

**UN75**  
2020 AND BEYOND



**GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FORUM**  
VIRTUAL EVENT | 16-17 SEPT 2020

# ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT & UN WE NEED:

## A Vision 20/20 for UN75 and Beyond

**VOLUME II**

STIMSON

**FRIEDRICH  
EBERT  
STIFTUNG**  
NEW YORK OFFICE



Global  
Challenges  
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one earth  
FUTURE



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## Planning Group

**The Stimson Center**, based in Washington, D.C., is a nonpartisan policy research center working to protect people, preserve the planet, and promote security & prosperity. Stimson's award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through concerted action.

**Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office** works at the intersection of the United Nations in New York, the international financial institutions in Washington D.C., FES field offices, and partners in developing countries. Our overarching mission is to bring a special focus to the perspectives of trade unions, women, and developing and emerging-market countries in an effort to forge consensus toward multilateral solutions to international and global challenges.

**Global Challenges Foundation** facilitates global governance reform aimed at ensuring the fair and effective mitigation of global catastrophic risks. In collaboration with others, the GCF fosters a demand for change and generates plausible alternatives to the current global governance system, its tools and approaches. Founded by Swedish-Hungarian financier Laszlo Szombatfalvy in 2012, the GCF is a politically independent not for profit entity.

**One Earth Future Foundation** has worked to solve complex problems at the root of armed conflict for more than a decade. Through its unique culture of iterative learning and improvement, One Earth Future designs, tests, and partners to scale programs that help communities see problems in new ways and solve them collectively. OEF Currently has 7 main programs: Shuraako, PASO Columbia, Stable Seas, Shared Resources, Our Secure Future, and OEF Research. Learn more about One Earth Future and its programs at [oneearthfuture.org](http://oneearthfuture.org).

**Global Governance Philanthropy Network** works to increase and improve philanthropic investing in global governance by mapping the sector, conducting research, and creating opportunities for active grant makers, potential future funders, and allies to come together and learn.

## Coordination Group

Academic Council on the UN System, Aspen Ministers Forum, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Cines International Law Initiative, CIVICUS, Clú de Madrid, Common Home for Humanity, Council on Energy, Environment, and Water, Democracy Without Borders, Doha Forum, Doha Institute for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Global Challenges Foundation, Global Governance Philanthropy Network, Global Green Growth Institute, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, Igarapé Institute, Institute for Economics and Peace, Kofi Annan Foundation, One Earth Future, Paris Peace Forum, PyeongChang Peace Forum, Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy, and Development, Search for Common Ground, Stanley Center for Peace and Security, The Elders, Together First, Truman Library and Museum, UN@75 Office, UN2020, United Nations Foundation, Universidad de Guadalajara, CUCosta (International Law Department), and Workable World Trust Foundation.

## Forum Overview

On 16, 17, and 18 September 2020, we—more than 3,600 registered participants with diverse backgrounds as scholars, practitioners, activists, philanthropists, business leaders, and policy-makers—gathered virtually to honor the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. A cornerstone of international order since 1945, the United Nations must continue to adapt and innovate to respond to new threats, challenges, and opportunities in our current age of complexity. Through the UN75 Global Governance Forum and preceding activities over the past two years along two distinct Partnership and Innovation Tracks, we seek to promote a more inclusive and effective United Nations, emphasizing dialogue, creative initiatives, and new proposals on the future of global governance.

In the corresponding [Volume I](#) of the forum's outcome document, the *Roadmap for the Future We Want & UN We Need: A Vision 20/20 for UN75 and Beyond*, we summarize twenty partnership initiatives and twenty innovation proposals (20/20), which are elaborated upon in this Volume II for the benefit of practitioners, scholars, activists, and policy-makers.

For the Forum's robust **Partnership Track**, we convened over 280 participants from thirty-eight countries in thirty-seven different preparatory meetings to pioneer twenty new multi-stakeholder partnerships among civil society, the private sector, philanthropic institutions, governments, and the UN system. Each partnership will advance one or more of the UN75 Political Declaration's twelve commitments with a bias towards action. The individual partnerships employed the Innovation in Partnerships facilitation methodology to prepare project leads in identifying and recruiting major stakeholders, and then working toward common goals, shared interests, and a unified program of action. Drawn from various stages of development, each partnership initiative—working across the forum's thematic pillars of sustainable development, peace & security, human rights & humanitarian action, and climate governance—represents an opportunity to be scaled and implemented worldwide in the future.

For the Forum's **Innovation Track**, we convened 260 experts worldwide in August for a four-part webinar series and month-long e-Consultation, supported by several original policy briefs across the forum's thematic pillars that elaborated upon twenty institutional, policy, and normative change proposals to enhance global governance. These discussions and policy research were informed, over the preceding two years, by five global policy dialogues (held in Doha, Seoul, and Washington, D.C.), two regional dialogues (for Africa and the Americas), three major reports, and several smaller studies and policy dialogues. Special attention was given in the Innovation track to elaborating upon the UN75 Political Declaration's individual commitments, as well specific tactics for building diverse coalitions and mobilizing political support worldwide for the 20 identified global governance recommendations.

We, diverse stakeholders from civil society (including youth), scholars, policy entrepreneurs, UN system bodies and Member States, the private sector, and philanthropic institutions, seek to honor the principles of multilateral cooperation upon which the UN was founded. In an era of accelerated connectivity, we aspire for this Roadmap to bring a fresh, modern perspective to the UN Charter's founding principles, both to update humanity's vision and to promote a truly “people-centered” architecture for global collective action.

## Highlights from the Forum

The quotes below illustrate some of the substantive debate and informative sessions that put forward innovative ideas and partnerships for a strengthened United Nations that inspires and serves all of humanity.

“540 organizations participated in the Innovation and Partnership tracks and were given the space and methodology to find solutions and next steps through dialogue and discussion. This convergence has developed the Roadmap to give voice and action to what people want and expect from the United Nations we need.” – *Juan Fernando Lucio, Director, PASO Colombia / One Earth Future*



“These partnerships are good examples of the thousands of initiatives like these that the world now needs. All major issues are cross-sectorial and cannot be addressed in silos. They need to involve critical partnerships locally, regionally and globally across governing bodies, local actors, business and finance.” – *Gro Harlem Brundtland, Member of the Elders, former Prime Minister of Norway, and former Director-General of the World Health Organization*

“Digital Technology is transformative across politics, conflict, and human rights, but we need better steerage of both the promise and containment of the perils. Coming to grips with technology will determine the relevance of the United Nations moving forward and the degree to which we achieve success.” – *Fabrizio Hochschild, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Commemoration of the United Nations 75th Anniversary*

“COVID has highlighted the fractures and gaps of social policies in general and health policies. We must remind ourselves that the center of any policy should be human beings.” - *Laura Chinchilla, Vice-President of the Club de Madrid and former President of Costa Rica*

“These are the types of initiatives that encourage me and the whole world to continue to fight for peace, security and for other ideas that we need today in such challenging times.”- *Juan Manuel Santos, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and former President of Colombia*



“This partnership track is extremely important – we have to make these partnerships work, we don’t have a choice. We need inclusive governance reform and systems reform through cooperation, co-creation and co-leadership.” – *Aya Chebbi, African Union Envoy on Youth*

“We do need innovative, feasible high impact solutions for climate governance. We need to protect the Amazon better, find models to keep it standing and measuring what’s happening. We need to measure the exposure of ecological threats and evidence based policy recommendations.” - *Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland, Chair of The Elder*



“It is important for us to remember that during this crisis, and in other conflict related situations, that civil society has been an active partner, making sure that governments are able to fulfill their obligations.”- *Hina Jilani, President of the World Organization Against Torture and Member of The Elders*





# Twenty Partnership Track Initiatives

Across the forum's four pillars (peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian action, and climate governance), this section provides more information about the multi-stakeholder partnerships (composed of UN system departments/agencies, states, the private sector, philanthropists, and broader civil society groups from all regions) developed in the activities preceding the forum.

## Pillar I: Sustainable Development

### The International Municipal Investment Fund (IMIF) and the Technical Assistance

*Partnership lead: United Nations Capital Development Fund*

*Participating organizations: Malaga Coalition for Municipal Finance, UNCDF, UCLG, Global Fund for Cities Development, Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation, Sweden, the European Union and other partners*

#### Background

When the United Nations was founded 75 years ago, the world was predominantly rural. Only 30% of people lived in urban areas. By 2010, we reached a fifty-fifty share. Today, 66% of us live in towns and cities, a complete reversal of the situation since the founding of the United Nations. In many continents, urbanization has reached 80% and has produced high productivity and higher living standards. But this is not a guarantee. Africa and parts of Southeast Asia are urbanizing at a record-breaking rate without the associated needed investments, nor associated productivity increases.


Many local governments in LDCs are unable to access international capital markets to finance those associated investments and projects that will achieve sustainable development, particularly in the world's least developed countries. In many cases, these local governments lack the regulatory authority to issue debt in order to borrow in international capital markets, an inability that is often exacerbated by the lack of legal authority to collect taxes. As a result, they are left to rely on fiscal transfers from central governments. Remarkably, a local government can have a better credit history than the central government of the same country, and yet the central government can access international capital, while the local government is denied such access.

In short, the global financial ecosystem is not structured to support municipal finance for SDG achievement, particularly in the LDCs. Instead, it favors countries, which have access to capital markets with sovereign guarantees and a monopoly of taxation; it also favors large businesses, which can move capital around the globe and limit their tax liabilities. This is critical and dangerous, and if we are not careful, we will lock in inequality and environmental unsustainability in these incredibly, quickly, rapidly growing cities.



## Our Value Proposition

Addressing this challenge is what motivated the Malaga Coalition for Municipal Finance (which features UNCDF, UCLG, and the Global Fund for Cities Development as its technical partner) to drive the creation of the International Municipal Investment Fund (IMIF). The IMIF is a unique, bespoke fund designed to focus exclusively on SDG-positive projects sponsored by cities and local governments, notably from developing countries and least developed countries. The fund will be managed by the asset management firm, Meridiam, with an initial funding target of 350 million Euros.



The IMIF's main objective will be to stimulate the opening of capital markets for local government infrastructure projects that are SDG-positive. The fund will mostly focus on investment opportunities falling into one of four distinct categories: transportation, green economy, utilities, and food security infrastructure. The pipeline for the IMIF includes the opportunities identified through its partners, which, under the umbrella of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), will include FMDV, C4o, ICLEI, and other networks of cities.

The IMIF will rely heavily on its Technical Assistance Facility (IMIF-TAF), which will be overseen by UNCDF. The IMIF-TAF will work with local governments on the policy and regulatory environments to enable cities to access global capital markets, domestic capital markets, and the investment finance that is necessary for the housing, the transport, the green space, the energy, the waste disposal, and all that is necessary to achieve sustainable development.

## Next Steps

Development finance institutions and NGOs have signaled their serious interest in capitalizing the IMIF-TAF, which will provide technical support to municipal governments to support consideration of their projects for financing from the IMIF. Pilot projects have also been chosen for initial investment from the IMIF.

UNCDF thanks the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Sweden, the European Union and other partners for enabling the creation of the world's first dedicated fund to invest in resilient, sustainable projects in developing country cities.

## Good Global Citizens: A Dialogue on Wealth and Responsible Tax Conduct for a Fair Post-COVID Global Economy

*Partnership lead: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office, Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation, Fair Tax Mark*

*Participating organizations: Bridging Ventures, Epworth Investment Management, International Monetary Fund, Oxfam, Patriotic Millionaires, Pennon Group, Principles for Responsible Investment, Public Services International, Tax Justice Network, Transparency and Accountability International and the UN Conference on Trade and Development*

The following summarizes a new partnership launched in September 2020 by [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung \(FES\)](#), [Fair Tax Mark \(FTM\)](#) and the [Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation \(ICRICT\)](#) as part of the UN75 Global Governance Forum. The partnership launched with a dialogue consisting of two 90-minute zoom sessions, on September 3 and September 9.

### Background on the Partnership

The partnership aims to help tackle hidden wealth and tax evasion and avoidance to enable progress on the UN's 2030 Agenda, particularly Sustainable Development Goal 10, on reducing inequality within and among countries and to create a more fair economy in the post-COVID recovery. The partnership is seeking to amplify efforts to scale up and contribute to synergies to two UK-based initiatives: a wealth registry spearheaded by ICRICT and a certification of responsible tax conduct led by Fair Tax Mark.

- [Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung \(FES\)](#) is a publicly-funded German non-profit foundation committed to uplifting the principles of social democracy, freedom and justice. FES has an international network of offices in more than a hundred countries. FES in New York addresses global issues at the intersection of the United Nations, the International Financial Institutions and the G20.
- [Fair Tax Mark](#) is a voluntary certification scheme launched in the UK in 2014 that aims to encourage responsible tax conduct by businesses. Some sixty businesses have been certified in the UK and corporations from around the world are increasingly seeking accreditation, prompting the development of international standards for responsible tax behavior.
- [Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation](#) is a group of global leaders who have proposed a global asset registry to measure assets and wealth inequality. It is also intended as a tool to combat illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, and asset ownership secrecy.

## The Problem

Wealth inequality poses serious risks to economies and the functioning of democracies, yet the actual magnitude of the problem is unknown because of entrenched financial secrecy. The use of ‘offshore’ structures allows the real ownership, location and very existence of wealth to remain hidden, in turn creating fertile ground for tax evasion, avoidance and other financial crimes. Further, the rise of transfer mispricing, profit-shifting and a statutory tax rate race to the bottom have ended the one-hundred year consensus that once dominated international corporation tax law.

## The Solution & Next Steps

Recommendations on the establishment of global corporate standards for responsible tax conduct and a global asset registry will be presented on September 17 during the UN75 Global Governance Forum and will be incorporated into ‘The Future We Want, the UN We Need’ outcome document. Together, these two programs would not only boost public finances, but tackle broader illicit financial flows, wealth inequality and enable a fairer playing field for business competition.

*Global Corporate Standards for Responsible Tax Conduct.* Businesses should do the following:

- Embrace public country-by-country reporting and related financial transparency. Multinational corporations should report on revenue, profit, subsidiaries, tax and employee investment, on a public country-by-country basis.
- Publish a binding Policy undertaking not to use tax havens artificially or pursue tax avoidance. The policy should be subject to annual affirmation via compliance checks and be owned by a named board director.
- Disclose their beneficial owners and persons of significant control. The threshold for disclosure should be at least at the level of 10% of shareholdings or voting rights, but preferably lower, including ownership via trusts.
- Pursue independent assurance from outside of the big accountancy firms. Independent assurance rooted in civil society is more likely to support the emergence of much needed legislative and regulatory developments on issues like unitary taxation and formulary apportionment.

*Global Asset Registry:* A global asset registry would link the existing data provided by recent tax transparency measures and provide missing wealth data, which would allow wealth inequality to be measured and understood, facilitate well-informed public and policymaker discussions and support appropriate taxation. A registry would also prove a vital tool against illicit financial flows, by ending impunity for hiding and using the proceeds of crime.

- The GAR should include all assets that are “relevant” and could include tangible assets, cover intangibles (e.g. intellectual property, trademarks, patents, etc.) and financial assets and property of firms and other ownership vehicles (e.g. trusts).
- ICRICT’s UK pilot study (launched in 2019) could be replicated across different

countries or at regional level based on feasibility or relevance: financial centers holding cross-border wealth, countries that are more capable of establishing some type of an asset register because they have the financial and technological capacity, or countries that are considering the introduction of a wealth tax (e.g. Argentina, Peru, Colombia, South Africa).

For more information contact Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung senior policy analyst Sara Burke [sburke@fesny.org](mailto:sburke@fesny.org)

## Cold Catch - Developing Cold Chain Infrastructure for the Somali Fishing Industry

*Partnership lead: Secure Fisheries, One Earth Future Foundation*

*Participating organizations: The Somali Federal Government's Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources; The Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources for the State of Puntland; The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation; Global Cold Chain Alliance; Somalia Seafood Export Association; and Secure Fisheries, a program of One Earth Future.*

The Cold Catch pilot program aims to develop an unbroken cold chain system from catch to consumer that can serve as a model for coastal food security solutions in Somali communities. Cold chain development is essential for improving food security. Reduced food losses and improved food quality in the fishing industry, especially, create opportunities to expand markets for sea-based protein and improve the stability and value of the fishing industry.

At over 3,000 km in length, the Somali region has the longest coastline in mainland Africa. The productive fishing grounds on the region's continental shelf provide opportunities for job creation, economic growth, and food security, but the industry's growth is limited by the lack of reliable infrastructure. Somali coastal communities' economies and livelihood security depend on fishing, but inefficient fishing and processing methods combined with limited access to ice and cold storage mean fish often spoil before they reach the market. This translates to lost profits for fishers. Moreover, low quality handling standards mean many products are not suitable for export, further limiting potential profits. Improving the cold chain in Somali communities would immediately benefit fishers, processors, and others involved in the sector by creating opportunities to expand the market for Somali fish and increase profits without increasing fishing pressure.

Our pilot project aims to develop cold chain infrastructure to improve connections for the Bander Beyla lobster fishery to domestic and export markets. Existing relationships in Bander Beyla facilitated this choice. Bander Beyla is a remote coastal village in the state of Puntland, northeast Somalia. Secure Fisheries, a program of One Earth Future, has worked there for over a year on community development and fisheries governance projects. Shuraako, a program of One Earth Future that connects Somali entrepreneurs with impact capital investors (such as Norfund and DANIDA) and provides portfolio management, has had a major client, Corno African Fishing Company (CAFCO), in the community since 2014. The community's lucrative lobster fishery can supply domestic markets (e.g., hotels in the inland capital Garowe) and export markets (e.g., export to Dubai), but the fishing community repeatedly expresses a need for cold chain infrastructure to move their harvest beyond the local market. A cold chain infrastructure would allow Bander Beyla's fishers to extend their fishing hours, decrease wasted harvest, extend their product shelf life from catch to consumer, improve product quality, and transport to a wider market.



The Puntland State Ministry of Fisheries selected Bander Beyla as a starting point for this pilot project for a few reasons. First, the fishing community in Bander Beyla is developing a system of cooperative fisheries management and governance, which provides a system through which cold chain infrastructure could be managed. Second, the community has recently engaged in environmental education, with a focus on fisheries sustainability, through Secure Fisheries. Third, recent capacity building has involved technical training (e.g., net repair), and needs assessment. As a result, the community is prepared for an expansion of their fishing capacity in a way that can be managed sustainably. If successful, the project will be expanded to two additional communities chosen by the Ministry.

This partnership is made up of a multidisciplinary group of innovators with collective knowledge around cold chain infrastructure, regional markets, and fisheries capacity. We face the challenges of establishing a cold chain infrastructure in a region with limited electrical capacity, poor road conditions, and limited technical equipment and expertise. We will facilitate public-private partnerships to build a business case for investment in the Somali cold chain, develop universal standards for cold chain projects that can guide on-going and future development projects, and produce context-specific training programs for pilot projects.

Our partnership's next steps include developing a set of guidelines that can be adopted throughout Somalia to guide cold chain projects, identifying companies and fishing communities who could benefit from training programs, collecting data to develop related business plans and form the basis of a value chain assessment, and outreach to industry partners to promote new infrastructure.

## Pillar II: Peace and Security

### New Alliances for Meaningful Human Control

*Partnership lead: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung New York*

*Participating organizations: Clearpath Robotics, Future of Life Institute, German Foreign Ministry, International Committee for Robot Arms Control, Stop Killer Robots, University of Berkeley, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs*

#### Background

Since 2015, efforts against lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), sometimes referred to as “killer robots,” that could engage in violent attacks outside of meaningful human control, have gained momentum among different stakeholders. Artificial intelligence experts, roboticists, scientists, as well as high tech professionals have expressed their reservations against their research, products and platforms being adapted for use in warfare.

The 2019 Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted 11 “Guiding Principles affirmed by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.”

Subsequently, some 40 UN Member States belonging to the “Alliance for Multilateralism” are now championing these 11 Guiding Principles as a normative and operational framework.

Moreover, the civil society-led campaign “Stop Killer Robots” works for a preemptive ban on development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. Similarly, UN Secretary-General António Guterres as well as his High Commissioner for Disarmament have called for the prohibition of LAWS and a new international ban treaty. A growing number of Member States have called for a prohibition of LAWS. Others believe that their use is sufficiently regulated by existing International Humanitarian Law (IHL). At a minimum, there seems to be a general agreement that it is necessary that human beings retain control over the use of force. Member States, with the support and active participation of the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector, quickly need to reach common understanding on characteristics, as well as on agreed limitations and obligations, that should be applied to autonomy in weapons.

In September 2020, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung New York Office (FESNY) launched a new partnership project aimed at building on the 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS and moving them to the next level, towards international legal instruments that regulate and prohibit LAWS. On 4 and 9 September 2020, as part of the UN75 Global Governance Forum, FESNY convened discussions with representatives from governments, the United Nations, academia, civil society and the private sector to discuss the moral, ethical, legal and humanitarian challenges posed by LAWS.

#### Summary of Discussion

Participants, speaking under Chatham House Rule, offered many diverse viewpoints, representing different perspectives on LAWS. The participants saw different pathways to addressing the risks posed by LAWS. However, early in the conversation, the Chair noted broad interest in better elaborating a positive obligation to maintain meaningful human control over

weapons systems and the use of force. To do so, participants began exploring in more depth the 11 Guiding Principles on LAWS.

Participants disagreed on the precise meaning, scope and value of the 11 Guiding Principles. However, all participants agreed that they could not be an end in themselves, but rather point to further progress toward stigmatization of LAWS. A significant majority agreed that good faith interpretation of the 11 Guiding Principles – particularly paragraphs b), c) and d) – required progress toward negotiation of a legally-binding multilateral instrument mandating a positive obligation to maintain meaningful human control over the use of force, at the level of individual attacks. Weapons systems that could not comply with such a standard would need to be ruled out by such an instrument. Participants largely agreed that the most likely venue for such a mandate would be within the CCW, in the form of negotiating a new protocol. However, participants also raised other potential venues including a UN General Assembly-mandated process or one analogous to the Ottawa and Oslo processes on landmine and cluster munitions.

Throughout the discussion, participants affirmed the value of effective multilateralism, stressing the need to address the challenges posed by LAWS through multilateral frameworks. Given the contested international political environment, progress toward negotiating a legally-binding instrument on meaningful human control would demonstrate the potential for effective global governance. Participants noted the difficulties posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but stressed that 2020 should not be a lost year for negotiations on LAWS.

Progress in effective multilateralism includes engaging with multiple stakeholders, including industry, academia and civil society. Participants saw potential for consideration of the practical implications of a positive obligation of meaningful human control for States, the UN, technology companies and workers and civil society.

Given the interest in pursuing discussions on meaningful human control, the group changed the name of the partnership project from “New Alliances to Curb Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)” to “New Alliances for Meaningful Human Control.”

As a next step, at the next CCW meeting in November 2020 the partnership will present a position paper that further clarifies the normative and technical principles of meaningful human control, so that Member States can incorporate them into a future additional protocol to the CCW on autonomous weapons systems.

## **Contact Information**

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## The Promise of Youth for Peace and Prosperity: Investment, Partnership and Action for Stability, Recovery, and Sustainable Development

*Partnership lead: Search for Common Ground*

*Participating organizations: The World Bank, UN Peacebuilding Support Office, African Union Youth Peace & Security Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, Alliance for Peacebuilding, US Agency for International Development, and United Network of Young Peacebuilders.*

Project Background: Key challenges the world is facing

In 2020, there are 1.85 billion young women and men 10 to 24 years of age in the world, 90 per cent of whom live in developing countries. One in four young people is affected by violence or armed conflict. Young people around the world are striving for peace, justice, inclusion, gender equality and human rights. Today, however, we are facing problems that multilateral institutions struggle to solve. Violent conflict has surged, reaching a 30-year high in 2018; authoritarian forces have emerged across the world; climate change has accelerated; and affective polarization has spiked.

Alongside these challenges, the world is experiencing a tectonic shift in power. Across history, young people have often driven social change, but today they are doing so with new force. Many people are fed up with injustice, inequality, inequities and limited pathways to a better life; with elites who make empty promises and institutions who resist change; with traditional forms of governance, including electoral politics, that (at best) inch toward gradual progress and (more often) fail to produce any change amidst urgent global conditions. People who are feeling this frustration are realizing they have a power which has lain dormant, seizing digital tools, and tapping into global networks to challenge systems perceived as unjust. In the U.S., protests over the killing of George Floyd revealed the ability of young activists to drive conversation and change. The dynamics of youth, frustration, and technology are global, and they are here to stay. Governments and institutions around the world are struggling to respond to this reality.

The Youth, Peace and Security Agenda

Young people are often the majority of the population below the age of 30 in conflict-affected countries. Despite facing systemic hurdles, many of them lead important initiatives building peace from the ground up. The international community increasingly is recognizing the importance of including these young people as essential partners in preventing violence and sustaining peace. UN Security Council Resolutions (2250, 2419 and 2535 on Youth, Peace and Security), and reports such as *The Missing Peace*, the independent UN Security Council mandated progress study on youth, peace and security, the Secretary General's Progress Study on the topic (S/2020/167) and the UN-World Bank Study, *Pathways to Peace*, recognize the significant role that young people could play in helping shape better peace and security outcomes globally.

This body of work is further supported by the coalition of 65+ UN agencies, NGOs, youth organizations, academics, donors and inter-governmental bodies who have come together to form the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security since 2012. The Coalition collaboratively contributes to a global, inclusive and transformative agenda on youth, peace and security (YPS).



The year 2020 marks the fifth anniversary of the historic UNSCR 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security making it the year for #youth4peace.

## Project Goals

Our long-term goals are (1) to transform social norms about young people (from perpetrators and burdens to partners) and (2) strengthen institutional capacities to support young people's agency, voice and leadership at the front lines of violent conflict and (3) improve investments that support youth-led action focused on shaping more just and peaceful societies.

To pursue these long-term goals, we are currently focusing on **four mutually reinforcing areas of work:**

- 1. Understanding Social Return on Investment** - To understand and articulate the need for more and better investments in youth, we need to demonstrate that these investments are worthwhile. We will undertake an analysis of the social return on investment (SROI) on Investment of youth-led peace and security interventions in up to 30 conflict and transition settings. The SROI for #Youth4Peace analysis will help quantify the effect of youth-led peacebuilding and justice-oriented efforts on (1) their peers—young people, (2) their communities, (3) various State & local institutions and (4) the private sector. By focusing on youth-led groups and their impacts, national government leaders and others who support the enabling environment will be better equipped to make the case for continued investment in young peacebuilders as key partners in preventing violence and sustaining peace in up to 30 countries.
- 2. High Level Political Buy-in for Supporting Youth-led Peace and Security Efforts** - In early 2021, the Governments of Finland, Qatar and Colombia will co-host a high-level conference in Doha, Qatar. At that event, Heads of states and governments will get together alongside leaders from international bodies such as the UN, EU, AU, civil society and youth leaders from several youth-majority countries experiencing armed conflict and violence or active peace processes. This conference will launch guidance for governments on how to support national strategies for strengthening youth inclusive peace processes. The SROI analysis will become a key advocacy tool to strengthen the commitment to youth inclusion.
- 3. Strengthening Youth Leadership for Change:** With our partners, Search for Common Ground is launching a new holistic approach to supporting youth leadership at the front lines of peacebuilding. The *Youth 360* approach offers a new model to sustain locally led efforts of youth building peace. Through Youth 360, we facilitate a process where youth groups gain access to funding, technical support, and decision-making power, through a global network of coaches, mentors and locally grounded skills for conflict analysis, collaborative design and implementation of youth-led efforts. This is an important step away from the traditional view of youth as beneficiaries of programming, seeing them instead as partners and recognizing their agency and leadership.
- 4. Financing Youth Leadership: A Global Multi-Partner Fund on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS Fund)** will introduce a seismic shift in *how and in whom* the international community invests to respond to complex violent conflicts in youthful majority countries. By securing the equivalent of **\$1 per young person** in the world today, the Fund plans to raise a collective total of **\$1.8 billion USD by 2030**. This bold investment will enable young peacebuilders, in partnership with other key stakeholders, to lead life-saving interventions in 10 of the world's most challenging violent conflicts. Essential to the fund's approach is a three-pronged strategy to: (1) direct funding to local youth-led groups to respond to frontline realities, building on the Youth 360 approach; (2) transform the peacebuilding field by convening stakeholders to collaboratively invest

in addressing the root causes of conflict over a five to 10-year time horizon in countries that have large youth populations and (3) provide backbone support that nurtures the culture of collaborative action for collective impact on the long run.

## Next Steps

- 1. Social Return on Investment:** The methodology for SROI is being finalized along with identifying key countries to pilot the methodology. Up to five countries will be chosen to develop the proof of concept. Upon completion, the methodology will be scaled to be launched in up to 30 countries by 2022.
- 2. High-Level Conference on Youth Inclusive Peace Processes:** Scheduled for May 2021. The following outputs are being collaboratively developed:
  - A high-level joint statement shared between Heads of State, High-level Government representatives, and young people to advance country-level operationalization of the YPS agenda based on specific contexts;
  - Launch of Guidelines in support of country-level operationalization of the YPS agenda;
  - A five-year strategy on strengthening youth-inclusive peace processesThe Global Conference will be co-hosted by the State of Qatar, Governments of Finland and Colombia, as well as co-organized by the United Nations Office of the Secretary General's Envoy on Youth (OSGEY) and Search for Common Ground in partnership with the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), UNWOMEN, UNDP, UNFPA and the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY).
- 3. Strengthening Youth Leadership for Change:** The methodology is being piloted in Sri Lanka and Guinea supported by UN Peacebuilding Support Office and UNAOC. Based on piloting, the proof of concept has been developed and is currently being designed for scaling through the establishment of a decentralized self-starting network of young peacebuilders.
- 4. Financing Youth Leadership through a YPS Fund:** Research has been completed for understanding how the fund will be structured and managed. Youth-led consultancies are ongoing. Currently seeking core investors to launch the fund.

## Interested in Joining this Partnership?

### Contact:

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## Women ART Peace Programme

*Partnership lead: Centre for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies*

*Participating organizations: Youth Leadership, Development Foundation (YLDF); Yemen, Peace against Violence Organization (PAVO), Furkhunda Trust for Afghan Women Education; Afghanistan, Gender Unit and The Center for Peace Studies at the University of Khartoum; Sudan, Tamkeen Organization; Spain, Hunt Alternatives; US, The Institute for Economics and Peace, Smash Strategies; US, The Campaign School at Yale University; US, UN Women*

### Background

The Centre for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies (CHS) is initiating a partnership program on women in conflict and peace under the umbrella of the UN75 Global Governance Forum. The program aims to achieve a situation where quantitative and qualitative representation of women in peacebuilding and recovery processes is visible at all levels.

This program adopts a comprehensive approach that equally recognizes the importance of each level; grassroots, Track I and Track II. The project gives a particular acknowledgment to the organic role of women at the grassroots level. Women's role as organizers, community catalysts and cross-community interactors, has proved to be more sustainable and effective in the long-run but has not yet been adequately addressed.<sup>1</sup> The Women ART program proposes a set of projects for uplifting women working on the grassroots level and highlighting their significant effort on one hand, while also ensuring to promote advocacy for women representation at Track I and Track II.

The program understands the complicated context of conflicts in Asia and Africa in general, particularly in Arab and Muslim-majority countries where most of the wars and conflicts in the world are taking place. While assessing the geographical scope of the program, we chose four countries where there is already a history of great deal of work on peace (Sudan for example), and/or where peace negotiations are foreseen in the coming weeks/months (Afghan Peace Talks). The program will focus on four countries which are Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan and Yemen for the first five years with the possibility to add other countries at a later stage.

CHS's facilitation will bring together local, regional and international representatives of relevant UN agencies, government stakeholders, research centers, civil society groups, grassroots organizations and NGOs. Partners are essential contributors to the development of the program and its roadmap. They will work simultaneously to develop context-analysis reports to help acknowledge the existing initiatives and explore areas where value-added work on advocacy, research and training is feasible; including organic peace-making efforts, mediation, policy engagement and response to humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and Sudan.

### Expected Outcomes

- Produce situational-analysis papers on peacebuilding approaches and women engagement in the four target countries.
- Establishment of a platform for lobbying and advocacy at each of the targeted conflict countries in order to review and strengthen the existing code of conduct and legal framework.
- Expand the pool of skillful, higher educated female scholars as future leaders at policy and grassroots levels.

- Enhance the capacity of 25 trainers at policy levels (negotiation/effective communication, leadership, business trainers, network building & community development trainers/lead facilitators.; and 35 mentors, coaches, facilitators at the community level for each of the targeted countries.
- Advance knowledge, skill and experience of conflict zone women in leadership and negotiation network building through local and regional conferences & sharing forum workshops.
- Build the capacity of a young female agent of change for community and policy level by engaging them in peace campaigns using mass or multimedia channels such as developing film, role play, arts, interviews, writing articles, storytelling, poem songs etc.

### Institutional Partnerships

Building partnerships is at the core of the Women ART Peace Programme which takes an organic, and step-by-step approach. This approach will help us to build on the already-established efforts, regionally and globally, towards a more active representation as well as engagement of women in peacebuilding and recovery processes. Our partners include globally recognized and locally active, research centers and think tanks, representatives of civil society groups and NGOs. The partnerships are based on the respect of the program's autonomy, and the belief of engaged local capacities and expertise.

### Partners from Conflict-affected Countries

Partners from conflict-affected countries are the core of the program. Each core partner acts in the capacity of an ambassador and key contributor to the program at all stages and projects, from situational analysis to the design of the prioritized projects, fundraising for join sharing pool, implementation, monitoring and evaluation through Consultation – Action – Reflection. Core partners can recommend building additional partnerships when and where required with other local organizations.

### Regional and International Partners

Regional and international partners act as a supporting and advisory body, sharing experiences from around the globe, providing support in international forums, and providing financial resources and technical expertise based on program needs.

The program will approach countries who adopt feminist foreign policy agenda as well as countries that have particular involvement in peacebuilding efforts including Sweden, Norway, Qatar, Turkey and Germany, the UK and the US. The program will also work on building partnerships with countries that have success stories in peacebuilding such as Malaysia and Indonesia. The program welcomes future partners based on its needs and the resources, expertise of partners.



## A Network for Peace and Security in Colombia

*Partnership lead: PASO Colombia, One Earth Future Foundation*

*Participating organizations: The United Nations Multi-Partner Trust for Sustaining Peace, Organization of American States, Swedish International Development Agency, The Colombia Peace Fund, The University of Notre Dame, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The International Youth Foundation, The Scaling Up Community of Practice, One Earth Future Foundation/PASO Colombia.*

### Background

On July 22<sup>nd</sup> and August 3<sup>rd</sup> an outstanding team of experienced, engaged and motivated people, and organizations convened to initiate a Peace and Security Partnership for Colombia catalyzed through the UN75 Global Governance Forum. Together we identified our agreed priorities and potential avenues to jointly carry out impactful actions at scale:

- The importance to focus the alliance between Government, the International Community, local communities and the private sector on key action components that truly transform local economic and social conditions and governance;
- A territorial approach that activates local cultural, ethnic, natural, economic and governance assets empowering new leaderships, including those of women;
- Special attention to inclusive agricultural development;
- Focus in the zones most affected by conflict in the context of the *Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*;
- Integration within the activities that present challenges facing the Colombian countryside; such as the increase of violence, the murder of social leaders and the effect associated to COVID-19, which invite us to invest in health, food security and local market consolidation

In order to successfully create the “**Network of Peace**” we need to face challenges in matters of coordination between central and local, state and private, formal and peasant economies and the so-called “costs” associated with the “last mile problem.” We need to innovate, do things differently, disrupt paradigms, permanently monitor the quality of key processes and be sensitive to the hundreds of details that are never included in work plans but give life to the programs. The ideas that provide the correct horizon to scale up and unleash the creative energy of thousands of Colombians across regions will be key to the scaling process.

### Our Value Proposition

During the discussion regarding *The Future We Want and the UN We Need*, the group of organizations invested in this project evolved. The participants have been working on a framework to integrate components, territories, strategies, actions, and operations, that address key strategic objectives that include: a) transform beneficiaries in territories into project partners, b) change the dynamics of commercialization in the territories, c) impact productivity axes substantially, d) strengthen local governance networks by generating synergies between programs and organizations in the territories, e) strengthen organizations, f) empower women and youth, g) develop resilience to emergencies associated with the presence of armed groups, h) provide an

appropriate response to the spread of COVID 19.

The project's overall strategy is to promote inclusive rural development of peasant economies in the territories most affected by conflict, illicit crops, and the presence of armed groups.

The framework in which this program operates is:

- Respect for life, represented in the empowerment of women and youth and in assuring that these groups have elements that allow for the development of their individual and collective creativity.
- Renewal of the socioeconomic fabric affected by conflict and illicit coca crops.
- Inclusive rural development.
- The environment as a provider of the best ecosystem services, with great potential for the enjoyment of life, the development of science, and the development of products required by humanity within the framework of regenerative economies.

The management of the partnership is based on a new form of governance that multiplies local collective intelligence, takes advantage of the assets in the territories, and generates synergies with existing programs and projects. The elements that make up this work method are: a) the Territorial Work Plan, b) the integration of operations for market creation, sustainable production, and development, the strengthening of peasant production infrastructures and collective entrepreneurship, and c) development of various dimensions of knowledge that go beyond technical and include empathy, the relationship with nature, and payment for community services, as initial incentives for peasant men and women.

#### Next Steps

The following are the activities that are taking place within the context of the present partnership driving the Network for Peace & Security in Colombia:

1. Consolidate the partnership around a specific work plan that addresses and designs solutions to the different challenges for peace and security in Colombia's territories.
2. Design financial mechanisms that support the plan, including the coordinated action of the partnership.
3. Select the zones where the partnership will operate.
4. Integrate the designs with existing work carried out by the State, the communities, and the International Community.
5. Create the scaling up network.
6. Integrate the partnership with current UN activities in the field of peace and security
7. Design the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
8. Incorporate cross sectoral elements, especially the gender, youth, and environmental components.
9. Integrate the resilience elements that address great risks like COVID-19 and illegal armed group activities.

## Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace

*Partnership lead: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

*Participating organizations: Access Now, European Cyber Security Organization, French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Internet Freedom Foundation, IPANDETEC, Manchester International Law Center, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zimbabwe, Microsoft, MISA Zimbabwe, Thai Netizen Network (Foundation for Internet and Civic Culture)*

### Project Background

Launched by President Macron in November 2018, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace is the largest international multi-stakeholder initiative on cybersecurity. It is based around nine common principles to ensure that cyberspace remains a safe, stable and resilient environment. The Paris Call is now supported by more than 1,000 governments, companies and civil society organizations from around the world. Supporters commit to working together to adopt responsible behaviors and respect online the principles and fundamental rights that apply in the physical world.

### Project Goals

The Paris Call offers a vision of regulation in cyberspace based on key principles, among which the application of international law, the adoption of responsible behavior by states, the prohibition on the use of force by non-state actors, and the acknowledgement of the role and responsibility of private actors. The goal of the Paris Call is to constitute a community of supporters from all sectors – public sector, private sector, civil society – that unite around, promote and implement a common set of values and principles in order to increase trust and security in the cyberspace. The Paris Call encourages all supporters to launch their own initiatives to implement the principles of the Call and promotes a multi-stakeholder approach in international fora.

### Next Steps

Setting up working groups to allow stakeholders to focus on the issues that matter most to them and develop concrete tools and solutions to improve global security in the cyberspace.

## Pillar III: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Inclusive Governance

### Enhancing Civil Society Space at the United Nations

*Partnership leads: UN2020, Together First, The Stimson Center*

*Participating organizations: Access Now, Amnesty International, Article 19, CIVICUS, Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Igarape Institute, Int'l Women's Association, ISHR, NGOCSO-NY, Oxfam, UNA-UK, Universal Rights Group, WFM Canada, DESA OISC, DESA NGO Branch, DGC, EOSG, OHCHR, UN75, UN Women.*

UN2020, Together First and the Stimson Center facilitated the participation of key civil society organizations and senior UN officials in a partnership initiative on “enhancing civil society space and participation at the United Nations” that took place as two 90-minute virtual meetings on 20 August & 27 August 2020, as a part of the UN75 Global Governance Forum.

The goal of these discussions was to interrogate the efficacy of organizing a campaign to promote the appointment by the Secretary-General of a high-level champion for civil society that would help facilitate and implement a system-wide strategy to protect and enhance civil society space and participation at the UN. The purpose of the appointment would be to help expand and ensure inclusive, equal, effective, well-coordinated and sustainable participation of civil society actors in programmatic processes and decision-making across the United Nations system.

The 75th anniversary of the United Nations has inspired a number of reform proposals designed to strengthen the accountability, transparency and effectiveness of partnerships at the UN, as it embarks upon the launch of its Decade of Action to achieve the SDGs. The need for the UN to define a system-wide strategy to promote, engage with and safeguard civil society has been a long-term call. In his Call to Action for Human Rights last February, the Secretary-General called for a system-wide strategy for the UN on protecting civic space, requiring all relevant UN bodies and agencies to develop their own policies and strategies on participation, promotion and protection of civil society actors -- the three “Ps” -- in the context of their mandates, with mechanisms to monitor and measure progress. In April 2020, the OHCHR issued a report on civil society space that reviewed UN policies and practices relating to civic space and civil society engagement in UN intergovernmental processes and forums at global and country levels.

As echoed by the UN75 People’s Declaration, UNA-UK and CIVICUS have made proposals for the appointment of a senior staff position at USG or ASG level to be designated as a civil society focal point and champion at the UN, as a modality to further develop and implement a system-wide strategy to promote and protect civic space. These proposals, which builds on previous work arising from the successful 1 for 7 billion campaign and a conference at Chatham House on Kofi Annan’s legacy were incorporated into a recommendation of the Together First campaign - the outcome of a wide ranging 18 month consultation process to find the most viable UN reforms. Civil society and other stakeholders are key implementation partners, and systematically increasing their participation is crucial to meeting current and future global challenges.

Yet current arrangements for civil society participation across the UN system are piecemeal, and where inclusion is permitted, participation favors well-represented NGOs with the ability to staff



an office at UN HQs. The full diversity of civil society constituencies are not so well represented across the UN system, such as social movements and grassroots organizations, including those organizations whose political advocacy causes certain Member States to deny them accreditation.

In line with the Paris Agreement and the Accra Agenda for Action, it has been suggested that the focal point should look at the development agenda from the perspective of those the development is intended to serve – bringing their voices into donor conversations as equal partners and helping strengthen local, and more broadly global south, ownership of development – thereby generating the support of the G77 and NAM. In a similar vein there would appear to be a very clear role for the focal point in advancing the notion of “people centered” UN peacekeeping – peacekeeping that answers to the “peace kept” communities as much as it does to New York.

Another prominent suggestion was that the focal point should sit within a broader package of reforms designed to protect and enhance civil society space worldwide, and in particular within the UN, and add substance to the Secretary-General’s civil society strategy. The proposal itself, being eye-catching and easily communicable, could serve a useful function even before implementation in being the headline for this reform package. Furthermore, upon appointment one of the first tasks the focal point should undertake is the address the asymmetric participation and involvement of civil society in various UN departments and agencies by conducting a system-wide audit of civil society engagement mechanisms across the UN and opportunities and threats to civil society space.

Participants of the partnership consultations discussed the history of the civil society focal point proposal, the proposed modalities and funding of the proposed position, as well as the scope of the role and structure of the office within the UN secretariat. While important questions regarding implementation remain, participants agreed that a public case could be made for a civil society focal point as it would increase the Organization’s limited capacity to engage proactively with civil society, and facilitate the improvement of modalities for civil society engagement across the UN system. Most importantly, it will give greater assistance to, and opportunities for, civil society organizations to engage with the UN, particularly from the Global South, to ensure that the Organization hears from new, more diverse and representative voices.

As a part of the UN75 political process, Member States have now mandated the Secretary-General with developing recommendations for the Organization, set to be issued before the end of the 75th session of the General Assembly, which could include further work on this agenda. The partnership’s next steps include the publication of a public-facing expert report outlining key principles of the proposal, including a declaration for CSOs to endorse a public campaign in support of a high-level champion for civil society.

For more information about this partnership initiative, contact Jeffery Huffines, Senior Advisor of UN2020 ([jeffery@un2020.org](mailto:jeffery@un2020.org)), Enyseh Teimory, Communications Officer of Together First ([Teimory@una.org.uk](mailto:Teimory@una.org.uk)), and Fred Carver, Advisor of Together First ([Carver@una.org.uk](mailto:Carver@una.org.uk)).

## Mental Wellness for the World's Growing Refugees, Migrants, and Disenfranchised Peoples: A Roadmap

*Partnership leads: Tesseract Group, Epiphany Film Fund*

*Participating organizations: Singularity University, OpenExO, a global transformation ecosystem, BrainBreaks HOPSport, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), Future Life, Inc., Harvard Graduate School of Education, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Humanity Crew, ICMHD, Omega Healthcare, Pythia International, Scalabrini International Migration Network (SIMN), Tesseract Group, The Office of Nick Kho, Tulane University School of Medicine, Udarta Consulting, LLC, United Nations Population Fund*

Our SDG-aligned Global Mental Wellness partnership brings together stakeholders professional mental health, psychotherapy, epidemiology, academic research, narrative therapy, family systems theory, mass and social media, refugee and diplomatic services, global media and public relations, public-private partnerships, international project management, financing, empowerment-centric scaling technology, and related activist communities to bring not only awareness but proven and successful mental wellness programs and education to people worldwide, with a primary focus on the world's refugee population. The following project addresses the following question:

*"How can you promote the United Nations' long-held commitment to human rights and humanitarian in support of the UN75 Declaration by developing and deploying a measurable, scalable mental health solution for refugees, migrants and the disenfranchised?"*

### Global Challenge

Good morning and thank you for the honor of presenting our Mental Wellness Roundtable solution and associated roadmap for development and deployment. We present this to you as a global team of experts and organizations passionate about developing and delivering game-changing mental wellness interventions to tens of millions of refugees, migrants and disenfranchised - and ultimately, all of humanity.

We come to this forum with the agreement that Mental Wellness is a basic human right, in support of our shared belief that: *"To have Peace on the outside, one must have Peace on the inside; and Peace on the inside first requires Mental Wellness."*<sup>2</sup>

The lack of mental wellness will cost the world estimated \$16 Trillion by 2030<sup>3</sup>!

Currently, 79.5 million people<sup>4</sup> have been forcibly displaced worldwide, many under deplorable circumstances resulting in significant negative individual and societal mental health impacts. COVID-19 exacerbates these rising global challenges.

### Project Partnership Initiative

Our project supports the UN75 Declaration's<sup>5</sup> assertions: "We will leave no one behind" and "We will promote peace and prevent conflicts".

Secondly, we support the global adoption of the UN's SDGs<sup>6</sup>, particularly 3.4 "Promoting Mental Health and Well-Being," as they relate to supporting the UN's "Human Rights" Pillar.

Accordingly, we curated a diverse, highly qualified team capable of generating comprehensive solutions integrating human and technological value optimized to help bring mental wellness to every human being. We chose to target “Mental Wellness”, a positively aspirational subset of the greater “Mental Health” field, focusing on solutions for globally widespread mental health problems and disorders such as stress, anxiety, depression, addiction, Complex PTSD<sup>7</sup>, and suicide.

### Initial Solution

We decided to leverage the deployment of ‘narrative therapy’ as the foundation of a first project. This choice reflects the proven value of Narrative therapy<sup>8</sup> as a tool for healing and discovering identity. This approach is effective for reducing the effects of trauma in refugees while preventing mental disorders, and can be provided by trained laypersons or paraprofessionals, across cultures and settings. Our initial project brings to the world’s refugees awareness and proven mental wellness methodologies, education, personal resilience, and economic and societal reintegration into their new homes.

### Roadmap to Deployment

We have formed, and are now in the process of officially registering, the Global Mental Wellness Foundation charitable organization by which we can commence this project, though which we can also begin to accept and redistribute donations to finance this project. We are now engaged in the following road map:

- a. Determine initial team contributions to Project One
- b. Explicitly outline, define, and architect Project One
- c. Determine a team budget for One Project
- d. Develop sponsorship / donation marketing collateral to support raising funds for Project One
- e. Begin to develop business and project plans for Project One
- f. Lock architecture, design, and specifications for Project One
- g. Identify and establish symbiotic entity partnerships, including deployment partners
- h. Commence fundraising for Project One, and in parallel
- i. Begin to architect a roadmap / plan for the larger “Moonshot” project / campaign that is our ultimate target, against which we will soon begin to expand our collaborating audience, partnership base and capitalization.

### Global Mental Wellness Foundation’s Key Messages

1. Global peace is not possible without inner peace – inner peace requires mental wellness
2. The lack of Mental wellness is the source of most of the worlds challenges
  - a. The lack of Mental Wellness is a huge problem for individuals, society, the world, and humanity, with a broad negative impact, resulting in economic, cultural, political, societal, and individual instability.
3. Our first Mental Wellness solution leverages narrative therapy, to treat the effects of trauma in refugees and to prevent psychiatric illness
  - a. Initially, we are focused on leveraging narrative therapy-based solutions to bring Mental Wellness to refugees, migrants, and disenfranchised peoples.
4. Ultimately, we aspire to bring mental wellness to all global populations.

For more information, please refer to **[www.globalmentalwellness.org](http://www.globalmentalwellness.org)**.

## A platform to support the UN Data Strategy

*Partnership lead: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, UN University, Global Information Management Working Group*

*Participating organizations: ECLAC, UN OCHA, MERIT, Esri, Strategic Planning and Monitoring Unit Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, SIPRI, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Columbia University, UN Global Pulse, UNHCR*

### Information Management and the triple nexus

Over the last two decades, considerable efforts have gone into information management (IM) standards, methods and tools in support of global agendas such as the [Sustainable Development Goals](#) (SDGs) and overall emergency / humanitarian response. Communities of practice exist within each of the triple nexus pillars, that exchange good practice on the application of modern IM systems to fields ranging from peacekeeping, through development, environmental protection, emergency response and human rights.

Yet challenges remain both for the consistent transformation of raw data into actionable information as well as to expand its use and applicability *across* the pillars of the [triple nexus](#):

- **No comprehensive global-level framework to guide the work of the IM community:** sector-wide coherence of IM and analytical practices mostly relies on ground-up coordination mechanisms and forums such as the Information Management Working Group (IMWG) and platforms such as the [Humanitarian Data Exchange](#) or [UNdata](#).
- **No consistent mechanism to foster public, private, philanthropic and academic partnerships to enhance the availability of information:** humanitarian and development actors primarily rely on partnerships with other NGOs and IOs to enhance their work on the ground. Enriching partnerships with external actors tend to be *ad hoc* and occasional.
- **No global oversight and monitoring of IM capacity requirements and availability:** resourcing of IM capacity across the triple nexus depends largely on individual agencies' strategies and objectives.
- **No mechanism to enhance the quality (fitness-for-purpose) of information generated:** information quality standards are largely set and self-monitored by individual organizations, limiting the reliability of data integration and aggregation at global levels.

### A Data Strategy for Action by Everyone, Everywhere

In recognition of these challenges and of the centrality of quality data for achieving global agendas, in May 2020 the Secretary-General launched the UN [Data Strategy for Action by Everyone, Everywhere](#) that sets a vision for collective and continuous improvement in how data, information and knowledge are leveraged.

The Strategy explicitly underlines the importance of partnerships across the UN, the civil sector, academia, the private sector and the donor community for its successful implementation. Specifically, the strategy points to the following types of partnerships:



- *Strategic partners*, who champion the cause of data action globally and in the long-term and help unlock the full potential of this Strategy, across priority use cases, enablers and capabilities.
- *Data action partners*, who work on defining use cases across mandates, and the SG’s priorities for 2020/21.
- *Knowledge partners*, who can assist with sustained advice on how to strengthen the enablers and capabilities needed for data insight, impact and integrity.

#### A Global Governance Forum Partnership Table to support the Data Strategy

This UN 75 Global Governance Partnership table convened IM stakeholders and thought leaders from across the UN, the civil sector, academia and the private sector to discuss the challenges surrounding the generation and use of quality information to support global agendas.

The members agreed that while the UNSG’s Data Strategy clearly identifies and addresses the need for more coherence in data and information underpinning the triple nexus, there is no concrete, well-resourced and empowered global-level mechanism able to support its implementation.

The members therefore agreed on the value of establishing a global platform to support the implementation of the Data Strategy. The platform’s mission would ultimately be *to ensure that the goals, objectives and principles of the UN SG’s Data Strategy are translated into concrete standards, methods and tools developed by and for actors across the triple nexus.*

The members agree that the overall objectives of this platform are to:

1. Provide a space to foster new, and enhance existing, collaborations and partnerships around information across the triple nexus, involving key stakeholders such as the UN, civil, private, academic and philanthropic sectors
2. Provide a space to collectively define, collate and access best-practice IM standards, methods and tools across the triple nexus
3. Serve as a feedback mechanism to the SG’s Office regarding progress against the Data Strategy’s objectives across the triple nexus and beyond

The members agree that this platform would work along the following broad principles:

1. Adopt a participatory use-case-centric approach to defining information and data requirements
2. Promote partnership wherever possible
3. Identify and promote existing capacities and best-practice
4. Seek to federate existing information platforms, communities of practice, and other fora around common goals across the triple nexus
5. Seek interoperability of information vertically (global, regional, national) and horizontally (thematic sectors) across the triple nexus
6. Maximize information flow and accessibility and thereby increase “business intelligence”

#### A roadmap

In a second round of discussions, the members defined a broad roadmap and next steps for the establishment of this platform:

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>
Present the outcome of table discussions and roadmap at the GGF plenary	16-17 Sept. 2020
Seek EOSG buy-in for the establishment of the platform	Q2 2020
Present the concept note to Philanthropy partners to seek funding for a task team	Q3 2020
Task Team to establish Theory of Change, ToR, Structure, Participation and Budget	Q4 2020
Pilot the concept with identified use cases	Q1 2021

Accelerating Digital Connectivity in the Wake of COVID-19

*Partnership lead: International Telecommunication Union*

*Participating organizations: EMEA Satellite Operators Association (ESOA), Facebook, GSMA, Loon: An Alphabet company, Microsoft, SpaceX, UN Global Compact, UNICEF, World Economic Forum*

The Partnership Dialogue for Connectivity is comprised of representatives of key providers of digital infrastructure and services, together with international organizations working to promote digital connectivity, who within the framework of the preparation to the UN75 Global Governance Forum agreed to collaborate in accelerating digital connectivity as per this Statement.

We, the Partnership Dialogue for Connectivity, find as follows:

- A. Recognizing that:
  - COVID-19 has laid bare the realities that underpin our globalized economies, with a key lesson that not being connected to the Internet increasingly means not having access to employment opportunities, education, health care, public services, as well as the power of information and digital transformation. It means, in short, being shut out of full economic and social participation in the modern world and related benefits;
  - Evidence emerging from research regarding the contribution of digitalization to mitigating the impact of pandemics suggests that countries with top connectivity infrastructure can mitigate up to half of the negative economic impact resulting from pandemics;
  - Despite the importance of digital economies and broadband, 3.6 billion people, are not fully participating online due to lack of access to high-speed internet or a compatible device, affordability of both, or the relevant skills or content;
  - Connecting the unconnected will require all stakeholders, in particular governments, providers of digital infrastructure and digital services, as well as investors, to work together in a complementary and collaborative manner to tackle the barriers to connecting people;

- The ability to participate in the economy and society, or benefit from public services is now highly dependent on broadband connectivity. Broadband connectivity for individuals, homes, businesses, schools, and healthcare institutions among others, recognizing changing usage patterns, is therefore not just a convenience, but rather, an essential requirement to access numerous services including education, health care, business and financial transactions, and public services, among others;
- The uptake of broadband services does not just depend on the supply-side variables like the coverage, availability and affordability of service. It also depends on demand-side elements including digital skills (both to use and produce digital products), relevant content, and sufficient access to network devices, particularly among populations in poor communities and among disenfranchised groups;
- Investment in digital technologies is a key part of sustainable and ‘green’ recovery given the critical role they can play in reducing humanity’s carbon impact and managing ecosystems;
- In order to secure a genuinely sustainable recovery, companies are encouraged to adhere to core responsible business practices by committing to the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, which are derived from key UN Conventions and Declarations in the areas of human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption;
- The UN Secretary General António Guterres, in his launch of the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, emphasized that “Effective digital cooperation is instrumental in achieving the future we want and the ambitious goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”;
- There is a need for policy makers, regulators and other stakeholders to adopt and promote good practices and experiences while facilitating, and removing barriers to, the deployment of broadband access in their respective countries;
- This COVID-19 pandemic has shown us that connectivity for all is essential and key digital challenges cannot be overcome by one stakeholder group alone. In response, a broad array of stakeholders has been working, and closely collaborating, to ensure that digital infrastructure, services and applications are deployed so that people may continue living their lives as normally as possible during the COVID-19 pandemic;
- A lot of significant work has already commenced to support digital connectivity in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to aid the recovery, including the initiatives noted in the Annex to this Statement;

B. In our determination to respond to Secretary General Guterres’ call to “build back better”, and with our firm belief that it is important to go further and “build back better with broadband”, we have agreed to work together to:

- 1) Further pursue (and, where appropriate, re-tool) initiatives to accelerate access to broadband connectivity for everyone in the post-COVID world, and where appropriate and without prejudice, to applicable legal and regulatory frameworks to collaborate to maximize the joint impact of such initiatives;
- 2) Leverage experiences of the members of the Partnership Dialogue for Connectivity as well as best practices developed as part of the ITU Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR), to support the development of a repository of good practices and case studies (on the basis of REG4COVID, the Global Network Resiliency Platform), and serve as ongoing resources to help policy makers, regulators and other stakeholders to tap into good practices and experiences with the aim of facilitating, and removing barriers to,

the deployment of broadband access in their respective countries in the wake of COVID-19.

- C. We invite other stakeholders, especially development finance institutions, global and regional organizations concerned with digital infrastructure, national governments and other potential partners to join us in the effort to build back better with broadband.
- D. Public and private sector initiatives should involve and drive the sustainability of local digital ecosystems with an appropriate priority in the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic assigned to support the connectivity and digitalization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Companies engaged in these initiatives are encouraged to adhere to the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, as taking a principles-based approach to driving recovery is foundational to ensuring these efforts are aligned with achieving SDGs by 2030.
- E. National governments should:
- Give due recognition to the crucial role of network infrastructure and services in underpinning the global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, especially through involving investors in digital infrastructure and service providers in the design and implementation of their recovery strategies, and by supporting the development of such infrastructure through economic stimulus packages, as necessary;
  - Ensure that their digital development plans are updated to take into account post-COVID-19 imperatives, including short and medium-term considerations (such as appropriate emergency and disaster relief frameworks; special infrastructure planning and construction provisions; and changes in the use of connectivity when isolation measures are in place);
  - Take a holistic multi-sectoral and pragmatic approach to expanding connectivity, so that policymaking includes all relevant government agencies and departments, recognizing:
    - (a) the key role that all digital technologies play in the provision of health, education, financial and public services in the wake of COVID-19;
    - (b) the role for supporting infrastructures, especially energy, in the development of digital infrastructure, and
    - (c) the fundamental need for digital inclusion to be an integral part of an overarching social and economic inclusion, including financial, health and educational inclusion;
  - Reduce existing and refrain from erecting new and unnecessary barriers to investment in, development, deployment and use of digital infrastructure, such as:
    - o the imposition of new taxes or license fees that could alleviate short term financial pressures but would be at the expense of the sustainable long-term recovery; or
    - o the imposition of unnecessary speed and latency obligations that could result in excluding vital connectivity solutions for areas where today there are none and that are not required for all broadband applications;
  - Support digitization efforts of local businesses, especially Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), as a strategic approach to supporting the recovery and adjust to the 'new normal'.

## The Digital Identity Project

*Partnership lead: Association for Computing Machinery's Future of Computing Academy*

*Participating organizations: Institute for Accountability in the Digital Age, 5th Element Group, IQVIA, Boundary Bay, UN Office of Partnerships, Bridge the Gap Ventures, International Telecommunication Union*

### Project Background

Technologies such as facial recognition and COVID-19 contact tracing have recently ignited fierce policy debates around digital identity, such as invasion of privacy, proper regulation, and the impact of computing on society. These debates have been largely limited to high-level leadership and traditional academic venues with limited entry points for students and early-career practitioners, who will inherit and are invested in these issues. We want to make it easier for this audience to self-educate and participate in these discussions.

### Project Goals and Desired Outcomes

The Digital Identity for the Next Generation Project is an outreach and communication project with the goal of engaging the next generation of stakeholders in the discourse on issues of digital identity (DI).

Through this project we intend to:

- Collect and develop accessible nonpartisan technical assessment that bridges technology and policy domain knowledge.
- Scale this work in the context our rights with respect to the implementation of technology as related to the Global Goals.
- Help people make informed decisions on the impact of digital identity technology and technology policy in their lives.

As part of this project we will create new tech/science communication materials that bridges knowledge gaps across our different stakeholders. We will prototype community input and engagement tools to identify emerging issues our stakeholders care about as well as the best practices to encourage their active participation, with an emphasis on ease of use and understanding in our services.

### Next Steps

- We will start working on general needs assessment to understand the degree by which different segments of youth are aware and educated on digital identity, with the goal of developing user profiles to better understand and prioritize knowledge gaps;
- We are exploring and collecting information on what work is already being done in the digital identity space and to what degree these existing efforts positively/negatively impact and/or consider the next generation.
- We have started looking at access to healthcare across different countries as a way to better understand where and when access to digital identity is or will be critical. We plan to do



this as a way to identify both digital divides and resources that can alleviate these issues. We intend to scale this process across different cases to get a more holistic picture of how digital identity impacts our everyday functions as a society.

- We are working with the Institute for Accountability in the Digital Age to explore the possibility of hosting virtual information sessions and labs for people interact and stay educated on emerging topics in the digital identity space.

## Pillar IV: Climate Governance

### Climate Governance Commission: 21st Century Governance for Exponential Climate Action

*Partnership leads: Climate Governance Commission and Global Challenges Foundation*

*Participating organizations: Stimson Centre, Together First, International Crisis Group, Exponential Climate Action Roadmap, Global Green Growth Institute, Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Club de Madrid, Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), New Delhi, and others.*

#### Commission Objective

The Commission aims to fill a crucial gap in confronting the global climate emergency, by innovating and proposing feasible, high impact global governance solutions for urgent, exponential climate action, to limit global temperature rise to or below 1.5°C.

#### The Global Climate/Nature Emergency and the Governance Gap

- The global governance response to the planetary climate/nature emergency has to date been insufficient to confront the scale, gravity, urgency and unprecedented nature of the problem. Despite the success of concluding the 2015 Paris Agreement, it has been reported that there is a [97% chance of exceeding a 2°C target](#) based on countries' climate policy pathways thus far. There is a pressing need to focus expert attention on this global "governance gap," to catalyze and prioritize appropriate global governance innovations to scale up international action, based on the best available scientific and technical knowledge. The window for action is narrowing for the international community, and the current situation calls for unprecedented levels of global cooperation and exponential action across every region of the world, and across the global economy.
- The currently inadequate global governance mechanisms leave humanity exposed to unacceptable levels of risk. Climate and related ecological risks (biodiversity loss, overstepping of planetary boundaries, etc.), are also interwoven with knock-on effects across sectors, e.g., for global financial and economic stability, peace, security and conflict, mass human rights violations and migration, food security, and so on.

## Pathways to Exponential Climate Action

- The climate challenge also presents unprecedented social, health and economic opportunities for humanity in forging the pathway to a 1.5°C limitation. This pathway has already been mapped in a comprehensive way, based on the best available scientific and technical knowledge, for example, in [The Exponential Climate Action Roadmap](#) and related/allied initiatives.
- The Commission will build on and add value to this existing body of knowledge and ongoing work by focusing specifically on improvements to the global governance architecture that would facilitate or leverage high impact climate solutions identified by the Exponential Roadmap and related initiatives. It will diagnose obstacles to effective climate action and propose global governance responses to these. For example: 1) global financing policies and the unlocking of greater and systematized investment in the new economy, including R&D for key sectors/issues; 2) legal frameworks for the recognition of the global commons and the whole Earth system/planetary boundaries; 3) global carbon pricing; 4) designing a state-of-the-art Global Environmental Agency; 5) UN Security Council and UN whole system response; 6) “accelerant” roles of the Bretton Woods institutions, and other economic/finance institutions such as the AIIB, NDB and EIB, and so on.

## Planetary Boundaries, Global Governance and Longer-Term Opportunities

- The governance requirements of our time require a shared cultural/conceptual shift, to acknowledge the global commons and the need for earth system governance, based on ever-improving planetary science. Planetary boundaries must be respected, keeping humanity within a “Safe Operating Space” (e.g., relying on the work of the [Earth Commission](#) and [Global Commons Alliance](#)). The science and shared objective circumstances must drive global governance responses.
- The urgency and complexity of the climate/nature emergency – which cuts across all areas of social, political and economic life – is likewise a significant opportunity to consider pathways towards the functional global governance we need in the longer term (e.g., to manage the range of global risks), with fact-based global governance and humanity’s collective best interest squarely at the center.

## Annex: Summary Logistical Matters/Background

### 1) Work/Consultations to Date and Collaborators/Partners

- Secretariat members have held **exploratory consultations** on the Commission and have actively facilitated sessions at multiple [Global Policy Dialogues](#) of the Stimson Centre.
- A focused **Commission Strategy Meeting** was held in Seoul on October 23-24, at Ban Ki Moon’s Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in connection with the [2019 Climate Governance Global Policy Dialogue](#) and Global Green Growth Week (a **Commission Strategy/Concept Note** was completed December 2019).
- A range of governments and their agencies have been or will be approached, to explore possible engagement in the work of the Commission (e.g., the [Leadership Group](#), the EU and the European Investment Bank, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, Costa Rica, etc.).
- Consultations with **other organizations** at senior levels or prominent individuals/forums (HRH Prince of Wales, BTeam, Doha Forum, Paris Peace Forum, Greenpeace International, WWF, Oil Change International, etc.).

## Projected Timeline, Meetings and Key Dates

- Background work is on-going within the Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) Secretariat, in cooperation with external consultants: a current priority is commissioning first policy papers over the summer / fall of 2020. Bilateral discussions with Commission Members, external experts/collaborators and inter-institutional meetings will be on-going throughout the life of the Commission, as necessary. An online expert consultation on initial research priorities took place in **June 2020**.
- **UN75 Global Governance Forum, New York (Sept. 16-17)**, timed to coincide with UNGA week).
- **2020-2021, Sweden** [date TBC, depending on global health conditions]: The Global Challenges Foundation's **New Shape Forum (NSF)** will be held in a high-level, discussion-based Round Table format, focusing on climate governance. A first meeting of Commission Members / Experts / Ambassadors would be held in the days in advance of the NSF.
- **Online and smaller/side events** [dates TBC, depending on global health conditions], The Hague, New York, Abuja, and elsewhere, around and in addition to key international and regional climate events, in connection with post-UN75 global consultations and preparations for COP26.
- **Final Report**, subject to Commission agreement, proposed in the course of **2021**, with a final or interim report released before COP26, Glasgow.

## Working Methods and Written Outputs

- The Commission's Secretariat will synthesize Commission consultations and information from key expert collaborators, in several short interim **Policy Briefs** and a **Final Report**. The Secretariat, working with partner institutions will build on and forefront **already-established scientific and technical expertise, and global policy proposals of excellence**. Materials will be tailored to be of direct use by policy- and decision-makers, stakeholders and communities of influence worldwide. There will be preparation of more concise, tailored materials for wider dissemination via a social media campaign and other targeted communications efforts.

## Earth System, One Common Heritage, One New Global Pact

*Partnership lead: Common Home of Humanity*

*Participating organizations: UN General Assembly (UNGA), Earth System Scientist Global Environmental Facility, Indigenous Peoples Major Group on Sustainable Development, Environmental Commission of the Club de Jurists, Progression Foundation, Association des Femmes Peuples Autochtones du Tchad, Our Common Future, One Earth: Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Vodafone Foundation, Ageas Foundation, La Caixa Foundation*

## Project Background

The Common Home of Humanity (CHH) worked alongside the convening committee on the UN75 Global Governance Forum for a two-day virtual forum presented on September 16th & 17th. The Forum honored the 75th anniversary of the United Nations (UN) and showcased 20 partnerships

and innovations to advance *The Future We Want, The UN We Need*. This platform provided an opportunity to bring together 200+ leaders from governments, civil society organizations, as well as from the philanthropic, technology, and business communities. The final aim is to foster new and innovative partnerships between the UN system and the participants, to better address some of the pressing global issues (peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, and climate governance challenges).

The Common Home of Humanity - a lead NGO in the UN's *Global Pact for the Environment* dialogues - led a partnership table on climate governance around the CHH Initiative "**One Earth System, One Common Heritage, One New Global Pact**"<sup>9</sup>. This CHH Initiative advocates giving legal recognition to the Earth System to protect Earth's Safe Operating Space – upon which all life depends.

This Initiative was a precursor of the strategy introduced by UN Secretary General António Guterres in his *State of the World* speech in January 2020, where he stressed the need to "**Adopt a whole-of-ecosystem approach by linking climate governance to other environmental agreements, protocols and conventions,**" an approach also underscored by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at an October 2019 Seoul dialogue.<sup>10</sup>

The UN's **Roadmap for Follow-up Consultations on UN General Assembly Resolution 73/333**<sup>11</sup> sets the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the establishment of the UN Environment Program – June of 2022 – as the deadline for adoption of a High-Level Political Declaration on a Global Pact for the Environment.

CHH advocates for the **Principle of the Integrity and Unity of the Earth System** to be the substantive content of this high-level declaration at the Landmark 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, of Stockholm 1972.

## Goal

Our goal for this partnership is to introduce the Principle of the Integrity and Unity of the Earth System that will be materialized through legal recognition of the Earth System as Common Heritage of Humankind - built around the scientifically established Nine Planetary Biophysical Boundaries - to form the framework for an ambitious new global environmental pact with cascading effects on social justice, health and economy.

## Desired outcomes

The Earth System, One Common Heritage, One New Global Pact dialogues will seek a consensus on the urgency of addressing climate challenges with a whole-systems approach, the beneficial outcomes of legally recognizing the Earth System as Common Heritage of Humankind, and the need to co-create social-engineering strategies for strong global action behind the CHH Global Pact for the Environment campaign.

The dialogues should develop key action steps to be operationalized following the September Forum by a CHH/GPE Advocacy Steering Committee, such as:

- A. Recruitment of Key Supporters: Member States, NGOs, Business Sector, Foundations
- B. Organizing Educational and Advocacy events (Webinars, Conferences, etc.)
- C. Development of Cultural and Political Inflection Point Strategies and Timelines
- D. Establishment of **e-Consultation Working Groups** to address a range of questions and concerns that will arise from different sectors, such as:

- How the CHH legal framework would greatly enhance, support and strengthen local, State, regional and global initiatives in reduction of climate-threat drivers and acceleration of climate-enhancement drivers
- How the CHH legal framework would provide strong incentives for States to fully participate without threats to sovereignty, and develop inclusive, transparent and democratic climate governance at local, regional and global levels
- How the CHH proposal would help create an inclusive and equitable global, sustainable economy.
- How the CHH proposal would support and enhance nature-based solutions, key ocean, land and wildlife conservation approaches, rapid growth of renewable energy, and accelerate the drawing down of dangerous carbon in the atmosphere.
- How to establish a system of rewarding impacts that contribute the restoration and enhancement of the Earth System, to influence in an effective way the true costs of the negative impacts.
- How to create a permanent monitoring system that quantitatively and qualitatively measures the different contributions of each state to the conditions required to stay within *the nine planetary boundaries*.<sup>12</sup>

#### Next steps

While new potential partners were identified during these Un75 Global Governance Forum meetings, all partners are asked to continue their contributions through post-Forum participation as the CHH/GPE campaign moves forward. This partnership is part of our campaign with the goal to introduce a new substantive content on the process of the Global Pact for the Environment, having as goal one high-level political declaration by the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. CCH will develop a post-forum agenda of webinars to educate people on the Earth System concept and CHH's Initiative, recruitment of NGO and Member State Partners, e-Consultation Working Groups, development of an international conference in June of 2021 (Stockholm +49) and a political strategy for the run-up to the UN's Stockholm+50 Anniversary event.

For more information about the CHH Initiative, please see:  
<https://www.commonhomeofhumanity.org/glimpse>

#### Countering Future Ecological Threats: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership Built Around the Ecological Threat Register

*Partnership lead: Institute for Economics and Peace*

*Participating organizations: Alliance for Peacebuilding, Chemonics International, Ford Foundation, International Crisis Group, International Peace Institute, MSI Worldwide, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSDP), Renewable Energy Association of Zimbabwe (REAZ) and Zimbabwe Wildlife Conservators (ZWC), Risk Management Solutions, Solidaridad, UN -PBSO/ PBF, UN -PBSO/ PBF, US AID, Zimbabwe Ministry of Environment, Water & Climate*

The Countering Future Ecological Threats Initiative includes public, private and civil society experts and organizations advising on the development of innovative, comprehensive, and evidenced-based policy and programming recommendations for countries with high levels of



environmental vulnerability, specifically with regards to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change.

The initiative builds on findings from [The Ecological Threat Register](#), an IEP report that analyses current and future risks arising from global population growth, water stress, food insecurity, droughts, floods, cyclones, rising temperatures and sea levels. The report projects until 2050 and lays out which specific countries will face the most threats, which countries will face the most severe threats, and lastly, but most importantly, which countries are least likely to cope, using IEP's Positive Peace framework as the main resilience metric.

Overall, the reports finds that 141 countries will be subject to at least one ecological threat by 2050 and that over a quarter of the world's population will live in 19 countries exposed to 4 threats or more. More than half are already among the 40 least peaceful nations. Given these conditions, and the fact that ecological disasters already displace an average of 24 million people per year with an additional seven million displaced by armed conflict, IEP estimates 1.2 billion people will be at risk of displacement by 2050. It's clear then, that in addition to tackling climate change, adaptation and resilience work must not only continue, but must be prioritized.

A number of group meetings related to the Initiative have been held. There was rapid agreement on the need to talk about future ecological threats simply and broadly, so as to more effectively raise awareness and avoid compartmentalization. It was noted that too often, future ecological threats are deemed domain of environmental groups and government departments working on climate issues, or alternatively a security issue, whereas the roots of vulnerability are equally if not largely socio-economic and developmental in nature. The group also reinforced the need for more concrete and measurable resilience metrics and the importance of raising awareness and investing in education and capacity building. The identification of and support for local civil society, government and private sector champions was deemed critical. At a programmatic level, the group agreed on the need to engender behavioral changes in both the formal and informal sectors while maximizing technological innovation and promoting diversification.

Over the next 3 months we will continue to build on the experience and expertise of the partners and countries involved, holding a variety of development, security and geopolitical seminars and roundtables to review which countries and regions should be prioritized, what specific policies will most effectively alleviate the physical impacts of threats, and what actions will most concretely increase countries ability to better withstand and adapt to the future shocks.

There is a distinct interest to include more partners that can use or build on the data to directly or indirectly support the development of policy, programs, products and services that reduce vulnerability to ecological threats at a country, regional or global level. We would be especially appreciative of organizations who can outline specific actions they, a priori, are taking or would willing to take in this domain. In the case of the private sector, this may include the development of new insurance or bond products, loan products and risk modelling services among others.

Beyond a match in mission, we seek to build upon our mutual expertise to influence policy at the government level without losing sight of what programming is feasible at a community level, especially in fragile contexts. As such, NGOs, Member States or funding partners with expert teams operating throughout this spectrum are especially welcome. We look forward to reporting progress and thank UN75 Global Governance Forum for bringing this initiative further to light.

For further information, please contact IEP's New York Office: [mcollins@economicsandpeace.org](mailto:mcollins@economicsandpeace.org)

## Amazon Rainforest Investor Coalition

*Partnership lead: Global Governance Philanthropy Network*

*Participating organizations: Brazilian Congress / Centro de Lideranca Publica, Cadasta, California Air Resources Board, Climate Bonds Initiative, ClimateWorks, Conexsus US, Earth Innovation Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, GCF Task Force, Global Wildlife Conservation, Impacta Advocacy, Initiative 20x20, Instituto Clima e Sociedade, Legal com a Amazonia, Martin Family Foundation / Mongabay, Milken Institute, Nia Tero, Pachama, Palladium Group, Partnerships for Forests, Sitawi Finance for Good, Sun Valley Institute, Synovia Capital, Teece Consulting, USAID Brazil, World Economic Forum, Xprize*

Serving as a partnership platform for the [UN 75 Global Governance Forum](#), the Global Governance Philanthropy Network and a set of partners have developed the following four part strategy to help advance forest-friendly economic development in the Amazon region. Please note that no formal partnerships have been signed and these ideas are still in formation.

- 1) **Impact Investing** – To help mobilize investment as well as increase the number of investment ready projects we will promote a series of resources including:
  - a. A survey and showcase of Amazon region investment opportunities, fund sizes, industries etc. as well as strategies, including those of the [SITAWI Guide to Impact Investing in the Amazon](#). Over [thirty impact funds](#) have been nominated with the survey available [here](#).
  - b. Development of green economy and market infrastructure by improving market logistics and intelligence ([Lab Amazonia](#)), supporting entrepreneurship [accelerators](#) and investor networking ([Partnership Platform for the Amazon](#) and [Initiative 20x20](#)), and promoting wider use of bio-economy aggregators like [TerraMatch.org](#) and [GCFImpact.org](#) as well as indigenous-and-traditional-population fair-trade platforms like [Origens Brasil](#) and [Tucum](#).
  - c. Facilitation of financial inclusion through support of community banking ([Community Banking Network](#)) and related virtual wallets ([E-Dinheiro](#))
  - d. Expanding access to credit by helping groups like [Conexsus](#) to de-risk loan applications via state mechanisms like [Pronaf](#) and more.
  - e. Inviting responsible procurement partners to expand market demands of sustainable Amazon produce via mechanisms like the [Buy for Benefit Coalition](#) and other local partners with guidelines and support programs for responsible sourcing in partnership with [Instituto Beraca](#).
  
- 2) **Governance and Rule of Law** – To support policy innovation and extend rule-of-law support in the Amazon region by surveying relevant philanthropic gifts, identifying gaps, and challenging the donor community to meet needs. Possible strategies may include:
  - a. Helping to standardize land rights reclamation processes with new mapping technologies in collaboration with groups like [RAISG](#) and the [Cadasta Foundation](#). In addition, reducing title fraud and land grabbing through efforts like [Be Legal with the Amazon](#).
  - b. Counseling investors about risks related to [forest crime](#) (due diligence by [Climate Advisors](#)) and [exposure](#) to forest supply chain and climate related issues ([Ceres](#)).
  - c. Supporting investigative journalism and indigenous media training to document human rights violations and environmental crimes. While this strategy is

still under development we will discuss with the [Environmental Investigation Agency](#), [Agencia Publica](#), the [Indigenous Media Caucus](#) and others.

- d. Supporting the [Forest Legality Initiative](#) and international legal mechanisms like the US Lacey Act and the European FLEGT Action Plan to advance relevant policies and litigation. Support groups to defend their rights and settle grievances through partnership with agencies like the [Inter-American Association for Environmental Defense](#) and the recent supreme court lawsuit of the [Brazilian Articulation of Indigenous People](#) – article [here](#).
- e. Facilitating [ease of business](#) developments to enable income generation in environments where it is difficult to conduct business.
- f. Deployment at scale of [chainsaw detection](#) devices and [drones](#) to sensitive areas to enable real time detection and monitoring of illegal deforestation. Potential partners could include [Rainforest Connection](#), [HughesNet](#) and [Iridium](#) as well as some elements of the technology developed by the [Rainforest X Prize](#).
- g. Developing an Amazon Commerce Solidarity Network to help address the impunity of illegal deforesters. Given that an estimated 65% of Brazilians have smart phones, the [E Dinheiro](#) program cited above could be scaled across the region as a loyalty program among pro-conservation consumers and merchants. Discounts would compel many to participate regionally. Those implicated in illegal deforestation would be subject to a peer-to-peer dispute resolution system managed by [Kleros](#) and guilty parties would be penalized or barred from the E-Dinheiro network, depending on the outcomes. This strategy could simultaneously impose financial hardship and shame on perpetrators in a situation where law enforcement is otherwise ineffective. In the absence of a partnership with E-Dinheiro, partnership may be explored with the [Bemol credit program](#) and other local financial operators.

**3) Carbon Market and Ecosystem Service Payment Innovation** – To help scale financial resources for forest conservation in scenarios where REDD+ and other carbon financing schemes have had limited success.

- a. Partnering with the [AirCarbon Exchange](#) to bring to market Amazon originated forest credits. The Singapore regulated carbon and environmental credit trading platform, with support from the [International Chamber of Commerce](#), can help bring to scale new kinds of carbon and ecosystem service credits that are pioneered by sub-national governments thereby bypassing some political obstacles of the past. Platforms like [Climate Path](#) and [ICC](#) legal precedents could provide private sector legitimacy and ownership.
- b. Partnering with [Pachama](#) to use new satellite and AI technologies for the task of issuing and monitoring new forest credit regimes for sale to the voluntary carbon markets. Note that many companies including Microsoft have already become customers of Pachama, a new Silicon Valley startup with seed funding from founders of Airbnb, Uber and other tech leaders.
- c. Bringing ecosystem service credit regimes like the [Amapa Green Treasure](#) program to scale through partnership with [Brasil Mata Viva](#) together with the platforms mentioned above and sub-national governments like those of the [Governors Climate and Forest Task Force](#), [Amazon Interstate Consortium](#) and the [Association of Amazon Municipalities](#).
- d. Issuing premium forest credits that are secured with drone/chainsaw alert systems (described above) and valued across a jurisdiction-aware [statistical model](#) that calculates avoided deforestation cost by [taking into account](#) regional land values (prices of crops included), accessibility (proximity to roads, rivers and other cleared

- land), biophysical measures (soil quality, slope, climate, etc.), and legal status of land (privately owned/indigenous territory/conservation area/undesigned/ etc.).
- e. Conducting sub-national advocacy to advance adoption and implementation of the [California Tropical Forest Standard](#).
  - f. Using the ideas proposed above to align philanthropists, impact investors and governments around a shared vision for implementation of the [Emergent Finance Accelerator](#) with all parties using the financial tools at their disposal to help regional governments slow deforestation and qualify for the floor price of \$10 per ton of avoided carbon emissions ([Environmental Defense Fund](#)).
- 4) **Investor Education** – Bringing the wisdom of the previous three strategies to the capital markets and the public by designing new financial products and more.
- a. Partnering with UN campaigns and calls to action like the [UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration](#) and the [UN Race to Zero campaign](#) to help galvanize investors around internationally endorsed targets.
  - b. Partnering with leading investor networks such as [NEXUS](#), [TED](#), the [Milken Institute](#) and the [World Economic Forum](#) to advance the strategies described here-in as a coordinated global effort.
  - c. Publishing philanthropy and investor education materials both in the form of market surveys and impact investor reports, but also in philanthropic strategic giving [guides](#) and a related [podcast series](#).
  - d. Scaling the call-to-action of [Amazonia Possível](#) and other relevant investor-education and-mobilization efforts to [avoid deforestation risks](#) and design new financial products such as green bonds ([Climate Bonds Initiative](#)) that encompass the strategies mentioned above.
  - e. Partner with public facing education efforts like the [Global Landscapes Forum](#) to bring relevant knowledge to wider audiences.

## Background

The [Global Governance Philanthropy Network](#) (a sister organization to [NEXUS](#)) offers educational programs to foster philanthropic interest in transnational issues and governance solutions. In April 2020, we published a [popular article](#) about investing in Amazon rainforest conservation and mapped several dozen grant-making foundations and impact investment funds dedicated to the region. During the next year we will seek out partners and develop the programs described above to help ensure that the business models, valuations and governance frameworks of any given acre of Amazon forest support keeping the forest standing rather than cutting it for soy or cattle production. For more information visit: [www.ggpnetwork.org/amazon-investor-coalition](http://www.ggpnetwork.org/amazon-investor-coalition).

# Twenty Institutional, Policy, and Normative Innovations

## 1. The Future of Global Economic Governance and Sustainable Development in The Covid-19 World

Create a “G20+” for accelerated, equitable, and broad-based recovery from COVID-19

*Author: Dr. Richard Ponzio, Director of the Just Security 2020 Program, The Stimson Center*

### Recommendation

*Create a G20+ to accelerate socioeconomic recovery from COVID-19 through enhanced coordination by G20 members with the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, and related bodies, supported by a new, small, full-time secretariat. The global economic governance system should be strengthened to limit the socioeconomic dislocations produced by the current global pandemic, to generate an equitable and broad-based recovery, and to reduce, at large, the volatility of our hyperconnected global economy.*

### Global Challenge Update

The remarkable transmissibility of COVID-19 alongside the speed and extent of its global spread in the first half of 2020 sent stock markets and bond yields tumbling worldwide, leading the heads of the IMF and OECD to predict that the world was headed toward a recession at least as bad as, if not worse, than that of 2008–9.<sup>13</sup>

Although markets rebounded somewhat, this wholesale volatility, coupled with drops in consumer confidence and severe knock-on economic and social effects from government-ordered business closures and population lockdowns resulted in swift contractions in both domestic and international finance, trade, air travel, and most other sectors of our closely intertwined global economy, as well as millions of job losses.<sup>14</sup>

In response to the 2008–9 crisis, the Pittsburgh G20 Summit in September 2009 vowed to make the G20 the “premier forum” overseeing international economic and financial cooperation and, thereafter, established the Financial Stability Board to implement reform of international financial regulation and supervision.<sup>15</sup> In the intervening decade, however (and prior to the COVID pandemic), economic inequality increased sharply in many quarters of the globe, concentrating income and wealth in a small percentage of the population.<sup>16</sup> There is, not surprisingly, a spreading and deep sense of resentment against economic globalization among those who, in contrast to its greatest beneficiaries, see themselves as “left behind by globalization and automation,” particularly in industrialized countries.<sup>17</sup> The current global economic governance system urgently needs upgrading in the face of such challenges, to help all countries better deal with—indeed, reverse—growing inequality both globally and domestically as well as



the catastrophic socioeconomic effects of the coronavirus pandemic and related threats to the well-being of nations and peoples.

#### Innovation Proposal

G20 Member States' economies generate about 74 percent of global GDP with roughly two-thirds of the world's population.<sup>18</sup> However, the G20 does not give representation to another 174 other countries, many in the Global South. They too are concerned with sustaining global economic growth while maintaining economic stability, reducing global inequality, and addressing the economic, social, and political threats posed by pandemics like COVID-19 and the accelerating challenge of climate change.

For the G20 to truly become the “premier forum” of global economic and financial governance, it needs an upgrade to what the 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission called “G20+.”<sup>19</sup> While the main policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority setting on critical issues for the world economy (including economic crisis response), it should also establish formal links with intergovernmental organizations for implementation and follow-through. Operationally, this proposal would entail assembling the G20 at the Heads of State level every two years at UN Headquarters, timed to coincide with the gathering of all world leaders at the start of the UN General Assembly in September in New York.

To overcome current fragmentation of roles among international economic policy institutions, the G20 will also require more institutional presence. Currently, it has no collective institutional memory and no familiar face to the world—not even a permanent website. A modest secretariat should be created for the G20+ to give it such presence and promote greater policy continuity, more accountability, and better-integrated economic, social, and environmental approaches to international problems by G20 governments, international organizations, and even civil society organizations and the business community. Well into 2021, the G20+ would need to focus, in particular, on mitigating the impact of and then promoting recovery from COVID-19. Specific measures could include integrated fiscal, monetary, central bank, and anti-protectionist initiatives to “prevent a liquidity crisis turning into a solvency crisis, and a global recession becoming a global depression.”<sup>20</sup>

#### Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

Multilateral diplomacy has been put to the test in recent years. Nevertheless, severe socioeconomic fallout worldwide from the COVID-19 pandemic reinforces the case for expanded multilateral coordination to foster a globally coherent approach to recovery, both to prevent and to respond effectively to this and other economic shocks, and to work towards greater economic equity. At the same time, without leadership, countries—large and small—could opt to turn inward, blame foreign adversaries for their troubles, and erect shortsighted barriers to international exchange.

On April 16, 2020, twenty-five Foreign Ministers from the recently formed Alliance for Multilateralism issued a statement arguing “for a co-operative, transparent, science-based and coordinated global response” against COVID-19 and to “work to minimize disruptions to cross border trade and global supply chains.”<sup>21</sup> Enthusiastic members of the Alliance for Multilateralism that are concurrently G20 members—including Argentina, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, and South Africa—should be looked to for leadership on the G20+ reform initiative, just as Canada's Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Paul Martin long advocated for the need to upgrade the G20 Finance Ministers forum to the level of Heads of State. Strong support is also expected from the 174 UN Member States not represented on the current G20.

## A more equitable, dynamic, and accountable International Trade System through WTO Flexible & Inclusive Reforms

*Author: Professor Dr. Edna Ramirez Robles, Professor of International Law, University of Guadalajara*

Given the current crisis at various levels of international trade (now exacerbated by COVID-19), how can stakeholders rather than governments influence Member States to cooperate multilaterally and avoid trade restrictive measures at their borders? Should the inclusion of other stakeholders [business community, international organizations, civil society (consumers associations, academia, NGOs)] in key decision-making processes be strengthened to achieve a more dynamic international trade system? Which elements will be necessary for the US to participate in a rules-based multilateral system once again with compulsory jurisdiction on international trade issues? What are the key aspects that the new World Trade Organization (WTO) Director General will have to focus on in order to transform the WTO into an equitable, dynamic and appealing organization? This policy paper aims to resolve some of these questions.

### The international trade agenda in 2019

At the policy dialogue entitled “A Better Framework for Global Economic Governance”, organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Stimson Center, and Club de Madrid, in Washington D.C. on November 2019 we reviewed that it wasn’t clear where the world was heading in connection with the following forces:

- Open international rules
- Competing coalitions
- Technological disruption
- Sovereignty First<sup>22</sup> was gaining traction due, in part, to the US-China trade tensions

Since its inception in 1995, the international trade regime (i.e. bilateral and multilateral agreements) has been shaped by the WTO. This Organization regulates the minimum standards of 164 Members, and not all of them have FTAs between them. Thus, to have a fairer International Trade System, reforms need to be implemented within the WTO.

### WTO crises till 2020

The WTO has been weakening over time. By 2020, many functions were deeply affected:

- **Negotiation.** Ministers reached a negotiation package in July 2008<sup>23</sup>, but ever since, they could only enact a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2017.
- **Adjudication.** The US officially started complaining of the Appellate Body (AB) performance in 2002<sup>24</sup>. Serious steps of paralyzing it started in 2017 and ended on December 11, 2019.<sup>25</sup>
- **Administration of Agreements** Although the WTO relies on a highly qualified Secretariat, it is a Member driven organization. Furthermore, in 2020 the Director General (DG) stepped down, yet, Members haven’t agreed on an interim DG. After September 2020, it will be a headless Organization.<sup>26</sup>
- **Cooperation.** It has worked, but not to the level that is needed, particularly during these critical times.
- **Trade Policy Review.** It works well, but again, is not able to encourage Members to be more accountable.<sup>27</sup>

Additionally, the WTO has been perceived as:

### **Insufficiently equitable**

WTO rules provided for Developing and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have been considered as not equitable<sup>28</sup> for Members with specific requirements. Thus, in 2000, it launched the Doha Development Round<sup>29</sup>, with little success. Initially, the Development issue was mostly a developing country problem, but afterwards it became a developed countries problem too. In 2019, the US was vocal and officially stated that it would no longer provide flexibilities to Members that could no longer be considered Developing Countries according to their designated standards.

### **Insufficiently dynamic**

Specifically, two functions have been blamed for not to be sufficiently dynamic: Negotiations and Adjudication. Therefore, Members have negotiated through FTAs<sup>30</sup> and the US paralyzed the AB.

### **Insufficiently accountable**

The increasing trade protective measures imposed worldwide (e.g. the US vs China trade war, and by 76 countries due to the COVID-19) have demonstrated that WTO Members are not being accountable for their WTO-inconsistent trade practices. Restrictions are becoming widespread after the paralysis of the Appellate Body.

### **Insufficiently inclusive**

WTO Members have not been sufficiently inclusive on critical topics [e.g. gender, youth, investment, e-commerce, competition, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), etc]. Furthermore, fundamental stakeholders have also been included insufficiently, e.g. through special forums (i.e. civil society: WTO Public Forum, or private sector Trade Dialogues).

#### WTO flexible & inclusive reform proposals

This policy brief proposes several flexible<sup>31</sup> and inclusive reforms to address the above identified issues (on negotiation, adjudication, cooperation, administration of agreements and trade policy review). These proposals aim to improve equity, dynamism, and accountability to WTO functions.

#### 3.1. Negotiation

Progress in ongoing negotiations can be achieved by including:

- Relevant topics and stakeholders in multilateral negotiations
- Flexible formulas to paralyzed negotiations
- Negative consensus on key areas
- New and more flexibilities for development in existing & forthcoming Agreements
- Flexibilities for all Members

#### 3.2. Adjudication

Members need to become accountable for their restrictive measures, otherwise the international trade system will fall apart affecting consumers the most. WTO Members (especially US) views are considered in the proposals below:

- Encouraging mediation and/or arbitration (Art. 25) when the Systemic Trade Concerns arise
- Including procedural flexibilities, preserving adjudication
- Walker Principles in Appeals<sup>32</sup>

### 3.3. Cooperation

Strengthening the WTO's Cooperation function does not require significant reform. The WTO Secretariat can focus on developing jointly with other International Organizations:

- Trade Policy courses, including other key stakeholders (e.g., the private sector, young leaders, academics, etc.)
- Polls, initiatives, needs assessments, and action plans.

Furthermore, WTO Members may wish to:

- Allow private sector to fund Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building (TACB) projects
- Incentivize private sector by including TACB project partners in negotiations
- Facilitate dialogues and needs assessments at Country level, including non-state actors (MSMEs, and Consumer Associations)
- Systemic TACB at a country level

### 3.4. Administration of Agreements

Clarify rules regarding interim designations when Members don't reach consensus (e.g. interim WTO DG). The next DG and Senior leadership team must:

1. Draw the attention of governments if trade restrictions are imposed
2. Encourage UN or other country-based partners to facilitate stronger, multi-stakeholder coalitions<sup>33</sup>

### 3.5. Trade Policy Review (TPR)

Strengthening WTO's TPR Division with a Legal Advisory Committee that can issue confidential Memorandums regarding the incompatibility of Members measures with WTO law. If measures are found incompatible, issuing Members could lose certain rights (e.g. voting rights, receiving aid, etc.)

### Implementation Strategy

If WTO does not address its weakened functions, Members will continue to protect certain industries within their borders, as we have witnessed the last couple of years. Not only with regards to US-China trade war, but also with 76 countries imposing restrictions due to COVID-19.<sup>34</sup> Protective measures will cause a significant reduction of imported goods (including food) and services (such as transport and telecommunications) prices.

Global value chains, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) will decrease, and monopolies will take over the economy. Thus, developing countries and LDCs that don't produce essential goods and services, will suffer the most. Poverty will raise, and consumers will be affected utmost, although they represent votes and it is in Government's interest to keep them happy. Mobilizing consumers and civil society organizations it is needed but to listen them goes first. The WTO does not have regional offices; however, the WTO Secretariat can cooperate with other international organizations and build partnerships with key stakeholders at a national level. This is a task for the next DG.

If the next DG does not prioritize these issues, civil society must do it. Communication campaigns can play a tremendous role. They need to be built together with "key national" allies, such as Universities, Business and Consumers Associations. As Stephen Browne elucidated persuasively: every stakeholder has a role, "consumers and civil society organizations can serve as key promoters of ethical frameworks in global governance". If all relevant stakeholders develop a coherent and strong agenda, the WTO can shape the International Trade regime as more equitable, dynamic and accountable for advancing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

## Strengthening the Lending Capacity of the Multilateral Development Banks

*Author: Augusto Lopez-Claros, Director, Global Indicators Group at the World Bank Group*

### A more sensible and generous international aid and debt regime

Although the international financial institutions have moved rapidly to provide support to countries affected by COVID-19, the amounts of funding actually delivered, as of end July 2020, have been small in relation to the large financing gap identified by the IMF (about US\$2.5 trillion). To take an example, some 80 countries have received support from the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility and Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), with about US\$41.7 billion disbursed as of end July, equivalent to about 1.7 percent of the IMF's own estimates for the financing needs of emerging markets and developing countries. Other official lenders such as the World Bank and the regional development banks have also stepped in with emergency funding.

Given the volume of interventions announced thus far in the more advanced economies and given the present and prospective needs for financial support in coming years in the developing world, one can raise the question of whether the collective "firepower" of the international financial institutions and the multilateral development banks is adequate to the task at hand both in respect of COVID-19 needs or the broader needs that will emerge in coming years to deal with climate change-related disruptions, and other development needs linked to poverty and inequality, infrastructure and the future of work.

We argue that the traditional mechanisms of funding at the multilateral development banks consisting of periodic capital contributions from official sources will need to be complemented by tapping into private sector resources aimed at promoting an ambitious development agenda. Not only are government budgets under pressure everywhere, creating fierce competition for scarce resources, but the unusually low-interest-rate environment which has been a chief feature of the post-global financial crisis world has created a situation today where upwards of US\$15 trillion of private sector wealth (equivalent to over 17 percent of world GDP) is earning negative yields. A broad range of institutional investors and holders of private sector wealth keep, on average, some 22 percent of their asset holdings in cash. Many of these might want to deploy some of their assets to finance promising development projects aimed at addressing some of the most urgent needs of our time. We propose a particular mechanism (sponsored loans program) as a complement to official capital increases. The attached note provides further operational details. It also highlights, by way of illustration, three priority areas that might attract private funding from institutional investors intent on raising their corporate social responsibility profile and identification with a progressive development agenda. In particular, we discuss the promotion of gender equality through the elimination of gender discriminations embedded in the laws of 190 countries, developing alternative metrics of human welfare, and supporting the environmental transition in agriculture.

As of end-March 2020 the IMF's "lending capacity" was equivalent to about US\$ 976 billion, consisting primarily of IMF quotas (SDR 320 billion) and multilateral and bilateral arrangements which the IMF has negotiated with member countries and financial institutions. While this sum may seem large, in July of 2020 it is equivalent to 0.4 percent of total global debt and 1.1 percent of world GDP. It is, thus, a relatively modest sum, adequate to deal with a handful of crises in a few middle-income countries, but insufficient in a major crisis such as COVID-19.

In recent months, a number of analysts and public officials have made a case for a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) issue, the IMF's only form of universal unconditional liquidity. The last and by far the largest SDR issue was agreed to at a G20 summit in London in 2009 (amounting to some US\$250 billion) and it made an important contribution to boosting confidence and was seen as a strong signal of international cooperation in the midst of a systemic shock to the global financial system. The case for an SDR issue today on the basis of need would appear to be compelling, given that this crisis is tangibly more intense and costly in terms of human welfare than the global financial crisis a decade ago, when global GDP contracted by 0.1 percent in 2009. In contrast, GDP in 2020 is likely to contract by at least 5 percent, with every region of the world being adversely affected. The IMF charter's Article XVIII, on the principles governing the allocation of SDRs, states that "the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term global need... to supplement existing reserve assets in such manner as will promote the attainment of its purposes and will avoid economic stagnation...". It provides sufficient legal basis to proceed with an SDR issue, particularly in the middle of unprecedented dislocations to global economic activity.

Some IMF members have raised concerns that because countries' SDR allocations would be linked to the size of their IMF quotas, much of the benefit would be concentrated in the larger countries. But this was not a concern in 2009, given the fairly generalized nature of the shock, which put countries' finances—including in the advanced economies—under huge stress. The IMF at the moment is working on a scheme that would allow large-quota countries to "lend" their SDRs to more needy members. While this is laudable, it would be less desirable than an SDR issue which, among other things, would not be constrained by the existing stock of SDRs, which is quite small in relation to the financing needs identified by the IMF itself.

Likewise, there is little likelihood that, in the middle of an economic calamity without precedent, an SDR issue of, say, SDR 720 billion (about US\$1 trillion at today's exchange rates) would be inflationary. Indeed, most of the advanced economies have responded to COVID-19 with large packages of financial support under the overall heading of "whatever it takes" which recognized explicitly that inflation was not a primary (or even secondary) concern.

The note makes a case, more generally, for overhauling and simplifying the system under which the Fund may issue SDRs under exceptional circumstances, such as times of crises. At present the system is unduly slow. Although an Executive Board decision is sufficient, US law mandates a 90-day period of Congressional notification. It also requires an 85 percent majority vote which effectively gives veto power to the US and the EU. As part of its efforts to improve global liquidity management, the IMF should be allowed to mobilize additional resources by tapping capital markets and issuing bonds dominated in SDRs (something that would not require amending the Articles) and allocating SDRs regularly to supplement the demand for "own reserves."

Given the extent of the economic collapse and the reinforcing effects of a sharp drop in emigrants' remittances, reduced tax revenues, and lower commodity prices, the joint G20/Paris Club initiative to freeze debt service payments through the end of 2020 to 73 of the poorest countries under the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) was a welcome development. For its part, the IMF has also provided additional debt relief to 28 countries under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, amounting to some US\$251 million during a six-month period through October 13, 2020. Efforts are underway within civil society organizations to persuade official creditors to extend the horizon of these relief initiatives beyond 2020, at least through April of 2022. There is also renewed interest in revitalizing debates that took place over the past decade on private sector involvement in debt relief initiatives, particularly in the context of debt sustainability exercises



routinely conducted at the IMF as part of the Article IV consultation process with members. Andritzky and Schumacher (2019) find that debt restructuring is not purely a “zero-sum wealth transfer from creditors to debtors.” By improving debt sustainability, debt restructuring can boost confidence and reduce debt service payments, in turn supporting the economic recovery. Thus, a restructuring that facilitates a transition from high spreads and limited or no market access to lower spreads and restored market access may offer upside not only to debtors, but also to creditors over a longer time horizon.<sup>35</sup>

## A UN Sustainable Human Development Network

*Author: Stephen Browne, British scholar-practitioner, former head of UNDP’s Poverty Alleviation Policy Division within the Bureau of Development Policy, and co-lead of the Future United Nations Development System project*

The UN began with networks. When it was founded 75 years ago, there was a lot of enthusiasm for epistemological exchange centered on the specialized agencies. WHO would be the hub for medical knowledge; UNESCO for education; ILO for labor and employment concerns, and so on. Knowledge cooperation became the basis of the largest pillar of UN activity: development.

It is still the case today. The specialized agencies continue to attract people to their own disciplines. What is different is the number of alternative networked communities, facilitated by the web, in which many specialists across all disciplines participate. These alternatives challenge the UN agencies in at least two ways: they need to remain relevant and founded on solid principles of reliability and objectivity; and they need to adapt to development problems that are no longer confined to specialized sectors but encompass a range of disciplines. To a degree the UN development agencies are stuck in the past, continuing to circulate knowledge internally within their own silos but not across disciplines. Given the range and wealth of expertise in the UN as a whole, system-wide networks should be able to provide invaluable support to emerging countries.

Getting the system to work more effectively across sectors and specializations has been a fundamental feature of UN reform since 2006 with the Delivering as One proposals. At the country level, UN teams were supposed to combine their expertise in responding to local needs. In some countries, this approach has worked. But the ministries in host countries also like to maintain separate relations with individual agencies.

The latest UN reforms again call for closer UN collaboration at the country level under the authority of UN resident coordinators newly empowered with extra staff and resources. The success of delivering as one, however, will depend on convincing more countries of the merits of working with the system as a whole. The qualities and experience of the individual coordinators will also be critical.

So, networks are envisaged at country level. In essence, this is the proposal of the Albright-Gambari Report of 2015, *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*. The report goes further in calling for closer collaboration between the UN system development organizations on one hand, and the IMF, World Bank and regional banks on the other, in assisting countries to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The idea is sound, but it will be difficult to achieve as intended. Herding the UN cats is the first step. An equal challenge will be the closer operational rapprochement of the UN with the financial institutions which tend to work rather independently, attaching their own strictures to their lending programs. As a former UN resident coordinator, myself, I am aware of the strong rivalry between the UN and the World Bank, which continues today.

What the country teams are attempting to do is partner with other local stakeholders, including civil society organizations and the private sector. Here the credibility and objectivity of the UN can enhance its convening powers. This chimes with a larger and even bolder proposal of a UN global partnership which could consist of a global web of the country networks, focused on the UN and its partners and supporting countries in their development aims. This brings us to the operational objectives of a global network centered on the UN. The 2030 agenda is focused on the 17 sustainable development goals which are in turn founded on the three sectors: economic, social and environmental.

Even more challenging is the call for a sustainable human development network. Human development is an original UN paradigm which emerged in 1990. It is centered on the capacity and empowerment of the individual rather than the health of the three sectors. It is measured by a human development index which is a surrogate measure which compares country success in meeting human aspirations. The paradigm has been elaborated over many years encompassing human needs, human security and human rights. It is an integrating agenda since it brings together all facets of the UN's work, including peace and security, human rights, humanitarian action and sustainable development. But its implicitly political agenda is one reason why the paradigm has not been taken up by the 'First UN' of member states. The development agenda of the organization is a technical one which does not address the essential but also more sensitive aspects of the development process.

#### Establish a system-wide UN Sustainable Human Development Network

Applying a network governance approach and incorporating key recommendations from the reports of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, the Future United Nations Development System project, and the UN's earlier Delivering as One coherence agenda, a Sustainable Human Development Network (SHD-net) would aim to move beyond existing practices across the UN system and forge a truly integrated development system. Specifically, each UN program, fund, and agency, as well as the World Bank, IMF, and regional development banks, would collaborate to maximize impact, improve the use of technical and financial resources, and better streamline reporting and broader administrative requirements in all UN member countries. Further tapping the ideas, networks, political support, and human and institutional resources from the proposed UN Global Partnership (see 8.3.2), the SHD-net would focus its normative, policy, and programmatic priorities on assisting all countries—developing and developed—to meet their Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

#### Inaugurate a UN Global Partnership

Despite forging decades-long relationships, civil society, the business community, regional intergovernmental organizations, and local governmental bodies participation in the work of the United Nations remains piecemeal and ad hoc. It lacks a level of prominent institutional representation and a hub through which these new actors can more effectively shape decisions at the global level, and through which various UN bodies can tap into the expertise and networks of these resourceful organizations. The Commission, therefore, proposes creating a UN Global Partnership.

## 2. Rethinking the UN's Approach to Peace & Security

### Very Small Steps on a Very Long Road: Some Options for a More Effective Security Council

*Author: Richard Gowan, UN Director, International Crisis Group*

#### 1: Is Security Council Reform a Distraction?

The chances of major changes to the Security Council requiring Charter reform – such as a change in the number of permanent or non-permanent seats, or the creation of formal restraints on the use of the veto – are currently extremely low. The UN membership as a whole has not settled on a vision of reform despite years of debate. At least three of the P5 (China, Russia and the U.S.) are not interested in significant changes. China in particular is an implacable opponent of any reforms that could give Japan an enhanced status in the Council.

There is value to discussing long-term visions of major council reform, as it offers a good conceptual starting-point for defining what a genuinely fair and effective UN would look like. But in immediate political terms, this is a distraction. There is still space for smaller-scale alterations to the way the Council does business, with no Charter reform. This note focuses on recent mini-reforms of this type, and highlights three areas (early warning, civil society outreach and peacekeeping oversight) where there are openings for the council to do better. Advocates of fundamental change argue that limited improvements cannot resolve broader questions about the body's power and legitimacy. This is true. But as major Council reform is a political non-starter, we must try to improve the Council we have, whether we like it or not.

#### 2. *Small Steps*

While the rules of the UN Charter make major reforms difficult, Security Council members are able to make practical improvements to their work quite easily. Recent examples include:

- **Moving Security Council Diplomacy online during COVID-19:** The Council showed its ability to revise its working methods with unusual speed this year as it transitioned to online discussions and the use of written votes in response to COVID-19. The results were imperfect – UN ambassadors struggle with the technical hiccups of virtual meetings just like everybody else – but the Council kept up a busy schedule throughout the pandemic.
- **Better “onboarding” procedures for new members:** Up until 2015, the General Assembly held elections for new Council members in October, giving the winners very little time to prepare for their duties. Since 2016, the elections have been in June, and the Council has given the “Incoming 5” (I5) increasing access to its deliberations in advance of their terms. This year, for example, the Council for the first time started sharing its internal documents with the I5 for 2021 from the start of August. These

small diplomatic courtesies give the new members a much better chance to prepare to “hit the ground running” on 1 January.

- **A (limited) opening up of the penholder system:** Critics of the Council often highlight the “penholder” system – by which P5 members control the drafting and negotiation of resolutions on most specific files – as an obstacle to transparent and inclusive discussions. But over the last year-and-a-half, Germany and the UK have conducted a useful experiment in opening up the penholder system a little, with the two countries sharing responsibilities for (i) Sudan and (ii) issues relating to sanctions in Libya. Although these are difficult files (and London agreed to the deal as a goodwill gesture during the Brexit period) the diplomats involved agree that dividing the burden has worked pretty well.

### 3. Three areas for improvement

What further areas for incremental mini-reforms are open to the Council? Here are three:

**Improving early warning debates in the Council after COVID-19:** Council members have sporadically asked how they can do better at early warning and prevention. The Council has created an opening for the UN Secretary-General to offer more early warnings and risk analysis through UNSCR 2532 -- the long delayed “Global Ceasefire” resolution of 1 July 2020 – which requests him to “provide updates to the Security Council on the UN efforts to address the COVID-19 pandemic in countries in situations of armed conflict or affected by humanitarian crises”. As Ashish Pradhan and this author [have recently argued](#):

Secretary-General Guterres should take an expansive view of his mandate to report on COVID-19 to the Council – offering Council members early warnings of potential virus-related crises and conflicts based on UN economic and humanitarian analysis as well political reporting. If the Secretary-General feels uncomfortable about calling out specific states in writing, he can also offer these warnings orally in closed meetings.

**Action Point:** Council members should encourage Guterres to take this chance to improve debates about new conflict risks in the Council, linking traditional and non-traditional threats.

**Expanding online conversations with global civil society:** While Council diplomats are understandably keen to hold more in-person meetings after months of talks online during COVID-19, they can take some positives away from this period of virtual diplomacy. Council ambassadors should use Zoom and similar technologies engage with global representatives of civil society online more often than in the past, bringing in a wider range of interlocutors than they have in previous informal consultations (“Arria Formula” meetings) in New York.

**Action Point:** Council members that have managed online diplomacy well – like Estonia – could form a study group to sketch guidelines on virtual Council diplomacy beyond COVID-19.

**Enhancing oversight of peacekeeping:** The Council missed an opportunity to improve its oversight of UN peace operations in 2018, when the UN secretariat organized the “Action for

Peacekeeping” (A4P) initiative. As part of this initiative, the majority of UN Member States signed a declaration calling – among many other priorities – for “clear, focused, sequenced, prioritized and achievable mandates by the Security Council matched by appropriate resources.” Côte d’Ivoire and the Netherlands tabled a Council resolution supporting this call, but P5 members blocked this, because they worried that it could bind their hands in future. Nonetheless, in a constrained budget environment following COVID-19, all Council members have an interest in improving their mandating and oversight of UN peace operations.

**Action Point:** Council members should develop a new set of guidelines and best practices for mandating peace operations that – while non-binding – can inform future decision-making.

## Multiple Security Councils

*Author: Dr. Vesselin Popovski, Vice-Dean, O.P. Jindal School of Law and Executive-Director of the Centre of UN Studies*

Global crises open opportunities to learn lessons, revise attitudes, eliminate inefficiencies, innovate, and transform global governance. The COVID-19 prompted the “Global Ceasefire” and can galvanize more initiatives for UN reform, closing the gap between the organization we have and the future we want. While political barriers to change are hard to overcome, imagining transformations can spur discussion and identify how to circumvent the gridlock of the reform. The failure of the Security Council to agree on a resolution on COVID was yet another sign of its impotence to prevent and stop global catastrophes. The Council, ignorant or paralyzed by vetoes, failed to act when crimes against humanity were repeatedly committed in Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, Gaza and other parts of the world. Millions of lives could have been saved, tens of millions of displacements could have been avoided, if the Council had lived up to its responsibility and taken proper action. The Council demonstrated continuous reluctance to recognize, let alone address, severe security implications of climate change. The size of the Security Council has not changed since 1965 and despite continuous efforts and proposals made for the last 25 years, none of these produced a serious impact. If the Security Council continues to oppose reform, one alternative is to establish three new Councils - Peacebuilding Council, Climate Security Council, and Health Security Council. The establishment of new Councils, with the P5 being permanent in all of them, does not reduce the P5 power, they keep all their privileges and veto in the original Security Council, but share the burden of work and financing on peacebuilding, climate action and health governance with more actors.

### Peacebuilding Council

Issues such as prevention, early warning, security sector reforms, building institutions, rule of law can come under the purview of the Peacebuilding Council. Once the guns are silent and parties cooperate, the Security Council can shift its attention to more hostile situations, and leave the Peacebuilding Council to deal with countries where violence deescalated. A powerful and well-resourced Peacebuilding Council can monitor the transition to peace and, as a result, the situation may never return back to the Security Council’s agenda. The P5 as permanent members of the Peacebuilding Council lose nothing, they keep full decision-making power. The composition of the Peacebuilding Council can inherit the current PBC membership, adding new financial contributors and allowing more actors to directly participate in international peace and security.



For example, while Japan cannot constitutionally undertake military engagements abroad, it has a track record of active engagement in peacebuilding, which will naturally make it a leader of the Peacebuilding Council. Similarly, Japan can be a permanent member of the Climate Security Council and the Health Security Council, having also a remarkable record of know-how and contributions on these agenda issues. In fact, if Japan is a permanent member of all three new Councils, it might decide not to knock on the door and demand permanent membership also in the current Security Council. A further rationale of having a Peacebuilding Council is that it can become an organ that anchors in one place the preventive tasks and operations, currently spread among several UN offices. Every Secretary-General has spoken about the importance of prevention, but none so far could institutionalize prevention.

#### Climate Security Council

The Security Council had a thematic debate on climate change in 2007, but could never produce an entirely climate change thematic resolution since then. Despite few country-specific resolutions recognizing climate-security links, more proactive involvement is needed to address the impact of climate-related disasters on peace and security. Accordingly, the Climate Security Council can collectively tackle the security implications of climate-related disasters, loss of biodiversity, land degradation, deforestation, oceans rise, etc. The Climate Security Council instead of simply being a state-based organ, can involve business actors, city mayors, philanthropists. The Climate Club idea, where members receive privileges proportionate to their emissions reductions, deserves attention, as it eliminates the free-rider problems with the Paris Agreement. The Climate Club membership is open to states committed to reduce emissions, by fixing an international carbon price and agreeing to implement policies that produce a minimal domestic target price. That target might rise over time, making a carbon-rich economy costlier. The reluctant to join the Club non-members face sanctions, for example, by tariffs on imports from the Club members. This motivates countries acting in self-interest to enter the Club, undertake ambitious emissions reductions, benefit from the privileges of the membership and avoid the penalty tariffs. The Climate Club does not alternate or substitute the various mechanisms under the 2015 Paris Agreement for Climate Change – aimed at transparency, technology transfer, funding, facilitation etc. – rather it represents an additional supportive agency, raising ambition and compliance.

#### Health Security Council

The Security Council adopted consensual resolutions on HIV/AIDS (2000) and Ebola (2014), but failed to adopt a quick and decisive text on COVID. The Health Security Council can nicely bridge the political and functional parts of the global health governance. While blame for inaction was targeted at the political ineffectiveness of the health institutions, there were important functional successes, such as the eradication of smallpox, polio, leprosy, etc. on which the new Council can build. The distinction between the political and functional levels suggests a complex and multi-layered institution, but it matters little in practice where political and functional issues are increasingly and inextricably inter-linked. Integrated analyses of potential crisis drivers are needed and these would be better initiated and orchestrated by Health Security Council, rather than by the under-capacitated WHO. Previous projects were typically sector-based one-offs, rarely looking beyond the immediate challenges. For example, Ebola swept West Africa and aid arrived to contain the disease, however, it was extended for Ebola only, whereas malaria is killing people in large numbers every day. This has been typical of WHO responses to disease outbreaks and epidemics originating in developing countries. Taxpayers in donor countries might argue that there is nothing wrong, if their money is selectively used to keep dangerous infectious diseases out of their backyard. But such excessive focus on short-term technical interventions jeopardizes



long-term capacity building, health promotion, community engagement. While sovereign nations reserve the right to protect their people, the future global health collaboration should not fade away. The G20 statement on COVID emphasized concern with the most vulnerable and underlined equity as an important principle in the response. It was remarkable to see even developing countries, despite facing their own health crisis, rising to the occasion. A Health Security Council can promote a holistic approach and convene a larger number of states, regional organizations, academic and business communities.

## In the spirit of partnership: Enhancing Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Promotion of International Peace and Security

*Author: Marina Kumskova, UN Liaison at the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)*

The principle of national ownership underpins the implementation of all policy international frameworks on peace and security. However, given the realities of the increasingly cross-border conflict landscape, **regional cooperation has become critical for peace and security.**

Regional organizations that engage actively in peace and security, including the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), benefit peace and security efforts by providing localized support to prevent and stop the crisis from escalating.

The international community has come to recognize the importance of regional arrangements over time under the leadership of the UN Secretary-General, the Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Security Council. For one, the recent United Nations Reform includes an ambitious goal to strengthen regional infrastructures, capacities and coordination on peacebuilding. One element of this effort is the operationalization of the single regional structure designed to support a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

However, **there are a number of challenges to the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations** on the path of enhancing cooperation. These include:

- *Geopolitical realities* have made it difficult for regional organizations to engage constructively in peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the regional level.
  - o For ASEAN, the reality of geopolitics has made it difficult for the organization to engage constructively in the crisis in Myanmar.
- *Diverse peacebuilding capacities* create a mismatch of expectations between the United Nations and regional organizations.
  - o The lack of a conflict prevention mandate in the OAS has limited its ability to actively respond to the situations in Venezuela or Nicaragua, for example.

Therefore, it is critical that the United Nations and regional organizations engage in a dialogue that aims at the developing of the following **critical elements of the regional cooperation on peace and security**:

- **Coordinating joint analysis and peacebuilding strategies among all relevant stakeholders engaged in peacebuilding in each specific context by:**
  - Establishing regional working groups, composed of heads of UN agencies, regional organizations, local peacebuilding organizations, Member States, financial institutions and donors, that meet regularly to share analysis and coordinate common messaging and strategies;
  - Ensuring that the UNDP-DPPA Joint Program capacitates Peace and Development Advisors in the region to effectively communicate peace and conflict developments to all regional peacebuilding actors;
  - Encouraging closer cooperation between all UN bodies, including the Peacebuilding Commission, the Security Council, Human Rights Council, as well as the funds and programs, on relevant regional developments, including exchange of information and providing recommendations by the Commission to the Council.
- **Building capacities and trustful relationships to exchange information and monitor crosscutting developments relevant to sustaining peace at the regional level by:**
  - Supporting institutionalized capacity of regional actors via the Peacebuilding Fund and ongoing operational support from the UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA) for building national and regional commitment, developing specific programming and engaging in partnerships;
  - Increasing regular engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission and DPPA's regional offices with regional organizations, including on cross-border issues;
  - Developing bilateral memoranda of understanding between the United Nations individual bodies, funds and programs and regional partners to act as flexible frameworks of cooperation based on mutual confidence and reliance.
- **Supporting existing or, when needed, creating inclusive regional platforms as spaces for regular exchange and strategic collaboration by:**
  - Establishing and strengthening existing regional platforms and partnerships to analyze and understand risk and share lessons learned and ensuring regular and meaningful engagement of local peacebuilders;
  - Ensuring that the Peacebuilding Commission effectively promotes and sustains attention on countries on its agenda and creates space for a wide range of actors to participate in meetings on specific country situations;
  - Considering within the UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs to support annual regional convenings for the United Nations, regional organizations and local peacebuilders to assess and take stock of regional peacebuilding progress and processes, while enabling better adjustment of the processes in line with existing gaps and sharing good practices from relevant contexts.
- **Enabling regional and cross-regional dialogue and cooperation by:**
  - Establishing and improving, when needed, formal communication structures between various peacebuilding actors at national, regional and global levels.
- **Mapping and mobilizing actors best positioned to respond to identified peace and security challenges by:**
  - Ensuring that the UN Regional Offices conduct regular mapping of peacebuilding activities and actors that have a potential to strengthen peace, prevent conflicts, continue to provide needed support to sustain such efforts, ensure complementarity, coherence and non-repetition;

- Encouraging the Peacebuilding Commission to provide a forum for the identification of the best possible regional actors for the deployment of required interventions and the development of a coordinating structure in a way that encourages inclusivity, sustainability and continuity.

Given the variety of contexts and political dynamics within different regions, it is not yet feasible to come up with a unified framework for regional peacebuilding coordination, neither is it necessary because regional capacities, activities and commitments differ from context to context. Increased United Nations leadership and operational support delivered in a flexible manner can develop needed capacities and bolster commitment of different regional actors; create spaces and opportunities for dialogue, joint analysis and policy development; and elevate expertise that is currently missing or being side-lined.

### Strengthening Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism (TCRM) in Africa, with support by UN, Regional Organizations, and local stakeholders

*Author: Daisaku Higashi, Deputy Director, Global Cooperation and Training, Center for Global Education and Discovery*

The report titled, *UN75 Regional Dialogue for Africa* suggests that “n order to enhance peacebuilding and security in Africa, initiatives advocated by the United Nations and regional bodies must be embraced and rooted within communities. The report also emphasizes, the United Nations, Africa Union, and sub-regional bodies across Africa should offer advice, financial, and technical resources to strengthen coordination between community, local, regional, state, and national governments.

Agreeing with the basic ideas of the report above, I would like to present specific recommendations for UN, Regional Organizations, and national stake holders to understand the traditional conflict resolution mechanism (TCRM) in Africa and strengthen TCRM in the context of peacebuilding.

Here are the key policy recommendations:

- There is a fundamental need for UN missions to understand traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (TCRM) in the peacebuilding operations in Africa. In many post conflict states, state authorities do not have enough functions, capacities, and trust in solving local traditional conflicts (including land and water disputes), typically shown in South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic. And in realty, it may take many years (or even decades) for these conflicted states to establish the modern and functioning justice systems with effective police and courts to address these local conflicts. At the same time, communal fighting over traditional disputes has been escalating, for instance in South Sudan, and it would endanger the entire peace process of the country.

- Thus, it is crucial for UN field missions to empower TCRM and to provide people with confidence that their local disputes can be solved. For instance, countries such as South Sudan and Afghanistan have TCRM embedded in local populations.
- The long-term goal is to create the institutionalized mechanism in UN field missions to map TCRM and identify influential local leaders who can play positive roles in solving local conflicts, enhance national peace processes, and create policy to empower TCRM. It is highly recommended that UN missions obtain resources to hire anthropologists, regional experts, and indigenous scholars within conflicted states as short-term consultants, as they already have rich experiences and understanding about TCRM. These members may also conduct some additional field research to update the political mapping.
- The teams led by regional-specific experts mentioned above will present reports about current mapping on traditional leaders, TCRM, and specific recommendations on how to empower TCRM. These recommendations should be shared by UN missions, UN Headquarters, Regional Organizations, and national governments and local stakeholders.
- In some cases, it may be difficult for UN missions to just utilize TCRM if the key components of the TCRM contradict the UN principles. In these cases, it would be critical to make some “adjustments” of TCRM, including the broader participation of youth and women into the traditional decision-making mechanisms.

#### Background for the recommendation above:

When I had a chance to have individually discuss with the ASG in charge of Africa in DPPA and DPO in March 2019, she recommended I pursue how to make a mechanism that utilizes the knowledge and expertise of the anthropologists and regional experts for understanding traditional conflict resolution mechanism in Africa and use TCRM in strengthening peace.

While I am not an anthropologist, but rather an international relations scholar, I thought it was a very important endeavor. Thus, I began working with the Best Practices Section of UN Department of Peace Operation (DPO) to prepare the seminar to discuss this issue. On 10 March 2020, UN experts from DPO, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA), as alongside Professor Eisei Kurimoto, a leading anthropologist on Africa at Osaka University, and I shared our views. We agreed on developing these policy issues further in the conclusion of the seminar. The public web article about this seminar can be seen in the link: <https://www.sophia.ac.jp/eng/news/unhq.html>

#### Implication for COVID-19 Pandemic:

Understanding TCRM and obtaining cooperation from local traditional leaders (such as prophets, peace-makers, priests in churches) are also very critical in tackling pandemics, including COVID-19. Distributing the vaccine in local communities requires the cooperation and support from these traditional leaders. Thus, supporting and strengthening TCRM is critical in not only addressing the local and traditional conflicts but also tackling the pandemic in conflicted states.

# Improve UN Civilian Capacity to Help Build Back Swiftly in the Aftermath of Conflict

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## Recommendation

*Establish standing and reserve capacities to meet UN needs for rapidly deployable civilian specialist skills in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts worldwide. Such a new civilian capability, with an emphasis on gender parity, could be central to the early efficacy of future integrated UN peace operations and special political missions.*

## Global Challenge Update

Violent conflicts are never static. Rapid emergency response post-conflict—and similarly energetic efforts to prevent new or recurrent conflicts—can reduce prospects of violence and increase chances for sustainable peace.<sup>36</sup> But, in many instances, the international community’s capacity to quickly mobilize critical technical expertise for effective early action has proven to be less than satisfactory. The COVID-19 pandemic has further tested global institutional capacity to coordinate quick and effective responses to crises. The global outbreak has the potential to erode international crisis management systems and further destabilize fragile countries by exacerbating both domestic and regional tensions.<sup>37</sup>

Building and sustaining peace requires greater international civilian capacity to support the objectives of post-conflict reconstruction and governance.<sup>38</sup> Despite this urgent identified need to complement and strengthen national and local-level governing functions in fragile and conflict-affected situations, the UN faces significant challenges in deploying civilian capabilities to missions and settings with mandates that vary widely.<sup>39</sup> Matching growing demand with supply in an innovative, systematic way was the goal of the UN’s Civilian Capacity initiative (CIVCAP, 2009–14) and “CAPMATCH”—the UN’s former online civilian capacity sourcing platform. CAPMATCH was used, for instance, to provide country-level support to institution-building efforts in Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire.<sup>40</sup> Despite CIVCAP’s disbandment and the closure of the CAPMATCH platform, the initiative drew attention to the many shortcomings related to the UN’s ability to deploy needed civilian capacities in conflict-affected states.<sup>41</sup>

## Innovation Proposal

Building on these efforts, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed a new UN Civilian Response Capability to meet three distinct goals: (a) improving support for post-conflict institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation in building and sustaining peace.<sup>42</sup> Such an initiative would include a rapidly deployable cadre of 500 international staff possessing technical and managerial skills, and fifty senior mediators and Special Envoys/Representatives of the Secretary-General with special attention paid to the recruitment of women mediators and mission leaders in line with UNSCR 1325 (2000) and the UN’s Gender Parity Strategy. Ideally, this group would be complemented by a two-thousand-strong standby component of highly skilled and periodically trained international civil servants drawn voluntarily from across the UN system—including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund—and beyond, to tap specialized skillsets (including judges,

municipal-level administrators, engineers, and technical specialists—particularly those with newly needed skills in areas such as cybersecurity).<sup>43</sup>

Advancing Secretary-General António Guterres’ renewed focus on prevention efforts requires a nimble global approach to identifying, sharing, and rapidly deploying civilian expertise to prevent and deescalate violent conflict. The new Civilian Response Capability would ensure that the UN could better respond to the urgent needs of conflict prevention and recurrence worldwide. It should be coordinated with other similar initiatives led by, among others, the African Union, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It can draw lessons from the EU’s Civilian Capabilities Development Plan launched in November 2018, which aimed to make the Civilian Common Security and Defense Policy “more capable, more effective, flexible and responsive.”<sup>44</sup> Investing in a system that provides immediate civilian leadership and expertise has the potential to reduce the outbreak and recurrence of violent conflict, thereby diminishing the need for costly, large-scale, and more politically intrusive interventions from the international community.<sup>45</sup>

#### Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

With thirty-seven political missions and thirteen peacekeeping operations that include thousands of civilian personnel worldwide, the UN’s need for technical expertise is unremitting (see table 4). At the same time, the dramatic global economic slowdown poses great potential for unrest and renewed violence in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions. Non-state, illegal armed groups may use the health crisis and knock-on socioeconomic effects, including the growing specter of famine, to gain political and social influence. Directly addressing this heightened threat to vulnerable populations requires preventive action and experts who are readily available for deployment. A new UN Civilian Response Capability could not be timelier.

The present pandemic serves as a reminder that preparedness is essential to prevent and mitigate crises. In 2020, the UN’s 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary and the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture provide two complementary tracks where Member States, with guidance from the Secretary-General and external experts, can choose to invest in new standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills. Fortunately, the draft UN75 Declaration calls on the Secretary-General to “enhance his toolbox to avoid the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities.”<sup>46</sup> If adopted by world leaders this September at the UN75 High-level Meeting, this commitment can pave the way for serious consideration of a new UN Civilian Response Capability and other innovative conflict prevention and response measures.

**Table: Civilian positions in UN peacekeeping and special political missions, 2018–20**

Number of civilian positions in 13 UN Peacekeeping Operations <sup>47</sup>	International civilian personnel (as of 31 May 2018)	4,386
	Local civilian personnel (as of 31 May 2018)	8,221
	UN Volunteers (as of 2020)	1,300
	Total	13,907
Total number of civilian positions in 37 UN Special Political Missions <sup>48</sup>	Civilian staffing approved for 2019	4,005
Total number of civilian positions in UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions		17,912



### 3. Reimagining Human Rights, Humanitarian Action & Inclusive Governance

#### Strengthening Global Humanitarian Architecture to Enhance Cooperation With Regional And Sub-Regional Bodies

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##### Problem Statement

There is a consensus that humanitarian response and the way it is conducted, as well as traditional structures of coordination, cooperation and funding, require reform if we are to better address the complexities of engagement. Despite advances in humanitarian response, the system still falls short of addressing the broader structural challenges posed to and residing within it. The main flaw with the current international response is the top-down nature of international humanitarian response, which is overly technical and procedural, thus neglecting operational realities on ground. Here, we need to include accountability to affected populations, regional and sub-regional bodies' partnerships and leadership. Three issues are paramount in enhancing cooperation with regional and sub-regions bodies: Leadership, and the need for strong, independent Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) with the requisite experience to champion humanitarian needs and see through the successful implementation of other reforms, including the cluster approach and pooled funds.

Most importantly, regional and sub-regional bodies and global humanitarian organizations are not always aligned in their objectives and may also be at odds with the global humanitarian architecture, especially in the context of conflicts. For example, when the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 1973 and launched coercive action in Libya in March 2011, the Council made several references to the cooperation of the League of Arab States, the AU and the OIC. However, while the UN and the EU were pursuing an intervention agenda in Libya, the AU suggested a peace initiative, not coercive action, following its guiding principles, which include the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes in Government (2000) and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002), both of which prohibit unconstitutional changes in government (de Waal, 2012). Libya's current situation is the product of faulty architecture of humanitarian interventions, whose outcomes are more chaotic with far greater tragedy than hitherto was the case.

Similarly, there is a discrepancy between the degree to which regional organizations are embedded in their contexts, on the expectation that they are closer to community needs than international actors, and their technical and organizational capacity to deliver assistance effectively. Perceptions of the neutrality of regional organizations are a source of debate within academic and practitioner circles. Because they are considered closer to the local communities than international actors, and because their governance structures are dependent on member states, their 'neutrality' is questioned and, at times, diluted, if not outright faulty.

Another challenge posed to regional engagements, is a technical one, involving decision-making, articulating a common vision and, in turn, homogeneous approaches, especially if member states

have conflicting interests. Who sets the agenda for a regional organization's humanitarian engagement? What degree of ownership does a regional organization's leadership have over the strategies they set? It is often pointed out that in the case of Africa, while countries may share culture and history, they have rarely 'spoken with one voice on issues concerning the continent'. In West Africa, 'in some cases, conflict affected countries accuse neighboring states of having played a surreptitious role in their predicament and even threatened to take reprisal action'

One of the major challenges of the humanitarian architecture is that it is constrained by individual preferences of the international agencies implementing them. This makes aid both less effective and less responsive than it could be. Aids are often provided for shorter periods of time and are inflexible, making the process of innovative practices incomplete or difficult to commence.

More so, aid recipients are facing increasing demands from donor agencies, and CSOs and NGOs usually experience mission drifts, where they have to meet the demands of the donors. Subsequently, scaling innovative practices takes time; first due to the fact that too few humanitarian innovations think about scaling, secondly, the humanitarian sector exhibits shortages in knowledge required to scale innovation that yields results, and thirdly, supporting scaling up is expensive and high risk and most donors refrain from committing to it.

Another major challenge is the cumbersome, rigid and complex structure of the global humanitarian structure that makes aid decision making less accessible to local stakeholders. There exists little or no accountability to the affected people and slow progress in inclusive power dynamics. The voices of the affected people remain unheard in decision making, in which community feedback is as equally important as giving donors feedback. All stakeholders need sufficient evidence of the impact of humanitarian innovation.

In the case of ECOWAS, there are limitations stemming from insufficient funding and a lack of technical capacity. Nevertheless, it still has the advantage of superior regional knowledge and the commitment of its member states to regional security and integration, which may constitute the basis for systematic peace building in the region. The missing link remains making a practical operational reality of tools such as the 1999 Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Olonisakin, 2011: 27).

#### Main Objectives and Characteristics of the Reforms

The main objective of strengthening global humanitarian architecture is to make the humanitarian response more relevant, responsive and proactive to humanitarian needs. The operational capacity, systems planning, predictable funding and sectoral coordination should be among the components of the proposed reforms. The reform process should desist from focusing on the top- boom approach of international humanitarian response to avoid being overtly technical and procedural in scope, and thus neglecting operational realities, local peculiarities and needs as well as providing accountability to affected populations, countries, sub-regional and regional bodies. Strengthening the global humanitarian architecture to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional bodies could be achieved via frameworks that reflect the comparative and mutual advantage for all parties. This is significant for wider recognition of the complementary effort between all parties, and the need to institutionalize and consolidate their interdependence into a comprehensive policy. Other objectives are to:

**i.** Promote dialogue and create enabling space for coordinated humanitarian action and exchange of good practice; **ii.** Support the capacity of RECs based on their respective responsibilities and mandates in accordance with international law in order to build resilience according to the

particular context of communities against conflicts in a way that does not alter the legal status of those communities, development projects, natural and human-induced disasters, especially those that undermine human security and sustainable development; **iii.** Enhance humanitarian coordination where appropriate, including AU Member States' civil- military humanitarian coordination and with traditional leaders, women's groups, faith based organizations and host communities. This would create appropriate interaction on peace, security and transition programs that would address root causes of insecurity and vulnerability; **iv.** Strengthen planning through research and reliable data; and humanitarian information management and exchange in support of Member States and RECs; **v.** Enhance partnerships and resource mobilization.

#### Political Support and Strategic Reforms

- Mobilizing support for harmonization and domestication of global treaties by regional and sub-regional bodies' parliaments would strengthen global humanitarian architecture for effective and efficient delivery of their mandates.
- Strong synergy and alignment of mandates and protocols by all parties are fundamental for partnership in order to avoid global humanitarian agencies inadvertently undermining the political power of regional and sub-regional bodies' agendas.
- There is need to rethink global humanitarian leadership in congruence with regional and sub-regional bodies. The approach of global humanitarian response to leadership is quite hierarchical and top-down, but what is needed is more facilitating and supportive leadership. Leadership should not be about being in positions of power or being in the spotlight, but instead helping to make the delivery of aid more effective and accountable to the populations.
- Regional and sub-regional bodies' governments must mitigate security risks for global humanitarian partners within their territories.
- While it is important to acknowledge studies, and learn from notable past and more recent experiences of regional humanitarian action, it is also worth asking why regional organizations have generally played a minor role in responding to major emergencies, and why they have been selective in their responses.

Global humanitarian response should take the following steps to strengthen its architecture for better delivery of assistance and aid:

**i.** To achieve reform and transformative change, there is need to address the key systemic barriers which can only be tackled through collective action and collaboration. First, funding structures that promote innovation should be less restricted and accessible especially to smaller NGOs and CSOs who can reach grassroots levels for longer periods of time. Having established that the results from innovation and development take time, funding and project allotted time periods should be commensurate with innovative designs. Also, thorough evaluations should be conducted to ensure that funding is being appropriated correctly and impacts are measurable; **ii.** Change organizational culture to embrace partnership (John Holmes, 2009). Partnership in this context means focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable rather than individual organizations, bodies or mandates; **iii.** A structural adjustment to the humanitarian architecture is necessary. Donors have to be flexible to accommodate long- term financing of humanitarian architectures. This can be possible when NGOs and CSOs are mandated to provide detailed evaluation progress reports which shows the impact made so far. Recipients of donor funding need baseline data that demonstrates the effectiveness of the innovative practices. An unintended consequence of this reform will be increased trust between donor and recipient. The structural adjustment should entail co-creation with regional and sub- regional governments/communities for effective impacts

**iv.** Ultimately, this paper does not argue for or against regional organizations' growing role in global humanitarian action. It is apparent that the humanitarian system needs regional organizations as part of an increasingly inclusive range of stakeholders most especially the CSOs, women and youth. Instead, the question is how regional organizations can complement other humanitarian actors (including the governments of affected states and the UN) and what can be done to develop proper systems for collaboration and coordination to maximize their contribution to the wellbeing of crisis-affected communities. **v.** Lastly, it will be crucial for regional humanitarian institutions to complement rather than compete with their international (and national) counterparts, while also developing clear roles for their member states to adopt. There is a need to ensure more functional and effective cooperation and coordination with regional and sub-regional arrangements and such cooperation and collaboration must be premised on a clear division of labor that recognizes the relative advantages of each organization.

In conclusion, there is need for the security architecture of the regional and sub-regional bodies to align with the global humanitarian architecture, taking cognizance of the vulnerable and marginalized groups in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325), on women and vulnerable groups.

#### Diagrammatic Representation of Humanitarian Action Phases

Early Warning includes monitoring systems in order to achieve enhanced predictability and information gathering on emerging and ongoing humanitarian situations.

Contingency plans and measures will be put in place to prepare, mitigate and reduce the effects of different forms of disasters. These measures include institutional mechanisms that serve as tools to predict and where possible prevent disasters and mitigate their impact on vulnerable populations. It also includes response mechanisms and building immeasurable resilience for communities to withstand disasters to effectively cope with the consequences of disasters.

Protection, in the broadest sense, aims to ensure that authorities and other actors respect their obligations and the rights of individuals in order to preserve the lives, human security, physical and moral integrity and dignity of those affected by armed conflicts and/or other relevant situations of violence as well as natural and human-induced disasters. Protection includes efforts that strive to prevent or stop actual or potential violations of international humanitarian law and other relevant bodies of law or norms that protect human beings.

Inclusive Peace Processes and inclusive dialogue should promote cessation of hostilities, negotiate humanitarian access and space, create safe havens, ensure the integrity and safe delivery of 16 African Union Humanitarian Policy Framework, November 2015 humanitarian assistance, as well as engender compliance by all warring factions with their obligations both under the ingredients of the resulting peace.

Post Conflict Reconstruction, Recovery and Developments- The African Union Humanitarian Policy Framework recognizes the fact that protracted and recurrent conflict situations, which lead to fragility of States are due to lack of the culture of peace and sustainable peace mechanisms. It lays emphasis on the need for redoubling efforts in the post conflict era. To achieve this in a sustainable way, the Framework recognizes the development, peace and security nexus and calls for deliberate measures to link humanitarian action with peace building, post conflict and development efforts.

Enhancing Capacity & Fostering Partnerships- Relevant local and international partners, academia, CSOs and research institutions and other stakeholders to support the regional and sub-regional bodies in, amongst others, strengthening the capacity of its staff and Member States in rapid response, contingency planning, simulation exercises, effective humanitarian coordination and early warning systems.

Humanitarian Financing and Resource Mobilization- This underlines that no action shall be taken in mobilizing alternative resources for humanitarian response without taking full cognizance of Africa's interest, and a thorough study of the impact of such efforts on the independence of the African Union, its character and without consideration of availability of other alternatives, and shall be with approval of Member States.

Research, Knowledge, Communication & Advocacy- Research, communication and advocacy are important in humanitarian response, in raising awareness and evidence based data to inform decision-making.

## Boost the Reach and Resilience of International Justice Institutions

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### Recommendation

*Seek universal acceptance of international justice institutions, in particular the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), while increasing their enforcement powers, preserving their independence, and enhancing their resilience against political pressures.*

### Global Challenge Update

International courts and dispute settlement institutions are an integral part of rules-based global governance. Even as they enjoy international standing and support for seeking justice and accountability, these mechanisms have often lacked universal reach, enforcement mechanisms, and resilience to effectively carry out their mandates. In today's environment, characterized in many places by an "anti-multilateralist turn,"<sup>49</sup> they are also subject to severe political pressures and criticisms. The fate of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was shut down in December 2019 by persistent U.S. refusal to agree to the appointment of new members, is a cautionary tale for other international courts and tribunals. However, harsh criticism of the ICC by the United States and some non-Western countries has not led to a mass exodus from the Court, however, although the Philippines and Burundi have formally withdrawn from it and Asian countries in general remain underrepresented. Major countries, such as China, Russia, India, or the U.S., as well as Indonesia, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam, or Myanmar are not parties to the Rome Statute. Moreover, only seventy-four of the world's nations accept the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in general terms, among which the United Kingdom is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council.

At the same time, the continued demand for justice demonstrates that international courts are needed. This is evident from high-profile cases, such as the *Gambia v. Myanmar* case concerning the latter's obligations under the Genocide Convention, and the thirteen active ICC investigations



(five of which were referred to the ICC by the countries in questions and two by the Security Council).<sup>50</sup>

#### Innovation Proposal

International judicial institutions need nations to support them to increase their effectiveness. This includes bolstering their reach (acceptance of their jurisdiction and decisions across the global community) and their resilience (the ability to avail themselves of mechanisms to enforce their decisions and to resist political pressure).

For the ICJ, this requires increased acceptance of its compulsory jurisdiction through so-called “optional clause” declarations under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. This would help to ensure that international disputes are addressed in courts of law rather than through direct and possibly violent confrontation.<sup>51</sup> In addition, more active use of the ICJ’s advisory opinions—non-binding, but authoritative—could extend its reach with respect to pressing global challenges. The UN General Assembly and UN specialized agencies should make greater use of their powers to request such opinions. Since ICJ judgments are enforced by the Security Council,<sup>52</sup> ongoing campaigns to restrain the use of the veto—including the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group and the French-Mexican initiative—should include a commitment by Council members not to obstruct resolutions that enforce ICJ judgments.

The ICC—though not formally part of the UN system—should establish enhanced working methods with the Security Council. These should include a protocol to guide Council decisions to support the ICC investigations and prosecutions it has recognized, including targeted sanctions to enforce ICC arrest warrants, as appropriate. Moreover, the vulnerability of international courts and tribunals to being rendered nonoperational should be urgently assessed. The ICJ and ICC should also be “stress-tested” and reformed to strengthen their resilience—not only regarding the appointment of judges, but also the need for appropriate funding, premises, and freedom to operate without political pressure and interference.

#### Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

Increasing the number of states that accept the ICJ’s and the ICC’s jurisdiction is essential to crafting a coalition to boost international justice institutions as an integral part of the rules-based multilateral order. This will lay the groundwork for more ambitious goals, such as ensuring that a majority of the world’s nations issue “optional clause” declarations under the ICJ or support a much-needed protocol on ICC-UNSC cooperation. These proposals can be achieved without having to pass large political and legal thresholds such as UN Charter amendment. Additional studies to underpin campaigns for international justice could be launched prior to the September 2020 Leaders’ Summit in New York and continued during the General Assembly’s 75<sup>th</sup> Session, while existing government-led initiatives, such as the Alliance for Multilateralism and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, can champion a drive to extend the courts’ reach and resilience.



## A high-level focal point for civil society at the United Nations

*Author: Fred Carver, Head of Policy, UNA-UK, 18 August 2020*

### The proposal as it stands

The proposal to create a high-level focal point within the UN system has been articulated in various forms. The Together First proposal drew from many of these, and inspired some of the others. While considerable support has already rallied behind the idea, there is a need to further add detail to this proposal. The proposal as it stands calls for:

“A high-level focal point to empower, convene and coordinate civil society... The office of the focal point need not be large. The ASG for External Relations, widely regarded as a highly effective office, had around six full time staff members. In terms of rank an Assistant Secretary-General or Undersecretary-General would give the post suitable seniority. However, what is vital is that the office be located within the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, that the Secretary-General champion it, and that the office has access to many other departments including the press office and press spokesperson.”

### The history of the proposal

From the moment the UN Charter was finalized, in collaboration with civil society, the relationship between civil society and the UN has been in flux. While other internal institutions, notably the ILO, formalized a role for civil society from the outset, the UN did not. Instead, two entirely separate processes evolved.

Article 71 of the UN Charter created the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and opened the door for NGOs to apply for formal consultative status through the Committee on NGOs, established in 1946, currently administered by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) NGO Branch. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 governs both the establishment of consultative status, as well as the accreditation of a broader group of civil society to UN conferences and consultations. There are three types of consultative status: General, Special and Roster. Consultative status provides NGOs with access to not only ECOSOC, but also to its many subsidiary bodies, to the various human rights mechanisms of the United Nations, ad-hoc processes on small arms, as well as special events organized by the President of the General Assembly. As of April 2020, there are 5451 NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC. Many civil society organizations have expressed concern that the process of acquiring consultative status has become overly politicized and subject to inappropriate levels of member state interference.

The Department of Global Communications (DGC), previously known as the Department of Public Information (DPI), was also established in 1946 by the General Assembly to promote global awareness and understanding of the work of the UN. In 1968, ECOSOC, by Resolution 1297 (XLIV) of 27 May, called on DPI to associate NGOs, "to support the work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes...". The Civil Society Unit, formerly known as NGO Relations, is within the Outreach Division in the DGC with over 1,500 CSOs currently in formal association in support of the department's efforts to disseminate information on the work and role of the UN.

The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS or NGLS) began in 1975 as an inter-agency program of the UN, administered by UNCTAD since 1988, with offices in Geneva and New York, mandated to promote and develop constructive relations between the UN and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). In 2019, UN-NGLS moved to the Civil Society Unit within the DGC where it currently helps facilitate the coordination of Civil Society Entities (not in ECOSOC-status) in events organized by the Secretary-General, the Deputy-Secretary-General, and the President of the General Assembly, as well as interagency projects and initiatives. Historically, UN-NGLS has had a specific commitment to enhance the participation of civil society representatives from the Global South and underrepresented constituencies; however, some consultees expressed a perception that the role of UN-NGLS had been fairly one-way in terms of communication, at least in its early days.

There is a long history of further reform proposals. The 1987 Brundtland Commission report, “Our Common Future”, called for a “genuine partnership” between governments, international organizations, and NGOs. In 1992, “Agenda 21”, the outcome of the Rio Summit, established nine “major groups” (Women, Children and Youth, Indigenous Peoples, Non-Governmental Organizations, Local Authorities, Workers and Trade Unions, Business and Industry, Scientific and Technological Community, Farmers) and mandated the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to work to strengthen and formalize them as the main channels through which broad participation could occur.

The seminal 1994 Childers and Urquhart study, “Renewing the United Nations System”, decried the fact that “the Charter provides NGOs with no means of consultation with either the General Assembly or the Security Council.”

In 1997, Gillian Sorensen was appointed to the newly established role of Assistant Secretary-General for External Relations, with responsibility for outreach to non-governmental organizations, and also served as the contact point for the Secretary-General with parliamentarians, the academic world, religious leaders and other groups committed to advancing the core pillars of the UN’s work. The Office did good work, but the mandate was widely considered to be too large and diffuse, and encompassed too many responsibilities with too few resources. Furthermore, successes of the Office were not followed through with additional sufficient resources to maintain success. ASG Sorensen was not replaced when she departed in 2003.

In 2004, the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, headed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and included senior representatives of civil society such as Kumi Nadoo (then of CIVICUS), recommended that the UN establish “an Under-Secretary-General in charge of a new Office of Constituency Engagement and Partnerships” – in other words, a senior member of staff to act as a focal point for civil society at the UN. However, by placing a premium on the development of multi stakeholder’s partnerships that included the robust participation of the private sector, some civil society groups felt that the suggested mandate of the new Office would dilute the responsibility of member states as duty-bearers, and perpetuate the power imbalance between corporations and civil society. The proposal, and the report, fell afoul of a number of issues, including an absence of follow up, the ambivalence of civil society due to the above concerns, and the deep freeze in UN-major power relations following the illegal invasion of Iraq by two permanent members of the Security Council. It was therefore never implemented, but continued to be developed and championed, in particular by CIVICUS.

In 2017, four members of the Steering Committee of the successful 1 for 7 Billion campaigns to strengthen processes for the selection of the Secretary-General (Avaaz, CIVICUS, FES, UNA-UK) wrote a report on recommended next steps towards improving our global system titled, “Strengthening civil society engagement with the United Nations”. The report contained recommendations from Barbara Adams (Global Policy Forum) on formalizing engagement between the UN and civil society, Eleanor Openshaw (ISHR) on the need for greater transparency in the work of the UN’s NGO consultative committee and the shortcomings in its politicized approach, and from Ben Donaldson (UNA-UK) in advocating for a high-level civil society focal point.

This advocacy then developed into a number of reports and publications outlined above from Together First, CIVICUS, UNA-UK, UN2020, partners and allies including:

- A proposal from Together First, outlined in the [Stepping Stones report](#) . In addition to widespread consultation, this proposal drew in turn from:
  - A [proposal](#) by Mandeep Tiwana of CIVICUS
  - A [proposal](#) by Ben Donaldson of UNA-UK, made in consultation with Gillian Sorensen and Ian Martin
- A proposal included in the “Plan for Global Action” element of the “UN75 People’s Declaration” released at the UN75 People’s Assembly in May 2020 as part of the [UN2020 initiative](#)
- An [essay](#) by Lysa John and Mandeep Tiwana
- The [outcome document](#) of the London Conference on the legacy of Kofi Annan

Meanwhile, support for elements of the proposal has also been building within the UN system: between 2018 and 2020, UN Women and OHCHR conducted a UN-wide online survey, followed by an online consultation in January 2020 on the question of how to protect civic space. In a February 2020 speech and subsequent report, “The Highest Aspiration: A Call to Action for Human Rights” the Secretary-General pledged that he would work towards “creative avenues for civil society participation” and recommended that the organization “launch a dialogue on more systematic participation of civil society in UN bodies and agencies ... and to design a system-wide strategy on civic space and adequate guidance to UN leaders in the field.”

The HLPF & ECOSOC review process also started in February, with co facilitators (Benin and Georgia) noting that “many have called for strengthening the engagement of stakeholders in the HLPF and its preparations, including by giving more time to discussions with stakeholders”. Following the onset of the coronavirus, member states decided to postpone the reviews of ECOSOC and the HLPF UN 75th session of the GA, which begins in September 2020. As part of the UN75 political process, member states have now mandated the Secretary-General with developing recommendations for the organizations, set to be issued before the end of the 76th session of the General Assembly, which could include further work on this agenda.

## Strengthen working ties between the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Security Council

*Author: Joris Larik, Assistant Professor, Leiden University, and Senior Advisor and Nonresident Fellow, The Stimson Center*

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has experienced a backlash from select Western and non-Western countries since its establishment. After the United States played an instrumental role in drafting the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, the U.S. Congress passed legislation undermining the court, such as the 2002 American Service-Members' Protection Act, the Bush administration concluded Bilateral Immunity Agreements with countries to prevent the transfer of American citizens to the ICC, and most recently the Trump administration threatened sanctions against the court. Moreover, alleging that the ICC is a Western-centric organization primarily focused on prosecutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries (Burundi, the Gambia, the Philippines, and South Africa) have given notice since 2016 of their intent to withdraw from it (although the Gambia and South Africa rescinded their withdrawal notifications in 2017). The universality of the ICC's mission has also been questioned due to an underrepresentation of Asian countries among state parties to the Rome Statute (see Figure 6). Faced with these challenges, the ICC remains constrained in its ability to serve as an effective tool to adjudicate—and ultimately to deter—mass atrocities, and to uphold the international rule of law. With the United States' decision, in June 2018, to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), this body's credibility and ability to operate effectively has also come under further strain. The ICC, HRC, and the UN Security Council should strengthen their working ties, as absent such reforms, the ICC's and HRC's authority, capabilities, and overall relevance are severely challenged. For this reason, the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed, for example: (i) adopting a protocol or outlining factors that could guide the UN Security Council when it deliberates on the referral of a situation to the ICC; (ii) having the UNSC support ICC action against perpetrators, including enforcing ICC arrest warrants, through sanctions (such as freezing assets); and (iii) encouraging a regular, scheduled human rights dialogue between the UN Security Council, HRC, and ICC, drawing on system-wide conflict analysis, early warning, early actions in response to large-scale human rights abuses, and improving cooperation between New York and Geneva-based institutions.

The current president of the ICC, Chile Eboe-Osuji, has expressed the need for urgent support from states, international and regional organizations, and civil society. While Member States marked the ICC Rome Statute's 20th anniversary in 2018, no concrete reforms emerged from the commemoration. Despite this lack of progress, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have continually advocated for increased use of the ICC, including to seek the ICC's opinion on the immunity of Heads of State to the court's prosecution. As with the ICJ, an international group of independent experts should be convened to recommend an ICC reform package to strengthen the court in a range of respects, as has recently been suggested.

Although the United Nations' human rights bodies continue to lack resources, adequate commitment by Member States to the human rights treaties they have joined, and enhanced coordination among themselves the bodies and with relevant UN organs, including the Security Council, initial disappointment with the HRC's inaction in its early years (2006–09) has given way to renewed optimism. This is thanks, in part, to its public statements regarding the Arab Spring, notable fact-finding missions to Libya, Syria, and Côte d'Ivoire, and a strong resolution in

2014 on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities. The ongoing proliferation of special procedures, usually exercised by independent mandate-holders, is also widely seen as a positive catalyst for change. Such successes lay the groundwork for the consideration of further reform of the HRC, to make it a yet more independent and effective body.

In addition, the international community should consider prioritizing corruption as a fundamental governance issue linked to systemic human rights violations, to be more effectively addressed through, for example, the establishment of a new international anti-corruption court, following the model of the ICC.

## Create a UN Parliamentary Network as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly

*Author: Dr. Richard Ponzio, Director, and Cristina Petcu, Research Associate, Just Security 2020 Program, The Stimson Center*

### Recommendation

Address the UN's democracy and legitimacy deficits by establishing a UN Parliamentary Network (UNPN) as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Composed of individual members of national and regional parliaments—as well as representatives of existing parliamentary networks, institutions and possible local authorities—the UNPN would act as a platform for direct participation, input, and accountability claims by the peoples of the world on governance matters pertaining to the UN.

### Global Challenge Update

The increasing transnational nature of global challenges requires a shared commitment to cooperation and collective action based on multilateral principles. Such action, however, requires both representative and legitimate decision-making, two elements that are insufficiently embedded within the UN system. At present, all 193 UN Member States are represented solely by the executive branch of national governments with no formal direct channels for legislative branch involvement.<sup>53</sup> Long before the creation of the UN, but particularly during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, numerous transnational parliamentary institutions were created during a “period of ‘parliamentarisation’ of international relations,” including popular regional bodies—at least 68 were identified in 2006 (see Figure 1).<sup>54</sup> Following the example of (sub-) regional governance institutions with parliamentary structures such as the European Union, the African Union, ECOWAS, and Mercosur, the UN General Assembly—the world's most representative body of states—is long overdue in incorporating a formal structure to allow for direct input and oversight from parliamentarians irrespective of their political affiliation.

### Innovation Proposal

With the long-term objective of creating a UN Parliamentary Assembly that affords greater citizen participation in global governance, the Albright-Gambari Commission recommended as an initial step introducing a parliamentary dimension to the General Assembly, by establishing a UNPN as a subsidiary consultative body to the UNGA.<sup>55</sup> This can be achieved under Article 22 of the UN Charter and does not require Charter amendment. The UN Parliamentary Network would consist of individual parliamentarians who decide to opt-in, and they would have diverse political

backgrounds beyond that of their home country's ruling-party. It could also include members of existing parliamentary networks, such as the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund or the Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization. The UNPN could focus on promoting transparency, oversight, and accountability within the UN system, as well as providing substantive inputs to the work of the General Assembly.<sup>56</sup> The UNPN could further help to address concerns at the grassroots level about the benefits of multilateralism and to provide a platform for input from domestic populations (i.e., through public hearings with local constituents), local civil society groups, and the private sector—a key feature to facilitate more accountable and inclusive decision-making at the global level. Initially, the UNPN could meet every September and contribute ideas to the work of the UN General Assembly at the start of its new session and maintain an online platform for engagement throughout the year. In its composition, the UNPN could consist of several hundred standing members and its operations could be supported by the UN Secretariat.<sup>57</sup> It could serve as a precursor to a more ambitious UN Parliamentary Assembly idea spearheaded by an over a decade-old campaign to establish a parliamentary assembly as a formal UN body that allows for optional direct elections of delegates.<sup>58</sup> The campaign has received support from 1,600 current and former members of parliament, over 400 civil society groups and networks, thousands of individuals from more than 150 countries, and Together 2030, an international coalition of more than 700 civil society organizations.<sup>59</sup> The European (2018) and Pan-African Parliaments (2016) adopted resolutions supporting the proposal as well.

#### Strategy for Reform on the Road to 2020 (UN75)

While the UN Parliamentary Assembly campaign has made important strides to expand the broad reach of supporting parliamentarians and civil society organizations, formalizing a full-fledged parliamentary body at the United Nations will require more time to garner sufficient political support. The UN Parliamentary Network idea, by contrast, is more realistic in nature and requires fewer political obstacles to be overcome. As the Albright-Gambari Commission proposed, ideas such as the UNPN should be tabled for discussion at high-level reform opportunities. In the lead-up to the UN75 Leaders' Summit, on 21 September 2020, advocates of a UNPN and a UNPA should work to establish a "UNPN Group of Friends" consisting of Member States and influential civil society organizations interested in championing these initiatives. The Group of Friends could go public during September's UNGA high-level segment. Including supportive parliamentarians worldwide too, the friends group could create opportunities to generate further momentum for the UN Parliamentary Network and United Nations Parliamentary Assembly post-2020.



## 4. Climate Governance: The Paris Agreement & Beyond

Boosting the role of the UNSC in climate governance: what paths ahead?

*Author: Adriana Abdenur, Co-Founder of CIPO and Member of the UN's Committee on Development Policy*

### The UNSC and Global Catastrophic Risks

In 1945, when the United Nations was founded, and during the following half-century, the main concerns of global leaders revolved around the risk of (and the desire to prevent) another world war fought through conventional means or nuclear weapons. Since then, our notion and awareness of major risks has changed. Most notably, projections for climate change suggest that humanity faces growing uncertainty and even unprecedented hazards. Especially if the goals laid out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the corresponding commitments of the Paris Agreement go unmet, humanity faces rising [existential risks](#): significant threats to our way of life.

Increased risks relate not only to specific dimensions, such as increasingly unpredictable weather patterns, intensified soil erosion, and sea-level rise, but also to the complex (and as yet little understood) interconnections between earth systems. Such phenomena threaten not only food, water, and energy security; they possibly lead to greater insecurity, from deepening social conflicts to expanding violent extremism and organized crime.

This scenario of deepening uncertainty calls for global and regional governance systems that are suited to address global catastrophic risks of climate change. In other words, better climate governance--the diplomacy, mechanisms and response measures aimed at steering social systems toward the prevention, mitigation, and adaptation to the risks posed by climate change--is needed beyond the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) already in place, from the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to the Paris Agreement. While, over the past two years, the UN system has incorporated more widely climate risks and responses, most recently through the creation of the Climate and Security Mechanism (CSM), most of these efforts are ad hoc and fragmented.

As if making the UN "fit for purpose" for the Anthropocene were not a big enough challenge, the ongoing efforts to boost governance systems take place precisely at a time when the world faces a crisis of multilateralism, with major institutions, including the United Nations, under attack from nationalist populist leaderships. As a result, many member states have become more reluctant in taking a proactive role in key issues of governance that are relevant to addressing climate-related global catastrophic risks. These reactions contribute towards undermining the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has the mandate to cover risk reduction and response to conflicts.

What is the UNSC's current role in climate governance?

The UNSC first began pondering the links between climate change and conflict and instability in 2007, when it acknowledged that climate can be a "threat multiplier" of pre-existing security risks. Since then, the UNSC has held a series of open debates on climate security risks (2007, 2011, 2018, and 2019), as well as briefings and more informal arrangements, such as Arria formula meetings. Although the agenda remains largely North-led, some of these have been co-sponsored by developing countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, and Malaysia. The UNSC has also issued [a series of resolutions](#) acknowledging the role of climate in security risks in country or region-specific settings in Africa and the Pacific, and those links have also been explored within broader debates about water security, conflict prevention, and complex challenges to peace.

The number and diversity of member states championing this issue at the UNSC has also expanded. Sweden, and more recently Germany, have called attention to the issue of climate and security at the UNSC. Over the past five years, more member states--including some developing countries--have come on board. The Climate and Security Group of Friends now encompasses more than 40 countries. In June 2020, ten UNSC member states [met](#) with UN Secretary-General António Guterres to explore how to better include climate-related security risks at the council. Climate change also began appearing as an important theme during [election campaigns](#) for non-permanent seats, with Kenya, Norway and Canada placing it among their priorities in the campaign for 2021-2022 seats.

However, among the P-5, reactions to the introduction of climate-security issues [have varied](#). China and Russia have expressed concern that, in dealing with this issue, the UNSC encroaches on the mandate and efforts of other UN system components, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UNFCCC. Others consider the Council's engagement with climate and security to be complementary to the work of entities.

Since the creation of the CSM, UN leadership has seemed to adopt the view that climate and security should be mainstreamed across the system, rather than be exclusively anchored in the UNSC, bringing attention to the development, peacebuilding, humanitarian, and human rights dimensions of the relationship between climate and security--which raises the question not of whether but rather how complementary may be achieved.

Clarifying and boosting the role of the UNSC

So far, proposals to boost governance in climate and security through the United Nations have included enhancing the UNSC's capacity to better address climate related threats, for instance by engaging a roster of climate security experts much as the CSM has done; the appointment of a special envoy for climate security, and an SG report on climate security every two years. While these measures may help to institutionalize the climate-security issue within the UN Peace and Security Architecture, they face a number of challenges. First, geopolitical rivalries continue to undermine the UNSC's effectiveness even when truly planetary risks are faced, as seen in the Council's recent slowness in issuing a resolution on the COVID-19 pandemic, calling for a [worldwide ceasefire](#). This trend of geopolitical interference in Council affairs is not new, but it may intensify as relations between the United States' relations with Russia and especially with China deteriorate.

Second, climate still occupies an ambiguous and sensitive role within the normative frameworks that undergird the Council, including the Responsibility to Protect (R2). Discussions about climate's relevance to such norms still raise alarms about the excessive broadening of the Council's

working definition of security, potentially serving to justify self-interested military interventionism. And third, issues of climate have yet to be properly incorporated into discussions of UNSC reform or, more broadly, of reform of the Peace and Security Architecture and its linkages to other parts of the UN system, including regional organizations.

Boosting the UNSC's role in climate governance thus requires a number of additional steps, geared not only at making the body more effective and systematic in dealing with climate risks, but also at enhancing its coordination with other parts of the UN:

- [According to the UN Charter](#), the UNSC has "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and "shall determine the existence of any [threat to the peace](#), breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restores international peace and security." Yet **clearer conceptual clarity** is needed with respect to how climate may fit within the mandate of the Council--not only with respect to what the UNSC should do, but also what it should refrain from engaging. One especially important space for this discussion is the idea of a more preventive UNSC.
- Second, more **intra-UN coordination** is needed, in the sense that there should be regular dialogue between the UNSC and other parts of the UN, including ECOSOC and the Peacebuilding Architecture, building on [joint meetings](#) that have been previously held.
- Third, ongoing debates about or relevant to **UNSC reform** should incorporate discussions of climate more systematically, for instance through cautious discussions of how and whether climate should be incorporated into the preventive pillar of the R2P concept, which in 2020 turns 15 years old, and under what circumstances. This also includes the extent to which the Peacebuilding Architecture should take on prevention attributes that currently overburden the Council's agenda.
- Fourth, coordination between the UN Secretariat and **regional bodies** such as the African Union, ASEAN, European Union, and Organization of American States, among others, should incorporate discussions of climate frameworks, including with respect to their security dimensions.

## A Green and Just Recovery

*Author: Dr Arunabha Ghosh, CEO, Council on Energy, Environment and Water*

Like dominoes, the pandemic has set in motion a sequence involving a public health emergency, job losses, financial insolvency and economic recession. These economic indicators will be supplemented with social stress; a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in many countries. We can expect that social fissures — on cultural or religious lines — will get deeper and erupt as civil strife. Plans for economic recovery must align not only with planetary imperatives, but also be socially sustainable.

According to the World Bank, 71-100 million people worldwide will fall back into extreme poverty (living on less than USD 1.9 per day)<sup>60</sup>. The contraction in global output (by 5-8 per cent this year) will reverse three years of gains in poverty reduction.

Meanwhile, estimates of emissions decline have ranged between 5 and 8 per cent. Cumulatively, the pandemic shock could reduce emissions by 128 GtCO<sub>2</sub> by 2050 (three years of emissions) resulting in 10 parts per million (ppm) lower CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations. Moreover, making sustainable recovery choices could avoid 230 GtCO<sub>2</sub> by 2050, or 19 ppm lower atmospheric concentration<sup>61</sup>.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has created new liquidity lines and activated existing lending facilities to offer emergency financial assistance (USD 88 billion to 80 countries) and debt relief (USD 251 million to 28 countries)<sup>62</sup>. The World Bank Group plans on spending USD 160 billion over the next 15 months (USD 50 billion as grants or highly concessional loans to the poorest countries). Effective 1 May, the G20 placed a moratorium on bilateral government loan repayments for low income and least developed countries until end-2020. Regional Development Banks have been extending support to private enterprises and for trade finance. But these responses have been inadequate. IMF debt relief is miniscule, although half of the LICs were already in or at risk of debt distress before the pandemic. The G20 moratorium pushes debt servicing to next year while interest payments keep accumulating.

Indications suggest that, barring China, emerging economies are suffering worse: Economic activity in early August was 35 per cent lower than the pre-pandemic level — and lagging behind the developed world<sup>63</sup>. Against widespread job losses, there will be a strong political incentive to push the economy at any cost. Emissions are already on the rise as countries have eased their lockdowns<sup>64</sup>. By mid-June, China's emissions had already climbed to the pre-pandemic levels<sup>65</sup>. From Mexico to South Africa, from the U.S. to India, governments have been relaxing pollution controls and energy efficiency standards<sup>66</sup>.

### System change

Policymakers often think of the trinity of jobs, growth and sustainability as impossible. The presumption is that only two of the three priorities can be achieved at any given time. We must square this impossible trinity by reorienting the economic structure from being exclusionary to making sustainable development more people centric and inclusive<sup>67</sup>.

Revolutions are driven by a sense of injustice but tend to occur when people feel they can take the leap towards the justice end of the spectrum. The pandemic has laid bare multiple injustices, in terms of the structure of economies, concentration of wealth, lack of social security, unequal access to medical care, and uncertain and uneven prospects for recovery. There has already been

a fair amount of analysis and commentary about how to make the recovery greener. And some ideas will be outlined below. However, we have to first start with what will it take to deliver a change in the system.

Tipping points need not be restricted to climate change; they can also be observed in policy, technology, finance and behavioral change. Recent literature refers to them as “sensitive intervention points”, wherein small but well-timed interventions could result in large impacts and accelerate progress along a low-carbon pathway. - <sup>68</sup> Examples include legislative changes (such as India’s budget announcement in 2015 for 175 GW of renewables capacity, or the UK Climate Change Act, 2008) or changes in accounting rules and disclosure guidelines for firms. There is growing evidence that asset managers are putting pressure on fossil fuel companies to disclose their exposure to climate-induced stranded assets and their plans to shift to more sustainable business practices and strategies<sup>69</sup>. These shifts have set a direction of travel in various sectors. While not irreversible, they have attempted to mainstream (by sector, if not holistically) sustainable transition policies<sup>70</sup>.

Interestingly, sensitive interventions need not be top-down, alone, but could be driven by changes in citizen beliefs and priorities<sup>71</sup>. We must investigate the conditions under which more widespread, not just sectoral or episodic, system change could occur, particularly as a consequence of shifts in individual beliefs and economy-wide paradigms. Consider these three conditions, which could trigger wider systemic transformation:

- *The simpler the action, the more powerful its message* (think about the Chipko Movement in India, or Gandhi’s Salt March)
- *A confluence of the interests of the vulnerable and the elite* (think about air pollution affecting everyone; think about Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*<sup>72</sup> and the demand for better quality of life in the U.S.)
- *Change occurs when we can confidently reject TINA (there is no alternative)* (think about the Montreal Protocol’s success because chemical alternatives to chlorofluorocarbons were available)
- *Seizing the moment requires seizing agency* (if citizens and communities are or feel empowered, they can not only demand change but actively engender it)

The alignment between economic recovery and environmental sustainability will be contingent on an alignment between the citizen and the state. In the aftermath of the pandemic, it is legitimate for citizens to expect the state to find pathways. At the same time, with the limits of state capacity exposed in many (developed and developing) countries, citizens have to also rely on their own agency. Finding balance between these competing tensions could lay the foundations of a new social contract, one focused on jobs growth and sustainability, and reliance against tail-end risks.

#### National priorities

The specific actions, at national, bilateral or multilateral levels, must be designed in line with this new social contract, while proposing practical and feasible ways to recovery and prosperity.

*Green investments and green jobs, but with just transition:* A green economy can channel additional investments and new job opportunities in renewables (particularly distributed energy),

in sustainable cooling, in sustainable agriculture, or in the use of efficient appliances in the rural economy. These are all new areas of investment and could also create new jobs, in the millions.

Clean energy infrastructure has higher employment coefficients than fossil fuel-based systems<sup>73</sup>. For emerging economies, this is even more attractive because energy demand is still rising, so new (and additional) jobs can be created. Here are some indicative opportunities in India alone<sup>74</sup>:

- 1.3 million direct full-time equivalent jobs if India achieved 160 GW of solar and wind capacity by 2022
- 530,000 potential new jobs if India supported another 130 GW of wind and 200 GW of solar by 2030
- 110,000 potential skilled and unskilled jobs for 20 GW of small- and large-scale micro-grids
- 50,000 potential skilled and unskilled jobs created by every 4 GW of urban rooftop solar
- USD 50 billion market opportunity to use distributed energy for powering productive enterprises in the rural economy<sup>75</sup>
- 2 million potential air conditioning servicing jobs In India by 2037, up 10x from a base of 200,000 in 2017
- 1.9 million potential jobs in the green hydrogen supply chain for heavy industry

But there are two key governance challenges: The lack of job security and social safety nets for many of the green job workers; and no clear roadmap for the transition of workers in fossil fuel sectors. The green recovery is held back by the lobbying power of the owners of fossil fuel capital. Instead, the recovery needs to find allies in the workforce of the green *and* brown sectors.

*Greening (small) brown capacity:* Small is not just beautiful, it is now critical. The recovery packages can be used to green the brown economy but attention has to focus on small businesses. The micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sector in India, for instance, serves as the industrial sector's backbone (45 per cent of industrial value addition; 40 per cent of 450 million informal workers)<sup>76</sup>. Small businesses have higher job-creating potential but also encounter high energy costs<sup>77</sup> in developing countries, often relying often on very polluting fuels. If countries wanted to drive local manufacturing, incentivizing investments in energy efficiency or switching to renewables-based electricity would be a welcome step.

*Energy subsidies and resource mobilization:* In emerging markets, the response has been mostly fiscal so far. Apart from health sector spending, countries have extended loans, guarantees and tax breaks to large and small firms, as well as relief assistance to poor households (unemployment benefits, suspension of utility bills, etc.). But thanks to pre-existing debt distress, they have continued to face fiscal constraints. The fiscal response (additional spending and tax cuts) in emerging market and low-income economies has been 2.8 and 1.4 per cent of GDP, respectively. This pales in comparison to the 8.6 per cent of GDP discretionary spending in advanced economies<sup>78</sup>.

Governments must turn to new sources of revenue, and the correct pricing of fossil fuels could be a significant opportunity. Underpricing fossil fuels has severe environmental and health costs. By some estimates, 16 G20 economies lose USD 3.2 trillion each year<sup>79</sup>. Pricing in these externalities could raise fiscal revenues of USD 2.8 trillion annually<sup>80</sup>. For G20 economies, alone, this could amount to USD 1.94 trillion (3.7 per cent of their aggregate real GDP)<sup>81</sup>. But the revenues must be also dedicated towards the social security and training needs of fossil fuel workers displaced by an energy transition.



## International action

Apart from these national-level interventions, three issues need international cooperation: Finance, technology, and resilience.

*Common Risk Mitigation Mechanism (CRMM)*: Governments have also struggled with the option of loose monetary policy against the risk of depreciating currencies. Emerging market economies have lowered their policy rates (often by 50 basis points or more) but for some there is limited scope for cutting rates further<sup>82</sup>. Moreover, emerging markets with flexible exchange rates have seen their currencies depreciate, at times by more than 25 per cent. Whereas China can relax constraints on lending<sup>[83]</sup>, this is not an option for most other emerging economies. They have been either intervening in the foreign exchange market or drawing down their buffer international currency reserves.

This poses a severe handicap to a greener recovery. On one hand, lower interest rates to stimulate investment could be directed towards green infrastructure. On the other, currency depreciation is one of the most important risks that emerging economies are saddled with, which results in high costs of financing renewable energy projects<sup>[84]</sup>.

The Common Risk Mitigation Mechanism (CRMM)<sup>85</sup> could pool and aggregate the financing needs of renewable energy assets across participating developing countries and creating a strong tradeable secondary market of investment-grade renewable investments. This is done by mitigating all non-project-specific risks — currency risk, offtake risk and political risk — through a common mechanism. Pooling and aggregation help to diversify risks, thereby lowering the costs of risk mitigation. The post-guarantee credit rating of all projects, regardless of local conditions or location, would be identical, thus enabling a liquid secondary market, and making a globally diversified demand pipeline, which would be both available and feasible for global investors.

A guarantee fund would be funded through international public money, with the guarantee being priced with market reflective premiums that could be blended down. The CRMM would create a global marketplace and feed into large pipelines of de-risked projects that investors could divert their capital towards. The guarantee would efficiently allocate risk by creating competition between existing insurance and reinsurance firms to transfer as much as 90 per cent of the risks to third parties. In turn, the guarantee would only bear the residual risk, thus limiting the capitalization required.

*Global Green Hydrogen Alliance*: For heavy industry and transport, the options for emissions abatement remain limited for now, although technological changes are occurring rapidly. Green hydrogen is a major opportunity, to be used as a substitute fuel for coal in sectors like iron & steel, fertilizer, petrochemicals, and long-distance freight transport. A 10-megawatt plant in Fukushima has started manufacturing hydrogen from renewable energy. Another plant in Sweden has commercially manufactured steel substituting hydrogen for natural gas as fuel. As global industrial processes shift, countries face a strategic choice, whether to shift to lower-carbon industrialization or fall back in industrial technology once again.

The technological divide has been a key constraint to rapid economic convergence between advanced economies and the rest. A green recovery would be unjust if it widened the tech gaps, rather than bridged them. No country has, yet, fully mastered the safe production, storage, transportation and application of green hydrogen in different industrial sectors. A Global Green Hydrogen Alliance could be a technological platform for participating countries. Emerging economies (in partnership with advanced economies) could serve as the test-beds for

technologies. Joint development — unlike the approach taken by Mission Innovation — would mitigate concerns around intellectual property monopoly or IP theft. The funding could be from public and private sources, in cash and in kind. Risk and responsibility and voice in governance would be the key principles for designing this innovation platform. The objectives here would be to not only consider high mitigation potential for prospective technologies but also assess their risks against inaction or insufficient action on climate mitigation <sup>[86]</sup>.

*Global Risk Pooling Reserve Fund* <sup>[87]</sup>: Perfect storms of shocks — pandemics, extreme weather events, droughts and crop failure — can make recovery difficult without an insurance cushion. The World Bank’s “pandemic bonds” will pay out just USD 132.5 million to International Development Association countries, less than the USD 141 million Wimbledon will receive from pandemic insurance <sup>[88]</sup>. A Global Risk Pooling Reserve Fund would pool risks of environmental and health shocks across countries. Since different regions face different climate perils (coastal flooding, heat stress, drought), pooling risks can lower the peaks of risk curves and reduce insurance costs. A voluntary allocation of a share of IMF Special Drawing Rights could capitalize this fund, paying out when major disasters (above a measured threshold) strike.

The fund would bridge major insurance firms, on one hand, and developing countries (and stressed communities in developed countries), on the other. Underserved regions would be drawn into a risk-resilience framework associated with chronic climate and pandemic risks. The risks could be also passed through to multilateral development banks and national development finance institutions (DFIs). The reduced (or better measured) climate risk profile could be leveraged for additional investment: MDBs and DFIs could use this to lower the cost of finance for sustainable infrastructure projects in countries within their portfolios.

## Global Governance Mechanisms for Implementing a Global Minimum Price on Carbon Emissions

*Author: Magnus Jiborn, PhD, Head of Research, Global Challenges Foundation*

There is wide agreement among economists that putting an explicit price on carbon emissions is one of the most efficient policy measures available to reduce such emissions and hence mitigate global heating. The High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, co-chaired by Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern, concluded in 2017 that:

*"A well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing emissions in an efficient way."<sup>89</sup>*

Similarly, the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate stated that

*"Governments should put a price on carbon and move toward mandatory climate risk disclosure for major investors and companies. Implemented together, these two actions would provide the strongest, clearest signal to market participants that policy-makers are committed to a new growth approach."<sup>90</sup>*

From an economic point of view, carbon emissions represent an external cost – a cost related to an economic activity that is not paid by those benefitting from it, but passed on to third parties, in this case humanity at large including future generations.

Not pricing carbon emissions can hence be seen as a hidden, and involuntary, subsidy of current fossil fueled consumption by all those who will suffer the damages of a changing global climate.

That pricing carbon is an efficient tool to combat global heating is a view supported also by policy makers and influential business leaders around the world. Several states and regions have implemented domestic or regional carbon pricing schemes in different forms, either as carbon taxes or Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) and the number is growing. The World Bank has listed 61 existing carbon pricing initiatives around the world – 31 ETS and 30 carbon tax systems – covering 22 per cent of global emissions.<sup>91</sup>

There are also a large and growing number of companies – around 1,600 in 2019 – that use or plan to use internal carbon pricing schemes as a way to manage and reduce their own emissions.

Yet, in spite of all these initiatives and the strong support that the idea has, we are still very far from anything similar to an adequate and harmonized global price on carbon emissions. First of all, the majority of countries and regions and the bulk of global carbon emissions are still not covered by any carbon price. This creates competitive asymmetries and risk of carbon leakage to areas where emissions are still not priced. Second, in most of the existing pricing schemes, prices are far too low to have any real impact. According to the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, less than 5 percent of global emissions are covered by a carbon price that is in line with what is needed to achieve the Paris Agreement targets.

This brief focuses on global governance mechanisms that could facilitate the establishment of a harmonized global minimum price on carbon emissions. It will not discuss the arguments for (or against) a carbon price as such, nor what a proper carbon price should be or whether a tax or a cap-and-trade system is preferable.

Since it appears highly unlikely that all countries in the world would be able to agree on a sufficiently high and globally mandatory carbon price in the near future, focus in this brief is on ways that groups of more progressive countries could move ahead in advance, through what William Nordhaus calls "Climate Clubs,"<sup>92</sup> and how such voluntary Climate Clubs could clear a pathway towards a minimum carbon price with global, or near global, coverage. Finally, the brief will suggest a few fairly small and simple reforms of international trade rules that might facilitate the path towards a global minimum price on carbon through voluntary Climate Clubs.

A Climate Club, according to Nordhaus, is a voluntary agreement by a group of countries to "undertake harmonized emissions reductions," more specifically by setting a common minimum price on carbon emissions that each of the participating countries commits to implementing by domestic policies. Each participating country freely chooses the mechanism by which a carbon price is produced – carbon taxation, ETS or a mix – and each country retains full control and responsibility over legislation, tax collection and implementation within its borders.

Since a Climate Club is intended as an instrument to overcome the free-rider problem that otherwise hampers the provision of public goods, it is important that non-participants can be excluded or penalized in some way. Participating and living up to the club's commitments must be associated with some benefits that are exclusive to members. In a Climate Club, this is achieved by club members imposing common border tariffs on import from non-participant countries.

Participants will thereby benefit from access to a market with low internal trade barriers, that is not accessible on the same terms for non-members.

If the Club is successful, and the market it encompasses is large enough, the idea is that the Club will attract new members and grow; even countries that are not so keen on imposing a carbon price will find it more attractive to tax their own export industries, than having someone else do it. If a Climate Club is open to new members that accept and satisfy its principles, it could hence create a dynamic that leads towards the establishment of a global minimum carbon price.

It is important to note that Climate Clubs should not be seen as an alternative to global climate agreements such as the Paris Agreement, but rather as a "complementary design."<sup>93</sup> Any international agreement, such as the Paris Agreement that aims to include all countries and requires unanimous consent, will almost inevitably result in low ambitions and weak commitments. Such agreements remain essential, to establish a "ground floor" for national climate commitments, but there should also be room for "coalitions of the willing" to spearhead more ambitious climate action and create new pathways for transition that others can later follow.

The EU has implemented a carbon price through an ETS system since 2005, and several member states also have carbon taxes. Recently, the European Commission has also launched an initiative to establish a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism to *"ensure that the price of imports reflect more accurately their carbon content"* and *"reduce the risk of carbon leakage."*<sup>94</sup>

The Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, told delegates at the World Economic Forum in February 2020 that countries exporting to the EU would have to implement a price on carbon themselves, or face an EU carbon border tax:

*"There is no point in only reducing greenhouse gas emissions at home, if we increase the import of CO<sub>2</sub> from abroad."*<sup>95</sup>

von der Leyen also pointed out that the goal of the carbon border adjustment is to incentivize other countries and regions to implement their own carbon pricing schemes:

*"If this turns into a global trend, we will have a global level playing field where no carbon border tax will be necessary".*

The exact form of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, as well as its consistency with international trade rules, will have to be assessed further. However, if the EU would proceed in this direction, and also open for countries with carbon pricing schemes on a par with the EU's own system, to be exempted from the border tax, this would amount to something similar to a Climate Club.

Consistency with international trade rules is a key – and highly controversial – issue for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. It appears that a border tax with the aim of protecting the environment need not be in conflict with WTO rules if a number of conditions are satisfied, in particular that it is implemented in a non-discriminatory way,<sup>96</sup> e.g. if it just compensates for an equally large internal tax on similar products. It has been suggested that, to ascertain compliance with WTO rules, EU's ETS system could be transformed to a "quasi-carbon tax" with a minimum price that can be utilized as the rate for a carbon border tax.<sup>97</sup>

Still, the measure is controversial and likely to meet legal and political challenges.<sup>98</sup> Here are two simple global governance measures that could facilitate the establishment of a global minimum

carbon price through voluntary Climate Clubs and avoid unnecessary trade conflicts and legal disputes around carbon border taxation.

1. Establish an international expert committee with the task of setting a non-binding, indicative, or recommended, minimum price on carbon emissions. The committee should consist of high-level expertise in economics as well as climate science. The indicative price could either be based on an assessment of the marginal external cost of carbon emissions, or on what is required to achieve a desired emissions reduction trajectory that is aligned with Paris Agreement temperature targets, e.g. to halve emissions every 10 years. The price level should be reviewed and adjusted regularly to mirror changes in estimated marginal external costs, or to make sure emissions reductions follow the desired trajectory.

2. The WTO should declare that for countries with policy measures that result in a carbon price at or above the recommended level, imposing carbon border tax on imports from countries without such a carbon pricing mechanism, is consistent with international trade rules as long as the border tax only compensates for the difference between the carbon price in the exporting country and the recommended minimum price.

## The Transition Project an Open Data Initiative to Accelerate Measurable Carbon Abatement in Every City

*Author: Tomer Shalit, CEO ClimateView, Founder of Transition Targets*

### Introduction

The Transition Target Project (the “Project”) is an open data initiative (ODI) that provides data-driven support to strategic transition planning initiatives for the world’s cities. The Project also enables global collaboration through sharing of validated data and best practices— which allows cities to define clear local targets, prioritize their actions, and create achievable goals.

The Project provides a robust set of transition data built upon a computational transition model—that in turn is built from first principles of physics—which provides operational insights into every required “shift”, sector by sector. It consists of 79 initial “Transition Targets” that have been identified and developed in association with Sweden’s Panorama project—a collaboration between the Swedish Climate Policy Council, Environmental Protection Agency, Energy Agency and a growing number of cities in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

### Why Transition Targets?

We don’t need more emission data to know that the situation is critical; instead we need to switch to a solution-driven approach highlighting where shifts must occur. Transition Targets are the fundamental building blocks for any plan: without concrete targets, it’s impossible to create the measurable shifts needed and to accelerate the transitions. The importance of breaking down goals into actionable targets can’t be overestimated, especially since the entire transition is dependent on thousands of smaller shifts across all sectors of society.

### The Essence of a Target

All Transition Targets are measurable, universal, have strong carbon abatement effects, and create operational value. They are, by definition:

- Precise in how they describe shifts and changes in the “Carbon Casual Chain” so that carbon abatement potential is measurable and defined;
- Referential to their sources, scientific papers (etc.) so they can be shared and scrutinized
- Defined so as to set a clear direction, but without being descriptive of the solutions—with the purpose being to guide stakeholders through technology-neutral pathways.
- Machine- and user-readable - making them useful as a knowledge base and as fundamental elements for computation and digital tools.
- Parameterized, elaborated, and structured to meet the existing, real-world needs of stakeholders—from scientists to policymakers.

### A Universal Blueprint

Since cities share fundamentally similar structures, it is possible to extrapolate data and create targets that summarize every Transition Target’s essence into parameters that are shareable and comparable. By setting up these parameters, we can collect and track relevant data that really matters to highlight effective carbon abatement practices and track progress. By the methodical presentation of open data (built on a model that sets these parameters), we can focus on the most potent actions and share measurable best practices.

### Our Computational Model

Each Transition Target encapsulates the shift for a single area of the climate challenge—such as how to move away from a “business-as-usual” high carbon emission state to a “low-carbon” (or carbon-neutral) state—for a given source of greenhouse-gas emissions (GHGs). Each Transition Target can then be combined with others to model cross-sector “Objectives” necessary to reach the city’s climate “Goal.” These municipal Goals are typically aligned with the “Mission” outlined in the Paris Climate Accord—to keep global temperatures from rising by more than 2 degrees over pre-industrial levels by mitigating local carbon outputs.

### The Open Data Imperative

The key for successful ODIs lie in their utility, transparency, and flexibility—which is why we research, analyze, and report data in a truly open format that is verifiable by experts and scientists from around the planet. All Transition Target shift data will be published as it is formalized so that technology companies, researchers, NGOs, and governments can work together to break down knowledge silos and generate practical insights through big data analytics that will help us solve this urgent and worldwide problem together.



## Strengthening International Legal Frameworks and International Courts for Climate Governance<sup>99</sup>

*Author: Maja Groff International Lawyer, The Hague, with John Saidi, Summer Legal Associate, Harvard Law School, Climate Governance Commission (Global Challenges Foundation, Sweden).*

### Introduction

The current state of international climate and environmental law exhibits many of the systemic weaknesses which would apply to international law more generally, in relation to its ability to contribute to the reliable governance of crucial global issues.<sup>100</sup>

The general lack of reliable implementation and enforcement of international environmental law and other systemic governance deficits (e.g., a complex, fragmented system of multiple, weak treaty regimes, without adequate monitoring and true enforcement ability) have been documented elsewhere; see, for example, [The Cartography of Global Catastrophic Governance](#) on the current regime complexes for Climate Change and Ecological Collapse.<sup>101</sup>

Against this backdrop, and in the light of the inter-related—and urgent—global environmental matters which require an effective and consistent governance response, with climate governance prime among these, **you are invited to consider the following question: what is the potential for international law, via one or several of the below avenues, or via other avenue(s), to contribute meaningfully to more effective climate governance?** New efforts and “innovations” may involve using existing institutions and processes or may contemplate the creation of additional institutions or norms. While the international treaty-making process and other international legal processes can be slow-moving, there have been notable (relatively swift) recent successes in the institution of major new international legal regimes.<sup>102</sup>

### **1) A legal framework for the recognition of the global commons and the whole Earth System / planetary boundaries**

The multi-disciplinary team behind the [Common Home of Humanity Project](#) argues that in order for the international community to manage effectively the global climate system—as well as other crucial and interdependent planetary boundaries—a new international legal paradigm to manage this global commons is needed.<sup>103</sup> The proposal argues that a scientifically-defined “Earth System” (underpinned by identified and monitored planetary boundaries<sup>104</sup>), which allows humanity to thrive in a safe operating space and includes a stable climate system, should be recognized as a global and indivisible “intangible asset,” and considered part of the common heritage of humanity. Such an intangible and shared global legal asset would be complementary the current sovereign state system of territorial ownership.

**2) As one of the six key UN organs, what greater role might the International Court of Justice (ICJ) play in the current climate governance challenge? Strategic and regularized advisory opinions?**

To systematize ICJ consideration of climate and environmental matters, it has been proposed that the UNGA create a specialized “Judicial Organ”<sup>105</sup> whose scope of concern would encompass environmental damage and climate change.<sup>106</sup> Such a Judicial Organ could be given the authority to refer issues to the ICJ for non-binding advisory opinions upon a state’s request. It is argued that such a more regularized system of advisory opinions on legal questions may then evolve to become a system of binding dispute resolution (much like how non-binding dispute resolution under the GATT matured into what has been considered to be a highly effective compulsory and binding dispute resolution scheme under the WTO).<sup>107</sup> Incorporating the ICJ into climate change governance would help further define rights and obligations and develop important equitable legal principles.<sup>108</sup>

**3) Techniques to enhance the enforceability of the Paris Agreement**

Enforcement mechanisms are not built into the 2015 Paris Agreement (PA), which raises the question of how deeper implementation / enforcement of the agreement might be achieved through a variety of other means or mechanisms. (See section 2, immediately above, on possible avenues of recourse to the ICJ.)

To date, many civil society and environmental organizations have relied on or argued for a “naming-and-shaming model” to attempt to exact a reputational cost on non-compliant nations, in the hope that this can act as an effective enforcement mechanism.<sup>109</sup> Given the sheer number of nations that came together to recognize the danger posed by unfettered carbon emissions, the reputational effect of going against the agreement may have some effect.<sup>110</sup> The naming-and-shaming accountability mechanism has been applied—with uneven success—in the field of international human rights to address the misconduct perpetrated by abusive regimes.<sup>111</sup> The question may be asked how such pressure might be further systematized and scaled up.

Other approaches may include exploring the feasibility of: using trade sanctions as enforcement tools against states that decide not to join or who do not comply with treaty obligations; conditioning a border tax (or a “Border Carbon Adjustment” (BCA))<sup>112</sup> or foreign aid on a country’s carbon emissions; or having all treaty members establish a deposit fund that pays dividends to states that comply with their treaty obligations.<sup>113</sup> Strategic tariffs imposed on non-compliant states by cooperating states has been quantitatively demonstrated to be an effective enforcement tool.<sup>114</sup> Regional trade agreements might also be made effective means of catalyzing or enforcing reductions in carbon emissions (see, for example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, both of which have components that express an intention to transition their economics to low emissions and to trade via sustainable transportation).<sup>115</sup>

**4) Is there a role for international criminal law (e.g., at the International Criminal Court) and the crime of “ecocide,” or otherwise the need for an International Environmental Tribunal?**

Currently, a key reference to the infliction of environmental damage as constituting an international crime in the context of armed conflict is found under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome

Statute, where any act that causes “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” would be considered a violation.<sup>116</sup> The proposed crime of ecocide has, in line with the aforementioned clause of the Rome Statute, been generally characterized as the imposition of serious damage to the environment that is either lasting in duration or extensive in scale, yet need not be within the context of armed conflict.<sup>117</sup> Current international norms already mandate a general obligation for all states to avoid causing substantial environmental damage to other states and the commons.<sup>118</sup> Thus, for example, if the activities of a state damage the environment to a sufficient extent, it can be argued that an international crime has been committed.<sup>119</sup>

If a sufficiently clear legal definition can be found, elevating ecocide to the level of a national or international crime could have a significant normative impact, as well as an impact on corporate and consumer behavior. Imposing a duty of care<sup>120</sup> through ecocide could strengthen preventative corporate behaviour and encourage sustainable activities and decisions.<sup>121</sup> Changes in corporate behavior could then induce changes in consumer behavior (and vice-versa) by remodeling the landscape of products and services available on the market.<sup>122</sup>

However, concerns as to the difficulty of defining and prosecuting a crime of “ecocide,” especially given the stresses and challenges already at play at the ICC if this would be the enforcement venue, have been raised in various quarters (see discussion on this topic within the **Segment 3 (August 17-23): Human Rights, Humanitarian Action & Inclusive Governance**). Rather, a separate and specialized “International Environmental Tribunal” has been proposed, with “not only individual but also corporate accountability jurisdiction [...] to address all environmental crimes,” and “to allow the coalescence and further development of legal expertise in international environmental law.”<sup>123</sup> A supplementary question would be how to design such a Tribunal in order to have maximum efficacy, state “buy in,” and specialization in the field of environmental governance; e.g., including not just criminal liability mechanisms, but forms of regulatory oversight, and civil or other types of liability for the various actors over which it should have jurisdiction.

## **5) Is there a role for the R2P (“responsibility to protect”) doctrine and the protection/prevention of ecological harms of concern to the international community?**

(NB: See also another background paper in this e-consultation: ***Boosting the role of the UNSC in climate governance: what paths ahead?***)

Given the threat multiplier effect / (human) security threat posed by climate change, and how “ecocide” within a nation’s sovereign borders can have a profoundly negative global impact, it has been argued that the “responsibility to protect doctrine” (R2P) may be used to justify coercive collective measures /international security action.<sup>124</sup> Former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has recently suggested the consideration of a collective international response under R2P against nations that adopt environmental policies that yield devastating global impact, in the context of out-of-control fires in the Amazon.<sup>125</sup> The idea posed is that R2P may authorize the international community to take the necessary action (e.g., through “an escalating series of denunciations, embargoes and sanctions” or “multilateral green helmets sent across the Brazilian [in this case] border to extinguish the fires that threaten us all”) that seeks to prevent the deliberate destruction of ecosystems that help sustain life on earth.<sup>126</sup>

## 6) A new treaty to ban fossil fuels

Despite nations agreeing to limit their carbon emissions under existing climate regimes, fossil fuel production continues to rise, and as such, undermines the progress gained by the emissions reductions.<sup>127</sup> In essence, fossil fuel production levels are higher than what would be consistent with each nation's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the PA, in part due to government support through subsidies, permitting, and research and development funding, to name a few.<sup>128</sup> "Supply-side measures" could help align nations' fossil fuel production with their climate goals by reducing oil production, and leaving untapped a significant portion of underground fossil fuel reserves.<sup>129</sup>

It has been proposed that a **Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty (FF-NPT)** would offer a supply-side solution to the problem posed by the emissions and fossil fuel production gap. The FF-NPT would largely mimic the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by prohibiting the exploitation of new underground fossil fuel reserves, providing a managed approach to diminishing and ultimately replacing fossil fuels for sustainable alternative energies, and establishing a fund for developing and promoting a transition to low-emission alternative energies.<sup>130</sup> Support for such a treaty might exist in states that are currently vulnerable to climate change-induced threats, such as the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).<sup>131</sup> Moreover, a number of political groups among OECD countries already support the idea behind the FF-NPT.<sup>132</sup> Equally important is the rising political momentum in favor of transitioning away from fossil fuels: major oil producers have publicly stated their desire to diversify their energy portfolios; OPEC members have begun harnessing greater energy from sustainable, non-carbon resources; there is growing pressure on university endowments, state pensions funds, and sovereign wealth funds to divest from their fossil fuel holdings; and significant pushback against fossil fuel infrastructure projects has been observed in the U.S. and the U.K., among other countries.<sup>133</sup> A range of governments (e.g., Belize, Costa Rica, France, Denmark, New Zealand) have also enacted partial/total bans on oil and gas exploration, while other governments (e.g., Germany, Spain) are phasing out coal exploration.<sup>134</sup> It is argued that a fossil fuel analogue of the NPT could decelerate the pace of climate change, and do so in a way that is globally inclusive and enduring.

# Innovation Track E-consultation and Webinars Summaries

*Held pre-forum on 4-30 August 2020*

## Segment #1: Global Economic Governance and Sustainable Development in the COVID-19 Era

*Co-facilitators: Edna Ramirez-Robles, University of Guadalajara and Richard Ponzio, Stimson Center.*

### Overview

The discussions during Segment 1 of the Global Governance Forum E-consultation resulted in high engagement and positive development of the ideas laid out in the above background documents. The COVID-19 pandemic and the remarkable speed, global reach, and ease by which the virus crossed borders and is being transmitted between people has sent stock markets tumbling worldwide, with the [World Bank projecting the deepest global recession since World War II](#) (an estimated 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP in 2020). This excessive volatility, the sudden drop in confidence by consumers too, and severe knock-on economic and social effects have resulted overnight in a swift contraction in cross-border finance, trade, air travel, and most other sectors of our hyperconnected global economy, as well as millions of job losses.

### Summary of discussion

A “G20+” for accelerated, equitable, and broad-based recovery from COVID-19

*Given the growing influence of the annual Heads of State G20 meetings in global economic and social policymaking, how can the 174 UN Member States that fall outside the G20 be engaged more effectively in its deliberations and follow-through? Should a small (perhaps virtual) G20 secretariat be encouraged for technical-level interactions with the UN system, including international financial institutions? And how can political support be mobilized for these proposed changes in the global economic architecture?*

The idea of creating an upgraded system where the G20 would be more aligned to the UN was welcomed during the e-consultation. It was stated that the “G20’s inclusion into the UN structures is needed if we want decisions on finance, climate, etc. to be coordinated across sectors and have a real impact on the ground.” It was further argued that the aim and rationale of the G20 should be the restructuring of the global system, and improved coordination among national actors, to achieve a global governance system that is more fit for purpose within the present era. On the other hand, concerns were raised on the fact that granting the proposed G20+ an institutional place within the UN could serve to further marginalize (rather than strengthen) the 174 non-G-20 member nations.

Participants suggested to incorporate the “G20+” idea into the structures of the UN, including the creation of a “Human Security Council” and a “UN Executive Council” which could take on this proposed function.

Another idea discussed was the call for a “group of experts” to represent member states to generate increased consensus on simple principles, against which policies should be measured and refined. Links were drawn to the human rights space at the UN, where experts are nominated by Member States to serve on various treaty bodies. These experts both analyze Member State signatory compliance with the given treaty and issue general comments on the implementation of the treaties. An alternative proposal would be to create an “Economic Policy Body” system, which would serve the same purpose and analyse various dimensions of economic policies. There is also the hybrid-type model of the UNPFII, where both Member States and Indigenous Leaders sit together.

Concerns were also raised about the idea of an expert model. Although scientists are instrumental to the development of better governance systems, the idea of experts might lead to a western-centric viewpoint. It was stated that “*Not all understandings of the natural world are the same as the Western-centric scientific method*” and that we “*need different definitions of ‘expertise’ to drive us forward*”.

A more equitable, inclusive, and dynamic international trade system

*Given the current crisis facing international trade at various levels (now exacerbated by COVID-19), how can diverse stakeholders influence governments to cooperate multilaterally and to avoid trade restrictive measures at their borders? Should the participation of diverse stakeholders (e.g., from the business community, international organizations, and the labor unions, consumer associations, academia, and NGOs, etc. that make-up civil society) in decision-making be encouraged, in order to strengthen and achieve a more equitable and dynamic international trade system? What steps are necessary for the U.S. to once again participate in a rules-based, multilateral trade system? What are the first major priorities the new World Trade Organization Director-General should focus on, in order to make the WTO more responsive to its Member States?*

The discussion in the consultation circled around the notion that the trade system cannot be reformed as long as countries use trade for economic warfare and multinationals for maximising short-term gain. It was stated that if we remove all the distortions, subsidies, and hidden social and environmental externalities, as well as the extreme differences between countries and regions with origins in colonialism now maintained by economic exploitation, trade should gradually come back into balance based on the real comparative advantages of each country.

It was also noted that more diverse stakeholders should engage in trade talks, and that the trade system is going to be scrutinized and transformed in light of the learnings throughout the COVID-19 crisis, focusing more on localizing production rather than importing from the cheapest manufacturer. It was also highlighted that encouraging monocultures and stressing efficiency to the limits for profit maximisation as the current system does, in addition to ignoring the climate and environmental costs of long-distance transportation, cannot continue for much longer.

Another thread of the discussion dealt with the notion of international taxation, and the need thereof. It was noted that the borders to international trade are becoming more and more porous, and that an argument can be made that all taxation could and should move to the institutional



level, emphasising that individual transactions (those not involving an institution) should not be taxed.

A more sensible and generous international aid and debt regime

*Although the international financial institutions have moved rapidly to provide support to emerging markets and developing countries affected by COVID-19, the amounts of funding actually delivered, as of end July, have been very small in relation to the large financing gap identified by the IMF (of about US\$2.5 trillion). Furthermore, efforts to do an IMF Special Drawing Rights issue (as in 2009) have foundered. What can be done to boost the lending capacity of official donors given the highly destabilizing nature of the COVID-19 related shock to the public finances and economic growth of these countries? Furthermore, should G20 Finance Ministers continue to suspend debt service payments (beyond the end of the year) for some or all of the world's 77 poorest countries? Is it time for private creditors (who are owed USD \$3 billion or a quarter of total debt) to step up and participate in this initiative? What other steps should be considered to improve the international aid and debt regime (especially for the poorest countries), and what is the likely best sequencing for implementing these measures?*

Based on the background brief, it was stated that “*the global debt bubble is a larger problem than just unsustainable poor country debt*”. The book “Global Governance for the 21<sup>st</sup> century” proposes strengthening global financial management and addressing corruption, among other economic measures. Debt is a symptom of underlying drivers and the current debt burden of developing countries in particular has to be relieved in a more sustainable way than in the past, which means that it should not reappear every few years.

It was also stated that nearly all developing countries and many middle-income countries are suffering under crippling debt. There are some concessions being made, mostly in the form of allowing postponements of payments. Meanwhile wealthy countries (and their citizens) get rich off of the ecosystem services provided by many of these countries. Shouldn't there be a global regime that recognizes “nature wealth”? Some participants argued that all global debt should be forgiven. Financial services and economies thrive when people have more assets and less debt.

Creating a more inclusive global economy through a “Sustainable Human Development Network”

*Drawing ideas from the Albright-Gambari Commission, the Future United Nations Development System project, and related initiatives (see below), how can greater coherence and efficiency be developed in the international development system to increase opportunities for more inclusive, broad-based economic growth and job creation coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic? To what extent should the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development continue to serve as the chief policy framework of the international development system, and should it be tweaked or substantively upgraded in light of COVID-19?*

Throughout the discussion under this theme participants highlighted the need for a more inclusive and broad agenda for the economy, with agreement that there is a strong basis in the Agenda 2030 to achieve this, although it might need slight refocusing based on lessons learnt from the pandemic, with special regards to resilience. Overall a stronger focus on resilience was sought after, and an economic system that enables the economy to become a public good that enables a good life, suitability and resilience for all; system that is altruistic and cooperative, that creates meaningful employment for all and eliminates poverty. It was also highlighted that economic growth should be deprioritized in favor of economic development. The construction of

a new "Grand Narrative" for a fair and inclusive globalisation that prioritises human resilience and well-being was further promoted.

On the other hand, it was also highlighted that businesses are accountable by statute, through stock exchange listing standards, shareholder stewardship, corporate and employee activism, social media and NGO opprobrium and that publicly traded companies are subject to corporate social responsibility and climate change activism. It was stated that *“With the rise of ESG (Environment, social and governance) and the increasing demand by investors, insurers and broader stakeholders to be more transparent about material issues like climate change and labour rights elements of the private sector may actually be a potentially more progressive force. If consumers hold business to account- in ways citizens have often been unable to hold governments - there may be more hope for positive change.”* Furthermore, the private sector may provide the margin of safety as the world experiences hopefully only a brief return to the 19th century great power rivalry until the US and China can work out a detente.

Others warned about private sector idealism, and stated that even if huge multinational companies and investment funds adopt codes of climate-friendly / sustainable investment, admittedly for their own self-interest in the long-run, it does not mean that they leave aside their main model of going for extreme and precarious efficiency, inequality-exacerbating profit making, wage suppressing and decency depriving employment practices, etc. Even if the climate would eventually gain something out of it, which is not certain as experience up to now shows, the average person certainly would not benefit, which would make the exercise pointless.

Points were also made to the fact that based on the need for an equal and more resilience-based global economic structure, the language and model for addressing these aspects seem to be missing or at least rudimentary in many economic circles, and that these issues are often still seen as "soft" and out of place in serious economic discussions.

Finally, a point was made on the importance of organised politics and the need to not let off the hook politicians and civil servants that have to make states, regional organisations and other public entities function for the common good. Well-functioning states and organisations would strengthen and be strengthened by good global governance, not the opposite. Furthermore, a case was made that the discussion and reforms need to be able to include input from or impact to nearly 194 countries as well.

## Segment #2: Peace and Security

*Co-facilitators: Volker Lehmann, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung New York and Dr. Conor Seyle, One Earth Future Foundation*

### Overview

Multiple, concurrent, and recurring intrastate conflicts, exploited by international state and non-state actors, have reversed the declining global trends in political violence witnessed since the end of the Cold War, fueling refugee movements and human suffering, particularly in the fragile and less developed countries. At the same time, the growing roles of women, civil society organizations, and businesses, whose voices are amplified through modern communications technologies, offer new opportunities for effective peacebuilding and governance reform and renewal, and transitional justice. The current global situation demonstrates the complexity of the issues and the need for improved responses at the global level to drivers of violence and insecurity. It also highlights the good work being done by organizations, including the United Nations, to identify and address the multiple drivers of conflict. Overall, there was a strong undercurrent of clarifying both vision and purpose, not only to achieve a clear and structured reform, but to decide which reforms are worth implementing in the first place. UN reform also needs to reflect the intersectionality of issues, recognizing that economic, security, health, climate, or other sectors cannot be siloed and dealt with individually. In any case, no matter the reform, big or small, it is important to be ready for a policy opportunity when the political opportunity presents itself.

### Summary of discussion

1. *Make the UN Security Council (UNSC) More Effective by Expanding Its Membership, Updating Its Working Methods, and Giving Greater Voice to Non-State Actors in Its Deliberations: How can we continue to move the dial of the discussion until adequate political support is achieved for its reform? What current initiatives for reform should be given more support and how can civil society and member states better mobilize to address UNSC dysfunction?*

Since chances of Security Council reform are extremely low, it would be more effective to focus on mini-reforms that do not require Charter amendment, such as improving early warning debates, civil society outreach, and enhancing peacekeeping oversight. Council members should encourage Secretary-General Guterres to take a larger role in improving debates about new conflict risks, linking traditional and non-traditional threats, especially since the Security Council provided an opening for the Secretary-General to report on the pandemic's impacts on areas with conflict and humanitarian crises. In addition, Council members have used online diplomacy during COVID-19 and could use these experiences to form a study group to sketch guidelines on virtual Council diplomacy on other issues. Giving greater voice to non-state actors in the Security Council will improve legitimacy and the capacity to alleviate conflict. Lastly, Council members can develop a

new set of guidelines and best practices for mandating non-binding peacekeeping operations to enhance peacekeeping oversight.

However, if the Security Council continues to stall on major global security threats, an alternative to UNSC reform could be the creation of “multiple Security Councils.” They would contain stronger regional representation and therefore increased capacities. In addition, Article 22 of the UN Charter allows for the General Assembly to create subsidiary bodies without Charter amendment, making this an implementable reform. As major security issues are no longer classical territorial issues, but increasingly health-, climate-, and inequality-related, security councils could be created to deal with these specific themes, thereby lessening the burden of the Security Council and allowing it to better fill and focus on its mandate. To prevent too many councils from being formed, there could be one Human Security Council that deals with related “soft” security issues. This could be a subsidiary body to the GA, UNSC, and ECOSOC, and can also absorb the G20 for financial matters. It is to be noted that creating these councils may take a lot of political will and capital that may not currently be present.

It is vital to remember the role that the UNSC plays, which is to prevent wars and conflict. Despite its problems, the UNSC continues to be viewed by almost all UN member states as the legitimate arbiter of the use of force between (and within) states. Undermining the UNSC’s authority and legitimacy by creating parallel arrangements, as well as potentially lead to a limitless number of councils. This would create bureaucracies, power plays and arguments over mandates, as well as other slowdowns. In addition, proposals to shift responsibilities away from the Security Council may prevent it from taking accountability for its mandate and failures.

Security Council reform may only be a part of the equation. The Uniting for Peace mechanism by the General Assembly could spur the Council to act. But the risk (political capital) to reward ratio seems quite high for most member-states, especially with so few precedents. The General Assembly could recommend concrete measures for situations when “Uniting for Peace” could be invoked, such as when the Security Council is slow to take action. However, “Uniting for Peace” has never been used to invoke military action. Even if it doesn’t invoke military force, it could still be used to affirm the international opinion about overwhelming humanitarian suffering and the need for military relief.

It may be useful to focus on a new security architecture that shifts from confrontational security to cooperative security. There are up to twenty UN agencies working on conflict prevention and security. Prioritizing cooperation would improve UNSC efficiency.

- 2. A strong UN Peacebuilding Council to replace the current Peacebuilding Commission and Entrust It with a Conflict Prevention Mandate: Within the framework of the current review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, how can this proposal be advanced and gain sufficient interest from member states and UN civil servants? Are there any key lessons that we can learn from the upgrade of the Human Rights Commission into a Council in 2006 that can apply to this proposal?*

A UN Peacebuilding Council could address gaps in how the UN Security Council provides humanitarian aid and protection and reduce violent conflict. By upgrading the UN Peacebuilding Commission into an empowered Peacebuilding Council, it would have enhanced powers,

responsibilities, and a mandate to lead on conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy development, coordination, and resource mobilization for situations not directly addressed by the Security Council. This would complement the UNSC in a more effective way to strengthen global peace and security by targeting specific issues, preventing them from further burdening or returning to the Security Council's agenda. Stakeholder consultations for the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the UN75 Declaration could strategically garner political will and provide support for the proposal.

This proposal might be feasible, especially because the Commission was a joint effort between the Security Council and GA. This might encourage political will and mobility as a result. The Peacebuilding Council might have a better chance at success if it operated under the Security Council, it could have more power and maintain control. However, it was noted a Peacebuilding Council may not be more effective than the Peacebuilding Commission has been, and that the Security Council should not be absolved of its Charter-given mandate.

Selection of member states for the Council will be determined by their respective national performances and level of adherence to international laws. They could also weigh-in on UNSC decisions, not as voters, but as value-added input. This could incentivize Member States to improve their national strategies, peacebuilding performances, and levels of regional cooperation. The GA can be responsible for evaluating the members of the Peacebuilding Council and terminate members if they do not fulfill their mandate.

- 3. Enhance Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Promotion of International Peace and Security: What can civil society, donors and other supporting member states do to promote greater synergy between the work of regional organizations and the UN system as a whole? What initial steps are needed to even bring to the fore the weak multilateral arrangements in certain regions (see the crisis of regionalism in Latin America for instance)?*

Conflict is increasingly cross-border, therefore necessitating regional cooperation for global peace and security. However, there are various hurdles to cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations: geopolitical realities that prevent action and a mismatch between peacebuilding capacities between the United Nations and regional organizations. Regional organizations can benefit peace and security by providing local support to prevent conflict escalation. The United Nations and regional organizations need to engage in a dialogue that focuses on coordinating joint analysis and peacebuilding strategies, building capacity and trust to share and monitor conflict development, supporting inclusive regional platforms to encourage collaboration, establishing formal communication structures, and mobilizing the actors best able to respond to identified conflict challenges. Increased support delivered with a flexibility to respond to multiple contexts can help develop these capacities and bolster regional commitment.

Enhanced cooperation is a potentially successful proposal provided that there is a clear division of labor. The UN should assume responsibility for peacekeeping while regional organizations assume responsibility for enforcing the peace, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency. Establishing offices for each regional organization in the UN would increase communication and better integrate efforts. In addition, this cooperation and resulting policies should encompass all UN human rights policies, including the UN Human Rights Screening Policy and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

Conflict prevention is best handled with local knowledge and close observation of critical actors. UN Resident Coordinators are well equipped to the task but are usually only seen as technical development experts rather than having an integrated role in security issues. Prevention would be more successful if the UN outsources more of its development work to regional organizations that can better deliver services and provide aid. Regional peacebuilding coordination promotes policy coherence and complementarity by avoiding programmatic overlaps. It can also foster regional norm-setting and the translation of global norms to fit local contexts, ensuring wider inclusivity and acceptance of processes.

4. *Establish Standing and Reserve Capacities to Meet Rapid Deployment Needs for Civilian Specialist Skills, especially for Women Civilian Leaders:* How can the UN be persuaded to invest in new standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs for civilian specialist skills?

Rapid emergency response post-conflict can reduce prospects of violence and increase chances for sustainable peace, but the international community's capacity to mobilize quickly is less than satisfactory. The Albright-Gambari Commission proposed a new UN Civilian Response Capability to meet three distinct goals: (a) improving support for post-conflict institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation in building and sustaining peace. The UN 75th Anniversary and the review of the UN Peacebuilding Review both provide opportunities to forward this proposal. States can choose to invest in new standing and reserve capacities to meet rapid deployment needs, supported by the commitments passed in the UN75 Declaration in September 2020, to prevent conflict and improve response measures. This proposal could be further developed through a mapping exercise to determine missing capacities to give missions the civilian specialists they need while deepening a mission-community bridge. An impact assessment could determine how best to integrate missions into their community and ensure communication. In addition, it is important to remember the role of police alongside civilian personnel, which will enhance UN peacebuilding capacities. In addition, experts from both within and outside the specified region should be mobilized to ensure impartiality.

Another option could be a United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), a multidimensional first-responder force to help complement existing UN arrangements. It would have a modular structure that can be adapted to specific situations, with one static HQ and two mobile ones. Each headquarters would have a full component of rapidly deployable services. A directly recruited, volunteer force could have the added benefit of creating an increased norm of "global citizenry" and international support for all nations and contexts.

5. *Global Support for Hybrid Peace Operations with Regional Organizations and Locally-Driven Peacebuilding involving Arbitration and Reconciliation:* How can these partnerships be developed in ways which promote locally-led, well-resourced, and accountable approaches that address the multiple drivers of conflict? Where and how can issues of arbitration and reconciliation be brought into these programs to maximize success?

In many post-conflict states, authorities do not have enough capacity, resources, or the trust to solve communal conflict. Strengthening traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (TCRM) in Africa is an effective way to improve peace and security by ensuring the inclusion of affected



peoples in order to successfully address conflict according to the specific needs of each conflict situation. So, it is crucial for UN field missions to understand and empower TCRM by creating institutionalized mechanisms that can map TCRM, identify influential local leaders, and empower TCRM. Additional recommendations to empower TCRM can be shared by UN missions, regional organizations, national governments, and local stakeholders. Strengthening Locally Driven Peacekeeping could be established by increasing resources for Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) or something of an equivalent function. This proposal recognizes that there is too much leaning on the UN when countries with institutions and resources could handle it on their own. The UN could be a useful agent in the shifting of responsibility but should not be a central player in order to help other stakeholders create long-term capacity building plans.

#### *6. Big Ideas vs Incremental Steps*

Something that may be missing in the five proposals provided is a compelling vision for a more effective United Nations. Rather, the focus is far too much on pragmatic and incremental reforms to existing institutions. This approach fails to deliver substantive change, but also fails to motivate people and Member States to aim higher with their goals and policies. It may be more helpful to keep big ideas alive until there are international leaders or a P5 with a more global vision to take them up. Big ideas can also provide useful leverage for negotiating compromises in other reforms plans.

Big reforms may be a distraction from saving what the current system currently offers. It is important to push for big ideas that can gain traction and deliver public goods, like the Sustainable Development Goal. In addition, it is important to note that incremental UNSC reform has delivered significant reforms over the past three decades. Therefore, the nature of reform processes seems to be incremental. A collective process generates consensus around incrementalism in order to achieve broad-based support, which is a crucial step for any reform to move forward. Big ideas tend to have narrow support, and diversity always lends itself to an incrementalistic approach.

It may be better to compare “big” and “small” reforms based on whether or not they can be effectively championed at the current time with the necessary political support. New possibilities should be managed accordingly. Big ideas can generate excitement and open the door to participation while small ideas can build necessary momentum and create a pathway for more big ideas. In the past, there hasn’t been a failure of one or the other, but both due to lack of momentum. Political will to see these ideas through has been largely missing.

## Segment #3: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action and Inclusive Governance

*Co-facilitators: Joris Larik, Leiden University, The Stimson Center and Jonah Wittkamper, Global Governance Philanthropy Network*

### Overview

As noted recently by David Malone and Adam Day in a special issue on UN75 in Global Governance, “Like many septuagenarians, the [UN] may appear out of touch, perhaps a bit deaf, and evidently less able to pull major powers together around common goals.” This is certainly true when it comes to human rights, humanitarian action and inclusive governance. More than 160 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, while egregious and large-scale human rights violations continue to be committed in many countries. With global inequality on the rise, rampant discrimination in many countries against different groups, and democracy and the rule of law under pressure, to name only a few important factors, serious questions about the UN’s reach as well as its own legitimacy. At the same time, the UN’s tangible contributions to lessening humanitarian suffering, the greater visibility of the Human Rights Council and increasing roles of women, civil society organizations, and businesses, as well as increasing awareness of issues of discrimination and underrepresentation in many parts of the world, provide inspiration for reforms that will strengthen humanitarian responses, human rights, and the rule of law and equality.

### Summary of discussion

#### Strengthen the Global Humanitarian Architecture and Enhance Cooperation with Regional and Sub-Regional Bodies

Regional and sub regional organizations, such as the Africa Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), directly address humanitarian crises. In order for these organizations to be fully functional, there is a need for stronger humanitarian financial aid and increased trust in these regional and sub-regional bodies by the United Nations and its affiliated agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). There is a crucial need for global and regional humanitarian institutions to complement each other, instead of competing with one another. There should be clear roles for UN Member States too, when encouraging increased coordination between global, regional, and sub-regional organizations.

The main objective of strengthening global humanitarian architecture is to make the humanitarian response more relevant, responsive and proactive to humanitarian needs. The operational capacity, systematic planning, predictable funding and sectoral coordination should be among the components of the proposed reforms. The reform process should desist from focusing on the top-bottom approach of international humanitarian response to avoid being overtly technical and procedural in scope, and thus neglecting operational realities, local

peculiarities and needs as well as providing accountability to affected populations, countries, sub-regional and regional bodies. Strengthening the global humanitarian architecture to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional bodies could be achieved via frameworks that reflect the comparative and mutual advantage for all parties. This is significant for wider recognition of the complementary effort between all parties, and the need to institutionalize and consolidate their interdependence into a comprehensive policy.

A Focal Point for Civil Society (at the Under-Secretary-General level with sufficient staff support) at the United Nations

The recommended high-level focal point within the UN Secretariat (and reporting directly to the Secretary-General and Deputy-Secretary-General) would serve as an integral component within a package of reforms designed to enhance civil society space within global governance, particularly at the United Nations. Priority tasks that the focal point could perform are: i) it would increase the Organization's limited capacity to engage proactively with civil society; ii) it would allow for the improvement of processes for civil society engagement, which vary greatly across the UN system, from organization to organization, country to country and sometimes even event to event. This should include an assessment of best practices, inconsistencies and roadblocks, with a view to raising standards and simplifying processes; and ii) most importantly, it would allow the UN to hear from a broader, more diverse and representative cross-section of civil society voices by proactively seeking out, through field visits and consultations, their views. At present, larger and better-resourced organizations, particularly those based in New York and Geneva, or in country office locations, have disproportionate access. Virtual participation can help to level the playing field, but only if these opportunities are known about and supported.

The focal point would stay within a package that would enhance civil society space particularly within the United Nations. The focal point should be part of a system wide strategy of civic space. Coalitions are needed to work on proposals in order for wider reform to be promoted. Although the relationship with the private sector is important, the focal point would work more on society, which does not include the P5. The focal point will have an office and will constantly engage with civil society and a diverse range of NGOs.

Strengthen Working Ties Between the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Security Council, and Regional Human Rights Tribunals/Commissions

The International Criminal Court (ICC), UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN Security Council (UNSC), and Regional Human Rights Tribunals/Commissions should strengthen their working ties, as absent such reforms, the ICC's, UNHRC's, UNSC's, and Regional Human Rights Tribunals/Commissions' authorities, capabilities, and overall impact are severely challenged. Focal points for each institution should be appointed to serve as day-to-day liaisons with the other institutions, working on dismantling the inherent structural 19 challenges for greater practical cooperation these institutions face. In particular, enhanced cooperation between the ICC, HRC, UNSC, and Regional Human Rights Tribunals/Commissions should privilege the need for early action in response to the initial outbreak of large-scale human rights abuses. The reform strategy of this proposal should revolve around promoting the ICJ - champions need to come out of the woodworks and explicitly support international courts.

Some often criticize the ICC of being ‘insensitive’ to the political interests of some states, or entire continents (Africa). Participants noted that this is unfair criticism, as the ICC is not a political organ and its purpose is not peace, but justice, and it should not be blamed, if the peace in a country can be jeopardized by investigating crimes (which occurs quite rarely). The ICC cannot be categorized as an ‘anti-African’ organ - the ICC is a ‘pro-African’ organ that investigates and prosecutes crimes committed against thousands of African victims.

One opportunity is to encourage the Human Rights Council, or the High Commission for Human Rights, to refer situations to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, when the Security Council is yet again paralyzed to do so. No legal problem as the prosecutor can trigger *motu proprio* investigations (Art. 15 of the Rome Statute) no matter who refers to a situation. The regional human rights tribunals are another avenue to bring charges against those states which deliberately shelter war criminals from investigation either in domestic or in international criminal tribunals; for example: Kurdish cases against Turkey and Chechen cases against Russia in the ECtHR in Strasbourg).

#### A UN Parliamentary Network as a New Advisory Body of People’s Representatives to the UN General Assembly

The UN Parliamentary Network (UNPN) would address the UN’s democracy and legitimacy deficits as an advisory body to the UN General Assembly. Composed of individual members of national and regional parliaments—as well as representatives of existing parliamentary networks, institutions, and possibly local authorities—the UNPN would act as a platform for direct participation, input, and accountability claims by elected representatives of the peoples of the world on governance matters pertaining to the UN. The UNPN would be a first step to the Parliamentary Assembly, which could eventually develop into a global Parliament.

A UNPA would give citizens of the world a much more direct vehicle to formally participate in the international arena, where today they can do so only through the executive branches of their national governments. It would give national legislators around the world an actual institutional body where they could formally collaborate upon transnational initiatives. It could discern global public opinion, collectively examine global issues, forge cross-border political alliances, and maybe even begin the formation of worldwide political parties. International NGOs and civil society could push their agendas directly with the parliamentarians holding seats in the UNPA, in a way that it’s almost impossible to do today with UN ambassadors from national governments. And it might even begin to cultivate an ethos of loyalty and obligation not just to the countries where we happen to have been born, but to our one family of humankind.

If it was possible, the stage of a UNPN would be skipped altogether and a UN Parliamentary Assembly be established right away. A first stage consultative UNPA is a modest proposal. Nonetheless, given the obstacles a UNPA has been facing, a UNPN might be a promising and realistic step. One of the major things a UNPN should do, however, is to prepare the ground for its own transition into a UNPA. A suggested pathway would be that civil society groups, parliamentarians and open-minded governments would establish an informal Group of Friends that examines a UNPN in detail and builds momentum. This group could also interact with other parliamentary networks that already exist and get them involved more closely. The UNPN itself and later a UNPA could act as platforms building synergies between these networks and civil society around UN reform and UN governance. Advocacy at the UN level will not be enough,

groups and representatives in capitals around the world are necessary to advocate the proposal and speak to foreign departments and parliamentarians.

Strengthen and More Fully Use the International Court of Justice to advance and Safeguard International Law by Expanding Its Jurisdiction and Making Use of Its Authoritative Advisory Opinions in Innovative Ways

The universal acceptance of international justice institutions, in particular the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), should be increased. Their enforcement powers should be strengthened, their independence preserved, and their resilience against political pressures enhanced. These proposals can be achieved without having to pass large political and legal thresholds, such as the UN Charter amendment, and many reforms can be achieved without the consent of the P5. Increasing the number of states that accept the ICJ's and the ICC's jurisdiction is essential to building a coalition to boost the international rule of law.

Increasing the number of states that accept the ICJ's and the ICC's jurisdiction is essential to crafting a coalition to boost international justice institutions as an integral part of the rules-based multilateral order. This will lay the groundwork for more ambitious goals, such as ensuring that a majority of the world's nations issue "optional clause" declarations under the ICJ or adopt a much-needed protocol on ICC-UNSC cooperation.

## Segment #4: Climate Governance

*Co-facilitators: Maja Groff, Sofia Norberg and Magnus Jiborn, Global Challenges Foundation*

### Overview

Despite the historic success of adopting the 2015 Paris Agreement (PA) and the Sustainable Development Goals (with [Goal 13 on urgent Climate Action](#)), [it has recently been reported](#) that there is a 97% chance of exceeding the higher 2°C warming limitation target of the PA based on countries' climate action thus far. Given the scale, urgency and unprecedented nature of climate change, how can governance innovations and enhancements scale up international action based on the best available scientific and technical knowledge?

Building on the [Action Plan](#) of the [Global Policy Dialogue on Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement and Beyond](#) of October 2019 in Seoul, this e-consultation aimed to further discussion on selected ways to bridge the "governance gap" in confronting the global climate challenge, reflecting on possible high impact solutions to facilitate exponential climate action.

Participant discussion focused on a range of themes throughout the week, including the concept of planetary boundaries and possibilities for an "expert science-based process" to move the international community forward, clearly defining a stable climate as a global public good. Furthermore, the role of international law and how inspiration can be drawn from human rights

were discussed, as well as concrete reform proposals of existing UN architecture, the concept of “climate clubs” and the interlinkages between climate change and security.

## Summary of discussion

Planetary boundaries:

### A Stable Climate as a Global Public Good

A great deal of support was shown for a suggestion to clearly define a “stable climate” as a Global Public Good. The rationale behind this proposal was articulated as follows: “Almost 30 years after the *adverse effects of climate change* have been considered as a *common concern of humankind*, there has been no consensus on what that means from a legal standpoint. Even though it remains the legal framework adopted by the Paris Agreement, there is today no official definition of what the implications of this approach are. A *common concern* is a vague political formula that does not legally recognize the existence of the common good itself (stable climate), [nor] helps to create the necessary legal capacity-building among nation-states to maintain and *restore* the Earth System for present and future generations. Answering to this paradigm challenge, by framing and organizing the relations of interdependence that emerge from the shared use of a unique and highly interconnected Earth System at a global scale, is certainly the biggest challenge that law theorists and diplomats have before them in order to rescue our common future from the abyss of environmental and climate catastrophe we are heading towards.”

Complementary discussion ensued on the role of international treaties and international law/*jus cogens* norms. It was observed, for example, that international law is not only built on treaties, nor is its binding effect always dependent on the consent of an individual state. It was argued that when it comes to conceiving of an international law for the “common home” of humanity, or for our “common heritage” or for the “common concern of humankind,” we should also look in particular at *jus cogens* precedents and how we can advance in this area the recognition of such peremptory norms, which, by definition, exist independent of state consent.

Additionally, the view was shared that: “a clean environment and stable climate are highly shared values, but cultural, and especially economic, norms and laws don’t reflect how valuable they actually are to us. Until economic and social frameworks are reconfigured to be more accurate in their valuations for the roles of climate and environment in our wellbeing, it is unlikely that more, better and different “fixes” will be the answer.”

### Expert Science-based Process

Another interlocutor argued that a possible immediate step forward to establish global legislation to stay within planetary boundaries that would avoid all the obstacles of government resistance would be to go as far as possible with an expert science-based process to work out the framework for global environmental legislation on climate change including the essential details and show what a legislative process could do. This would remove many of the objections that countries now use to avoid action on the issue, or at least make more transparent their self-centered perspective



or their subjection to vested interests. It could be implemented immediately by a coalition of non-state actors, and hopefully attract interested states to take this up and move forward.

Many participants agreed that the idea of a science-based expert process to explore what global climate legislation could look like, including different options regarding distribution of responsibilities, was compelling. A fear was expressed that the process of reaching agreement on a fair and workable distribution of responsibilities between countries would be extremely difficult and trigger national self-interest reactions that have hampered global climate negotiations until now. The Paris Agreement was made possible partly by leaving that question unresolved and leaving it to countries themselves to determine their commitments. However, the Expert Science-based Process proposal indeed suggested that such determinations should be taken out of the political process, as a main thrust of this proposal, in order to avoid these pitfalls.

### Climate Clubs

As set out in a background paper to the e-Consultation, one potential solution for strengthening Paris Agreement implementation could be to create a “Climate Club” of states with shared policies. Members of the Climate Club could, for example, fix a global carbon price, which can gradually go up, and they also punish non-members with trade tariffs until all realize how beneficial is to be Climate Club member.

However, it was pointed out that although a Climate Club is a voluntary arrangement that a group of countries can enter into without waiting for global agreement, there needs to be some kind of “law and order” to avoid multiple trade disputes and countries using climate change as an excuse for protectionism. Further questions were posed in order to move the discussion forward, namely: “what room [is there] for WTO to play a more constructive role, for example by – perhaps in collaboration with IPCC or some other international environmental institution – appointing a group of experts to: a) set an indicative (but non-mandatory) minimum price on carbon emissions; b) provide reliable data and a standardized methodology for calculating emissions embodied in trade for different types of goods; and, c) adjust WTO rules so that carbon border adjustment mechanisms that are in line with a) and b) are judged admissible.”

### Reform proposals for the UN

Various ideas on how the UN could strengthen its work around climate change were put forward, including:

A proposal for “[A New Narrative of Hope and Resilience](#)” for human dignity and well-being, that stresses the importance of the UN and global publics speaking out more clearly about global goods (including a stable climate, a resilient and equitable economic system, etc.). Another proposal was presented for a “[Global Resilience Council](#)”—for the people and the planet—to provide the institutional framework for negotiations and decision-making above the level of individual specialized entities like UNFCCC—scaling up responses to a higher level more suited to interconnected and multifaceted global challenges. This would help bring together the security and development professional communities, engage non-state actors together with states and regional players, and would avoid partial groupings and unilateral measures that may be considered as one-sided sanctions and aggression. A proposal was tabled for the UNGA to

establish a Climate Security Council as a UN Charter Article 22 subsidiary body, instead of waiting for the current Security Council to address the issue of climate change. Furthermore, arguments were advanced for either a UN Parliamentary Assembly, or a “Parliament of Humankind.”

## Climate and Security

A specific example of the interlinkages between climate and security was made by one participant over a farmer-herder crisis over “Common-Pool Resources” (CPR) in western Africa, in this case, essentially land and water. Climate change has worsened the desired access by both farmers and herders to land and water, with the result that herders sometimes violate the boundaries of farmland in order to feed their cattle. This leads to reprisal attack from farmers, and the cycle continues.

Another participant made a case highlighting the interlinkages between climate and security in the Amazon region, which covers parts of nine countries, where deforestation is almost entirely caused by illegal activity. Such activity might be perpetrated by organized crime groups dedicated to environmental crimes such as illegal logging, gold digging, through land invasions to clear fields and pasture for agriculture and ranching, or by legal actors such as transnational companies in soybean cultivation, stock raising for beef, mining, and infrastructure. While deforestation has long been understood as an environmental and a development issue, such a security lens allows us to unpack the highly organized and even professionalized ways in which such activities are taking place. It was suggested that we need to find new ways to boost regional governance in transboundary, climate-sensitive biomes such as the Amazon, where the discourse of national sovereignty has become a major hurdle to even the most basic cooperation arrangements in forest monitoring, sustainable development, climate mitigation, disaster preparedness and environmental crime investigations—to mention only a few. While locating this debate within the Security Council is a highly sensitive discussion (which would likely provoke strong reactions from some member states), the UN system should work to boost regional organizations and to foster more effective South-South cooperation around these vulnerable areas.

It was added that generally it is not possible to deal with climate change, economy, and violent conflict in separate governance boxes. Furthermore, the connection between climate change and conflict can go in both directions; climate change may enhance violent conflict, but conflict also makes measures against climate change more difficult, for example by increasing the risks involved in investing in renewable energy in unstable states. Therefore, this point also has bearing on another proposal, presented at the webinar and in a background paper to the e-Consultation, of a risk-pooling mechanism to mitigate investment risks in developing countries, in order to unlock capital for a green development pathway.

## Annexes

### Post-Forum Survey Results

Did the Forum have value to the participants? Before identifying what next steps to put forward, we wanted to know what participants in the Forum thought about the event and what their conclusions were after the discussion. A survey conducted (between one and ten days) after the UN75 Global Governance Forum asked participants their opinion about the content presented and the relevance of the event. Overall perceptions of the event were positive, with an average rating of 4.34 out of 5 for the question of whether the event was valuable for the UN and 4.15 when asked how valuable the event was for a participant's personal work. Respondents to the survey who participated directly as a facilitator or presenter were more positive than respondents who participated as observers, with an average rating of 4.8 out of 5 for the perceived value for the UN and 4.55 for their own work. When asked directly if the Forum was worth their time, 95.6% of participants felt that it was. Eighty-three percent of participants felt that the event was extremely or somewhat innovative in its structure. Seventy-four percent said that the Roadmap outcome document represented their vision of the future of the UN "a lot" or "a great deal."

The survey also asked participants about their thoughts about 14 specific reform ideas proposed in the Forum. It asked participants to select any of these that they felt "were important for the UN to incorporate into its post-UN75 vision." Results are presented below: almost all of the reforms were endorsed by more than half of the participants, and no reform had less support than a third of the participants. Several did achieve deep endorsement with the idea of "Greater participation of civil society in the development or execution of reforms guided by democratic principles and human rights" being endorsed by 80 percent of respondents.

Percent of respondents endorsing each intervention as important for the post UN75 vision.

<b>Proposal</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Greater participation of civil society in the development or execution of reforms guided by democratic principles and human rights	80
Recognizing climate change as a security issue	68.89
Developing new systems to address economic inequality and human development	65.19
Improving transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council	58.52

Improve the global legal enforcement systems around human rights and international law	58.52
More multistakeholder approaches in general, without a focus on any single sector.	57.04
Engaging in more locally-led peacebuilding	56.3
Develop locally led and bottom-up systems for addressing climate change	55.56
Improve systems for representing more people in UN deliberations	54.07
Developing new coalitions to address economic shocks and recovery from COVID	51.85
Empowering the UN's peacebuilding systems with new partnerships and authorities	48.89
Improving international trade systems and structures	46.67
Setting-up systems which increase the cost of climate change	37.04
The private sector having a larger role in the UN's work	35.56

**Partnership Track Survey Results**

The partnership pillar was assessed through two different methods. First, notes and reports conducted during the discussions were collected and assessed to see what the conversation suggested. Second, a post-event survey sent to participants asked them to report their experiences and their intended next steps.

In the first case, the nature of the partnership discussions means that each conversation was at a different point in terms of organization, commitment, and maturity of the discussion. The network approach that the conversation was built on assumed that some institutions (and indeed, some entire partnerships) would drop out of the discussion as things evolved. The notes from the conversation reflect this diversity. Of the 20 virtual initiatives representing different partnerships,

ten submitted initial discussion notes and six submitted final outcome notes to the convenors. This does not mean that those initiatives who did not submit such reports did not achieve outcomes, but it does suggest that of the initial 20, we can identify at minimum 6 that are moving forward with specific activities. These specific activities universally include a commitment to a next-step discussion to be undertaken in the near term, as well as individual commitments to action from participating partners to develop the idea and the project needs.

In the second case, 14% of the partnership participants responded to our post-event survey. Of these respondents, 94.6% said that they plan to take specific next steps to promote the project developed in the discussions, and 74.3% said that they would either be interested in sponsoring the next steps of the project or that they would “maybe” be interested in such sponsorship. Only 24.7% ruled this out entirely.

The outcome of the partnership discussions are the result of multiple different inputs including the process itself, the nature of the problem on the table and the potential solutions discussed, the relationships and interests of the participants in the discussion, and the extent of the organizing work done by the facilitators before and during the discussions. Accordingly, the results of the discussions vary: some of the conversations may have incrementally advanced a larger conversation while not generating an active partnership. On the other end of the spectrum, 30% of the discussions (6 out of 20) appear to have generated organized, active, and engaged partnerships leading to concrete next steps and plans. The remaining 70% of the discussions probably fall on a spectrum of activity from this degree of organization down to something less concrete. Follow up to the partnership progress will be assessed before the end of 2020.

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- <sup>100</sup> For example: issues of slow and uneven policy and legal norm development, fragmentation of institutions and bodies of law, deficits in reliable implementation and enforcement, problems with universal acceptance, insufficient or unavailable adjudication bodies, and uncertainty / ambiguity regarding a range of key governing legal principles, among others.
- <sup>101</sup> Luke Kemp and Catherine Rhodes, *The Cartography of Global Catastrophic Governance*; published by the Global Challenges Foundation, 2019. (Luke Kemp is Research Associate at the University of Cambridge's Centre for Existential Risk. Catherine Rhodes is the Executive Director of the University of Cambridge's Centre for Existential Risk.)
- <sup>102</sup> Such as the negotiation and adoption in [2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons](#). The International Criminal Court, with the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute, and the 1997 adoption of the "Mine Ban Treaty," are of course other such prominent examples.
- <sup>103</sup> See summary of argumentation for a new legal paradigm at: <https://www.commonhomeofhumanity.org/glimpse>.
- <sup>104</sup> See this overview from the Stockholm Resilience Centre: <https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html>.
- <sup>105</sup> E.g., a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly established under Article 22 of the United Nations Charter tasked with addressing environment and climate-related matters. The judicial organ would offer another avenue for states to request advisory opinions from the ICJ without having to petition the General Assembly each time; it would offer a regularized process for cases to be brought before the ICJ that otherwise would not come before it. Andrew Strauss, *Expanding the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as a Means of Addressing Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Trade Regime*, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 1009 (William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
- <sup>106</sup> Andrew Strauss, *Expanding the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as a Means of Addressing Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Trade Regime*, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 1009 (William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
- <sup>107</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>108</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>109</sup> Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, *The Resilience of the Paris Agreement: Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime*, 31 GEORGETOWN INT'L L. REV. 1, 22 (2018).
- <sup>110</sup> Samantha Page, *No, The Paris Agreement Isn't Binding. Here's Why That Doesn't Matter*, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2015), <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/12/14/3731715/paris-agreement-is-an-actual-agreement/>.



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- <sup>111</sup> Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, *The Resilience of the Paris Agreement: Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime*, 31 GEORGETOWN INT'L L. REV. 1, 23 (2018).
- <sup>112</sup> For example, see this literature review of possible methods to strengthen to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), at p. 11: <http://www.utslappshandel.se/upload/utslappshandel/ets-reforms-a-lit-review-march%20-2020-by-se-epa.pdf>.
- <sup>113</sup> Michael Finus, *Three Ways International Finance Could Enforce a Paris Climate Deal*, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 8, 2015), <http://theconversation.com/three-ways-international-finance-could-enforce-a-paris-climate-deal-51763>.
- <sup>114</sup> Niven Winchester, *Can Tariffs Be Used to Enforce Paris Climate Commitments?*, 41 World Econ. 2650, 2263-64 (2018).
- <sup>115</sup> Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, *supra*, note 21, at 44.
- <sup>116</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8.
- <sup>117</sup> See, e.g., Mark Allan Gray, *The International Crime of Ecocide*, 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 215, 217 (1996); Ludwik A. Teclaff, *Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide*, 34 Nat. Resources J. 933, 934 (1994).
- <sup>118</sup> See Rio Declaration On Environment And Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874; Declaration Of The United Nations Conference On The Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
- <sup>119</sup> See Ludwik A. Teclaff, *Beyond Restoration – The Case of Ecocide*, 34 Nat. Resources J. 933, 953 (1994).
- <sup>120</sup> Duty of care, or vigilance, is understood to be the identification and prevention of serious destruction of an ecosystem or the overstepping of planetary limits that is applied to both parent and local companies. Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat, *supra* note 26.
- <sup>121</sup> See Rob White, *Ecocide and the Carbon Crimes of the Powerful*, 37 U. Tas. L. Rev. 95, 107-113 (2018).
- <sup>122</sup> See Robert Agnew, *The Ordinary Acts that Contribute to Ecocide: A Criminological Analysis*, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF GREEN CRIMINOLOGY 58, 60-61, 68 (Nigel South & Avi Brisman eds., 2013).
- <sup>123</sup> See comments of Dr. Vesselin Popovski, and Dr. Peter Stoett, 20 August 2020, in the discussion within the *Segment 3 (August 17-23): Human Rights, Humanitarian Action & Inclusive Governance*.
- <sup>124</sup> Trina Ng, *Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role for the Security Council*, 15 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 275, 296 (2010).
- <sup>125</sup> Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, *Amazon Fires: Brazil's President is Committing Ecocide. We Must Stop Him*, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 26, 2019), <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-amazon-fires-brazils-president-is-committing-ecocide-we-must-stop/>.
- <sup>126</sup> *Id.*
- <sup>127</sup> SEI, IISD, ODI, Climate Analytics, CICERO & UNEP, THE PRODUCTION GAP: THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN COUNTRIES' PLANNED FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION AND GLOBAL PRODUCTION LEVELS CONSISTENT WITH LIMITING WARMING TO 1.5°C OR 2°C, 4-5 (2019) [hereinafter *Production Gap Report*].
- <sup>128</sup> *Id.* at 21.
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- <sup>130</sup> Peter Newell & Andrew Simms, *Towards a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty*, CLIMATE POLICY, 4-5 (2019).
- <sup>131</sup> *Id.* at 8.
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