Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda E-Consultation

17 January - 13 February 2022

SUMMARY REPORT

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ABSTRACT

The **Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 & Our Common Agenda E-Consultation** entailed four weeks of online consultations on key proposals taken-up in the **Our Common Agenda** (OCA) report and strategies around maximizing the proposed September 2023 Summit of the Future during the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Week in New York. The first two weeks of the consultation, Segment One (17 - 30 January), focused on substantive inputs, and the second two weeks, Segment Two (31 January - 13 February), sought ideas and diverse perspectives on procedural aspects of advocacy and a strategy for reform – to raise the ambition of the forthcoming intergovernmental negotiations – in the Countdown to 2023. This report seeks to directly support and elevate the related **Global Policy Dialogue** from 1-2 March 2022, as well as the Countdown to 2023 strategy session on 3 March, held in Washington, D.C. Additionally, the consultation was timed to feed fresh ideas and critical observations into the **OCA Thematic Consultations** organized, in February and March 2022, by the President of the General Assembly.

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1. Segment#1 (17-30 January): Thematic priorities of the Our Common Agenda report and beyond, leading up to the Summit of the Future in 2023

1.1 CONTEXT & DISCUSSION PROMPTS

Acting on the 15 November 2021 procedural resolution adopted by the General Assembly to welcome the Our Common Agenda report, the President of the General Assembly has initiated a series of multi-stakeholder dialogues in February and March of 2022. This provides a momentous opportunity for global civil society, governments, and the UN to jointly influence the path taken, between now and the Summit on Transforming Education in 2022, the Summit of the Future in 2023, and the World Social Summit in 2025. As such (and feeding directly too into the 1-2 March Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 and Our Common Agenda), this e-consultation sought diverse ideas and perspectives from more than eighty participants worldwide to the following questions:

Identifying Priorities
1. Which of the Our Common Agenda proposals (from the 90 presented) has the potential, if adopted, to achieve the biggest impact in terms of building a more inclusive, networked, and effective system of global governance? Please briefly explain your choice, including any specific ideas for enriching your identified OCA proposal.

Finding the Gaps
2. What's missing in the OCA? Are there any particular global governance innovation proposals in circulation today -- whether institutional, policy, legal, normative, or operational in nature -- that should be considered on the "Road to the 2023" Summit of the Future, including in the recommendations of the High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods later this year?

Building Back Better and Greener
3. Are there any Our Common Agenda or other global governance innovation proposals out there most likely to contribute in meaningful ways -- at global, regional, national, and local levels -- to broad-based and green recovery worldwide coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic?

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Responses were received (for which the organizers are thankful) from:
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The following summary provides a brief overview and synthesis of the contributions submitted by participants and does not necessarily represent the views of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
1.2 OVERVIEW

Discussions in segment one began with a series of issue-specific debates based on proposals from the Our Common Agenda report. Early contenders of these issue-based discussions included the call for a Civil Society Champion, aiming to capitalize on "low-hanging fruit" in paragraphs 121 and 130 of the OCA report, to further explore options on a high-level entry point for civil society, and to build on the long-standing annual UN-Civil Society Forum. Participants also engaged in a debate surrounding the repurposing of the Trusteeship Council. Here, whilst there were some concerns about how to upgrade the Council's mandate and structure (given inherent Charter reform challenges), in general, there was agreement in having a principal organ of the United Nations act as a convenor and monitor of deliberations on the global commons, including the atmosphere, outer space, oceans, Antarctica, biodiversity, and potentially other areas. The case for repurposing the Trusteeship Council was, in part, buttressed by calls that emerged for definitions of peace beyond military agendas and viewing peace more holistically as a global public good. Concerns surrounding this OCA recommendation dealt with operational capacity and the practicality of implementing the repurposed Council's recommendations. This initial discussion evolved into a larger debate on the governance structures, systems, and broad concepts and definitions required to operationalize the Our Common Agenda report.

The e-consultation's exchanges on the Secretary General's call for more networked and inclusive multilateralism, and on the evolution of global governance more generally, represented two distinct but interrelated lines. Proponents of far more inclusive multilateral methods called for a “Copernican moment” to move beyond state-centric multilateralism, stating that whilst sticking to current global governance structures may be most practical, “… what is practical is inadequate to what is needed, keeping to the practical guarantees failure.” This led to two calls to action (1) a redefinition of multilateralism where the state is part of a global system that fully engages the ideas, networks, and capabilities of non-state actors too; and (2) utilizing quick wins to advance the potential for effective consensus-building. At the same time, several discussants questioned the efficacy of such a re-orientation, re-emphasizing the democratic legitimacy of intergovernmental processes and – given our state of global emergency – the need to build on existing resources rather than designing new institutions and approaches from scratch.

Despite this initial discussion weighing the importance of networked decision-making versus establishing specific intergovernmental focal points for engagement on specific global problem-sets, discussants began to consider that this modus operandi may indeed be two sides of the same coin. On the question of consensus as a gate - way/keeper, there are some issues guarded by picket gates - with broad political buy-in - and some politically or administratively more contentious issues guarded with armed fortresses. It is in the latter of these where broad consensus through inclusive multilateral mechanisms becomes critical in moving forward. In other words, some discussants called for the international community to view the conversation through a meta-lens of networked approaches - working in parallel on joint agendas, keeping in mind distinct organization and agent-level priorities. In this vein, some spoke of networked multilateralism being a continuum of intergovernmental approaches, and others called for “More bold thinking … from civil society alongside like-minded Member States (and in particular experienced states-people within various countries).”

With this in mind, participants turned to the question of how one begins to identify the roles and priorities across such a diverse and complex multi-stakeholder network. With some notable exceptions, most discussants suggested that most of the 90 proposals of the OCA were (whether intentionally or otherwise) aspirational. What many participants agreed was missing from the report was clarity and the incentive structure to catalyze prioritization and action. The group thus went about attempting to answer and dissect this two-part question through different approaches.

Some participants defined calls to action based on urgency. Given that the OCA report seemed to be missing catalysts for action, discussants proposed that stakeholders in the multilateral system should prioritize those issues where they can catalyze action in the quickest way possible, due to the general urgency of the decade of action for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This would require multi-stakeholder approaches so that each relevant (state and non-state) actor could tackle specific global problem-sets by harnessing their own comparative advantages.
Others took to a longer-term theory of change and incorporated a sequential perspective in their call to action. With this approach, given that the ultimate goals reflect general thematic issues such as sustainable use of the global commons, peace, collaborative economies, and a new social contract, participants asked what are the most appropriate means to achieve these ambitious ends? Ultimately, discussants proposed that this comes down to trust and accountability across the multilateral system. Thus, we need to see a shift in culture and values of global governance first, in order to begin implementing the OCA's recommendations. This would require facilitating institutional reforms, understanding the current role of the United Nations, and clear communications to build shared consensus to advance specific OCA proposals.

Whereas the previous dichotomy came to be considered as parallel, but co-existing mechanisms of multilateral governance, or two sides of the same coin, the conversation between these two latter groups converged within the nexus of “informal productive networks.” Participants suggested that there is no need to choose between short- and long-term approaches to the agenda at hand; rather, we must develop a framework within which to manage and understand our different timelines and priorities as they feed into (and reinforce) one common agenda. To this end, participants drew on a proposed “do-ing” framework: i) Do now! Things the SG can do pretty much on his own; ii) Do soon. Things the SG and a significant grouping of member states can do; and iii) Do? Things that need to be moved from idea into viable initiative through either a bespoke process or some change in current dynamics. Civil society and other stakeholders may then choose to engage with the first set of proposals and see them to fruition, work on moving group ii items to group i, or concretize the more abstract ideas in group iii, to push them up the task list. Discussions evolved on the specifics of this framework, and the box below presents some iterations of the exchange among participants:

1. **Do now!** Things the SG can do pretty much on his own, such as:
   a. Establish the High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods (HLAB)
   b. Appoint a Special Envoy for Future Generations
   c. Build a Futures Lab in the Secretariat and issue a foresight report
   d. Upgrade the partnerships office (though Bob Orr may suggest this is harder than it looks)
   e. Re-establish the SG’s Scientific Advisory Board

2. **Do soon.** Things the SG and a significant grouping of member states can do, such as:
   a. Hold a World Social Summit in 2025
   b. Build an emergency platform for the next pandemic/disaster
   c. Agree on complementary measures to GDP (though formalizing this is another matter)
   d. Advance the right to a healthy environment in a compact and/or other international document
   e. A Declaration on the rights of future generations

3. **Do?** Things that need to be moved from idea into viable initiative through either a bespoke process or some change in current dynamics, such as:
   a. Transform Trusteeship Council into a representative of future generations
   b. Figure out what the New Agenda for Peace actually means
   c. Turning the social contract chapter into a plan of action
   d. A lot of the ideas in the “building trust” sections of OCA
   e. A lot of other good ideas and principles (e.g. do a control F on “human rights” and ask “how do we turn this into action?”)

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**Move to SG’s docket:**

a. Establish the High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods (HLAB)

b. Appoint a Special Envoy for Future Generations

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**1. Do now!** Things the SG can do pretty much on his own, such as:

   a. Build a Futures Lab in the Secretariat and issue a foresight report
   b. Upgrade the partnerships office
   c. Re-establish the SG’s Scientific Advisory Board
   d. Build an emergency platform for the next pandemic/disaster
   e. Agree on complementary measures to GDP (though formalizing this is another matter)

**DELETE: 2. Do soon.** Things the SG and a significant grouping of member states can do, such as:

   a. Hold a World Social Summit in 2025
   b. Advance the right to a healthy environment in a compact and/or other international document

**2. Do?** Things that need to be moved from idea into viable initiative through either a bespoke process or some change in current dynamics, such as:

   a. A Declaration on the rights of future generations (and) Transform Trusteeship Council into a representative of future generations
   b. Figure out what the New Agenda for Peace actually means
   c. Turning the social contract chapter into a plan of action

**Break these down for actionable items:**

   d. A lot of the ideas in the “building trust” sections of OCA
   e. A lot of other good ideas and principles (e.g. do a control F on “human rights” and ask “how do we turn this into action?”)
The role of the UN and other stakeholders in global governance continued to ebb and flow throughout segment one of this consultation, with job descriptions of the United Nations system ranging from that of a convenor, marketer, networker, norm-setter, and consensus-builder, to name a few. Segment two of the consultation proceeds to tackle this question more directly. Below are key takeaways across the three discussion prompts from segment one:

1.3 KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Which of the Our Common Agenda proposals (from the 90 presented) has the potential, if adopted, to achieve the biggest impact in terms of building a more inclusive, networked, and effective system of global governance? Please briefly explain your choice, including any specific ideas for enriching your identified OCA proposal.
   - Participants lending support to the Secretary-General’s call for a new social contract anchored in human rights posited that the UN still commands considerable moral authority and, for many people, stands for the best of human aspirations, tolerance, and hope. The UN’s convening power is why it should play a crucial role in shaping this social contract between citizens and their governments. At the same time, reconceptualizing the global multilateral contract between countries will help us to better address problems that are global in scope, such as vaccine inequity, expanding access to quality education, implementation of the SDGs, societal resilience, and the management of the global commons, and accelerating other goals such as those under consideration in connection with the proposed new Agenda for Peace.
   - Participants also considered the new Agenda for Peace and that the proposal’s room for emphasis on foresight and prevention has the potential to better tackle the cycle of violence afflicting many regions. For example, strengthening foresight will enable identification and adaptation to new peace and security risks. In addition, investments in prevention capabilities, such as the Peacebuilding Fund or Regional Prevention schemes, will allow for ways to better address the cross-cutting issues of security, climate change, health, gender equality, development, and human rights from a prevention perspective.
   - On climate, the environment, and global public goods, there was a call for dedicated science-based agency to protect the global commons and fight against the climate crisis in an approach similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) - an independent advisory board of influential experts whose role and authority are clearly codified in treaty/convention. The repurposed Trusteeship Council, Envoy for Future Generations, and Declaration on Future Generations must underpin and energize such a deliberative agenda put forward by a new IPCC type mechanism for enhanced global governance.
   - On the subject of the increasingly hyperconnected global economy, participants held that our existing institutions are not ready for the potential economic, social, and political changes new frontier technologies might bring to the global marketplace. New multilateral frameworks are urgently needed to ensure that new technologies will not increase inequality and be used for malign purposes. This is why the proposed September Summit for the Future - which offers a platform to discuss these issues and to facilitate consensus - is so important.

2. What’s missing in the OCA? Are there any particular global governance innovation proposals in circulation today -- whether institutional, policy, legal, normative, or operational in nature -- that should be considered on the "Road to the 2023" Summit of the Future, including in the recommendations of the High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods later this year?
   - In view of the 90 proposals highlighted in the OCA report, participants underscored the absence of consensus as a critical challenge acting as a barrier to effective change. Furthermore, the lack of clarification on certain topics, such as the new “Agenda for Peace” and the “Right to a Healthy Environment” are identified as conceptual limitations, for which further work from external partners might be helpful.
   - Participants also noted that the adoption and full implementation of global governance innovation proposals (whether within or beyond the OCA report) was highly dependent on “the community of states overcoming entrenched collective action problems” alongside “ideological and other differences among Member States and their representatives.” Noting the absence of strong political will, participants also highlighted the concern of some
Member States and institutional stakeholders “cherry-picking proposals that fit into their [narrowly focused] agenda.”

- Participants highlighted the need for flexible and inclusive coalitions and approaches centering on a “youth and gender perspective” and ensuring the transparency and accountability of these coalitions and approaches.
- Noting that “some institutions can’t do what we want” and that we lack the time to “wait for them to be reformed,” several participants suggested new and innovative global governance proposals in order to better manage the global commons and global public goods (many of which are backed up by considerable research). A “Sustainable Development Council” and a “Global Resilience Council” were suggested, potentially following the above proposed IPCC model of having “independent expert advisory boards with profile and influence.” Other participants suggested instruments, such as a “UN World Citizens’ Initiative”, a “UN Parliamentary Assembly”, a “Global Anti-Corruption Court”, or a “Global Environment Authority”, that would create space for global governance mechanisms that extend beyond a preoccupation with national sovereignty in the international system of governance.

3. Are there any Our Common Agenda or other global governance innovation proposals out there most likely to contribute in meaningful ways -- at global, regional, national, and local levels -- to broad-based and green recovery worldwide coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic?

- Participants called for a science-based global innovation and monitoring agency. For example, when approaching the newly proposed Agenda for Peace, the international community ought to prioritize evidence-based foundations of an agenda for prevention and protection. Furthermore, to have science and fact-based agendas mainstreamed into the Summit of the Future agenda, a strong technocratic voice must be heard at the United Nations, building on momentum garnered by the Secretary-General’s recently announced High-level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods. However, whilst the UN can improve its status as a source of global knowledge and science, debt, inflation, and economic recessions will remain serious impediments to progress. Thus, participants called for economic gaps also to be bridged by re-channeling investments in military spending toward social spending.
- Given the rich buffet of recommendations presented in the OCA report, some participants characterized the OCA as a manifesto for a renewed UN and multilateral system at large. As such, aside from considerations of how to approach and operationalize the report within global governance (see the section 1.2 Overview above), there was a call for further consideration of regional and national adoption of key regional and nationally-oriented elements of the OCA report. Some called for greater focus on regional geopolitical realities when implementing OCA recommendations. This would entail, for example, “plurilateral political leadership from Middle Powers to push for the necessary systemic changes, with agreements at the G20 then passed on to the [global] multilateral institutions for further deliberation by all 193 UN Member States and implementation.” Meanwhile, others called for national consultations on the OCA report, and the space for civil society to step in and run these consultations should governments not take up this more nationally-oriented agenda for deliberation followed by action.
- Participants also raised the need to consider greater representation (both between and within countries) when undertaking the reform innovations proposed in the OCA report, keeping in mind that much of the UN continues to rest on principles designed by those powerful states who benefited from the global governance arrangements introduced immediately following World War II in 1945. In particular, several participants called for greater representation of the Global South, women, and youth in all efforts to build, in the words of the Secretary-General, a more inclusive, networked, and effective multilateral system.
2. Segment#2 (31 January - 13 February): Coordination strategies and levers for engagement leading up to the Summit of the Future in September 2023

2.1 CONTEXT & DISCUSSION PROMPTS

The Our Common Agenda report, aside from laying out 90 recommendations, promotes three unique intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder vehicles for individuals, organizations, and governments to influence, debate and shape global agendas: the 2022 Summit on Transforming Education, the 2023 Summit of the Future, and the 2025 World Social Summit. Participants of the 3 March Strategy Session after the Global Policy Dialogue on Global Governance Innovation: Beyond UN75 and Our Common Agenda will discuss and seek to coordinate diverse organizational strategies in the run-up to these summits (the Countdown to 2022, 2023, and beyond. This e-consultation sought diverse ideas and perspectives to the following questions from more than eighty participants worldwide:

**Actor Mapping**
1. Which individuals and organizations are key stakeholders, at sub-national, national, regional or multilateral levels, that have formal or informal influence over the 2023 agenda, and at what levels do you believe engagement should be focused, in particular, to ensure the most forward-leaning and ambitious outcomes from the September 2023 Summit of the Future?

**Advocacy Opportunities**
2. In considering operative clause three of the 15 Nov 2021 procedural resolution on the Our Common Agenda report – which calls for collaborative approaches in furthering Our Common Agenda – what are the advocacy, outreach, and multi-stakeholder consultation opportunities most needed (both those described in the OCA report and beyond) to ensure that many of the best ideas identified in segment one of this e-consultation are formally deliberated upon and, ideally, adopted?

**Sequencing**
3. What are the immediate and medium-term steps that need to be prioritized and taken by global civil society, governments, and the UN Secretariat to best prepare for the forthcoming series of OCA recommended summits (2022 Summit on Transforming Education, the 2023 Summit of the Future, and the 2025 World Social Summit)?

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Responses were received (for which the organizers are thankful) from:

- Javier Surasky
- John Vlasto
- Adam Day
- Mónica Serrano
- Mandeep Tiwana
- Soon-Young Yoon
- Vesselin Popovski
- Adewale Bakare
- Peter Hoffman
- Ben Donaldson
- Andreas Bummel
- Tad Daley
- Jens Orback
- Cristina Petcu
- Keith Porter
- Lise Howard
- Gabriel Amvane
- Joshua Lincoln
- Felix Dodd

The following summary provides a brief overview and synthesis of the contributions submitted by participants and does not necessarily represent the views of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
2.2 OVERVIEW

Segment Two of the consultation began with participants seeking clarity around what this community could or should aim to achieve heading into 2023? Questions emerged around pragmatic and/or ambitious approaches, and it was noted that a “tension between the “reformers” and the “revolutionaries” plays out as the perfect becomes the enemy of progress.” Whilst segment one discussed big-picture goals and ideas, segment two featured concerns around the methodology and concrete steps for “getting-from-here-to-there.” Several elements are needed to align, or, in other words, it was about ensuring the right ingredients, temperature, and timing. When baking in a 76-year-old kitchen, the ever-present question is about whether the time is now to renovate or even tear down and rebuild?

Participants acknowledged that the “how” was often more difficult to discuss than the “what.” This initiated an exchange on different practices and opportunities for engagement across the United Nations systems, at regional, national, practitioner, and executive levels. Concerns arose around what-not-to-do as a means of identifying a valid methodology through a process of worst-practice elimination, such as working in silos and attempting to reinvent the wheel each in a time of global urgency. Participants shared that whilst the global community's ways of working needed to be adapted to the times, 76 years of lessons learned represent a valuable resource of “do's and “don'ts.” The question became “How can we pool resources to ensure that we are (a) building on what exists and (b) not working in silos?”

To this question, a broad consensus was reached that a multi-pronged strategy would be required to align the different elements of a comprehensive and integrated methodology in the coming years. Two lines of ideas emerged that are built on through the discussion. First was a two-pronged, inward-looking, and outward-looking approach. Second was a four-element set of guidelines, not necessarily mutually exclusive to the former strategy.

The two-pronged approach

Inward-looking level (concerning advocacy to Member States, OPGA, EOSG, and UN staff):

- **Member States:** i) hear what OCA ideas/proposals they support; ii) understand the proposals that they are dissatisfied with/would get their push back; iii) assist them in building on this consensus by suggesting proposals/ideas that they should be rallying behind; iv) understand how this community can support them to advance the OCA.
- **UN Staff:** given the matrix of work being developed for the OCA, should recommendations become the divided responsibility of different parts of the UN System, this community needs to work with UN Staff/Technocrats in charge of coordinating specific actions, as the legitimate agents of change.
- **OPGA and EOSG:** developing and calling on connections with these offices for strategic ideas and contributions.

Outward-looking level (concerning actors beyond the UN System):

- **Global coalitions/movements:** one must build on existing movements, whilst further engaging in outreach and “invite them to join the Breakthrough Movement.” Again, work with the wheels that already exist rather than re-inventing them.
- **National actors:** reaching out to the capitals through a potential two-fold strategy i) have C4UN and the broader community "recruit" at least one influential non-governmental actor (champion) in as many countries as possible, and ii) have each of them (under the umbrella coalition) send letters to their Foreign Ministers, encouraging them to be bold and support OCA proposals (the letter to be both in English and the national language). The We The Peoples - Campaign for Inclusive Global Governance further presents the possibility of reaching out to parliamentarians.

Four-element set of guidelines

First, any strategy should not just be focused on one set of stakeholders, but rather represent a “multi-pronged or a strategy of strategies” across regional, thematic, and demographic lines. Moreover, participants identified the need to acknowledge those who disagree with the OCA recommendations when designing our strategies. To this end,
contributors to the consultation emphasized the importance of penetrating domestic and mass discourse and national politics, in order to rally further support.

**Second,** identify key actors and catalysts who can erode or counteract “state spoiling behavior.” Across the e-consultation, examples of such actors were the media, mayors, cultural norm setters, capitals, and specific demographics such as youth.

**Third,** to avoid siloes, formal processes in implementing global strategies should be consciously designed as multi-stage, including a wide review stage post deep dive to explicitly look at trade-offs, connections, synergies, and new thinking in related areas.

**Fourth,** ensure we learn from the past 76 years in order to effectively respond to shifting geopolitical forces and identify best practices for influencing change. Such knowledge can help respond to the shifting sands of geopolitical forces.

### 2.3 KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. **Which individuals and organizations are key stakeholders - whether at sub-national, national, regional or multilateral levels and have formal or informal influence over the 2023 Summit of the Future agenda? At what levels do you believe engagement should be focused to ensure the most forward-leaning and ambitious outcomes from the Summit?**

   - Participants identified the role of mayors, governors, parliamentarians, and subnational authorities as key stakeholders with which to collaborate, and suggested “blueprinting into action” and strengthening the UN Office for Partnerships, which could consolidate efforts and “ensure comprehensive access and full inclusion.” Suggestions included appointing a greater proportion of female mayors (given that only 13% of global mayors are women), whilst additionally working with more regional networks of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

   - Noting that the “UN/global governance will not always be best placed to be part of the solution”, participants identified that the “locus of governance has been shifting downward.” Groups like the one engaged in this e-consultation should not focus solely on one demographic or level (local, national, and international); as there is no inherent tension between local and national actors, there is no forced choice. It was noted that despite the dominant role played by states in global governance, the OCA’s own recommendations often require a localized approach. Therefore, participants considered how “the UN can best add value to positive regional, local, civil society activities”, with this approach anchored within key conversations around the Summit of the Future.

   - Participants noted that in addition to identifying key stakeholders, it would also be useful to map the “spoilers” such as “corporate emitters, fossil fuel burners, polluters, large red meat producers, etc” and to consider how to demand accountability from them through “sticks (taxing, licensing) and carrots (green incentives).” The challenge to “act as one” was noted in the presence of actors acting contrary to established global governance norms and principles, including authoritarian regimes that restrain civil society and states that disengage from multilateral levels of governance. Communities like this, noted several participants, must be cognizant of the OCA report’s limitations and the potential scrutiny it may face.

2. **In considering operative clause three of the 15 Nov 2021 procedural resolution on the Our Common Agenda report – which calls for collaborative approaches in furthering Our Common Agenda – what are the advocacy, outreach, and multi-stakeholder consultation opportunities most needed (both those described in the OCA report and beyond) to ensure that many of the best ideas identified in segment one of this e-consultation are formally deliberated upon and, ideally, adopted?**

   - Participants discussed the promotion of “systems advocacy and the publication of an idea with system-wide impact and that is expandable to accommodate other ideas.” Participants suggested capitalizing on meetings with Missions of Member States and UN Staff (particularly in the OPGA and EOSG) to “hear what OCA proposals they support”, “understand the proposals they are dissatisfied with” and “suggest proposals they should be rallying behind.”
The discussion additionally noted the need for seriously “rethinking how deliberations are carried out and decisions are made at the UN” in light of the OCA’s call for “networked, inclusive and effective multilateralism.” It was highlighted that “current processes are bureaucratic and heavily state-centric, often screening the UN from the everyday struggles and demands of people, including victims and those excluded from decision making.” As such, new institutions such as a World Citizen’s Initiative and a UN Parliamentary Assembly could be set up to help implement the OCA proposals.

Participants called for advocacy, outreach, and multi-stakeholder consultation on the OCA to be evidence-based and scientifically sound (note: this is the thematic focus of the upcoming (23-25 June) Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the UN System. This is crucial for informing stakeholders what is truly at stake. What the IPCC did on climate change is a good model of this and could be expanded to other areas.

3. What are the immediate and medium-term steps that need to be prioritized and taken by global civil society, governments, and the UN Secretariat to best prepare for the forthcoming series of OCA recommended summits (2022 Summit on Transforming Education, the 2023 Summit of the Future, and the 2025 World Social Summit)?

- Participants noted the necessity of defining a strategy as a collective response to the OCA Report. They highlighted the urgency surrounding the amplification of their positions, and the need to “come up with a common and stronger voice that is agreed by all.” A broad strategy for action, it was noted, requires “identifying the right focal point in each level and organizing ourselves in groups or clusters to focus efforts in one particular level of action or determined actor.” As such, keeping in mind the Summit of the Future, it was suggested that the “main goal should be anchored on protecting global commons in the post-Covid era, so as to trigger the process of adapting the UN system to do just that.”

- Participants suggested fast-tracking several of the OCA proposals, “so as to show progress that is central to building support for the broader and full agenda.” By “banking a few early big wins”, momentum could thus be created towards achieving the more difficult proposals. As such, a “High-Level Advisory Board on Global Public Goods”, a “Parliamentary System including CSOs”, a “Transparent UN System”, a “Human Security Council” (or a “Global Resilience Council”), an “Emergency Response Platform” and working on “Intergenerational Equality” were identified as key proposals to address in the near-term, though with elements requiring a longer-term approach to realize a particular proposal’s full vision and ambition.

- The e-consultation acknowledged that unfortunately, “development” and “human rights” do not generate the political urgency that “security” does on the international stage. With proper representation and transparency, “securitizing” development or the climate crisis can reframe how these issues are prioritized. Moreover, such an approach can help to overcome the impediment of a narrow, exclusive view of sovereignty that threatens to derail the essence of Our Common Agenda. At the same time, these efforts will need to invest considerable energy in nurturing and sustaining political will, which is not a fixed constant.

FINAL WORD

With many thanks to all the participants for their valuable and thoughtful contributions, it may be helpful to summarize one meta-narrative that emerged. We all have different approaches and perspectives on the validity of various ideas and initiatives. Yet we are all climbing the same mountain, so to speak. As such, it is important to encourage all efforts working in the same direction, to work together on matters of shared concern, and to discuss together - critically and generously - when some may be perceived to be going “the wrong way.” We are building a world we have not yet seen, which means we must approach the work with a degree of flexibility and openness. Yet the challenges we face demand that we act urgently. Therefore, we are engaged in a constant push-and-pull of the urgent and pragmatic, the consensus and the necessary, the important and the doable. We are in this together, and the utility of our efforts will be found in the collective progress arising from our distinctive contributions.

1 Participants further identified risks and rewards in the approaches taken by the Secretary General in terms of networked and inclusive multilateralism.