role of civil society in conducting “responsible advocacy” and “establishing a relationship with intergovernmental organizations.” Emphasizing the OCA as a complement to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, the PGA noted the need to increase his mandate, in order to create lasting synergies with the UN Secretary-General, and highlighted the establishment of civil society focal points in every UN agency as a step forward.
2.6 Luncheon Session: “From COP-26 to Stockholm +50 to the 2023 Summit of the Future: New Directions for Climate Governance”

This special luncheon session, hosted at the Georgetown University Mortara Center for International Studies, focused on the future of climate governance and the finding and recommendations of the interim report, *Governing Our Climate Future*, of the Climate Governance Commission. Panelists discussed a wide variety of topics, including the transnational impact of poorly designed climate adaptation and mitigation measures, the need for a new social contract that addresses the social and economic impacts of green transition, and the Biden administration’s international climate policy. Panelists agreed that the international community should give voice to young people from the Global South who are not only the most vulnerable to climate change, but also often neglected from climate policymaking. They also highlighted the need for a whole-of-system approach to improving global climate governance that would require reforms in multilateral decision-making, the global financial system, the international intellectual property regime, and regional and international institutions.

2.7 Special Forum: 2023 Summit of the Future

This Special Forum included both Global Policy Dialogue Participants and several hundred Georgetown Students. Panelists opened the floor by addressing the role of the UN system in meeting the current challenges posed by the conflict in Ukraine and what these challenges mean for the work of the UN in general, and for the 2023 Summit of the Future in particular. They highlighted the critical juncture that the multilateral system was facing, with statements such as “the Ukraine invasion has shaken a multilateral system that was not in good shape” and that we need “more demographics scaffolding the UN.” However, panelists went on to say that the crisis in Ukraine, as one of many current crises around the world (including other long-lasting global conflicts and the existential climate crisis reflected in the latest IPCC report released 28 February 2022), has only reaffirmed the need for a renewed multilateralism as called for in *Our Common Agenda*. Speakers highlighted the potential that the UN General Assembly has in holding the UN System accountable, noting that frameworks of social cohesion, conflict prevention, human rights conventions, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement are all principally conflict deterrence mechanisms. The importance, therefore, of leveraging the normative strength of the UN system and, specifically, the UNGA, both now and during the Summit of the Future, becomes particularly important.

From the perspective of the UN’s Economic Commissions, the 2023 Summit of the Future was highlighted to be both necessary and essential, with the caveat that “how we prepare and plan for it is key for its impact.” Having vulnerable groups, such as those who have no social protection or are directly affected by climate crises, present at the Summit, reinforces the creation of a “value-based society.” Finally, three youth empowerment recommendations were put forward for the Summit’s agenda: (1) designing the proposed UN Youth Office with an integration mandate, recognising that youth are not one homogenous group; (2) establishing a UN Youth Council; and (3) increasing accessibility for youth to UN initiatives by translating jargon and multiple reports into clear action items to be communicated in the Transforming Education Summit. Moreover, it was emphasized that individual youth engaging in the Summit of the Future process need not be a binary decision of “engage” or “disengaged.” Rather, they would likely participate across a broad spectrum of core activities, supported by organizations such as civil society-coalitions, think tanks, NGOs, and other activities that can facilitate youth entry into UN system policy-making and implementation.
3. DAY 1

3.1 Overview

During the Global Policy Dialogue, participants were divided into four breakthrough groups, each grappling with a specific set of global challenges and offering related concrete proposals, including by elaborating individual Our Common Agenda recommendations. Day 1 focused on the conceptual understanding of a particular global problem-set and the strengths and weaknesses of various actors, including international organizations, in addressing the global problem under examination.

The COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract breakthrough group discussed the social contract and relations between citizens and the state, addressing: (i) the tensions between international institutions and national sovereignty, including over steps to safeguard basic political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights; (ii) shortcomings and politicization of the UN development system (including in health arena); (iii) global citizenship and identity; and (iv) growing distrust between and within states.

The Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons breakthrough group established the boundaries of its problem-set through the lens of the climate emergency, examining: (i) inherent weaknesses in how global environmental decision-making is undertaken, (ii) the urgent need to break down silos in global environmental governance, and (iii) the political landscape in climate financing, including support of green technology diffusion and co-development with the Global South.

The Conflict Prevention and Management and Building Peace breakthrough pinpointed issues from (i) Security Council reform and (ii) tensions within the inherent international security hierarchy to (iii) the deterioration of global peace and security (especially against the backdrop of the Ukraine-Russia crisis), and (iv) the changing nature of violence and armed conflict.

Finally, the Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods breakthrough group framed the scope of their agenda around: (i) broad-based definitions of global public goods and narratives to communicate global collaboration, (ii) socioeconomic challenges facing, in particular, often-times forgotten middle income countries; and (iii) and the need to introduce inclusive approaches for the redesign of international institutions for more just, equitable, and sustainable global economic governance.

Across all groups, Day 1 focused on breaking down and analyzing some of the most significant global governance challenges, essentially embracing two broad categories of issues in laying the groundwork for subsequent proposed global governance innovations on Day 2. The first category dealt with “low hanging fruit” or low resistance points for the introduction of reform narratives to tackle specific global problem-sets. This included where the issue at hand was widely acknowledged and the scope of the problem was more about the “how” than the “what” (on such wide-ranging issues as, for example, climate finance, transcending silos, managing violence and armed conflict, and supporting least developed and middle-income countries). The second category consisted of reframing the problems themselves; this included, for instance, rethinking the UN and wider international development systems, and reconsidering how decision-making is undertaken in global governance. Participants also
underscored how the problems and parameters identified were interconnected and dependent across the four breakthrough groups, thus the solutions would likely need to be interconnected too.

3.2 COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract

A New Social Contract

Participants discussed the significance of a social contract in terms of the citizen and the state. What is the state’s responsibility when it comes to direct and indirect taxes? States have started to outsource traditional (public) responsibilities, and there is often collusion between business and politics. For example, public health vs. private health and public university vs. private university. There is a desire to underfund public health so that the private sector can flourish and shift to beyond boiler-plate nation building. The international community needs to transcend beyond traditional notions of state sovereignty. Participants also placed an emphasis on how global public goods are, in essence, a state’s responsibility. It seems that many countries are headed towards some kind of “philanthro-capitalism.” There is a need to interrogate the notions of global public goods and sovereignty. The notion of “global public sovereignty” should be integrated within institutions that prescribe a broader definition of global sovereignty. Work needs to be done in defining global citizenship. The concept of global public goods can, in fact, reinforce existing paradigms of inequality by encouraging international partnerships that leave local communities destitute—rather, local communities need to build and better leverage their existing capacities.

A Siloed United Nations

The economic dimension of global governance also shines light on a fundamental problem of the UN: “everything is siloed.” There needs to be a more integrated approach to international problem-solving. In terms of politics, economics, and finance, the world’s main organizations are highly disconnected. There was no integrated approach in responding to COVID-19, including the related question of intellectual property rights concerning vaccines. Participants agreed that there is a serious problem with increasing inequality (i.e. moral bankruptcy). Yet, gaps between words and deeds of institutions persist. What is the incentive structure? Should there be greater emphasis placed on maximizing profit for shareholders vs. public goods? With regard to vaccine nationalism, there is a large inequity of vaccine distribution. The vaccine development rate is linked to “strongman leaders” (parallel to the Moon Race). The UN failed to call out poor leadership, and there seems to be a disregard for accountability. The WHO has a lack of independence in its functioning, adding to the global governance trust deficit. Effective partnerships are key to fixing the current situation and moving forward. This will make it easier to address the next pandemic and deliver on current vaccine needs. It would only require 50 billion dollars to vaccinate the world, which is not an impossible task. Participants were struck by the failure of national leadership and UN leadership to take action. COVAX is a shadow of PEPFAR, and it has failed to quickly and adequately ensure vaccine production in the Global South.

Systems of Development

Participants identified a critical issue with the United Nations: it is a static organization with no ingrained system of development (in comparison with the European Union organizations). The UN includes all types of organizations regardless of their intergovernmental design, which thereby causes barriers towards achieving consensus among its diverse members. UN Member States are comfortable with the system, and there is no output legitimacy or system of genuine accountability. Governments are
not ready to embrace and sell transnational governance to their citizens. Discussions thus posed that national governments are one of the main obstacles in the UN’s development. Conversely, European engagement has always hinged on democratic states. Participants suggested that the EU is a great example of leveraging multi-national sovereignty for holding transnational actors accountable and “getting things done.” What is the UN’s purpose? Guidance on global governance can be found by looking at peacebuilding or other sectors. Problematic issues should be called out, and coalitions of organizations should be assembled to work on separate issues in a domain that allows for information exchange and constructive action. In regards to the Human Rights Council, participants noted its slowness in reacting to the Ukraine crisis. We should be careful to ensure that conversations on global public goods are not usurping existing strengths of the UN Human Rights Framework. Participants concluded their discussion on development systems by noting that: “Democracy and human rights operate in tandem; democracy is a human right.”

**Global Identity/Global Citizenship**

Participants underscored how the *Our Common Agenda* report does not challenge the idea of the UN as an exclusive inter-state organization. There should be more balance between citizens worldwide and states. Citizens have a role to play, and while they should have a space of their own in the international system, at present their space is always intermediated through their government. Discussions emphasized that global citizens require an institutional home, for instance a parliament, which should complement the UN’s intergovernmental bodies. In democratic governments, the checks and balances achieved by separation of powers, among other things, are taken for granted; a system like this does not exist in the UN. Participants also agreed that the UN lacks legitimacy regarding legal actions. Health is a human right and a stronger WHO is thereby needed to strengthen access to healthcare. In the long-run, there needs to be a legal dimension to this. Regarding the OCA’s proposed Emergency Platform and new Envoy for Future Generations, accountability mechanisms and operational power both need to be discussed. What mechanisms are currently in place for holding global institutions accountable? Colleagues noted that there exists a globally fragmented response which contributes to ongoing mistrust in the international system.

**Growing Distrust**

Participants acknowledged a growing distrust between Member States and increasingly towards the UN system and Secretariat too. A lack of solidarity, along with vaccine nationalism, are connected with other ongoing governance challenges faced by the United Nations. The proposed new social contract is introduced to address this trust deficit. This is an opportunity for the UN to enforce its own standards and values. Participants agreed that this boils down to the (sometimes poor) relationships of UN Member States and their inability to identify challenges effectively. Most progressive Member States have not invested enough energy in UN reform, and we do not see this changing with the OCA report. The OCA is a product of what the Secretary-General thought was possible at this time. However, it does not provide concrete institutional reform recommendations that could then better prepare the world body to tackle current and over-the-hORIZON global problems.
3.3 Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons

Underscoring the Urgency of the Climate Crisis
Participants unanimously agreed on the fact that the nature of the “climate discussion is urgent”, yet this urgency is not adequately reflected in global governance processes and mechanisms. Highlighting that “obstacles are viewed conceptually”, one participant argued that we are “thinking too small”-we are thinking that we have time, but “the future is now and impacts now will accelerate.” The recently released IPCC report was underscored during the discussion, which claims that the slow pace and small scale of climate adaptation measures are unlikely to address the full extent of challenges faced. For instance, the report expresses “high confidence” that “the impacts of climate change...threaten the achievement of the UN SDGs by 2030.” Participants expressed concern about how the Ukraine crisis may decrease the already insufficient funding for climate mitigation and adaptation, especially in developing countries, and noted the need to “mobilize so as not to lose momentum.”

Reconsidering the Decision-Makers in Global Environmental Governance
Participants noted that “the decision-making process needs to shift”, and that we “must connect super local to the overall bigger picture.” Noting the gaps in current environmental governance architecture such as “fragmentation”, “lack of inclusivity” and its propensity for “bottlenecks”, participants highlighted the “role of local communities”, which “often have knowledge, capacity and solutions, but are excluded from decision-making processes.” Discussants highlighted that a “multi-faceted approach” should be executed, with an “ambitious” framing, which addresses the issue of the “tragedy of commons” as based on state sovereignty, whereby “everyone is waiting for someone else to move.”

Dissolving Siloes in Global Environmental Governance
Keeping in mind the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, participants underscored the need for environmental governance to break away from siloes and to be fully integrated. Discussants underscored the need to “understand and ensure that environmental policies affect not only the climate, but also biodiversity and vice versa.” Furthermore, it was noted that issues such as migration, conflict, and development are interconnected with climate change; therefore, we should engage them in a “fully integrated” way, including by fully employing relevant coordination mechanisms.

Financing for the Climate
Regarding the issue of financing for the climate, a participant cited the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 report which claims that the “climate crisis solution requires 2% of GDP”, in comparison to “15% of GDP” spent as a response to COVID response.” Participants also contended that there is “not much clarity” with regards to “loans, financial pledges” and where “current money is going, and how to make it more transparent.” Participants questioned whose resources are being used, such as the IMF’s, and how “we can better fund people already being affected on the ground.” To that end, the need for a robust system to address “loss and damages” that is more ambitious-and goes beyond the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage-was raised by several participants.

Green Technology
Participants highlighted that “finance is not flowing for developing countries”, and noted the need to “reduce the cost of capital for technologies.” It was emphasized that “unless we close the gap on equitable technology, we are not going to meet our 1.5 degree target.” The discussion aimed to find the “impediments to technology within our policy structure”, noting that the developing world, including
India and Sub-Saharan African amongst others, still lack critical access to basic energy, while the developed countries are transitioning from coal-based energy to solar, wind and green hydrogen. Participants noted the need to “ease access to technology” and emphasized on technology co-development between the from the Global North and South to bridge the technology divide and move towards a more equitable clean and green transition globally.

3.4 Conflict Prevention and Management for Building Peace

Reforming the Security Council
The UNSC is still widely recognized as a legitimate authority on matters of peace and security. However, there were concerns raised over its outdated structure and voting method, which creates blockage and prevents it from addressing new security threats. The invasion of a sovereign state by a P5 member will require the Security Council to re-examine its representativeness and the frameworks in place for holding Member States accountable for their actions. In this regard, participants considered the potential role of the General Assembly in increasing accountability of the Security Council.

Hierarchy of International Security
A hierarchy exists in our conception of international security, where conflicts are normalized in certain regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The unprecedented international solidarity for Ukraine is prompted, in part, because conflict hasn’t been normalized in Europe; meanwhile, little attention has been paid to ongoing conflicts in Yemen or Mali. Participants wondered if this is linked to racial hierarchy and North-South inequality.

Deterioration in Global Peace and Security
We are witnessing a spike of conflict since 2014. The fastest rising type of conflict is internationalized civil war in which regional actors send their own militaries to intervene—signaling a breakdown in respect for national sovereignty. Discussions noted that the number of violent demonstrations have also doubled during this time, signaling strong levels of political and socio-economic instability across all regions. The number of displaced people is also increasing, doubling in rate over the past decade. Discussions further emphasized that the crisis in Ukraine is expected to bring unprecedented levels of displacement and will have a ripple effect in global institutions supporting peace and security.

The Underlying Causes behind Armed Conflict
Discussions emphasized that we need to look into underlying causes behind conflicts, such as food and water security, small arms proliferation, displacement, and local grievances against the governing authority. This will help us move beyond “bandage solutions” to sustainable models of peace and security. Studying these dynamics will allow us to understand their correlations with conflict risks and enable us to prevent conflict occurrence in advance. However, one major challenge identified by the group was that this will require investment in conflict foresight and prediction capabilities.

Conception of Violence & Armed Conflict
Colleagues noted the need to understand that violence is fungible and can shift forms. High-level definitions of armed conflict are state-centric and do not always align with the risks and reality of conflict
on the ground. For example, the drug war in Mexico is causing devastation to the local population, but it is often overlooked outside the country because it doesn’t align with our typical conception of armed conflict. In particular, discussions realized the need to move away from the counterterrorism-focus framing of conflict over the past two decades that has led to many harmful outcomes.

3.5 Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods

Broad-based Definitions
The discussion, in beginning with an attempt to define the scope of the problem, quickly realized that definitions themselves were part and parcel of the puzzle at hand. The group then focused on two main themes: first, the definition of global public goods themselves, and thus the scope and limitations of a collaborative economic model; and second, the effectiveness of language used to communicate such models to different stakeholders, whether nationally, regionally, or globally. On defining global public goods, it was noted that most things, in theory, could be modeled as a global public good. It was, therefore, important to focus on the globally recognised and existing definitions. This led to a question of whether to pick low-hanging fruit across the board and recommend that the Summit of the Future focus on “early wins” to make a case for global collaboration, or instead whether 2-3 global long-term priorities should be chosen as the Summit’s central focus. Whilst a final verdict was not reached by the group, as the discussion was framed as part of an ongoing discussion, this dilemma did lead to a further exploration on entry points for international policy-making (see below). Second, on the language and narrative surrounding the broad-based discussion on forging a collaborative economy worldwide, the need to strike a balanced and inclusive, yet still concrete approach, became apparent. Participants used the example of the term “solidarity” to point out that whilst this term meant a lot to many countries in the world, especially in the Global South—the concrete sense of accountability it generated for action was unclear. One thus needed to set out what solidarity actually meant in an action-oriented manner and the resultant duty such a commitment holds. In this sense, when calling for collaborative economic reform, one needed to establish an action-oriented narrative that would allow for better accountability toward achieving agreed goals.

Entry Points For Reform
Given the breadth and depth of the group’s discussion on collaborative economy and global public goods, participants discussed several entry points for reform of the global economic and financial architecture. Four potential global gateways were highlighted: (1) Gender Gaps: building more inclusive and participatory mechanisms for international economic access and collaboration; (2) Climate Challenges: countries that rely on the primary and secondary sector economic activity face specifically tumultuous economic recovery paths from the pandemic as a result of the evermore severe climate crisis; (3) Global Digital Divide: an increasingly digitized economic landscape leaves behind those who lack access to digital services, both at the individual level but also at the level of nations. Part of enabling the collaborative economy, therefore, needs to come from technology and knowledge sharing—this was especially reflected in discussions on “Beyond GDP” (see section 4.5 below) and “WTO reform” (see section 4.5 below); and (4) New Social Contract: specifically, the importance of social protection in leveraging the economic capacity of vulnerable populations and youth.

Middle Income Countries
In defining the parameters of the problem, participants noted that the current multilateral development and financial architecture and narratives surrounding reform and development often let middle income
countries slip through the cracks. These countries suffer from a lack of access to funding, but importantly, a lack of access to opportunities to increase their capabilities in the economic system. Thus, participants posed that whether understood in economic terms (as human capabilities based economics of development), or by the goals of the *Our Common Agenda* report, there exists a fundamental development gap and set of corresponding challenges facing middle income countries. This has been further worsened by the effects of the pandemic, where middle income countries have been some of the hardest hit, which has, in turn, had effects on other global policy issues, such as the closely related issue of vaccine equity.

### Inclusive Approaches

It was noted that the review of international development and financial architecture provided an important, and much-needed, opportunity to create a more inclusive global governance system. At the same time, some participants noted that it may be unrealistic, given the imminent priority for many governments of national recovery from the pandemic, to call for major structural changes in the international system. Instead, existing institutions needed to be re-evaluated and made more inclusive vis-a-vis the Global South and non-state actors, such as communities and groups that have traditionally been left behind in economic decision making. The group debated how this posed both an opportunity and a challenge, highlighting again the fine balance between being inclusive and effective, but still keeping to achieving clear, concrete, action-oriented policy goals—noting this was not a trade-off but rather an intersection that needed to be attained.

### The Role of the United Nations

Having noted the scope of the problems and potential challenges and opportunities, as well as some of the actors (both state-based and non-state) at play, the breakthrough group went on to consider the role of the United Nations as it works to promote greater economic collaboration and the strengthening of Global Public Goods. With some caution and candor, it was noted that the role of the UN was not to be a “central manager” of global public goods themselves. Often, it was no longer even able to lead the reforms called for from within the UN. Instead, the role of the UN was seen as three-tiered. *First*, it was a *Norm-Setter and Hoster*: in this sense, be it metrics of economic success, conventions on best practices in global economics, or other normative standards, it hosted the norms collectively agreed upon, and thus, it provided a mechanism of accountability both between Member States and between Member States and their citizens and citizen groups. *Second*, it serves as a *Gap Identifier*: whilst many agendas are set by Member States, the UN has the capacity to, and traditionally has, brought agenda items to the table that have been left on the peripheries of international policy-making. In this sense, it has the ability to increase permeability and expansion of the global policy agenda, and this would be the case too for the 2023 Summit of the Future and 2025 World Social Summit. *Third and finally*, it acts as a *Global Knowledge Hub*: with seventy-six years of institutional knowledge, and as a system made up of thousands of practitioners with an immersible wealth of collective intelligence, the UN system acts as both a source knowledge for Member States, government, the private sector and other stakeholders, but also as a center for knowledge, in its partnerships with think tanks, localized units, and centers of knowledge capital. Thus, in approaching the proposed summits in 2023 and 2025, and in reorienting the UN to be more suitable for taking forward *Our Common Agenda*, discussants posed that this more clearly and realistically understood, but impactful, operational capacity of the UN must be at the forefront of those who engage with the UN and within the United Nations itself.
4. DAY 2

4.1 Overview

On Day 2, the breakthrough groups proceeded to outline global governance innovations to address the issues scoped out on Day 1. This included reform innovations in the form of proposed institutional, legal, policy, normative, and operational change, reflected in both the elaboration (within each individual breakthrough group) of two-or-three Our Common Agenda proposals and two-or-three carefully articulated proposals beyond the OCA.

The COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract breakthrough group considered the urgent need for a civil society focal point within the highest echelon of the United Nations Secretariat, financially bolstering the Secretary-General’s New Social Contract, expanding UN data, analytical, and communications capabilities (UN 2.0), a World Citizens’ Initiative, and a UN Parliamentary Assembly. The group on Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons discussed ways to repurpose the UN Trusteeship Council, create a new UN Emergency Platform, promote horizontal environmental governance, introduce a climate risk atlas and establish a Responsibilities Chain Task Force to help achieve zero deforestation and other social-environmental violations in commodity chains.

The Conflict Prevention and Management and Building Peace breakthrough group explored proposals to reinvigorate international peacekeeping, foster a culture of peace, establish a new consensus for peace and security through a renewed Agenda for Peace, invest in conflict prevention and foresight, and apply universally rights and values to conflict management. The Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods group fleshed out recommendations on the case for a World Social Summit in 2025, moving beyond GDP as the chief metric for national progress, a G20+ Biennial Summit for major global economic governance actors, revitalizing the World Trade Organization and international rules for trade, and rethinking the international financial architecture.

Across all breakthrough groups, the recommendations put forward—and analysis underpinning them—were closely intertwined. For example, a UN Parliamentary Assembly would seek to increase accountability of international decision-makers, thereby improving conditions worldwide for fostering a culture of peace. Equally important, metrics of socioeconomic prosperity beyond GDP may effectively include environmental stability as a dimension of national prosperity through climate accounting, thus contributing to horizontal environmental governance. Indeed, Global Policy Dialogue participants coming together in the closing plenary session identified accelerators, enabling intersectional entry points for advancing two or more of the GPD’s recommendations through a single initiative for more inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism. Moreover, several overarching themes emerged across the ideas examined in the four groups, such as the need: (i) to include women and young people in decision-making, (ii) to improve communication of knowledge across and within global institutions, and (iii) to inject a sense of pragmatism into global governance innovation discussions by reflecting the often-times limited, yet critically important role the United Nations can play in rejuvenating multilateralism.
4.2 COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract

OCA Proposal: Civil Society Focal Point

Participants endorsed a system-wide civil society focal point, serving as a high-level envoy for civil society. The mission of the envoy would have to be clearly defined. Civil society were the first responders in many instances regarding COVID-19, helping, in particular, marginalized communities. The proposed high-level civil society focal point is essential as there are currently many asymmetries in the UN system, making the case for a central harmonizing point. Discussants agreed that a single-level entry point is misleading, as this proposal would not act as a bottleneck to progress. Rather, it aims to ensure that all UN bodies act consistently and drive the UN’s outreach to civil society, especially smaller, locally-led civil society groups. Colleagues noted that there are currently no best practices for civil society participation in the UN system, and therefore, the proposed high-level envoy can examine and implement a body of best practices. As one participant remarked: “It is now time for a guardian for civil society space at the UN.”

OCA Proposal: Financially Underwriting the Social Contract

Discussants advocated financially underwriting the social contract, including universal healthcare and human rights access through tax reform (similar to the taxation of multinational corporations). This proposal should be leveraged to promote national, regional, and global public goods. Participants agreed on the need to reform international taxation systems. Institutional tweaks will not be possible without further funding. This would also strengthen human rights and future pandemic response by earmarking funding for universal healthcare. However, participants felt that the Our Common Agenda report is not actually providing specifics; rather, it is “an appeal to member states” or “a manifesto.” Participants recommended a tax on multinational corporations that could advance this proposal.

OCA Proposal: UN2.0: Data and Communications

Participants emphasized the need for a UN 2.0 with a quintet of capabilities regarding data analytics and strategic foresight. The UN should help to ensure the right to credible information, and more specifically, authoritative sources of information. Professional and safe mechanisms are needed to collect citizen generated data. Best practices on data collection should be encouraged, for example, on monitoring and impact mainstreaming. The UN bodies produce a lot of data, and it is imperative to decrease the digital divide worldwide so that people everywhere can access and be empowered with this knowledge and information. Discussants also agreed that access to data should be considered more broadly as a human right (than as an economic right that requires money to participate), and public funds for this purpose could be generated through tax reform.

Beyond OCA: World Citizens’ Initiative

Discussants proposed a UN World Citizens’ Initiative (UNWCI), which revolves around the idea that if a certain number of global citizens endorses a citizen-launched initiative, UN bodies such as the General Assembly or the Security Council would have to put the item on their agenda and give representatives of the initiative the floor to make their case. In terms of the General Assembly, this could be done during the annual general debate, when heads of state and government are present. A UNWCI will allow global citizens to have more impact in an increasingly complex and integrated world that requires greater global cooperation between states and citizens. It will help create a citizen-based global political sphere.
Participants voiced support for the champion of this proposal to be the European Union, given its relevant experience with a similar kind of citizen’s initiative in Europe.

Beyond OCA: UN Parliamentary Assembly
Discussants agreed on the need for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) which could, for the first time, give popularly elected representatives a formal role in global affairs. As a new UN body, the proposed assembly will directly represent the world’s citizens and not governments. Initially, states could choose whether their UNPA members would come from national parliaments, reflecting their political spectrum and gender equality, or whether they would be directly elected. Eventually, the goal is to have all members directly elected. In short, the UN should evolve from what many believe to be a generally ineffectual “talk-shop” into a viable democratic and legislative body. In this age of globalization, more and more issues have a global dimension that require global cooperation. At the UN and other international fora, governments come together to negotiate and decide on policies that affect us all.

4.3 Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons

OCA Proposal: A Repurposed Global Trusteeship (or Stewardship) Council
Participants noted the historical colonial legacy of the UN Trusteeship Council, but then considered ideas of repurposing it in a way that incorporates new, forward-looking ideas, such as those associated with a proposed Global Environment Agency or a “Global Resilience Council,” to oversee and better manage global threats, such as climate change and pandemics. It was noted that the aim could be to create an apex “stewardship body,” connected to the OCA’s proposed “Declaration on Future Generations.” Participants also highlighted the need for a potential legal paradigm shift in “how we view the global commons” and how to “define the object of climate governance” (e.g., as an intangible Common Heritage of Humankind, to ensure more effective international governance).

OCA Proposal: UN Emergency Platform
Noting the challenge of bureaucracy and inefficiency at the intergovernmental level, participants highlighted the need for an emergency platform with a quick reaction time to current and future climate issues, in comparison to the UN’s slow pace at present. As such, participants discussed officially declaring a “planetary climate emergency,” noting that “right now, there is no global climate emergency status.” The participants recommended the following ways in which the platform could take effect:

1. National-level implementation of a climate risk atlas (see below) that looks at hyper-local climatic impacts at the district, county or provincial levels is critically required for all countries, in order to provide up-to-date scientific information and dynamic risk assessment that aids policy development and effective decision-making at the national and sub-national level.

2. Circuit breakers that alert and ignite an integrated emergency response framework as soon as a certain risk threshold is crossed. Accordingly, participants noted that “when planetary fires are happening, we need an automatic stabilizer, which provides automatic payout information”.

3. Ease in financial payout: Participants highlighted the crucial need to create an insurance cushion that automatically releases payment and emergency financing to countries during emergencies, beyond climate. This would also address, avoid and reduce the delays from bureaucracy as noted during the COVID-19 pandemic and delays associates with negotiating for financial payouts.
Beyond OCA Proposal: Horizontal Environmental Governance and tackling misinformation via the Future Lab

Participants highlighted that global environmental governance should reliably ensure full respect for “planetary boundaries and stewardship”, and act as a “cross-cutting institution that is able to focus on climate targets.” At the same time, discussants highlighted moving away from a top-down approach to governance, whereby climate is “mainstreamed into the national agenda of countries”, towards “building capacities within systematic government ministries” through a “horizontal approach.” As such, all national ministries could “provide risk reports of five years”, to conduct monitoring and evaluation and provide scientific-based environmental policies. This is where the Future Lab plays a critical role. Participants noted that the Special Envoy for Future Generations needs to go beyond climate and include planetary boundaries. Currently, there is a lack an updated and reliable data and widespread misinformation, hence the Future Lab can be the platform that collates, up-to-date global data to make responsible changes and address risks and violations, including, social, financial environmental etc. The data portal by the Future Lab could assist in building a collective capacity across countries.

Beyond OCA: Responsibilities Chain Task Force

Discussants supported the new idea of establishing a Responsibilities Chain Task Force, which “includes value chains and commodity chains,” in an effort to shift the narrative of global governance from nations to supply chains and coalesce the global public, the private sector, governments, and civil society in a coordinated effort around a combined global effort to protect our planet. With the intention of ending deforestation and other violations in supply chains, as well as “ensuring common standards of accountability across the private sector and financial institutions” and “making connections across industry, finance and climate governance,” the proposed multistakeholder task force could help tackle the triple planetary crisis, “increase the impact and feasibility of strong climate governance mechanisms” and emphasize on responsible production by addressing the entire value chain of producers, consumers (intermediary and final), importers and exporters. Finally, the participants also highlighted that the Responsibilities Chain Task Force will function on the framework of impact, feasibility and necessity, all of which requires up-to-date, reliable global data on supply chains that could be provided by the Future Lab.

Beyond OCA: Climate Risk Atlas

Highlighting the absence of “new and updated climate risk data,” participants noted that this leads to considerable challenges in environmental governance. As such, a climate risk atlas, building on a similar kind of instrument currently maintained by the G20, is required for all countries, in order to provide up-to-date scientific information that aids policy development and decision-making. Relatedly, participants noted that, for example, “when planetary fires [or other extreme weather events] are happening, we need an automatic stabilizer, which provides automatic payouts,” as a coordinated insurance mechanism.

4.4 Conflict Prevention and Management for Building Peace

OCA Proposal: Reinvigorate International Peacekeeping

Participants called for an urgent reinvigoration of peacekeeping, the UN’s most effective tool for conflict resolution and the alleviation of immediate human suffering from violent conflict. Unfortunately, the
OCA does not sufficiently address peacekeeping: it sidesteps the original Agenda for Peace, and its proposals on peacekeeping and peacebuilding are “not particularly ambitious.” It also does not address the troublesome reframing of counterinsurgency and terrorism by some actors using peacekeeping language (in, for example the Sahel and Somalia). To make peacekeeping more effective, we need a more innovative scheme, particularly on how to end internationalized civil wars—currently the fastest growing type of conflict.

**OCA Proposal: Foster a Culture of Peace**

Participants identified the need to create a culture of peace that moves away from addressing the impact of violence and instead focuses on the attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and sustain peace. The UN has immense power in setting norms and consensus. Uniting this strength, we should reflect on the way we look at violence and review how language, culture, values, and patriarchy shapes conceptions of violence. One prime example is how interventions and negotiations are still state and perpetrator centric. Fostering a culture of peace includes putting victims and others impacted by conflict at the center of the conversation. The OCA’s call for addressing all forms of violence provides a strong foundation. To foster this new culture of peace, we need to “firmly put justice, human rights, local actors, women, and youth at the center of conflict resolution.” Beyond traditional UN mechanisms, such as the UN Security Council, peacekeeping operations, and the UN General Assembly, this new culture of peace must include peace education efforts involving civil society, women, and youth.

**OCA Proposal: A New Consensus for Peace and Security through a Renewed Agenda for Peace**

A new consensus on peace and security is urgently needed. Unlike other global issue areas, such as climate or development, addressing conflict proves to be highly controversial in the international system. Participants found that OCA proposals on peace and security are less innovative than those in other areas; dynamics that contribute to conflicts—such as arms dealing, water and food insecurity, and illicit financing—are not acknowledged; and we don’t have a concrete plan that addresses new types of violence linked to climate and cyber. We must find a common framework to understand conflict through a **Renewed Agenda for Peace**. The invasion of Ukraine by a P5 member creates even more urgency for pioneering this new framework and highlights the importance of this task.

**Beyond OCA: Investment in Conflict Prevention and Foresight**

There is an urgent need to invest more in conflict prevention and to expand the conflict prevention window. While an UN-led, short-term crisis monitoring window may still be required, there is increasingly less of an excuse not to foresee emerging crises, and, in doing so, the international community can help to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict five or event ten years into the future. There are already a number of indicator-based mechanisms that are being effectively used to predict deteriorations in peace over similar periods of time (IEP’s [data-driven work on Positive Peace](https://dataforpeace.org/) to name just one). Colleagues discussed that the adoption of these and other tools will ensure the UN and UN Member States can more effectively use conflict prevention funds and tools and better leverage investments in the SDGs for peacebuilding and conflict prevention purposes.
Beyond OCA: Universal Application of Rights and Values

Participants posed that although the UN is supposed to be the champion of universal rights and values, “its actions are often far from universal”, citing for example that the hierarchy within the international system tends to normalize conflicts in some regions and limits their recognition; “and some Western countries want to hold other actors accountable for acts of war and human rights abuses, but not their own actions ...” To secure the UN’s legitimacy as a global norm-setter, we must make sure of the universal application of these norms, particularly in the realm of peace and security.

4.5 Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods

OCA Proposal: World Social Summit

In fleshing out the World Social Summit proposal put forward by the OCA, the breakthrough group addressed two specific questions. First, beyond renewing the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration, what are the specific objectives that the World Social Summit hopes to achieve? Second, what are the entry points into the Summit proposed specific agenda items, and what needs to be kept in mind at the early design stage of the World Social Summit in order to achieve successful outcomes? First, on the objectives and added value of the Social Summit, participants framed it as a “booster shot” for the 2030 Agenda given that, by then, we will have five years left towards the agenda’s implementation. This led to suggestions that the World Social Summit could be framed around the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Second, on the question of entry points and design, participants posed that multilateral development banks could play an important role in realizing the proposals advanced during the World Social Summit, and thus, diverse stakeholder buy-in would be an important first step in the preparatory process. At the same time, whilst the series of Summits proposed in the Our Common Agenda report are said to be Member States driven processes, it is important that agents of change from civil society and the private sector are involved in the design and follow-on stages.

OCA Proposal: Beyond GDP

The importance of Our Common Agenda’s “Beyond GDP (or GDP+)” proposal for increasing the capabilities of nations and their citizens to access and better engage the global economic system traversed all four sessions of the Collaborative Economy breakthrough group. Participants outlined that many countries do currently have alternative measurements of economic prosperity, but the issue is often the level of international recognition of these metrics. The UN, then, as a “norm setter and hoster,” should begin taking the first steps in changing its use of economic indicators in internal reports and documents (beyond simply the pioneering work of UNDP’s Human Development Reports). Moreover, it was noted that whilst these different measurements of economic prosperity currently exist in parallel, the ultimate sentiment of the OCA report is to arrive at a single measure that captures multiple dimensions of economic prosperity, to be used as the new conventional tool for measurement (replacing GDP and per capita income as chief metrics of a nation’s progress). Participants went on to say that this needs to be further communicated to Member States, and not just be a change undertaken internally within the UN system. As such, the action on this recommendation would be in supporting Member States in the creation or new indices, whilst working to establish a single index for economic prosperity (comparable to the use of GDP and per capita income today) that is synonymous with sustainable development.
OCA Proposal: Biennial Summit of the UN-G20-IFIs

Convening a Biennial Summit, which brings together ECOSOC, the G20, and the Secretary-General and heads of the International Financial Institutions, was considered with a high-level of pragmatism and ambition. Participants first discussed the value-add of such a periodic convening. They concluded that it would serve as an important point in time to stock take, measure, and trace the progress of international economic policymaking through the global economic architecture as the world builds back from the pandemic. Therefore, such a Biennial Summit could run in parallel, and even compliment, existing economic forums that serve to build action-oriented policies. It was noted, however, that in convening such a diversity of stakeholders, especially the heads of the IFIs, one may find several diverse economic languages talking straight past each other. It was thus important to participants that a baseline be established on which the Biennial Summit’s convenings could be grounded and progress measured (and accounted for). Whether this would be the 5Ps (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships), the 17 SDGs, the 12 themes of the UN75 Political Declaration, or another framework is a subject for ongoing debate.

Beyond OCA Proposal: Revitalizing the WTO and Rules Based Trade System

Participants noted that a functioning dispute settlement mechanism provides an important check against abuse of trade power, especially in support of low- and middle-income economies. However, it was proposed that the WTO requires revitalization across at least two key dimensions. First, more inclusive mechanisms for decision-making. Second, more frameworks for accountability in trade. A major concern is whether international trade will play a pivotal role in building back from the pandemic, given that trade has been a source of sustained economic prosperity for many countries. Yet, for trade to be broad-based and benefit all countries, the international trading system’s limited mechanisms for accountability must be addressed. Participants thus posed, for example, encouraging in the near-term greater regional trade as a potential intersectional solution, to both tackle issues such as the climate crisis but also increase accountability amongst near-by trading partners.

Beyond OCA Proposal: Rethinking the International Financial Architecture

It was noted that in order to enable access to international finance, expansion of economic activity and sustainable growth for low- and middle-income countries, urgent reform of the international financial architecture is needed urgently. Especially at this crucial juncture of economic recovery from the pandemic, asymmetric access to finance worldwide, as well as hurdles to prosperity such as illicit financial flows, could cement global inequalities for years to come. This would also have adverse effects on the new social contract which the OCA proposed to renew. Participants further discussed how major structural changes to the international financial architecture may no longer be on the table, given the unforeseen economic strain caused by the pandemic. At the same, some expressed hope that even the small window that the pandemic and its major socioeconomic knock-on effects provides a brief window of opportunity to overhaul and amend the international financial system. In this regard, ideas such as restructuring credit rankings, climate accounting, and renewing how multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund operate each posed promising direction for this timely conversation.

In addition to the four breakthrough groups, Georgetown Student volunteers presented their event synthesis and recommendations during the closing plenary session on Day 2. For their full contribution, which provides a concise overview of the two-day GPD, please see Annex I below.
5. Conclusion and Next Steps

Following the Global Policy Dialogue, leaders across civil society, including from the Coalition for the UN We Need, the Together First campaign, the Global Governance Innovation Network, and the Climate Governance Commission, came together on 3 March. The objective of this half-day strategy session was for these civil society-led efforts to come together to chart a “Countdown to 2023” complementary action program on issues of global governance renewal, inclusion, and strengthening, including by mobilizing pressure and feeding bold, carefully researched proposals into the preparations of the proposed Summit of the Future in 2023 and World Social Summit in 2025.

This session further built on the Countdown to 2023 Engagement Toolkit, as well as the GGI-GPD E-consultation that took place from 17 January - 13 February 2022 and fed into the GPD.

The Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda, was convened as the start of what the organizers hope will be an ongoing, ambitious, and paradigm shifting conversation between a growing “High Ambition Coalition” community of diverse stakeholders counting down to 2023.

Moving forward, the following additional Global Policy Dialogues are proposed:

- 1-2 December in Recife on the Triple Planetary Crisis.
- February 2023 in Abuja on a New Agenda for Peace.

Annexes:

I. Georgetown Students’ Contribution

By Mahek Ahmad, Georgetown University

Hello everyone. My name is Mahek Ahmad, and I am a senior at Georgetown University studying Government, Arabic, and Women and Gender Studies. I, along with Neval Mulaomerovic, Andrew Park, and Aryaman Sharma, have had the pleasure and honor of serving as student volunteers for the Global Policy Dialogue for the past two days. I would like to begin by extending sincere thanks to all of you, for allowing us to sit in the rooms where decisions about the future of our generation are being made, graciously encouraging us to contribute, and smiling supportively even when our ideas were not necessarily the ones you expected. As the Head Delegate for Georgetown’s Model United Nations team, I have spent quite a bit of my time role-playing what you all have done here this weekend and am sure other volunteers have done the same. I am elated at the fact that we have the opportunity to speak at an event that turns all of that practice into reality. Looks like all those conferences are finally paying off!

Youth engagement took a larger portion of the conversation this week than any of us expected. I speak for all of us when I say we were pleasantly surprised at your commitment to increasing meaningful and representative engagement from young people around the world. As one of the panelists stated
yesterday, it is important for young people to partake in decisions pertaining to their future, but it is also important that they have a planet to exist on. Opportunities like the one given to myself and the other Georgetown volunteers are a first step - engaging students who are learning about many of the same issues you are discussing in the Our Common Agenda and putting in them the trust to offer solutions, even if they are not the ones you would have thought of yourselves.

Incorporating global governance into curriculums and encouraging participation across the board will not only increase interest in the UN but reinforce the legitimacy of and trust in international institutions that is crucial to their success and existence. The recent events in Ukraine and consistent exposure to the shift in the nature of peacekeeping from political and societal change to military operations have been jarring to our generation. Now, in addition to maintaining our planet, all of you must also consider how to re-instill faith in institutions, both international and otherwise, into today’s youth. As we have had the opportunity to listen to all of you diagnose these issues, critique the existing system, and create innovative solutions, we would like to take a moment to offer some of our own.

The COVID and Human Rights breakthrough group engaged in a sweeping discussion with several recommendations emerging. Of those, the development of a World Citizens’ Initiative stands out as a pragmatic mechanism for expanding the UN’s state-centric model to a more integrated, people-centered institution. An essential mechanism for bottom-up advocacy, a World Citizens’ Initiative would actualize and formalize the OCA’s call for community-based listening exercises, while ensuring that the UN’s agenda represents citizen concerns and priorities.

In the area of Climate Action, an essential climate initiative that the group narrowed down on was planetary stewardship - guiding the international community’s attention away from pure nation-state development in the realm of climate and focusing more on the macro, planetary issues that are deemed detrimental. As a global community, climate change not only affects the status-quo in a pure economic form, but rather also concerns impending social and political developments. The OCA’s development is contingent on mainstream data - climate data - and its legitimate use in bringing about accountability within the IPCC. The group also highlighted the importance of a stewardship council that safeguards and facilitates the appropriate application of common goods in designated areas. Global governance relies on the next generation to establish climate task forces that stabilize both moderate and extreme climate change related side effects: for example, it is imperative that the general assembly takes a strong stance in establishing a responsibilities chain task force. In accordance with sovereignty and natural rights, it is important that member-states take both caution and initiative in establishing either a value chain governance model or enhance the social awareness of climate change to local communities within states. Whatever the initiative entails, climate change should not be more than a simple label.

The solution provided by the Collaborative Economy group that we found most impactful is reform of the International Financial Architecture. The center of the conversation is the 5 Ps: “People, Planet, Peace, Prosperity, and Partnerships”, and the solutions in this plan will lead to more focused summits that actually discuss solutions instead of waving a state’s flag, introduce more financial equity among middle-income countries to promote inclusive multilateralism and limit inequalities in gender and climate, and encourage rationalism and regionalism in expanding the world trade system. These
decisions and solutions will be cognizant of the environmentalism we are seeing through climate change and will prioritize investments into the future that create a new social contract.

And finally, in the area of Conflict Prevention and Management for Building Peace, the breakthrough group with which I had the pleasure of spending my last two days, we believe the concept of accountability within the international system is key to conflict prevention. As we discussed the possibility of expanding the Security Council, we realized that the unfortunate reality of the global hierarchy is that an expansion is less likely to result in representative decisions and more likely to result in an increase in states exempting themselves from international obligations. The only feasible answer then becomes accountability - what can the UN do to ensure countries do not have an incentive to break international laws? We would argue that the answer lies within regional bodies - use these existing systems that have historically garnered more trust from citizens to impose consequences that would otherwise be impossible for the UN. There needs to be a balance between efficacy and representation, and by many measures, the answer lies in accountability.

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to share our reflections and ideas.
II. Global Policy Dialogue Agenda

Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda

28 February at the Beacon Hotel & Ala Restaurant

Before 6:00 pm: Check-in at Beacon Hotel

- Participant packet, COVID-19 test kit, and N-95 mask will be available upon check-in.

6:00 pm: Guests escorted to Ala Restaurant in groups (five-minute walk) for a Welcome Reception (6-7:00 pm) and Dinner (7-8:30 pm)

- 6:00 pm (Group 1 departs from the Beacon Hotel lobby)
- 6:30 pm (Group 2 departs from the Beacon Hotel lobby)
- 6:50 pm (Group 3 departs from the Beacon Hotel lobby)

7:00 pm Welcome Reception and Dinner at nearby Ala Restaurant (1320 19th St NW, Washington, DC 20036)

Day I: 1 March at the Stimson Center

Stimson Center, 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, 8th Floor, Washington, DC 20036

7:30 am: Breakfast at the Beacon Hotel

8:30 am: First group escorted to the Stimson Center

8:40 am: Second and final group escorted to the Stimson Center

8:45 am: Check-in at the Stimson Center (tea/coffee will be served)

9:00 am: Opening Session: “Our Common Agenda & the Road to 2023”

- Lead-off remarks:
  - H.E. Amb. (Prof.) Tijjani Muhammad-Bande (Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN)
  - H.E. Danilo Türk (President of the Club de Madrid and Former President of Slovenia)
  - H.E. Amb. Alya Al-Thani (Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar to the UN)
  - H.E. Amb. Anna-Karin Eneström (Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN)
  - H.E. Amb. Cho Hyun (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN)
  - H.E. Amb. Agustin Santos Maraver (Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN)
Moderator: Dr. Richard Ponzio (Director, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program, Stimson Center)

10:30 am: Group Photo (for virtual/in-person participants) and Brief Tea/Coffee Break

10:45 am: Breakthrough Groups Session 1: Building consensus around a shared understanding of a particular global problem-set


12:15 pm: Hot Lunch

12:45 pm: Special Luncheon Discussion on furthering recommendations across thematic areas of the High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods

  - Speakers:
    - Dr. David Passarelli (Executive Director, Centre for Policy Research, UN University)
    - Dr. Adam Day (Director of Programmes, Centre for Policy Research, UN University and Co-Lead in supporting the UN High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods)

  - Lead Discussants:
    - Nandini Harihar (Research Analyst, Council on Energy, Environment, and Water)
    - Anja Olin-Pape (Head of UN Strategy at the Global Challenges Foundation)
    - Nudhara Yusuf (Global Governance Innovation Network Facilitator and Coalition for the UN We Need Global Youth Coordinator)

  - Moderator: Jens Orback (Executive-Director, Global Challenges Foundation)

1:45 pm: Short Break and Proceed to Afternoon Breakthrough Sessions

2:00 pm: Breakthrough Groups Session 2: Analyzing and critiquing the status-quo: Strengths and weaknesses of current global governance responses to a particular global problem-set


3:30 pm: Brief Tea/Coffee break

3:50 pm: Introduction on a Systems Approach to Global Governance & Peacebuilding

  - Speaker: Steve Killelea (Founder and Executive Chairman, Institute of Economics & Peace and founder of the technology company Integrated Research Ltd)

  - Moderator: Michael Collins (Executive Director Americas, Institute for Economics and Peace)

4:10 pm: Plenary Session 1
This session will feature 3-4 minutes overviews per breakthrough group on the shared understanding and analysis/critique of the status-quo global governance response to a particular global problem-set; after a group’s members have added any additional points, we will welcome 15-20 min. discussion with the full plenary, before proceeding to the next breakthrough group.

- **Co-Moderators:** Dr. Adriana Abdenur (Executive-Director and Co-Founder, Plataforma CIPO), Noemi Becerra (Program Officer, Club de Madrid), and Michael Collins (Executive Director Americas, Institute for Economics and Peace)

**5:20 pm:** Conclude and take shuttle bus to Reception and Dinner at United States Institute of Peace (2301 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20037)

**6:00 pm:** Evening Reception and Dinner at United States Institute of Peace (co-sponsored with the Missions of the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Nigeria to the United Nations, as well as the Embassy of the State of Qatar to the United States)

**6:30 pm:** Reception Opening Remarks

- Lise Grande (President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace)
- H.E. Amb. (Prof.) Tijjani Muhammad-Bande (President of the 74th Session of the General Assembly and Permanent Representative of the Nigerian Mission to the UN)
- H.E. Amb. Cho Hyun (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN)
- H.E. Amb. Agustin Santos Maraver (Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN)
- Alexandre Stutzmann (Special Adviser to the President of the UN General Assembly).

**6:45 pm:** Dinner Served

**7:30 - 8:30 pm:** Moderated dialogue on “Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda"

This concluding session will consist of a 25-30 minutes moderated dialogue, followed by 30-35 mins Q&A and discussion with the audience.

- **Speakers:**
  - H.E. Mary Robinson (Chair of The Elders; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights)
  - H.E. Maria Fernanda Espinosa (President of the 73rd Session of the General Assembly)
  - H.E. Laura Chinchilla (Vice-President of the Club de Madrid and former President of Costa Rica)
  - H.E. Chido Mpemba (African Union Youth Envoy)

- **Moderators:**
  - Lise Grande (President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Brian Finlay (President and CEO, Stimson Center)

**8:30 pm:** Program concludes and Shuttle back to the Beacon Hotel
Day II: 2 March at Georgetown University

Mortara Center for International Studies, 3600 N Street NW, 36th St NW, Washington, DC 20007

7:30 am: Breakfast at the Beacon Hotel

8:10 am: Shuttle departs for Georgetown University (Mortara Center for International Studies)

9:00 am: Special Keynote on Taking Forward the UN75 Vision and Commitments

- **Speaker:** H.E. Abdulla Shahid (President of the 76th Session of the General Assembly) (video)
- **Panelist (Q&A and discussion):** Alexandre Stutzmann (Special Adviser to the President of the UN General Assembly)
- **Reflections by** H.E. Amb. Cho Hyun (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN) and H.E. Amb. Agustin Santos Maraver (Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN)
- **Moderator:** Henry Alt-Haaker (Senior Vice-President, Robert Bosch Stiftung)

10:00 am: Brief Tea/Coffee Break and Proceed to Morning Breakthrough Rooms

10:15 am: Breakthrough Groups Session 3:

*Debate and elaborate on a select number of relevant Our Common Agenda reform proposals in response to particular global problem-sets (and related gaps in global governance) – whether of an institutional, legal, policy, normative, or operational nature.*

- **Four groups:** Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons, Conflict Prevention and Management, COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract, and Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods.

11:45 am: Pick-up Lunch Boxes

12:30 pm: Special Session “From COP-26 to Stockholm +50 to the 2023 Summit of the Future: New Directions for Climate Governance”

- **Lead-off remarks:**
  - Maja Groff (Convenor, Climate Governance Commission)
  - Dr. Arunabha Ghosh (CEO and Founder, Council on Energy, Environment, and Water)
  - Dr. Adriana Abdenur (Executive-Director and Co-Founder, Plataforma CIPO)
  - Sue Biniaz (Deputy to the Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry, U.S. Department of State)
  - H.E. Chido Mpemba (African Union Youth Envoy)
- **Moderator:** Dr. Magnus Jiborn (Director of Research, Global Challenges Foundation)
- **Welcome:** Professor Lise Howard (President, Academic Council on the UN System and Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University)

1:45 pm: Short break and Proceed to Afternoon Breakthrough Rooms
2:00 pm: Breakthrough Groups Session 4:

Beyond (or complementary to) the Our Common Agenda ideas discussed in the morning breakthrough session, debate and refine innovative reform proposals in response to particular global problem-sets (and related gaps in global governance) – whether of an institutional, legal, policy, normative, or operational nature.

- **Four groups:** Climate Action and Governing the Environment and Global Commons, Conflict Prevention and Management, COVID-19 Response and Human Rights Promotion: Forging a New Social Contract, and Collaborative Economy and Promoting Global Public Goods.

3:15 pm: Short Tea/Coffee Break and Proceed to Special Forum

3:30 pm: Special Forum on the 2023 Summit of the Future (Held in Gaston Hall within Healy Hall)

- **Speakers:**
  - H.E. Mary Robinson (Chair of The Elders; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights)
  - H.E. Amb. (Prof.) Tijjani Muhammad-Bande (President of the 74th Session of the General Assembly and Permanent Representative of the Nigerian Mission to the UN)
  - H.E. María Fernanda Espinosa (President of the 73rd Session of the General Assembly)
  - H.E. Laura Chinchilla (Vice-President of the Club de Madrid and former President of Costa Rica)
  - Nudhara Yusuf (Global Governance Innovation Network Facilitator and Coalition for the UN We Need Global Youth Coordinator)

- **Moderator:** Dean Joel Hellman (Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University)
- **Welcome:** Professor Lise Howard (President, Academic Council on the UN System and Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University)

4:30 pm: Short Tea/Coffee Break and Proceed to Concluding Session

4:45 pm: Concluding GPD Session: Shaping the September 2023 Summit of the Future

Final report-backs from four breakthrough groups + Georgetown students group (4-5 mins per group elaborating on select Our Common Agenda and related global governance innovation proposals to more effectively address a global problem-set; after a group’s members have added additional points, we will welcome 8-10 min. discussion with the full plenary, before proceeding to the next breakthrough group). Held in the Riggs Library, 3rd floor, Healy Hall South Tower at Georgetown University

- **Co-Moderators:**
  - Professor Lise Howard (President, Academic Council on the UN System and Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University)
  - Professor Joris Larik (Professor of International Law, Leiden University, and Senior Adviser, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program, Stimson Center)
  - Dr. Richard Poncio (Director, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program, Stimson Center)

6:00 pm: Vote of Thanks and Reception (Held in the President’s Room, next door to Riggs Library)
7:00 pm: Program Concludes and Shuttle back to the Beacon Hotel

Day III: 3 March at the Stimson Center (9:00 AM - 12:30 PM)
Stimson Center, 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, 8th Floor, Washington, DC 20036

For leaders from the Global Governance Innovation Network, Climate Governance Commission, Coalition for the UN We Need, and Together First, this follow-on, half-day strategy session will be convened at the Stimson Center. The goal is for these civil society-led efforts to come together to advance a shared vision and mobilize political pressure—in parallel to related intergovernmental initiatives—in charting a common (or at least complementary) action program for 2022 and beyond on global governance inclusion and renewal.

7:30 am: Breakfast at the Beacon Hotel

8:30 am: Participants escorted to the Stimson Center

8:45 am: Check-in at the Stimson Center

9:00 am - 12:30 pm: The Countdown to 2023 Strategy Session

· Opening Remarks: Natalie Samarasinghe (Global Director of Advocacy, Open Society Foundations and former Chief of Strategy, UN@75 Office)
· Co-Moderators:
  o Enyseh Teimory (Together First)
  o Dan Perell (Coalition for the UN We Need)
· Closing Reflections on the Way Forward by Fergus Watt (Coordinator, Coalition for the UN We Need)

12:30 pm: Light Farewell Lunch Served (feel free to organize lunch meetings in D.C.)
III. Global Policy Dialogue and Special Evening Program Participants

Scholars/Policy Researchers

Adriana Abdenur, Cofounder and Executive Director of Plataforma CIPÓ
Dr. Mayesha Alam, Vice President, FP Analytics and Non-Resident Senior Fellow, United Nations University – Centre for Policy Research
Aisha Al-Alammari, Assistant Professor, Qatar University
Raghad Al-Saadi, Principal, Polar Lights Prime
Banou Arjomand, Research Assistant, Stimson Center
Gabriel Amvane, Academic Council on the United Nations System
Adewale Bakare, Director of Global Governance 2.0 Research & Innovation, Savannah Center for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development
Tyler Beckelman, Director of International Partnerships, U.S. Institute of Peace
Michael Collins, Executive Director of Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace
Sam Daws, Director, Project on UN Governance and Reform, Oxford University
Adam Day, Director of Programmes, United Nations University
William Durch, Distinguished Fellow, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program, Stimson Center
Jessica Duque, Outreach and Development Officer, Institute for Economics & Peace
Brian Finlay, President and CEO, Stimson Center
Maiara Folly, Co-Founder and Programme Director of Plataforma CIPÓ
Arunabha Ghosh, Founder and CEO, Council on Energy, Environment, and Water
Lise Grande, President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
Nandini Harihar, Research Analyst, Council on Energy, Environment and Water
Joel Hellman, Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Daisaku Higashi, Professor, Sophia University
Peter Hoffman, Assistant Professor in International Affairs, The New School
Lise Morjé Howard, Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and President of the Academic Council on the United Nations System
Ian Johnstone, Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Steve Killelea, Founder, Institute for Economics & Peace and the Global Peace Index
Marcelo Knobel, Professor of Physics and Former Rector, University of Campinas (Brazil)
Georgios Kostakos, Co-Founder and Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainable Development  
Giovanna Kuele, Researcher and Project Coordinator, Igarapé Institute  
Joris Larik, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University  
Joshua Lincoln, Senior Fellow, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy  
Amanda Long, Senior International Partnerships Assistant, U.S. Institute of Peace  
Karim Makdisi, Associate Professor of International Politics and Director of the graduate program in Public Policy and International Affairs, The American University of Beirut  
Nayifa Nihad, Graduate Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Development, University of Oklahoma  
David Passarelli, Executive Director, Center for Policy Research, United Nations University  
Kelsey Piva, Graduate Fellow, Georgetown University  
Richard Ponzio, Director of the Global Governance, Justice & Security Program and Senior Fellow, Stimson Center  
Vesselin Popovski, Professor in International Peace Studies, Soka University  
Keith Porter, President and CEO, Stanley Center for Peace and Security  
Dr. Edna Ramirez-Robles, Professor of International Trade Law, Universidad de Guadalajara, CUCosta, Mexico  
Jimena Leiva Roesch, Head of Peace and Sustainable Development and Senior Fellow, International Peace Institute  
Filip Savatic, Ph.D. in Government, Georgetown University, Visiting Researcher, Sciences Po Paris, and Administrative Coordinator of the Academic Council on the United Nations System  
Monica Serrano, Academic Council on the United Nations System  
Muznah Siddiqui, Intern, Stimson Center  
Javier Surasky, Program Officer, Governance for Development Area, Cepei  
Nudhara Yusuf, Global Governance Innovation Network Facilitator, Stimson Center  
Jerry Zhang, Intern, Stimson Center

Non-Governmental Organizations

Maria-Elena Aguero, Secretary-General, Club de Madrid  
Nofe Al-Suwaidi, Director, Doha Forum  
Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Robert Bosch Academy  
Noemi Becerra, Senior Programmes Officer, Club de Madrid  
Agustina Briano, Outreach and Development Coordinator, Club de Madrid  
Tom Brookes, Policy Advisor, The Elders
Linda Burenius, Head of Development, Global Challenges Foundation
Andreas Bummel, Co-Founder and Executive Director, Democracy Without Borders
Craig Charney, President, Charney Research
Laura Chincilla, Vice President of Club de Madrid and President of Costa Rica (2010-2014)
Monique Cuillerier, Communications Team, Coalition for the UN We Need
Tad Daley, Director of Policy Analysis, Citizens for Global Solutions
Ben Donaldson, Head of Campaigns, United Nations Association-UK and Together First
Alistair Fernie, Chief Executive, The Elders
María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, President of the Seventy-third Session of the General Assembly
Maja Groff, Convenor, Climate Governance Commission
Jeffrey Hufnines, Senior Advisor, Coalition for the UN We Need
Magnus Jiborn, Research and Innovation Director, Global Challenges Foundation
Sarmad Khan, Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System
Paul Kuzmickas, Operations Manager, The Elders
Anselmo Lee, Pyeong Chang Peace Forum
Michael Liu, Executive-Director, Chinese International Law Initiative
Augusto Lopez-Claros, Executive Director, Global Governance Forum
Aishwarya Machani, Next Generation Fellow, United Nations Foundation
Tinuola Makinde, Programme Assistant/Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Savannah Center
Paulo Magalhaes, Founder and President, Common Home for Humanity
Beckie Malay, Convener of GCAP Philippines, Global Call to Action Against Poverty and Coalition for the UN We Need Steering Committee
Wanjira Mathai, Vice-President and Regional Director for Africa, World Resources Institute
Eston McKeague, Leader, Young World Federalists
Sarah Meschenmoser, Senior Project Manager, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy
Maria Theresa Nera-Lauron, Advisor for United Nations Program, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
Anja Olin-Pape, Expert on Youth Policy, Global Challenges Foundation
Jens Orback, Executive Director, Global Challenges Foundation
Daniel Perell, Baha'i International Community New York Representative, Coalition for the UN We Need, Steering Committee Co-Chair
Marie-Laure Poiré, Manager Global Advocacy, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Mary Robinson, Chair of The Elders
Megan Robert, Director of Policy Planning, United Nations Foundation
Natalie Samarasinghe, Convener, Together First; Open Society Foundations
Conor Seyle, Senior Strategic Advisor, One Earth Future Foundation
Rebakah Shirley, Director of Research, Data & Innovation, World Resource Institute Africa
Remy Stuart-Haentjens, Director of Partnership, Paris Peace Forum
Kate Sullivan, Strategic Planning and External Relations Manager, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation
Enyseh Teimory, Senior Communications and Campaigns Officer, United Nations Association-UK
Mandeep Tiwana, Chief Programmes Officer, CIVICUS
Justin Vaisse, Founder & Director General, Paris Peace Forum
John Vlasto, Chair of Executive Committee, World Federalist Movement
Fergus Watt, Coordinator, Coalition for the UN We Need
Soon-Young Yoon, Chair of the Board, Women’s Environment and Development Organization and UN Representative for the International Alliance of Women

**Intergovernmental Organizations and Government Representatives**

Sara Abdulla Al-Saadi, *Embassy of the State of Qatar in Washington DC*
Amb. Alya Al-Thani, *Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations*
Sue Biniaz, *Deputy to the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate*
Sohini Chatterjee, *Senior Policy Advisor, Executive Office of United States Ambassador to the United Nations*
Fernando de la Mora, *Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations*
Amb. Anna-Karin Enestrom, *Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations*
Pablo Emilio Gutierrez, *Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations*
Nick Hartmann, *Director, Global Policy Network, United Nations Development Programme*
Aditi Haté, *Policy Officer and Project Manager on OCA, Executive Office of the Secretary-General*
Dali ten Hove, *External Relations and Reporting, MONUSCO*
Amb. Cho Hyun, 26th *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations*
Eiko Ikegaya, *Deputy Chief, Policy and Best Practices Service, DPET, DPKO-DFS, United Nations*
Yoon-Hye Kim, *Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations*
Rosa Malango, *Director of the Regional Commissions New York Office, United Nations*
Naomi Miyashita, *Policy Planning Team Leader, United Nations Peace Operations*
Chido Cleo Mpemba, *African Union’s Special Envoy on Youth*
Amb. Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, *Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, President of the General Assemblyof the 74th Session*
Muyiwa Onifade, *Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, Cristina Petcu, Reporting and Coordination Officer, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali*
Marcel Pieper, Senior Coordination and Outreach Officer, UN75/OCA follow-through lead, EU Mission to the United Nations
Jeffrey Prescott, Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Arnold Pronto, Principal Legal Officer, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
Amb. Agustin Santos-Maraver, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations
Simbharashe Gwenzi, Executive Assistant to the African Union Youth Envoy
Abdulla Shahid, President of UNGA76, Foreign Minister of Maldives
Jake Sherman, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
Alexandre Stutzmann, UN75/OCA follow-through lead, Office of the President of the General Assembly
Danilo Türk, President of Club de Madrid and President of Slovenia (2007-2012) Ambassador of Slovenia to the United Nations, UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
Christian Wohlert, Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

Special Evening Program (March 1) Additional Washington, D.C.-based Participants

Prof. Amitav Acharya, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance, American University
Andrew Albertson, Executive-Director, Foreign Policy for America
Hamad Al-Jaber, Embassy of the State of Qatar to the United States
Tyler Beckelman, Director of International Partnerships, United States Institute of Peace
Abdulaziz Al-Thani, Diplomat, Embassy of Qatar to the U.S.
Chuck Ashley, Our Common Agenda lead, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Prof. Kuniko Ashizawa, Adjunct Professor, American University and George Washington University
Paula Boland, Executive-Director, United Nations Association - National Capital Area
Kristen Cordell, Senior Policy Adviser, USAID
Vivian Lowery Derryk, President and CEO, The Bridges Institute
Jeremy England, Head of Operations, International Committee of the Red Cross
Brian Finlay, President and CEO, Stimson Center
Patrick Gallagher, Senior Associate, Logan International Relations
Lise Grande, President and CEO, United States Institute of Peace
Liz Hume, Executive-Director, Alliance for Peacebuilding
Shamil Idriss, Chief Executive Officer, Search for Common Ground
Rob Jenkins, Assistant-Administrator, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization, USAID
Mathew Keating, Program Specialist, US Mission to the UN Washington Office, U.S. Department of State
Amb. Mark Lagon, Chief Policy Officer, Friends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, TB, and Malaria
Amanda Long, Senior International Partnerships Assistant, U.S. Institute of Peace
Wendy MacClinchy, Director, United Nations Program, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)
Amb. George Moose, Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Ellen Laipson, Former President, Stimson Center; Director for the Center of Security Policy Studies, George Mason University
Alexia Latortue, Assistant-Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department
Mark Nichols, Board Member, Stimson Center
Tarso Furtado Nunes, Consultant, Seven Summit
Jeffrey Prescott, Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Laurel Rapp, Member, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State
Curtis Reid, Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs, National Security Council, U.S. Government
Pablo Sanz Lopez,
Lisa Sharland, Senior Fellow and Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, Stimson Center